http://www.e3g.org/concept/3rdGenerationEnviron/ en E3GAdmin Copyright 2010 2010-11-08T10:48:58+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/programmes/climate-articles/post-durban-commentary/ http://www.e3g.org/programmes/climate-articles/post-durban-commentary/#When:15:05:55Z Durban did not fail. That is by far and away the most important outcome from the latest round of climate negotiations. Failure would have effectively removed any prospect of achieving a legally binding global agreement to avoid dangerous climate change. It would have set the world on a path to becoming 4°C, or more, warmer. It is worth remembering that a 4°C global average temperature rise would mean much greater rises in places such as the Arctic or the Mediterranean basin. It is also worth bearing in mind that, on the Hadley Centre’s worst case analysis, we could find ourselves in such a world as early as fifty years from now. That is well inside the lifetime of many major investment decisions being made today. Across the world, 2011 was an unprecedented year for extreme weather events – floods, droughts and storms harmed millions and cost billions. It will take more analysis before we know with confidence how much of this was due to climate change but this is exactly the kind of disruption that is forecast to occur with increasing frequency and violence as the planet warms. it matters a lot that Durban did not fail Climate change will lead to a complete transformation of the prospect for humanity. This is true whether climate policy succeeds or fails. If it succeeds, the transformation will take place over the next 30 years. If it fails, the transformation that is already underway will accelerate gradually and become dramatic in the thirty years after that. The choice is whether events or people drive that transformation. If people make the choice, then over the next 30 years the way energy is used will be transformed. This will bring with it a wide range of co-benefits in terms of both economic efficiency and human well being. Food and water security will be maintained. However, the pattern of economic winners and losers will be significantly disrupted. If events drive the transformation, the global average temperature will rise inexorably, and for all practical purposes, irreversibly. Food and water security will be undermined, and ever larger numbers of people will be displaced, exposed to conflict and disease and subject to deeper climate induced poverty. This will also disrupt the pattern of economic winners and losers but in a manner that will greatly increase the number of losers. So it matters a lot that Durban did not fail. It actually did rather better than anyone expected. Most attention has, understandably, focussed on the agreement to negotiate a new legally binding treaty by 2015 and the decision to have a second commitment to the Kyoto Protocol. This was the central bargain without which the talks would have failed. That it succeeded was in no small part due to the EU untypically punching its weight. The critical glue holding this disparate alliance together was that much derided factor: European climate leadership. But there were nine other areas on which real progress was made. These included the adoption of the governance arrangements for the Green Fund, the adoption of guidelines for monitoring and reporting emissions and the inclusion of carbon capture and storage. There were also important agreements on how to deal with forests and making the Clean Development Mechanism work better. These are technical issues replete with mind numbing detail. No-one could argue that reaching agreement on them, of itself, takes us very far towards a carbon neutral global economy. But this does remove some of the potential roadblocks on the way to negotiating the overarching, legally binding, global agreement to which we are now committed. There are two further notable consequences of Durban. First, the formation of a green coalition of countries committed to a high ambition outcome. This comprises the EU, together with a wide range of countries from Africa, Asia, Latin America and the small island states. Assisted by some effective work by NGOs, these countries worked together to create the pressure for an ambitious agreement in the final hours at Durban. The critical glue holding this disparate alliance together was that much derided factor: European climate leadership. This leadership rested on Europe’s continued support for the Kyoto Protocol despite other developed countries reneging on their promises. It also depended on the EU being seen to implement the 20:20:20 climate and energy package, and to deliver its commitments on climate finance to developing countries. Durban has simply kept open a vital door. We still have to go through it. Second, the effective end of ‘pledge and review’ as an alternative to trying to forge a legally binding, global agreement. Since Copenhagen the climate policy debate has often got lost in the thickets of a false choice between ‘top-down’ or ‘bottom-up’ approaches. This, and all the other ‘Plan B’ strategies, consistently miss the point that the very difficult political choices required to avoid dangerous climate change remain the same which ever route you take. The critical difference is that the top down UNFCCC process makes it very clear which countries are unwilling to make those choices. The alternatives all allow the laggards to hide behind each other and a fog of good intentions. Achieving a legally binding global treaty on climate change is probably the most difficult diplomatic task humanity has ever attempted. We may not succeed. But to give up trying is to admit defeat in the struggle to preserve the climate. Durban has simply kept open a vital door. We still have to go through it. Whether or not we make it through will depend, not so much on what happens in endless succession of negotiating rounds between now and 2015, but on how we shape the wider climate conversation in the key capitals. So far, that debate has been dominated by the climate makers - the small number of large businesses who produce and burn fossil fuels. It is now time we heard a lot more from the climate takers – the very much larger number of smaller businesses whose revenues and values are already being undermined by rising temperatures. This article also appeared