The renewal of key EU political roles, initiated by the European Parliament elections in June, is now complete. The second von der Leyen Commission and the new Council president, António Costa, will both take office on 1 December. The last stages of the process reaffirmed the Commission’s continued commitment to Europe’s decarbonisation, but also a more complex political landscape facing EU climate action.
Following von der Leyen’s confirmation as Commission President, Member States nominated their respective Commissioner candidates. Von der Leyen assigned portfolios to these nominees through Mission Letters, which detailed the policy plans in her Political Guidelines. Now, the European Parliament has approved the new College of Commissioners after a process of written questions and committee hearings. E3G reflects on what this lengthy process revealed about the incoming EU leadership, European climate politics and the EU’s ability to advance its carbon neutrality agenda.
1. The incoming Commission has confirmed a broad commitment to continuing Europe’s green and just transition, but uncertainties remain.
Commissioner candidates pledged to continue Europe’s green and just transition, lowering energy bills and moving away from fossil fuels. They aim to focus on clean industry leadership, expanding renewables, upgrading grids, accelerating electrification, and addressing growing climate impacts. This sends an important message to the rest of the world: Europe remains committed to decarbonising its economy.
However, several policy details remain unclear, including future funding after the Recovery and Resilience Facility, the direction of the Multiannual Financial Framework and the future of the Just Transition Fund. While Commissioners pledged to cut red tape without deregulating the simplification agenda remains a risk to EU’s regulatory stability in practice. The incoming Commissioners did not explicitly commit to reinvigorate the EU’s social agenda and provided limited acknowledgement of the importance of energy and material efficiency for competitiveness, energy security and sustainability objectives.
2. EU decision-makers see climate policy through the lenses of economic competitiveness, climate impacts, social acceptability, and regulatory stability and simplification.
Commissioner candidates committed to continued climate action by emphasising the need for regulatory continuity, the importance of the green transition for competitiveness, and the urgency of addressing climate impacts.
Across political groups, MEPs’ climate-related questions reflected these priorities, alongside concerns about trade relations with third countries, administrative burdens and public support for the transition. While Russia’s war in Ukraine was primarily discussed in the context of energy security, broader links between climate action, security and resilience remain underdeveloped in EU political debates.
3. The new political balance in the EU institutions herald a cycle making green policies more contentious and limiting the influence of climate-ambitious policymakers
Political bargaining within a broad majority formed by the EPP, S&D, ECR, Renew, and Greens allowed for the confirmation of most Commissioners. However, tensions surfaced with the evaluation of the executive vice-president candidates. S&D’s Teresa Ribera, nominated as Executive VP for Clean, Just and Competitive Transition faced a particularly polarised and tense hearing while progressives and liberals were reluctant to endorse ECR’s candidate, Raffaele Fitto, and far-right Olivér Várhelyi. Simultaneously, the EPP allied with far-right groups to weaken the EU’s Deforestation Law, reversing an existing compromise. This move strained relations with liberals and social democrats, highlighting a significant breach of trust.
A last-minute political deal allowed the EPP, S&D and Renew to approve all candidates, but it came at the cost of damaged mutual trust. Their lack of internal cohesion meant that the Greens and ECR remained crucial actors in the confirmation process. The EPP is still expected to form ad-hoc majorities with groups to their right (ECR, Patriots, ESN), making it the main deal broker in the Parliament. In this context, progressive groups may struggle to shape the EU’s agenda, and climate-ambitious MEPs – including from the EPP – will need to leverage all their bargaining power.
4. Polarisation and fragmentation of the majority supporting the next Commission is a risk for EU stability and effective climate action.
The Commission’s programme, with its continued commitment to climate action, is supported by Christian-democrats, liberals and social-democrats. Their shared political ownership of key climate-related portfolios has the potential to stabilise the green transition’s political footing.
However, this coalition may struggle to maintain its traditional leading role as alternative right-wing-only majorities in the Parliament, Commission, and Council become viable. This evolving dynamic heightens risks of inaction and paralysis as a result of institutional clashes, policy inconsistencies, and political instability. It would also aggravate the mistrust and polarisation seen during the parliamentary hearings, potentially hindering the Commission’s ability to achieve consensus on upcoming climate transition policies, such as the Clean Industrial Deal.
The EU’s response to pressing geopolitical and climate challenges will ultimately depend on its ability to sustain unity.
