

The Road to Antalya

EARLY INSIGHTS ON WHAT IS NEEDED FOR COP31 TO DELIVER IN A CHANGING GLOBAL ORDER

Kaysie Brown, Cosima Cassel, Rachael Drake, Alden Meyer, Gustavo Pinheiro, Lily Hartzell, Katrine Petersen, Ellie Belton

2026 will test the credibility and direction of global cooperation on climate, including for the UNFCCC. The climate regime must demonstrate that it can make a durable and politically resilient shift, elevating the focus on implementation, delivery, and partnerships alongside consensus-based negotiations. The stakes are high. Decisions taken this year will shape the pathway to the second Global Stocktake in 2028 and determine how the regime can evolve to support delivery at scale, crucial to ensuring the process remains fit for purpose in a more uncertain, and rapidly shifting, global order. COP31 must integrate climate action into the geopolitical arenas shaping this decade.

In a similar vein to COP30,¹ success at COP31 will not be defined by a single flagship outcome, but rather how it delivers across a range of priorities. It will also depend on how it functions as part of a continuous political and technical process to 2028.

Structured cooperation between successive Presidencies to provide continuity in delivery is key. The COP31 Presidency will need to build on the progress made by the Brazilian COP30 Presidency to strengthen the coherence, impact and accountability of the Action Agenda in delivering real-world results across all elements of the climate ambition landscape. It should also establish a Troika with the COP32 and COP33 Presidencies to develop a credible workplan to ensure there is visible progress in implementation ahead of the second Global Stocktake's political phase.

¹ E3G, November 2025, [Closing the Ambition Gap at COP30](#)

Priorities for the COP31 Presidency and ambitious parties include:

- ▶ **Laying the foundations for the second Global Stocktake**, ensuring it drives course correction.
- ▶ **Accelerating action on mitigation** and transitioning away from fossil fuels.
- ▶ Securing public **finance commitments** and mobilising private finance.
- ▶ Integrating **adaptation and resilience** into actionable plans.
- ▶ **Articulating the role of trade and industry**, and diffusing trade tensions.
- ▶ Supporting the **evolution of a global climate system** that remains flexible enough to advance progress and implementation wherever political space exists in an increasingly unpredictable world.

Parties must maintain a focus on translating political signals from inside and outside the process into implementation, leveraging the Action Agenda alongside new or reinvigorated coalitions and partnerships. In the lead-up to this year's COP, it will be vital to sustain a steady drumbeat of climate leadership and delivery through a broader global calendar of key meetings and events, from the Munich Security Conference that took place in February, to the World Bank/IMF meetings in April and October, the G7 and the BRICS summits, and climate weeks – both mandated and non-mandated – across the globe.²

Each milestone in 2026 should lock in commitment and strategic focus that culminates in Antalya. This rhythm of direction must carry through COP31, demonstrating how international cooperation translates political alignment into practical delivery and progress across the full range of priorities.

Introduction

A shaky multilateral system, uncertain geopolitical dynamics, domestic political challenges, and strained international cooperation tested leadership, splintered cohesion, and limited ambition at COP30. Meanwhile, extreme weather drove mounting human and economic costs throughout 2025, causing over an estimated \$224 billion in global economic damages and underscoring the urgent need to both reduce emissions and build resilience against the changing climate.³ From South Africa's record heatwaves to insurance withdrawals in parts of Europe and the US, the economic signals are already flashing red. Avoiding system-disruptive economic, environmental and social losses this century requires a step change in

² We have published a visual timeline highlighting some of the significant moments in the diplomatic year leading up to COP31, which can be viewed at E3G, March 2026, [Driving momentum and delivery on the road to COP31](#)

³ Munich RE, 13 January 2026, [Climate change presses on: Devastating wildfires and intense thunderstorms exacerbate losses for insurers](#)

global ambition and delivery today. As UN climate chief Simon Stiell said on 12 February, climate action is critical to delivering stability and prosperity in an unstable world.⁴

Positive trends do exist, and it will be important to build upon these. Markets and economic forces continue to drive change. Clean energy investment has surged, climbing from roughly \$200 billion a year a decade ago to over \$2 trillion in 2025 and outpacing fossil fuel investment by more than two to one. There is strong momentum behind clean energy deployment, and climate action is increasingly embedded in industrial strategy and energy security planning including across many regions such as Asia. Additionally, the rupture of the international order presents opportunities for new and different coalitions, partnerships, and ways of working to drive progress.