in Tom’s regular column in the ENDS Magazine Climate and Energy Security - Delivering a Global Deal 2012-01-30T15:05:55+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/programmes/climate-articles/ends-euro-travails-and-climate-inaction-twin-crises-of-political-will/ http://www.e3g.org/programmes/climate-articles/ends-euro-travails-and-climate-inaction-twin-crises-of-political-will/#When:15:42:09Z December, it is turning out, is actually the cruellest month. It is when nations normally meet every year to make progress on tackling climate change. This year, they will meet in Durban. Do not expect too much. The International Energy Agency (IEA) has just published its annual World Energy Outlook. The 2011 edition makes grim reading. Current policies, it projects, put us on course for a 3.5°C rise in temperature. If they fail, we are heading for a 6°C rise. In its cautious way, the IEA refers to these prospects as ‘long-term average temperature rise[s].’ What it does not tell us is that the long term is getting shorter. The assumption of most political and business leaders and media editors is that this means somewhere beyond the end of this century. In fact, it is increasingly clear that we may find ourselves living in a world 3.5°C warmer by around the middle of this century. That is within the lifetime of many of the carbon intensive investments being made today. So we have a paradox. The investments needed to meet these projections, in tar sands, shale gas, coal mines and power stations, are capital intensive as well as carbon intensive. To deliver value to shareholders – or put another way, to pay for our pensions and public expenditure – these investments require long term political, economic and social stability. But if they succeed they will change the climate and undermine the food and water security on which that stability depends. I am reminded, at this point, of an early Bob Dylan song which contained the opaque, but wonderfully prophetic, line ‘there’s no success like failure and failure is no success at all’. The IEA goes on to warn that by 2017 the investment driven by current policies will have locked-in all the emissions permissible on a path to keeping the temperature rise to the 2°C that is now widely agreed by governments to be the threshold of manageable climate change. It does not go on to explain the obvious corollary, that, therefore, if you want to stay below 2°C, all subsequent energy investment would have to be carbon neutral. Only if much more aggressive climate policies are adopted globally can this inflexion point be delayed and the option of manageable change to the climate be kept open. This is not yet technologically impossible and is certainly not economically impossible – as the IEA has previously pointed out, most of the additional cost of achieving carbon neutrality will be paid for by the avoided cost of oil. What will be tested in Durban, however, is whether it is remotely possible politically. There the prospects make ‘grim’ seem positively cheerful. Critics of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol make the mistake of thinking that there is a problem with the process. They believe that somehow if we adopted a different process, with fewer players and less demanding requirements, we would do better. But whatever process you choose, the politics of achieving the goal, remain the same. The voluntarist approach advocated by some, especially the United States, under the banner of ‘realism’ is a seductive delusion. It is a sly way of giving up on the goal while seeking to avoid blame for the consequences. There could hardly be a worse time politically to have to deal with a global problem this difficult. Governments are distracted and constrained by the current economic crisis. They are faced by some deeply entrenched economic and political interests antagonistic to climate policies. They are also faced with dysfunctional relationships both between and within government and business and a growing public loss of confidence in political leaders everywhere. To maintain a stable climate, investors must be persuaded that governments are serious about putting in place policies that will drive economies towards a low carbon future. The climate challenge, it turns out,  has much in common with that of restoring confidence in the Euro. Both are crises of political will. The economic turmoil of the past few weeks is caused by investors losing confidence that Eurozone governments will adopt the policies needed reduce their debt. There is no lack of awareness of the consequences of policy failure. And definitely no lack of policy options. But there is a massive lack of willingness on the part of incumbent politicians to make the necessary hard choices. The economic outcome has been a stuttering series of policies all fitting comfortably into the category of too little too late. The tempo on climate policy may be much slower, but the trajectory of policy development is identical. We are doing too little, too late. This was the clear message of the IEA report. There is, however, an important difference: economies will eventually recover, the climate is for ever. Public discourse on climate change is currently asymmetric. It is dominated by a small number of voices from those who are changing the climate. We hear practically nothing from those whose climate is being changed. Governments are responding to the interests of climate makers – the energy producers and their largest customers rather than those of climate takers – pretty well everyone else. Were we paying more attention to the climate takers, the parallels with our current economic crisis would become even more apparent. By avoiding hard choices the world’s political leaders are running up a vast carbon debt that will eventually have to be paid for. In the process, they are, as Nick Stern made clear, exposing the global economy to a systemic risk far more serious than that the bankers have taught us to fear. Solving our economic problems will sooner or later require global agreement on strict measures to lower the risks associated with today’s massive flows of capital. Solving our climate problem will require equally strict global measures to lower the risk associated with the flows of carbon that accompany that capital. What happens in Durban matters a lot more than most people realise. Tom Burke is a founding director of E3G and a visiting professor at Imperial and University Colleges, London. He also advises Rio Tinto. This article was written by Tom Burke for the Political Commentary in the ENDS report. Climate and Energy Security - Delivering a Global Deal 2011-11-14T15:42:09+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/programmes/climate-articles/ends-from-the-greenest-government-ever...