The 2026–27 El Niño threatens to erode years of EU investment in global stability. Its impacts will drive food and energy insecurity as well as supply chain disruptions, heightening risks of economic disruptions and fragility beyond the EU’s borders. The EU’s external response should anticipate rather than react, back partners early, and put climate security and resilience at the heart of its external action. At COP31, Europe should show strategic leadership, build trust and strengthen partnerships; done well, this would reduce the security and economic risks that come back to Europe.
The current El Niño could be “one of the strongest since at least 1950”, according to the Secretary-General of the World Meteorological Organization, and may contribute to 2027 becoming the hottest year on record. The world has experienced strong El Niño events more frequently since the 1960s, increased as a result of climate change.
El Niño’s direct impacts vary strongly by region and are hard to predict precisely. Disruptions to people and places add another layer of risk to complex geopolitics that affects everyone, complicating domestic choices around the world. As effects are expected to last into 2027, and the resulting strain on economies and societies will be felt for longer, it will compound existing crises, with energy and fertiliser prices already high due to conflict-related disruptions to transport, on top of pre-existing food insecurity.
Europe is already feeling the heat at home
Europe, the fastest warming continent, experienced a “summer of truth” in 2026 with an estimated 50,000 heat-related deaths and €17bn losses in GDP. The heatwaves also showed how closely Europe’s security is tied to climate impacts: nuclear power plants had to shut down, and wildfires put demands on the military while also affecting readiness.
Recent analysis by the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre suggests that, with a particularly strong El Niño, “Europe may experience warmer-than-normal conditions, with that warmth building towards spring 2027”. Additionally, El Niño related disruptions elsewhere are likely to impact the EU through food and energy prices, disruptions to supply chains, and heightened risks for economic security and stability. Such cascading impacts pose a challenge to the EU’s resilience, its investments in stability and thereby the EU’s geopolitical objectives.
Abroad, El Niño is undercutting the EU’s investments in stability
The EU has invested heavily in stability beyond its borders, through climate action, development partnerships and diplomacy. Many of those countries highly exposed to El Niño-related disruptions are also key partners for the EU. Extreme weather events that hit these countries can constrain economic growth and development, in turn weakening governance and increasing the potential for instability. This undermines not only their resilience but also risks undoing the EU’s previous efforts in a strategic environment on which European security and competitiveness depend.
- Droughts in Bolivia and Indonesia.
- Water and power shortages in India associated with a weaker than usual monsoon.
- Likely contribution to severe storms, including Typhoon Champi and Hurricane Isaias
- Crop failures in Central America and East Africa, and threats to agricultural production across Southern Africa, East Africa, Western South America, and Southeast Asia.
- Food shortages and disrupted supply chains worsen commodity shortfalls and inflation. Shortages can also lead to stockpiling, further straining the supplies of essential commodities such fertilisers. The mining and production of critical raw minerals could also be impacted by droughts or floods in affected regions.
- The current El Niño could lead to direct output losses of 0.4–0.7% of global GDP. Further, it can drive global food prices up by more than 6%, adding to inflation risks around the world. Emerging markets where food makes up a higher share of household spending are hit hardest. These include India and Indonesia, both important partners for the EU.
- Reduced precipitation reduces energy production, particularly in regions where hydropower makes up a large share of generation. At the same time, higher temperatures drive up energy demand, for example, for air conditioning, as in India.
- Reduced precipitation can lower water levels in the Panama Canal. The canal carries goods between the Americas, links Latin America’s coast to Europe and provides an alternative Europe–Asia route. Disruptions there affect Europe’s trade: longer and costlier journeys can impact European businesses at home and abroad.
- Hostile actors already use misinformation to undermine EU partnerships and exploit divisions between Member States, especially during crises. They are likely to exploit El Niño-related disasters too.
The EU’s room for manoeuvre is shrinking
Europe increasingly recognises the need to consider the geopolitics of climate security in its decision making. This is visible in the recent Foreign Ministers Dialogue on Climate Change and Ecosystem Degradation as National Security Risks co-hosted by the UK, the EEAS and Kenya at UNGA, and the new proposal for an EU Climate Resilience Framework. But transboundary climate impacts are becoming geostrategic liabilities just as the EU’s external budget shrinks in negotiations on the next Multiannual Financial Framework, and as donors cut Official Development Assistance. This risks limiting the EU’s ability to advance its interests globally and protect its strategic assets.