Leaders, and everyone who recognises the threats of climate change and the opportunity for a clean energy future, must act on these risks and opportunities in 2026, learning lessons from 2025. As with previous COPs, COP30 delivered progress in some areas, but the ambition expressed in parties' Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) is still short of what the science tells us is needed. Market action must be coupled with cooperation and leadership.

The extent to which COP31 can demonstrate continued commitment to the negotiations, collaboration in partnerships, and real-economy delivery will determine its effectiveness. COP31 will need to operationalise the two-tier approach flagged by the COP30 Presidency in their January letter:⁵ a formal track rooted in consensus, alongside a parallel track focused on mobilisation, deployment and scaled delivery. The intent is not to decrease the prominence or importance of negotiations, but to enable and accelerate implementation among those Parties willing to take more ambitious steps forward in the absence of consensus. Climate-aligned powers in the developed and developing world must act more closely together as a unified bloc.

In this briefing we set out what we see as early critical ingredients for an impactful COP31. We focus on E3G's areas of competence, and our specific recommendations are not exhaustive. In particular, COP31 must also embed nature at the heart of climate action, with a focus on halting deforestation and ending exploitation of oceans.

⁴ UNFCCC, 12 February 2026, [UN climate chief in Istanbul: new era of climate action can deliver stability in an unstable world](#)

⁵ COP30 Presidency, 27 January 2026, [Twelfth letter from the President](#)

Implementation and delivery at the heart of COP31

An impactful COP31 will require a decisive shift from negotiation to implementation. To build on the several useful hooks for delivery created at COP30, the COP30 and COP31 Presidencies will need to work in tandem to define the governance, timelines and accountability needed to ensure initiatives are taken forward in meaningful ways.

Delivery should not be seen as an alternative to negotiation, but as a force-multiplier and practical implementation of the Paris architecture. Initiatives such as the Global Implementation Accelerator and the Belém Mission to 1.5 have the potential to lead to a significant scaling-up of action, but only if they are clearly embedded within the wider UNFCCC architecture and linked to finance, national planning, transparency reporting and ultimately the inputs to the second Global Stocktake (GST2) in 2028. The Baku to Belém Roadmap establishes the financial backbone of the delivery agenda, setting forward guidance for credible finance tracking and mobilisation commensurate with implementation needs.

By COP31, the two Presidencies, following consultation with Parties as well as non-state actors, should put forward clear proposals on how these new initiatives will complement each other as well as existing elements of the Paris architecture (such as the Just Transition and Mitigation Work Programmes) in supporting implementation of NDCs and national adaptation plans. They must also lay out how progress will be tracked.

A Troika of Presidencies should then be established to provide continuity and delivery over the period to COP33, with Türkiye and Australia coordinating closely with Ethiopia (as confirmed COP32 Presidency) and India or South Korea (as interested candidates for the COP33 Presidency). Developing a credible workplan to reduce emissions fast, minimise further global temperature rise, and return as soon as possible below an increase of 1.5 °C in the case of overshoot, would signal that the Parties to the UNFCCC can connect negotiation cycles to delivery in the real economy, and ensure that implementation progress is visible ahead of GST2's political phase. Visible continuity from Belém to Antalya to Addis Ababa must demonstrate momentum across cycles rather than resetting at each COP.

