As we open London Climate Action Week today with the message ‘Don’t tell me climate action isn’t happening’, the global clean economy is in rude health, expanding by six times in the last decade. Over 90% of new power investment globally is in renewable energy, which overtook coal as the largest source of global electricity in 2025. Repeated fossil fuel price shocks are making clean energy the obvious economic and security choice.
But if the economic tailwinds for climate action are so strong, how do we explain the pushback seen from politicians in so many European countries and is this due to a decline in public support for climate action?
In contrast to much public commentary, the facts show the climate pushback is driven more by elite political games than any shift in public support for climate action.
What does the data say about public support?
Public support for governments to take more action to tackle climate change is strong in all countries and has been rising across the richest economies. Decades of climate activism and the lived reality of climate impacts has delivered robust cross-society willingness to act. There is no broad cultural rejection or polarisation of action on climate and the environment in Europe.
It is true that support for “net zero targets” as a specific formulation has fallen in popularity compared to support for climate action. This is seen most clearly in the UK where both Reform and the Conservatives have campaigned against net zero. But when the same policy objective is explained with different language this difference in support decreases. This suggests this is a result of “net zero” as narrative – not a policy – being toxified by targeted political and media campaigning.
There has been a consistent change across the EU and UK in the relative priority voters give to climate action in the short term. This has fallen from the highs seen in 2019-21 when climate social movements peaked. The topics of ‘cost of living’ – and for some ‘immigration’ – have risen to the top of the agenda driven by inflation and stagnation of wages. That said climate change was still the fifth most important issue for UK voters in the 2024 election and receives similar levels of priority to defence.
Support for specific climate policies – like more renewable energy, more home insulation and electric vehicles – also remains strong in most countries including among voters including among voters in populist parties. The public also understands the air pollution and energy security benefits that come with the shift to clean technologies. Despite these positive views, there is consistent scepticism among large parts of the public that governments will be able to deliver these changes effectively and fairly.
The “German boiler ban” is a good example of poor policy making and lack of communication driving a real public backlash that was then amplified by populist parties. As are attempts to weaponise the 2025 Iberian blackouts to undermine renewable energy.
Some of this is fuelled by disinformation in an era of increasing information manipulation in online spaces. Targeted manipulation, for example, has led the UK drivers to increasingly doubt the growing cost savings from electric vehicles. But some of criticisms of poor policy implementation are true. Just because people agree with the climate objectives of a policy does not make them accept bad policy design resulting in unfair and ineffective execution.
The political backlash to climate action
The weight of evidence suggests the much talked about – but hard to find – public backlash on climate is not founded in real economic costs or bottom-up public opinion but is a manufactured feature of political positioning and media echo chambers. It is a real elite political issue, but unfortunately many political parties in the centre-ground have responded as if the public has a problem with climate policy.
The centre-right across Europe has responded to the electoral threat from populists, and policy roll-back in the US, by falling back on its traditional deregulatory reflexes. Though the UK Conservative party is the only centre-right European party to oppose net zero. These changes have been cheered on by some industries opportunistically looking to weaken environmental rules but opposed by other businesses for raising costs from policy uncertainty.
The reaction of parts of the centre-left in UK, Canada and US – typified by the “Abundance” movement – has been to blame environmentalists for slow economic growth. But this confuses planning disputes over competing local interests with the climate project which is about building a clean and resilient economy as fast as possible.
There is also a dangerous tendency across Europe from political parties of all shades to try and delegitimise environmentalists and further restrict environmental democratic rights.
Populism and climate change
Populist parties are not really targeting climate change because of the issue itself. Though some of their politicians may well be true climate deniers. They are doing it because they think climate policy can be made emblematic of an elite and top-down politics which people have grown distrustful of. This elite distrust is held by a large majority of voters and is spread across supporters of different political parties in Europe. It is coupled with a growing pessimism about the future especially among the young and has its roots in deindustrialisation, the financial crisis, COVID and the cost of living.
It is not based on citizen’s lived experience of climate policy.
The fact is that climate action done right is popular in all countries.
Climate change is not an issue like immigration that defines populist voters. Supporting climate action isn’t a problem for attracting voters away from populist parties. Climate action is mostly irrelevant or even attractive to them. For example, 62% of UK Reform Party voters at the 2024 election said the government caring about climate action was important.
There is no point trying to appease populist voters with watered down climate policy, as populist politicians will just switch to another target to stoke distrust.
But effective climate action does depend on the public’s trust in institutions to act in their interests. So fundamentally, most populist voters don’t have a real problem with climate action, but climate action has a fundamental problem with populism.
Why we need to keep talking about climate change
The most consistent result of climate polling in all countries, is that people underestimate the level of support for climate action in their own country. This means that failing to explain that climate action is working exacerbated by “green hushing” by governments, companies and in the global media – has real consequences.
In the UK only a quarter of people think climate policy has lowered domestic emissions, despite them halving since 1990.
There is a need to design climate policy and politics that rebuilds support for institutions, addresses the sense in much of the public of being ignored by decision makers, and delivers tangible benefits where people are.
There are four principles politicians should follow to do this:
- Don’t stop talking about climate change and climate action. It comes across as inauthentic and the public understands climate is a serious problem that must be solved. As shown by the huge demand for the National Emergency Briefing in the UK. Double down on demonstrating how government is protecting people from the climate impacts they are experiencing now through investment in local resilience.
- Do smart climate policy that addresses people’s immediate concerns on cost and fairness. Have the humility to realise that a mega-project like climate will have unexpected impacts and problems and these need to be dealt with. People need to know that there is space for debate about the choices and solutions. Embed this need to learn and engage into policy and delivery processes.
- Do design and communicate climate policies so the immediate benefits to energy and economic security, competitiveness and nature are clear to the public and connected to where they live.
- Build real public ownership of the transition. We need a social contract for the climate transition that goes beyond effective execution and economic benefits to make sure people feel change is fair, and they have been respected and involved in the process. Community or public ownership of renewable energy is very popular, and people have real pride in cleaning up their local environment and enhancing nature.
Investment in whole of society engagement is necessary to build sustainable foundations of action through good and bad political times. Work is needed at all levels to build long run coalitions and especially mobilise those impacted by climate change now.
1.6 million mobilised in the UK, and more around the world
The latent demand for action is shown by the UK’s Great Big Green Week in June 2026 which mobilised 1.6 million people around the country for climate and nature action.
London Climate Action Week, which has grown to over 1300 events in 2026, and its partner weeks from Shanghai to Rio de Janeiro, Bangkok, Zurich and Baku are the beginning of a global movement to engage across society. Climate Action Weeks are building deep roots for climate action by mobilising support directly from communities, and from cultural, professional, educational and other institutions that have huge public reach and high trust.
Climate action is not a single campaign or an election but a multi-decadal project of economic and societal transformation. Climate action makes economic sense, but this is not enough to drive societal change at the pace we need to avoid catastrophic damages.
We all need to keep talking about climate, making the case, communicating and engaging, and building robust whole of society alliances for change.
Don’t stop talking about climate.