-to-our-very-own-tea-party/ http://www.e3g.org/programmes/climate-articles/ends-from-the-greenest-government-ever...-to-our-very-own-tea-party/#When:15:18:30Z Ian Fleming introduced the world to his arch villain Goldfinger in 1959. Into his mouth he put the now famous aphorism “Once is happenstance. Twice is coincidence. The third time it’s enemy action.” Later, a more vulgar version of the same sentiment became popular in America. It was claimed that if something looked like a duck, walked like a duck and quacked like a duck, it was probably a duck. The moral of this somewhat oblique introduction is that things often really are what they appear to be. If it looks like the coalition government has abandoned its effort to be the greenest government ever, that is because it has. The evidence for this judgment is now so great as to defeat that last vestiges of hope in those of us that wished otherwise. David Cameron used greenery effectively in his successful effort to convince voters that the Tories were no longer the nasty party. It may still be true that he personally remains committed to this cause. But then he may also be personally committed to the cause of preserving the NHS while his government seems intent on its demolition. Liam Fox resigned because he confused his personal and his political responsibilities. The prime minister does not seem likely to repeat that error. The level of panic in the government is now such that personal principle no longer has any place in determining its policies. As the chancellor told a recent meeting of the Cabinet: “Anything that gets in the way of growth will be flattened.” The Tory press over the past few weeks has drummed home a clear message – green gets in the way of growth. There is no more evidence for this assertion than there is for growth itself, but the point is now so often repeated it has become a mantra in Whitehall. I will come to why this might be happening in a moment. First we should look at a sample of the bill of particulars supporting the charge of abandonment. It is extensive. The coalition began by abolishing the Sustainable Development Commission and the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution. At a stroke it got rid of two of the most authoritative public institutions of any independence able to hold the government to account for its environmental actions. It then tried to sell off the public forests, against the advice of its own Secretary of State for the Environment, and was only stopped by a massive public outcry. Its next trick was the Red Tape Challenge. This invited anyone who wished to propose the abolition of any piece of environmental legislation they did not like. Then came the proposal to disembowel the planning system, which I wrote about last month. This provoked a masterly campaign by the National Trust that has forced at least a pause for reflection. However, the prime minister’s emollient letter to the trust was written before the chancellor got into flattening those who disagree with him. You would be a very naïve environmentalist indeed if you thought that the battle to save the planning system was anywhere near over. This is especially true in the light of the rumours and – I imagine – papers floating around Whitehall about the coalition’s intention to mount a similar putsch against the need for environmental consents. So what on earth is going on? Or more exactly, what is going on in the Treasury and the Cabinet Office, where most of these proposals to dismantle Britain’s environmental machinery emanate from? The short answer is that we are having our own Tea Party. One of the most strikingly unpleasant aspects of Congressional politics in the US is the declaration of war on the environment by right-wing Republicans. Of course, that is not what they say they are doing. They claim they are removing the burden of over regulation on hard-pressed businesses in order to speed up growth. What they are actually doing is taking advantage of the current economic circumstances to pursue a long-held ideological commitment. Their goal is simple. They want to take government away and let markets rip. They know, however, that the American public would never stand for an overt attempt to repeal environmental laws. So what they are doing instead is to pass bill after bill to eliminate the funding for the agencies that are required to enforce those standards. If the politics of repealing environmental laws are too difficult, then get rid of the institutions without which the law is no more than text on a piece of paper. If this sounds familiar, it is because it is. It is not likely that we are facing a strategic effort funded by private interests such as the Koch brothers in the US. This is much more likely to be an example of a typical British muddle. Start with a measure of Treasury reluctance to pay for anything here. A dash of libertarian ideology there. Mix well with some sparkling populist rhetoric and add a twist of small-business opportunism and, whether shaken or stirred, you have a cocktail that no one really wants to drink. The reality is that environmental regulations more often stimulate growth than impede it. Weak businesses will always complain about having to do more to meet current standards. The Conservative Party knows very well that it does not improve its electoral prospects by reinventing the nasty party. The media will happily write both sides of the story as long as it sells papers. If the coalition fails – as it will if it continues on its present course – to deliver the greenest government ever, it will be a cockup rather than a conspiracy. In a way, that would be even sadder. Nevertheless, this would be a cock-up with consequences that business and the environment, as well as the coalition, would be better off without. Tom Burke is a founding director of E3G and a visiting professor at Imperial and University Colleges, London. He also advises Rio Tinto. This article was written by Tom Burke for the Political Commentary in the ENDS report.   