Evolving diplomacy, empowering coalitions

In a more fragmented landscape, diplomacy must be done differently. New or evolved coalitions of willing countries are needed to move ahead on implementation, drive political commitment to seek consensus in negotiations, and importantly to push ahead where consensus is difficult. They must be empowered to do so. These kinds of coalitions have helped create and sustain momentum previously, such as through leadership alliances like the Powering Past Coal Alliance and Clean Energy Transition Partnership, and the Climate and Development Ministerial on enabling access and flows of adaptation finance. Involvement of and closer coordination with non-state actors will be critical, and the Action Agenda must play a central role here.

Coalitions should not be seen as a workaround to consensus, but as accelerators that operate within the Paris framework. Their credibility increases when their progress is transparently reported and can feed into collective assessments under the Global Stocktake. This linkage prevents fragmentation and reinforces the universality of the process.

While all Parties must take an active role, those driving the agenda will be the COP31 Presidency countries, as well as Brazil, given the COP30 Presidency initiatives continuing in 2026. Türkiye as host Presidency will need to provide clarity on the overarching political priorities for COP31 and establish the necessary political leadership and coordination to deliver the negotiated agenda and establish links with wider initiatives and the Action Agenda.

The Presidency has a responsibility to ensure that international coalitions operate effectively and contribute meaningfully to the process. A first, essential, step is deep and early engagement by Türkiye and Australia with Pacific region Parties to design an impactful Pre-COP, which will be held in Fiji this October. Moreover, Türkiye can serve as a bridge between Parties and stakeholders, fostering cooperation and helping initiatives deliver concrete outcomes aligned with the negotiated agenda. Although each Presidency has its own political priorities, there needs to be continuity in the structure and implementation of the Action Agenda five-year plan secured at COP30 in order to provide clarity and predictability. This in turn enables governments, non-state actors, and implementing partners to engage effectively. Türkiye must ensure, through early, open, and substantive engagement with stakeholders, that diverse perspectives are reflected in the shaping of priorities.

Key priorities for the Presidency and other ambitious countries

Kicking off the second Global Stocktake (GST2) process, and ensuring that NDCs are not forgotten

The Global Stocktake (GST) is the global collective assessment of progress toward the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement, designed to inform stronger action and updated NDCs. The second GST will take place in 2028, and COP31 has a responsibility to stimulate faster progress in the areas that it will assess: accountability, adaptation efforts, NDC implementation and energy transition, finance flows, and equity.

To build clarity in the process and metrics for GST2 and to lay the groundwork for the strong set of political outcomes needed at COP33, a COP31–33 Presidency Troika should work together to ensure the COP31 process is purposefully designed to feed into and support the GST2, including clear linkage to GST2 inputs, thematic reviews and reporting cycles.

As of March 2026, around 60 Parties have not yet submitted the updated NDCs due in 2025, and must now do so in good time before COP31 to give a fuller picture of the trajectory of global climate action. The current NDCs should be viewed as the floor, not the ceiling of ambition, and COP31 should send a clear diplomatic signal on ambition by encouraging major emitters to update or submit NDCs. Strengthened NDCs from major emitters whose 2035 targets are currently expressed as flexible ranges are needed now already, building to GST2. A firm diplomatic push through G7, BRICS, regional climate weeks, pre-COP, and bilateral channels could strengthen NDCs' ambition ahead of Antalya.

If COP31 fails to strengthen these building blocks, GST2 risks becoming a retrospective stocktake rather than a forward-looking proactive plan and correction. The decisions taken in 2026 are therefore not merely about optics but are crucial for the global climate trajectory.

Accelerating action on mitigation and energy transition

A significant political signal from COP30 was growing support for a global roadmap to transition away from fossil fuels, to be taken forward by the Brazilian Presidency. A key test for COP31 is to build on that momentum, through the Presidency and a wider cohort of countries showing early, visible support for taking the roadmap process forward beyond 2026 and as an input to the GST2 cycle. A strong, credible process will further require clear, early proposals from Brazil on how the roadmap will be drawn up. Clear governance, timelines and reporting, ideally clarified before SB64, could position the roadmap as a guide to a structured transition platform and a durable input into GST2. A broad range of countries must be engaged in a process of dialogue throughout the year to advance

international cooperation on the transition and build political support for continuity around developing and implementing the roadmap. The UN Secretary-General's call at the IEA Ministerial for a dedicated global platform to strengthen dialogue on the fossil fuel transition further bolsters the opportunity for the COP30 and COP31 Presidencies to lead this process.

