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## Political Economy of Cooling: External Projection References

	China	Brazil	Mexico	Indonesia	Thailand
<b>External Projection</b>					
<b>Foreign Policy</b>	Under President Xi, China is moving from the dictum of “keeping a low profile” to position itself as a soft power – “striving for achievement”. <sup>1</sup> China’s economic model has boosted assertiveness in foreign affairs with recognition of the value of multilateralism up to the point that engagement may compromise core national interests. <sup>2</sup>	Despite a historically strong diplomatic network <sup>3</sup> , under President Bolsonaro, Brazil is increasingly sceptical of multilateralism <sup>4</sup> , focussing on bilateral relationships, expanding agribusiness, & fossil fuel trade. <sup>5</sup> Trade is a long-held priority with recent governments accelerating high carbon exports to China & the US. <sup>6</sup>	President López Obrador has taken a non-interventionist stance in contrast to previous administrations’ active engagement in bilateral & multilateral negotiations. <sup>7</sup> Mexico’s economy - including cooling manufacturing & trade - is deeply integrated with the US, influencing its foreign & domestic policy. <sup>8</sup>	Indonesia engages actively in ASEAN but otherwise takes a non-alignment position. <sup>9</sup> Under President Widodo, priorities are shifting to a "pro-people" foreign policy, focussed on investment & trade. <sup>10</sup> Indonesia wields economic diplomacy & strongly protects its interests, particularly natural resource exports. <sup>11</sup>	Thailand is testing its foreign policy position by reviving old & forging new relationships <sup>12 13</sup> . Thailand is approaching these relationships with a focus on economic development in ASEAN & security issues with global powers including the US & China <sup>14 15</sup> . Thailand promotes multilateralism <sup>16</sup> , taking a ‘complex engagement’ approach to foreign policy balancing cooperation & conflict between major powers & allies <sup>17</sup> .



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<p><b>Climate Diplomacy</b></p>	<p>Climate change is a rising diplomatic priority<sup>18</sup>, seen as an opportunity for China to gain prestige &amp; legitimacy internationally.<sup>19</sup> China has set a target for carbon neutrality by 2060<sup>20</sup>, however the country's enhanced NDC has been deemed highly 'insufficient' by Climate Action Tracker.<sup>21</sup> China's NDC includes energy efficiency in buildings &amp; urban infrastructure<sup>22</sup> and, though cooling is not referenced explicitly<sup>23</sup>, China has committed to implement the Kigali Amendment<sup>24</sup>.</p>	<p>Brazil's role in the international climate regime has shifted in recent years with engagement now shaped by foreign policy priorities &amp; high carbon development<sup>25</sup>. According to Climate Action Tracker, Brazil's 2020 enhanced NDC effectively reduces the country's climate ambition.<sup>26</sup> However, recent pressure from the US Biden Administration has shifted Brazil's anti-climate rhetoric towards a commitment of net-zero by 2050.<sup>27</sup> Brazil has not ratified the Kigali Amendment.<sup>28</sup></p>	<p>Mexico has a legacy of leadership in climate negotiations<sup>29</sup>. However, broad trends in foreign &amp; energy policy have deprioritized climate multilateralism<sup>30</sup>, although sub-national &amp; non-state actors continue to engage on climate through international coalitions.<sup>31</sup> According to Climate Action Tracker, Mexico's 2020 enhanced NDC is 'insufficient'.<sup>32</sup> Mexico ratified the Kigali Amendment in 2018<sup>33</sup> &amp; their enhanced NDC reflects the mitigation contribution of the country's National Cooling Strategy<sup>34</sup>.</p>	<p>Indonesia is very active in the UNFCCC both on its own &amp; as part of the Like-minded developing country &amp; G-77+China negotiating blocks<sup>35</sup>. Forestry &amp; land use remain a major focus of its climate diplomacy, with oceans as a topic of growing engagement.<sup>36</sup> Their upcoming presidency of the G20 (2022)<sup>37</sup> offers the potential for Indonesia to act as a consensus builder on climate outcomes outside the UNFCCC. According to Climate Action Tracker, Indonesia's NDC is 'highly insufficient'.<sup>38</sup> Indonesia has not yet ratified the Kigali Amendment.<sup>39</sup></p>	<p>Thailand is a member of the G-77+China &amp; the Coalition for Rainforest Nations<sup>40</sup> groups within the UNFCCC &amp; is in the top 10 countries facing climate risks with climate plans focused on adaptation.<sup>41</sup> Thailand has strong climate policy frameworks<sup>42</sup>, but sectoral development plans are criticized for neglecting climate targets.<sup>43</sup> Thailand provided an updated NDC in 2020, which includes HFCs, development of energy efficiency technology &amp; demand-side management, though not specific to cooling.<sup>44</sup> Thailand has not ratified the Kigali Amendment.<sup>45</sup></p>
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