Climate and Energy Security - News & Comment 2011-10-20T15:18:30+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/programmes/climate-articles/more-fight-less-fuel-energy-efficiency-and-renewable-energy-in-the-departme/ http://www.e3g.org/programmes/climate-articles/more-fight-less-fuel-energy-efficiency-and-renewable-energy-in-the-departme/#When:15:52:44Z The Department of Defense is rapidly emerging as the leading force in the United States for the development and use of renewable energy technologies.  Energy efficiency has emerged as mission essential to the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force. Why? How do these technologies improve national security?  How do they make our military more effective? Will renewable energy and energy efficiency save lives and money?  And what does the Defense Department’s leadership on “green energy” mean for the rest of the economy? In collaboration with the Environmental and Energy Study Institute (EESI) in Washington, D.C., and the Truman National Security Project, E3G organized a briefing on July 27, 2011, entitled More Fight, Less Fuel: The Defense Department’s Deployment of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy for Members of Congress, their staff and the general public. The topic was why the U.S. Department of Defense should be – and plans to be – leading the United States in the use of energy efficiency and renewable energy technologies. Speakers at the event included: Sherri Goodman - senior Vice President, General Counsel and Corporate Secretary, CNA; Executive Director, CNA Military Advisory Board. (Moderator) Senator Mark Udall (D-CO) Thomas Hicks – Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy Richard Kidd, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army, Energy and Sustainability Vice Admiral Dennis McGinn - (US Navy, Retired), President American Council on Renewable Energy; Vice Chairman, CNA Military Advisory Board Drew Sloan – (former US Army Captain), Iraq and Afghanistan Veteran, representing Operation Free; Fellow, Truman National Security Project The briefing drew a standing-room-only audience of 190 people. Bill Becker, E3G’s Senior Associate articulated his thoughts on the briefing on the Huffington Post.  Amongst the handouts were 2 reports from CNA – Center for Naval Analysis called National Security and the Threat of Climate Change and Climate and Energy Security - Delivering Climate Security 2011-08-09T15:52:44+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/programmes/climate-articles/climate-change-new-frontiers-in-transparency-and-accountability/ http://www.e3g.org/programmes/climate-articles/climate-change-new-frontiers-in-transparency-and-accountability/#When:13:51:10Z The Transparency and Accountability Initiative (T/A Initiative) is a donor collaborative working to expand the impact and scale of transparency and accountability interventions. E3G was commission by the donor collaborative to identify where transparency and accountability could provide transformational outcomes in tackling climate change. There has been much less attention paid to transparency and accountability in the field of climate change than in other areas, such as natural resource governance and donor aid. However, as the pressure to act builds and new financing for tackling and adapting to climate change comes forward, it is increasingly clear that transparency and accountability mechanisms are not only necessary but can also play a crucial role in promoting delivery of an effective response to this global crisis. Gaps and Opportunities Tackling climate change requires both ‘bottom up’ action and ‘top down’ action to help reduce the potential loss of human lives and livelihoods threatened by changes in the global climate. Countries need to demonstrate that it is economically feasible for them to change onto a low carbon, climate-resilient pathway. Government, civil society and the private sector must monitor and report on action that is being taken to mitigate and adapt to climate change and ensure that climate financing is being spent effectively. Transparency and accountability lie at the heart of both processes and are critical to their success by rebalancing power, building trust and ensuring governments do not renege on their commitments. This paper examines the major transparency and accountability trends in the climate change sector ranging from the changing role of emerging economies to the potential for corruption of new resources. It reviews the role of transparency and accountability in: national plans aimed to reduce emissions; deforestation and degradation; domestic climate change policy; trade and private investment and the carbon market. By identifying gaps and opportunities in these areas, the paper recommends innovative ways for civil society to use transparency and accountability to deliver trust and high impact climate change outcomes across critical sectors, countries and forums. The authors propose that policymakers and practitioners move beyond environmental silos and reach out beyond the sphere of the public sector. This will mean tackling the fundamental incentive and power structures that perpetuate high carbon lock-in. Climate and Energy Security - Thinking 2011-05-24T13:51:10+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/programmes/climate-articles/whole-of-government-response-to-global-climate-change/ http://www.e3g.org/programmes/climate-articles/whole-of-government-response-to-global-climate-change/#When:13:38:42Z Nick Mabey’s recently participated at the Halifax Forum set in Nova Scotia, Canada towards which he contributed a paper on taking a holistic approach to climate security. Hosted by the German Marshall Fund of the United States in cooperation with the Government of Canada, the conference attracted the foremost security policymakers, defense and military representatives, and analysts from North America, Europe, and Asia for in-depth intellectual exchange on security and defense challenges. Nick was part of a panel on ‘Resources and Risks: Are We Insatiable or Just Unprincipled?’, shared by Maj. Gen. (ret.) Richard Engel, Director, Climate Change and State Stability Program, U.S. National Intelligence Council and R.Adm. Neil