The process will need to be inclusive and country-led, with Brazil facilitating dialogue and cooperation between producer and consumer countries on ensuring an orderly and equitable transition as well as improving coordination between international institutions and initiatives already engaged on the transition to bolster the ecosystem of support for delivery. Aligned processes such as the International Conference on the Just Transition Away from Fossil Fuels in Colombia in April and the regional climate weeks will also be key to build momentum around the roadmap, showcasing existing country and alliance actions to deliver a global shift away from fossil fuels and creating a feedback loop of ambition.

To ensure this transition is just, orderly and equitable, COP31 needs to operationalize the Just Transition Mechanism agreed at COP30 to provide a set of practical tools (including enhanced access to finance) to support nationally led planning and implementation of just transition strategies, particularly in countries facing the greatest economic and social challenges. Without this, political support for faster mitigation will remain fragile. This is particularly salient in least developed countries (LDCs) and emerging economies, where constrained fiscal space and limited social protection systems make structured just transition support essential for sustained mitigation progress.

Via the Action Agenda, it will also be crucial to maintain and build on the enhanced coordination of energy transition initiatives enabled by the Activation Groups established under the COP30 Presidency, recognising how such initiatives drive real-economy implementation and sending strong political signals on the clean energy transition. This means ensuring a platform at COP31 for progressing the Plans to Action launched under Axis #1 on Energy Transition, including on fossil fuel transitions. There is also opportunity to make progress on electrification (including industrial electrification) and methane, including practical reductions in fossil and waste methane, building on the No Venting Coalition and International Super Emitter Response Network set up at COP30, and aligning measurement and market practices to avoid fragmentation and protect competitiveness.

Creating clear expectations and next steps on finance

Finance remains a persistent faultline in the UNFCCC. Finance is not simply a negotiation track; it is the fundamental enabler of action as well as a pillar of the Paris architecture, including through the Article 2.1(c) call to align financial flows with the Paris Agreement's temperature and resilience goals. Finance influences how Parties approach other issues and ambition cycles, and yet climate finance is constrained in this geopolitically strained moment. How to drive financial flows, particularly for the most vulnerable, ensure the recommendations laid out in the Baku to Belém Roadmap are picked up, and nest this

work in continued evolution of the international financial architecture, is a major test moving ahead. For many LDCs, whether finance is effective depends not only on volume but on modality, including direct access, simplified procedures, and finance that reaches communities rather than remaining in intermediary pipelines.

COP31 needs to take steps to demonstrate that actions follow commitments made, even in this much more constrained environment for development assistance. This will require new and renewed climate finance commitments from bilateral donors and the multilateral development banks (MDBs). The Presidency must set clear expectations that these commitments be made before or at the high-level finance dialogue at COP31, while being realistic that the total concessional finance available in the short term is unlikely to increase dramatically. Parties must also be encouraged to fulfil their obligations to submit information on their forward-looking climate finance under Article 9.5 and to report on past finance provided in their Biennial Transparency Reports, both due in December 2026.

COP31 should additionally support mobilisation of wider finance. While the COP30 outcome did not wholeheartedly embrace the Baku to Belém Roadmap, its vision for scaling climate finance flowing into developing countries to at least \$1.3 trillion per year by 2035⁶ must remain a central part of finance action at COP31 and beyond. Azerbaijan, Brazil, Türkiye, and Australia should work together to elevate the five action areas laid out in the Roadmap, creating linkages with the relevant Action Agenda activation groups as well as other relevant institutions and processes such as the MDBs, IMF, the Country Platform Hub, and Coalition of Finance Ministers. The Troika of Presidencies should take action to ensure there will be demonstrable progress in areas such as boosting MDB finance for adaptation in particular, easing fiscal space constraints in developing countries, advancing investment treaty reform, and demonstrating the ability of country platforms to create investable pipelines. The new Veredas Dialogue on Article 2.1(c) should take a similar approach in strengthening linkages between finance discussions and action within and outside the UNFCCC.

