At the World Bank and IMF Spring Meetings last week, public and private conversations orbited around the Middle East conflict and the rapidly shifting global order – and their implications for climate and development. For much of the past decade, climate policy operated under a relatively stable assumption that geopolitics would fundamentally help – or at least not derail – the trajectory of collective action. We are now witnessing a structural shift where geopolitics is not only shaping the pace of transition but redefining the terms of cooperation itself.
With energy markets rattled, trade routes scrutinized, and inflation risks recalculated, the rationale for climate cooperation has grown both stronger and more fragile. Indeed, the current moment is defined by a convergence of disruptions. Conflict dynamics in the Middle East have returned energy security to the heart of geopolitics. Major power competition is intensifying. At the center of much of this geopolitical turbulence lies the U.S. federal government’s climate and cooperation rollbacks, creating vacuums and volatility across regions and the world.
Europe plays a particularly delicate role, committed to climate while contending with multiple security, economic, and geopolitical pressures. China, meanwhile, is consistent in its approach, with its focus on clean energy supply chains while engaging in elements of the international system to reflect its interests. Layered onto this is the role of middle powers – increasingly assertive, more pragmatic, and less interested in aligning within traditional blocs but also hedging, facing their own pressures, and not acting in unison.
Against this backdrop, the state of climate action presents a paradox. In some ways, the economics have never been more favorable: investment in clean energy continues to surge, deployment is accelerating, and technological pathways are clearer than ever. Yet emissions remain stubbornly high, fossil fuel consumption continues, and climate impacts are intensifying.
Climate diplomacy and multilateral processes are under strain, and the global architecture that underpinned much of climate finance is itself under pressure. This raises a fundamental question: what does climate cooperation look like in a world where geopolitics is not a constraint to be managed, but a driver of outcomes?
Some possible future trajectories are emerging:
- The messy middle for both climate and the global order. The energy transition continues – but unevenly and without coherence. Progress is made in certain sectors and regions, driven by market forces and domestic policy. However, there is no unified global push. Multilateral institutions persist, but with piecemeal influence. Cooperation may shift toward bilateral deals, minilateral groupings, and sector-specific alliances. Financing falls short of what is needed, emissions decline but not fast enough, and adaptation becomes the dominant frame for many countries. The risk here is not collapse, but drift – a system shaped by inertia rather than intention.
- China is an increasingly central actor. China’s scale, industrial policy, and long-term planning position it to shape the next phase of the global energy transition. This could accelerate deployment of clean technologies globally, but also raises questions about dependency, trade tensions, and the nature of cooperation itself. How should other countries, including traditional leaders, navigate a system increasingly influenced by a dominant player?
- Deepening fragmentation. Geopolitical tensions intensify, trade conflicts expand, and climate becomes subsumed into broader strategic competition. As supply chains regionalize and technology access becomes more restricted, climate policy is increasingly framed through the lens of national security and industrial strategy. Cooperation continues, but becomes slower, more conditional, and difficult to sustain.
- A more optimistic path. Climate emerges as one of the few areas of essential cooperation. Shared risks – from climate impacts, economic instability, energy and data demand intersects, or energy insecurity – drive new forms of coordination. Financing reforms are unlocked, new coalitions emerge, and diplomacy evolves to become more flexible, pragmatic, and grounded in geopolitical realities. But this outcome is not inevitable. It requires deliberate effort, new partnerships, and a willingness to rethink existing architectures.
The coming months will test which trajectory takes hold, and whether support for climate and clean energy momentum accelerates or succumbs to other pressures.
The Spring Meetings highlighted the growing pressure on international financial institutions, particularly amid declining official development assistance and increasing political scrutiny. Key diplomatic moments – from the Petersberg Climate Dialogue and the Conference on Transitioning Away from Fossil Fuels in Colombia to France’s G7 leadership – will demonstrate whether climate remains on top tables as security and economic concerns dominate.
Looking ahead to COP31, the question is can it not only deliver outcomes, but also function as a meaningful platform in a fragmented geopolitical landscape?
What is needed now
1. Reframe climate action as central to – not separate from – economic and geopolitical strategy. That means ensuring that climate, including climate security, adaptation and resilience, and delivery, remains a top table issue and is better integrated into government and industry decision-making and political narratives.
2. Accelerate political commitment and action on clean energy security. Leaders have rhetorically elevated clean energy security as the answer to disentangling from current and future energy shocks. And the World Bank, IMF, and IEA discussed how to navigate global economic risks from energy shocks and conflicts, pledging financing for vulnerable countries. But countries, institutions, and major players in clean energy must come together to keep coordinated action on clean energy at the top of collective agendas.
3. A renewed and recalibrated focus on finance. With traditional development models under strain, new approaches are clearly needed to mobilize and direct capital at scale, particularly for emerging markets and vulnerable countries. The active discussions last week at the Spring Meetings, including on the role of multilateral development banks, national development banks, climate funds, and public-private partnerships, must now be taken forward.
4. Governments must support international action by modernizing and adapting cooperative models. That means continuing to support the UNFCCC process and the role of COPs as a delivery driver and accountability space, including with the Action Agenda, and supporting (and winding down where necessary) coalitions that match the shifting global order. The tools, partnerships, and narratives of the past decade are no longer sufficient. Navigating this next phase requires a more pragmatic, politically attuned approach that acknowledges the realities of a contested world while still striving to shape outcomes.
The risks in this moment are real: fragmentation, delay, and the potential for climate action to be sidelined. But there are also openings. The economic momentum behind clean energy has been powerful. The crisis in the Strait of Hormuz further demonstrates the imperative of clean energy acceleration. New actors and coalitions are emerging. And the growing visibility of climate impacts may yet force climate cooperation higher on the geopolitical agenda. The question is whether we can move fast and strategically enough to turn these openings into progress.