Morisetti, Climate and Energy Security Envoy, Ministry of Defence and Foreign and Commonwealth Office, United Kingdom moderated by Ms. Lisa Friedman, Deputy Editor, ClimateWire. His paper entitled “Facing the Climate Security Threat: Why the Security Community Needs a “Whole-of-Government” Response to Global Climate Change”, encourages international governments to take a risk management approach when making investment decisions for energy systems, infrastructure, and agriculture to ensure that they are resilient to likely impacts of climate change. A brief summary is below and the paper is available to download above. Summary Public policy decisions with far greater costs than climate change policies — from military procurement to interest rates to financial system regulation — are taken under far higher uncertainty than exists over climate change science, impacts, or policy choices. Climate change should be treated similarly to other strategic threats like terrorism and cyber-security. It is a global problem that relies mainly on civilian action by civilian authorities to reduce security risks to manageable levels and, if left unmanaged, will have serious hard-security implications. As security actors in many countries move from analysis of climate threats to response strategies, the need for better decision-support systems to design and prioritize action is becoming clear. To date, the security community’s priority has been to manage the impacts of climate change without compromising security objectives. But given the inadequacy of current emission reduction commitments, security planning will need to be based on far more extreme climate scenarios. A more effective “whole-of-government” approach to the risk management of climate change would require the inclusion of climate change in national security processes, regular assessments of the effectiveness of climate security action, and a risk-management framework that expands responsibilities well beyond environment and energy ministries. Climate and Energy Security - Delivering Climate Security 2010-11-26T13:38:42+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/programmes/climate-articles/speech-for-the-business-of-sustainability-conference-at-the-minerals-counci/ http://www.e3g.org/programmes/climate-articles/speech-for-the-business-of-sustainability-conference-at-the-minerals-counci/#When:15:09:19Z Please see attached document for a copy of Tom Burke’s speech at the Business of Sustainability conference, Minerals Council of Australia 13/10/2010.  The speech explores the interaction between the mining industry and society within a world-wide political context.  Tom Burke demonstrates that the increasing resource scarcity facing our world requires a new alignment in the interaction between businesses, governments and individuals.  Within this space he says, the mining industry must contribute by persuasively articulating the part others must play in making resource scarcity risks manageable.   Climate and Energy Security - News & Comment 2010-11-23T15:09:19+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/programmes/climate-articles/what-the-uk-elections-mean-for-climate-security/ http://www.e3g.org/programmes/climate-articles/what-the-uk-elections-mean-for-climate-security/#When:17:28:07Z Following the UK elections on May 6th, the right-wing Conservative party, who secured 306 seats in the election (20 short of an outright majority), joined forces with the center-left Liberal Democrats, who secured 57 seats, to form the UK’s first coalition Government since World War II. This briefing note looks at the key elements of the new coalition government’s climate and energy program. It suggests that: The UK’s first coalition Government since World War II is likely to provide continuity in its emphasis on climate security; The Government has outlined a strong focus on delivering low carbon finance through the creation of a green investment bank, energy efficiency and market reform; and will shape innovation and industrial policy to build its competitiveness in low carbon technology; There are potential flash points between the coalition partners on nuclear power and Europe, but the Liberal Democrat influence may lead to a more positive agenda on Europe than had initially been anticipated. A pdf version is available above for download. Climate and Energy Security - News & Comment 2010-05-20T17:28:07+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/programmes/climate-articles/conservative-party-announces-green-investment-bank-plans/ http://www.e3g.org/programmes/climate-articles/conservative-party-announces-green-investment-bank-plans/#When:12:18:37Z Shadow Chancellor George Osbourne announced on November 24th that the Conservative Party would be consulting on the creation of a Green Investment Bank, which will invest in the next generation of green British businesses. This announcement was followed by the creation of a high profile working group – the Green Investment Bank Commission on February 2nd, advised by Lord Stern of Brentford and chaired by Bob Wigley, Chairman of Yell Group Plc.  E3G’s Nick Mabey has been selected to join this Commission to provide independent advice to the Conservative Party over the coming months on the role, scale and focus of the bank. Other members in the commission include: Bob Wigley, (Chair) Chairman Yell Group plc James Cameron, Vice Chairman, Climate Change Capital Katherine Garrett-Cox, Chief Executive, Alliance Trust plc Seamus Keating, CFO, Logica plc Nick’s appointment builds on work done by E3G over the past year to build the case and vision for a Green Investment Bank.  