Throughout 2026, sustained diplomacy by progressive donors, international financial institution shareholders, and the COP30 and COP31 Presidencies will be essential to engage MDBs at the highest level, identify and resolve obstacles, and pave the way for tangible commitments at the Leaders' Summit or other high-level finance dialogues.

Strengthening adaptation and resilience, loss and damage

COP30 elevated the prominence of adaptation and resilience and yielded some positive outcomes that must be built on in 2026.⁷ In particular, there is an opportunity – and a necessity – to make progress on delivering the commitment to maintain momentum and political attention to resilience and adaptation. This is the case around finance as well,

⁶ UNFCCC, [Baku to Belém Roadmap to 1.3T](#)

⁷ E3G, 2 February 2026, [What will shape global climate resilience in 2026?](#)

including on next steps needed to triple adaptation finance. This will depend on transparent methodologies to track delivery of finance and will need to feed meaningfully into GST2. Delivery of this commitment must also be connected to action in the real economy, such as the growing focus on insurance mechanisms and investment in resilience in the interests of macroeconomic stability. Locally led adaptation initiatives, including those emerging from the new LDC University Consortium, provide an early test case for how adaptation finance can translate into measurable local resilience. Links to the Action Agenda and Baku to Belém Roadmap are therefore also important elements of adaptation delivery. Strong political coalitions will be essential to drive this process forward.

The Global Goal on Adaptation indicators were adopted at COP30, but there remain significant methodological issues to address. The SB64 sessions in Bonn in June and COP31 must set out the path to refine the indicators by COP32 via the Belém–Addis Vision, to ensure that Parties regain confidence in the indicators and that they support learning, accountability and improved outcomes on the ground.

One clear moment to elevate this agenda will be the Pre-COP in the Pacific, where the spotlight will be squarely on Small Island Developing States and LDCs, and the specific issues they face as climate vulnerable countries. The Pre-COP should serve as both a galvanising political moment and a structured donor dialogue moment, including space for LDC-led political-level finance engagement in 2026. It can support a larger groundswell of political momentum around resilience. It is critical that Pacific island states are engaged closely from the outset to enable an impactful Pre-COP designed in their interests, promoting a unified push for mitigation and adaptation. Holding the Climate and Development Ministerial during Pre-COP would be a signal of support for the delivery of adaptation finance for the most climate vulnerable countries.

Finally, COP31 must create political space for continued discussion on loss and damage – largely absent from COP30 – including pathways to scale finance via the Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage.

For many vulnerable countries, the provision of adaptation and loss and damage finance are the litmus test of whether the Paris Agreement is functioning as intended. The visibility of adaptation and loss and damage in the GST2 and the subsequent political outcomes will be decisive in showing whether the multilateral system can deliver for the most vulnerable, which in turn will shape their ambition for the next round of NDCs in 2030.

Articulating the role of trade, industry, and green industrialisation

Trade and industrial policy are increasingly integrated with climate action as they shape emissions trajectories and investment decisions. At COP30, Parties reaffirmed the need to promote a supportive and open economic system and agreed to hold dialogues at SB64, SB66, and SB68 “to consider opportunities, challenges and barriers in relation to enhancing

international cooperation related to the role of trade”, to be followed by a high-level event in 2028 and a report to COP33 from the SB Chairs summarising the discussions at that event. The three dialogues, high-level event, and report will inform decisions to be made at COP33 on how to advance the objective of positioning trade policy as a driver of climate ambition rather than as a barrier to international cooperation.