Already stretched by volatile geopolitics and overlapping climate crises, the EU needs to preserve every bit of political room for manoeuvre. This is essential to shape decisions in multilateral spaces such as COP31, as well as in bilateral, plurilateral and ad hoc coalitions, in order to advance EU’s broader geostrategic and economic interests.
How the EU’s external response must adjust
El Niño and its impacts offer a window into the dynamics of climate risk in a world above 1.5 °C of warming. An active, anticipatory response would protect the EU’s room for manoeuvre in the near term. It would reduce the security and economic impacts that cascade onto the EU and its partners, build credibility and leverage, strengthen ties with partners and counter disinformation.
With a view to COP31, the EU could highlight its response to domestic climate risk as well as an internationally coordinated response to El Niño. This could open space for conversations on how to advance climate security through adaptation and resilience in the near- and medium term. It could showcase delivery and implementation while upholding the credibility and role of science, strengthening its role as core element of international climate diplomacy.
Integrating these lessons into the EU’s foreign and security policy posture would help European governments and institutions move towards an anticipatory approach and safeguards its ability act.
Three opportunities for the EU to show leadership:
The EU can work with partners and affected countries to prevent panic stockpiling. Coordinated messaging on (food) price volatility can prevent speculation and stop further inflation passing through EU markets.
The EU can support with satellite and modelling capabilities to help partners plan ahead, identifying further disruptions in key regions early, and limit El Niño’s impact on food, fertiliser and other commodity markets. The EU can continue to build on tools such as the Copernicus Climate Change Service, the European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasts, alongside initiatives such as Destination Earth, INFORM Warning, and OceanEye, which provide impact projections and early warning data. Building on these, the EU can strengthen science-based partnerships that improve early warning systems, emergency response, and corresponding data availability, while building further diplomatic capital and trust.
EU institutions and Member States should use hybrid-threat assessments to prepare for hostile actors exploiting El Niño- and climate-related disasters through disinformation, economic coercion, cyberattacks or attacks on critical infrastructure.
Working as ‘Team Europe’ with the EIB, EBRD, Member States, and their development finance institutions, the EU can build on previous coordination and agreements to provide flexible financial, technical, and humanitarian support packages to help partners respond to El Niño-related disruptions to food security, water security and energy supply. Building on the recent UNGA Foreign Ministers Dialogue on Climate Change and Ecosystem Degradation as National Security Risks, it should work with bilateral partners as well as multilateral organisations such as WFP, FAO and the World Bank.
The EU can work with partner countries, climate funds, and development banks to increase access to finance for adaptation and resilience in the medium term. This means simplifying funding processes and helping national and local institutions secure support that responds to their priorities. The EU should also protect resources for mitigation, adaptation and resilience in other countries in the next EU budget, as an investment in its own security.
The EU can deepen work on climate-smart agriculture and resilient food systems, sharing experience on productivity-enhancing and adaptation-focused food system interventions. It can bolster research to identify pathways and solutions for long-term resilience, food security, and enhanced agricultural productivity with climate co-benefits. For instance, the EU-India Strategic agenda 2030 proposes setting up an Agrifood Policy Partnership Dialogue, which could be developed to deepen cooperation on resilient and climate smart practices. Accelerating efforts on green ammonia to bolster green fertiliser production will also be useful.
The EU should support countries in closing the gaps between energy supply and demand that El Niño is exacerbating. Shifting to renewables and storage would shore up countries’ energy security and reduce their vulnerability to future macroeconomic shocks. The EU can support this through regulatory and technical assistance, joint partnerships, and investments in cleantech and clean energy, for example by building on the EU–India FTA to make cleantech cooperation a central pillar. Where near-term deployment of renewables is not possible the EU can support the build-out of storage capacity.
The EU can draw on its new Climate Resilience Framework which should inform the EU’s external action and funding priorities. This is a source of credibility with partners as it seeks to take a similar, more forward-looking and coordinated approach to preparing for climate impacts.
At COP31, the EU can take the opportunity to coordinate its response on resilience and adaptation with partners such as the UK. Coordinated engagement with other partners should aim to reduce the impacts of El Niño-related disruptions in other countries, such as through aligned resilience packages, as well as sharing of modelling and satellite capabilities. Delivering on food security and adaptation, both worsened by El Niño, would show action on key priorities and help create conditions for progress on finance and mitigation at COP31.
El Niño will give the world a preview into the climate instability and transboundary disruptions of extreme weather patterns. Its impacts are already undercutting the stability the EU has worked to build. By adjusting its external response now, the EU can rebuild strength and leverage, deepen relationships with critical partners, and make its foreign and security policy fit for the geopolitics of climate instability.