Media coverage FT: Conservatives will force Whitehall to cut emissions or lose funding Guardian: Tories pledge 10% cut in government emissions The Independent: George Osborne: The Treasury should lead the fight against climate change Telegraph: Tories to pay people to recycle in green revolution Times Online: Tories part the clouds for blue-sky vision of a green and pleasant land Daily Mail: Council to give families M&S vouchers… for putting their rubbish in the right bins     Systems for Change - Low Carbon Finance 2010-02-03T12:18:37+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/programmes/climate-articles/what-does-the-security-community-need-from-a-global-climate-regime/ http://www.e3g.org/programmes/climate-articles/what-does-the-security-community-need-from-a-global-climate-regime/#When:15:57:25Z The impacts from climate change on instability and security are already being felt from the Sahel to the Arctic. Even under the most optimistic global greenhouse gas abatement scenarios impacts will continue to worsen for forty years. Without efforts to limit global temperature rises well below 2°C there is a high risk of catastrophic climatic changes in all regions resulting in large-scale instability and conflict. The security community needs to help build a strong, effective and sustainable climate regime which sharply reduces the risk of an unmanageable security environment, and helps manage the unavoidable consequences of climate change. There is a growing consensus on climate security challenges… Security analysis carried out in most major countries generally agrees that climate change will be an important security threat multiplier in the short to medium term. Climate change will impact on a broad range of security issues from state instability to border conflicts and energy and food security. Peaceful management of even moderate climatic changes will require immediate investment in increased resilience in national and international governance systems. Humanitarian, development, diplomatic, security and military agencies are already beginning to respond to these trends through enhanced risk assessment, developing new scenarios to drive capability and contingency planning, and carrying out assessments of facility and equipment resilience to a changed climate. …. But it is mostly based on medium impact scenarios Current security assessments are mainly based on mid-range scenarios developed by the International Panel on Climate Change. While useful they do not cover the full range of future climate change risks and do not reflect the most recent research. Therefore, they are not a sound basis for security planning; failing to consider worst-case scenarios is as dangerous for climate change as it is for terrorist attacks. High likelihood that “worst case” scenario undermines global security… If global abatement efforts underperform, or the sensitivity of climate systems to greenhouse gas emissions is at the higher end of current estimates, then impacts will be far greater and critical climate “tipping points” – such as the breakdown of the Indian Monsoon - are likely to be passed by 2030. These “worst case scenarios” are not low probability, but largely inevitable under current momentum economic behaviour. As atmospheric concentrations increase there is little uncertainty over whether extreme impacts will occur, only when they will happen. Unless current emission trajectories change the livelihoods of billions of people will be destroyed and major economic damage will impact all countries. Outline Climate Security Scenarios; 2100 outcomes for a 2°C target Climate Security Scenarios The grid above presents four scenarios looking at different combinations of uncertainty over climate sensitivity (the response level of the climate system to a particular level of greenhouse gas concentrations) and the success of global mitigation policies. The scenarios illustrate the 2100 outcome assuming the current “consensus” scientific target of aiming for a 50:50 chance of achieving 2°C in 2100 (450ppm CO2 eqv). The temperatures given are global averages, but fragile regions such as Africa will experience rises at least 50% higher. An average global temperature rise of 4°C would make subsistence agriculture unviable in many regions of the world, and have very large economic impacts in industrialised regions. Even the most optimistic scenario for successful mitigation sees critical limits exceeded under a high climate sensitivity scenario (“Crash Response”). The high level of international cooperation implied by this scenario suggests that there would be coordinated action to both lower emissions and deal with climate change impacts. This is not true in the scenarios where climate mitigation policies – and hence global cooperation - fails and countries fall back on defensive adaptation in the low climate sensitivity case, or aggressive competition for resources in the high sensitivity case. It is highly unlikely that the current relatively benign global security environment – with largely open trade, travel, investment and declining conflict and poverty levels – would be maintained under the pressures of a high climate sensitivity and low cooperation environment; whatever security interventions are undertaken. …giving security actors a strong stake in a successful climate regime Given the security consequences of failing to limit global emissions the security community has a strong and legitimate interest in promoting an effective and sustainable global climate change regime. While the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol remains the capstone of the global climate regime, a mature regime will also require strong action at other levels. For example, nuclear proliferation agreements need to be strengthened to mitigate negative security impacts of any major increase in global nuclear power build. International and regional cooperation will be needed to ensure resource management treaties on maritime boundaries, fisheries and international rivers are resilient to climate change. The security community can help by “stress testing” the climate regime… Unlike other international security regimes on arms control and WMD proliferation, the climate regime has not been subjected to rigorous outside scrutiny over the risk of achieving its goals. While some attention has been paid to the risks of extreme climate scenarios, little consideration has been given to the potential for failure of mitigation polices or possible conditions for the failure of the UN regime itself. The security community needs to have a climate regime with a high probability of success, or it will need to include extreme scenarios of 5-6°C warning in its forward planning scenarios. Managing these impacts would imply significant changes to current security spending priorities. With its history of systematic “risk management” of serious threats the security community is also well-placed to help “stress test” the international climate regime to analyse whether it is resilient to future