COP31 cannot resolve trade disputes, but it can contribute to highlight how climate ambition reinforces, rather than fragments, trade cooperation. COP31 should review the progress made at the first of these three SB dialogues in June and give political guidance to the remaining two, directing trade discussions towards the dedicated dialogue sessions to avoid tensions spilling over into other negotiating tracks. Building on the success of the COP30 Action Agenda, including the Belém Declaration on Global Green Industrialisation, and the discussions to be held in the Integrated Forum on Climate Change and Trade launched by Brazil, the COP31 Action Agenda can help advance these initiatives with practical solutions such as concrete finance delivery, technology cooperation, and implementation platforms.

By diffusing trade tensions seen at recent COPs and focusing political attention on the positive role of trade in accelerating green industrialisation, COP31 can help to shift the narrative and identify opportunities to drive global climate action by strengthening trade cooperation and accelerating industrial decarbonisation.

Ensuring a system fit for the next era of climate action and implementation

The UNFCCC remains the central normative anchor of global climate cooperation and must remain at the centre. But there is growing recognition that it, and the wider global climate system, must evolve to better support the next phase of climate action and real-world delivery.

While other international arenas – including the G7, G20, BRICS, and various foreign policy, development, trade and security fora – increasingly shape the political and economic context for climate action, they also operate on foundations laid within or supported by the UNFCCC and informed by IPCC assessments. The Paris Agreement’s architecture, including the shared temperature goal, NDC cycle, enhanced transparency framework, and the Global Stocktake, continues to provide the only universal reference point against which climate ambition and delivery are collectively assessed. This universality is a stabilising asset that helps to sustain direction even amid short-term political setbacks.

In a precarious and fragmented geopolitical environment, the strength of the UNFCCC lies not in its exclusivity, but in its capacity to drive singular political and technical focus on climate, and to enhance progress toward the Paris Agreement’s goals by driving broader real-world action. That integrative function will determine whether COP31 marks progress or simply preserves process.

Parties must engage actively, coming forward with proposals on what shape this system needs to take and opportunities to accelerate this evolution. At present, formal UN negotiations, voluntary initiatives by businesses, investors, states, and cities, and high-level political processes often operate in parallel. COP31 must actively shape ideas on how to better link these strands together so that they reinforce one another. Already, Brazil's attempts to elevate the dual tracks of consensus-based negotiations and real-economy delivery are an attempt to move the UNFCCC forward into this new era. Antalya must consolidate this dual-track model, embedding delivery alongside negotiation as a durable feature of the regime.

One important element of COP evolution is positioning the Action Agenda as an operational bridge between negotiated outcomes and real-economy implementation. To shift the centre of gravity toward delivery, closer coherence between formal intergovernmental negotiations and non-state, sectoral and subnational action becomes essential. Under the COP30 Presidency and the UN High-Level Climate Champions, a five-year plan was launched to organise the Action Agenda more strategically around system-level transformation, moving beyond a collection of voluntary initiatives toward an implementation ecosystem aligned with the goals of the Paris Agreement and structured around the elements of the COP28 Global Stocktake consensus decision.

Continuing this approach under the COP31 Presidency will be critical. Politically elevating the five-year plan and continuing to advance progress on implementation of the Activation Group objectives and workplans is essential to provide continuity across COP cycles, strengthen accountability, and ensure that cooperative initiatives directly reinforce Party commitments under NDCs and long-term strategies rather than operating in parallel to them.

Emerging institutional thinking around implementation provides an opportunity to deepen this role. The proposed Global Implementation Accelerator (GIA) can help by identifying systemic acceleration opportunities and directing resources toward positive tipping points in the global transition. This could be supported by a mechanism to match national priorities with delivery partners, finance providers and existing initiatives. Properly designed, this architecture would rely heavily on the Action Agenda's networks and activation groups, linking organisations such as the United Nations Development Programme, the NDC Partnership and city, industry and finance coalitions to country-level implementation needs. There must also be stronger alignment with formal UNFCCC workstreams that already address implementation challenges, such as the Just Transition and Mitigation Work Programmes and the Global Goal on Adaptation.