environmental, political, policy and technical risks. A risk management approach implies examining each of the uncertainties around climate change to see where risk of large and irreversible impacts lie, how these risks can be monitored, what is the current strategy to lower these risks, and what is the contingency plan to respond in the event that the “worst case” scenario occurs. … and ensuring that critical elements are adequately addressed Initial risk management analysis of climate change suggests the following areas should be prioritised by the security community to ensure issues of uncertainty, learning and thresholds are explicitly dealt with in the climate regime: Stronger Mitigation Goals: The most critical security threats in most parts of the world are associated with runaway climate change and crossing crucial climate tipping points. Dramatically lowering the possibility of exceeding 3-4°C – the broad threshold estimate for many climate change tipping points – would require a stronger global mitigation target than currently discussed. These give a 50% chance of staying below 2°C but a 30-40% chance of being in the 3-4°C range. Climate Regime Resilience: there is significant potential for delivery failure in main planks of current global and national climate change policies; for example, preventing deforestation. High levels of additional cooperative investment in RD&D of low carbon energy technologies would hedge against many of the risks of mitigation failure. The climate regime needs to be resilient to under-delivery as breakdown would delay global action for a decade. Tensions inside the climate regime over country mitigation performance are best dealt with by a strong regime of reporting and transparency so problems can be identified early and countries facilitated back into compliance with their obligations. As in arms control the principle of “trust and verify” is a good foundation for regime sustainability. Contingency “Crash Mitigation” Programmes: the most likely response to a higher estimates of climate sensitivity or a major impact event (e.g. major Antarctic sea melting) would be a rapid move to a “crash mitigation” programme, possibly including geoengineering. It is vital to have contingency plans for this including frameworks to control the deployment of geoengineering technologies and ensure safe build out of nuclear power if that is a major response option. Systematic monitoring of key climate tipping points: currently there is little systematic monitoring of major climate system tipping points e.g. the North Atlantic Circulation. The IPCC system is too slow and patchy in coverage as it relies heavily on existing academic funding systems and is not driven by decision support needs. There is an urgent need for greater investment of at least $1.2-4 billion pa to give policy makers early warning of dangerous climate scenarios. Monitoring and modelling “perfect storm” climate impacts: current climate change impacts research does not capture the most important near term risks for human and national security. By analysing individual impacts it often misses the compound impacts of climate change on food supply, energy security, human and animal health and ecosystems, and how they interact in areas of fragile governance and resource mismanagement. There is a need for investment in dynamic risk modelling of “perfect storm” events – for example 2008 on fuel and food prices – to give early warning for humanitarian and preventive interventions. Increase resilience in international resource management regimes: peaceful management of resource tensions thrown up by climate change will need stronger international management regimes in order to preserve a rule-based global order. These changes could include reframing resource sharing mechanisms, enhancing international arbitration and improving scientific cooperation. The time to strengthen regimes is now, when the impacts of climate change are still at relatively low levels. This will require actions across a wide range of international, regional and bilateral agreements. In some areas - e.g. transboundary water – international adaptation funding should be conditional on agreement to a climate resilient and equitable management regime. Improve cooperation on preventive and humanitarian intervention: climate change will require a major increase in humanitarian and preventive missions by the international community and regional organisations. These will require better coordination, high levels of capability (e.g. civilian lift) and greater investment in preventative approaches to natural disasters. Currently only 5% of the EU humanitarian budget is spent on prevention. Collaborating counties (for example the EU and AU) should begin planning for responses to these high impact scenarios, developing regional scenarios based on a 3-4°C a planning assumption to drive the development of contingency plans and enhanced capability. These elements form a clear basis for different parts of the security community to engage constructively with the climate change negotiations and broader international management regimes in the coming years. Climate and Energy Security - Delivering Climate Security 2010-01-18T15:57:25+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/programmes/climate-articles/copenhagen-week-2-closing-the-deal/ http://www.e3g.org/programmes/climate-articles/copenhagen-week-2-closing-the-deal/#When:13:29:58Z Ten key questions determining the future of everyone on the planet will be answered by the end of next week. 1. Will we stay below two degrees or are we headed for a four degree world? 2. Will the US re-enter or wreck the global climate regime? 3. Are we headed for a legally binding treaty or more talks about talks? 4. Is there enough real money on the table? 5. Are we working on one or two treaties? 6. Will border tax adjustments break the deal? 7. Will China accept international scrutiny of its actions? 8. Did we save the Maldives? 9. Did we get a headline or an outcome? 