Delivering in a volatile world

COP31 is an important test for the UNFCCC and the global multilateral system. Early and consistent engagement by the Presidency, and climate-committed countries more widely, will be essential to maintain momentum on climate diplomacy. That diplomacy must extend beyond climate ministries to include key departments such as finance, development, foreign affairs, energy and industry to leverage private-sector climate action and unlock implementation at scale.

COP31 should also be understood as a strategic docking point within a wider diplomatic arc. Its success may not be measured by any one headline-grabbing breakthrough but by Parties' ability to drive balanced, tangible progress on agenda items and to take a multi-year view to lay the foundations for a credible second Global Stocktake, and ultimately by showing that cooperation for climate action remains a top-tier, and eminently doable, endeavour. Decisions and political signals in Antalya will shape ongoing discussions in finance ministerial circles, development banks, trade negotiations, industrial policy fora and beyond. Conversely, progress made in those arenas must feed back into the UNFCCC to reinforce collective ambition and accountability.

Ahead of COP31, climate leadership from willing countries must remain visible, demonstrating that evolution and innovation is happening and that multilateral climate action remains effective, relevant and capable of rising to the challenges of this decade. High-profile events and regional summits – such as climate weeks, G7 and BRICS ministerials and leaders' summits, international financial institution meetings, regional fora and trade dialogues – should be used strategically as reinforcing moments that build toward political consolidation in Antalya. Antalya's credibility will be shaped long before the gavel falls.

ABOUT E3G

E3G is an independent think tank working to deliver a safe climate for all.

We drive systemic action on climate by identifying barriers and constructing coalitions to advance the solutions needed. We create spaces for honest dialogue, and help guide governments, businesses and the public on how to deliver change at the pace the planet demands.

More information is available at www.e3g.org

COPYRIGHT

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution – NonCommercial – ShareAlike 4.0 License.

© E3G 2026

AUTHORS

Kaysie Brown is E3G's Associate Director for Climate Diplomacy and Geopolitics where she leads efforts on multilateral diplomacy, foreign policy, and the intersection of geopolitics and climate. She has significant experience as a foreign policy diplomat, researcher and practitioner. She served previously as the US Deputy Negotiator for pandemics and COVID-19 diplomacy and as Chief of Staff for US Sustainable Development Goals at the US Department of State. She has also worked in and led policy around conflict response, stabilisation, development, and broader multilateral engagement.

Cosima Cassel is Programme Lead for Climate Diplomacy and Geopolitics, based in E3G's Berlin office. Her work focuses on multilateral venues. She is a former UK civil servant and diplomat with over a decade of experience working on environmental policy.

Rachael Drake is a Senior Policy Advisor in the Climate Diplomacy and Geopolitics team, based in E3G's Berlin office, with a focus on UNFCCC and multilateral issues.

Alden Meyer is a Senior Associate in the Climate Diplomacy and Geopolitics team, based in the Washington office. He has five decades of experience on both US and international climate and clean energy policy, research, and advocacy, and has been a senior leader in several national civil society organisations and international networks.

Gustavo Pinheiro is a Senior Associate in the Climate Diplomacy and Geopolitics team, based in Rio de Janeiro. He brings over three decades of experience in climate policy, finance and energy transition across Brazil and the Global South. He has held senior leadership roles in civil society and philanthropy, and advised governments and multilateral institutions on climate strategy and implementation.

Lily Hartzell is a Senior Policy Advisor for Public Banks and Development, based in E3G's Washington office. She focuses on the geopolitics of climate finance, and is a former US finance negotiator in the UNFCCC.

Katrine Petersen is Programme Lead in the Global Clean Power Diplomacy team, based in E3G's London office. She works on global energy transition strategy in multilateral venues, and has previously worked in civil society organisations and with the climate science community on energy transition campaigns.

Ellie Belton is a Senior Policy Advisor in the Clean Economy team, based in London. She leads E3G's work on trade, with a focus on driving climate ambition through trade policy and investment tools, and aligning trade and climate agendas in international institutions. She previously worked in UK government.