10. Did the leaders turning up help or hinder? E3G, Third Generation Environmentalism has one of the planet’s most influential and experienced teams of climate change activists in Copenhagen. Specialising in the politics of climate change, they have played a key role over the past two years brokering stronger alignment between governments, business and NGOs on core issues such as the 20C goal, the need to complete a treaty by June 2010, the inclusion of bunker fuels, the technology transition and climate security. With offices in London, Brussels, Beijing and Washington, E3G has mobilised its extensive networks of leaders within government, business and the NGO community to tunnel through geographic, institutional and political barriers to promote a high ambition outcome from Copenhagen. As the fog of war thickens during this crucial week E3G will have a team of eight exceptionally well connected people monitoring and shaping events and available for background briefing and on the record comment. More details available in the Media Advisory available to download above. Climate and Energy Security - Delivering a Global Deal 2009-12-14T13:29:58+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/programmes/climate-articles/technology-action-plans-and-funding-complement-legally-binding-climate-agre/ http://www.e3g.org/programmes/climate-articles/technology-action-plans-and-funding-complement-legally-binding-climate-agre/#When:13:00:20Z Comments on Major Economies Forum Announcement by United States, Italy, India and Australia As we approach the endgame of the Copenhagen climate change negotiations, members of the Major Economies Forum, a group of the largest emitting nations, announced a $350m technology transfer program to support developing countries a series of action plans for key climate technologies and a US led clean energy innovation Ministerial discussion. Secretary Chu of the United States Department of Energy, along with representatives from Italy, India and Australia, came together to make the announcements which mark the culmination of the first six months work by the world’s major economies to shape the pathway for future efforts to develop and deploy technologies. These initiatives can help achieve the step-change required within innovation and diffusion to keep the increase in global temperatures well below 2°C if they are accompanied by legally binding treaties that ensure sustainable global emissions reductions,” said Shane Tomlinson, Programme Leader, Systems for Change, E3G. “At the same time, the reports highlight the scale of the technology challenge – underscoring the need for an additional USD 14-32 billion per annum public energy RD&D spending to achieve climate goals.”  While initiatives such at this are necessary to accelerate technology innovation, establishing the right foundational agreement in the UNFCCC is essential to allow enterprises such as the Major Economies Forum to deliver and ensure countries can count their actions toward internationally agreed targets. Negotiators need to agree new institutions in Copenhagen to operationalise the technology action plans, coordinate activity and provide criteria for measuring, reporting and verifying funding support. This balance of ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ action under the UNFCCC would overcome the dangers of relying on one central fund but still provide full transparency and accountability. Institutional arrangements alone are not enough. World leaders should come together in Copenhagen to address some of the major issues which the Major Economies Forum has highlighted. The major economies should commit to double public spending on energy related research, development and demonstration by 2012 and quadruple it by 2020. To support global decarbonisation countries should also ensure that 15% of this increase is designated for cooperative initiatives with developing countries. Copenhagen is the moment to agree ambitious technology development objectives for renewable energy, energy intensity, adaptation technologies and access to energy for the poor. But, whatever the outcome, Copenhagen can only be a beginning and not an end for delivering a transformational technology agenda. As such it is important that initiatives that accelerate innovation and increase investment, such as the Major Economies Forum, can continue to compliment the formal UN negotiations. The Global Partnership can build momentum and raise ambition by creating innovative solutions to technology issues. Climate REDI (Renewables, Efficiency Deployment Initative) launched today is one example of such a proposal. This comprises four key elements: a programme to promote access to solar and light emitting diode (LED) technology; an efficiency programme for equipment and appliances; a technology information platform; and a renewable energy programme under the World Bank. These initiatives can act as pathfinders to develop the new mechanisms which we need to put all economies onto a low carbon trajectory. The Major Economies Forum should continue to develop such initiatives and broaden its scope to focus on often neglected areas such as adaptation technologies. Nations will also have to find a way to resolve some of the difficult issues which they often fail to grapple with in the formal settings which the United Nations process provides. The innovation Ministerial meetings launched today, and which are open to all interested parties not just the largest countries, should aim to make progress on some of these issues, including knowledge sharing and intellectual property rights. In the intense atmosphere of Copenhagen it is easy to see all issues as negotiating chips in a grand bargain on climate change. In the past that is exactly how technology transfer has been treated. However, to truly succeed the Copenhagen outcome must catalyse and leverage wider action. Achieving this requires an emphasis to build the right UNFCCC institutions but also to launch a new phase in outside initiatives such as the Major Economies Forum. ENDS Editor’s Notes: 1. E3G is an independent, non-profit European organisation operating in the public interest to accelerate the global transition to sustainable development. E3G builds cross-sectoral coalitions to achieve carefully defined outcomes, chosen for their capacity to leverage change. E3G works closely with like-minded partners in government, politics, business, civil society, science, the media, public interest foundations and elsewhere. 2. E3G’s portfolio on similar subject includes: Breaking the Climate Deadlock: Technology for Low Carbon Future Innovation and Technology Transfer: Framework for a Global Climate Deal UNFCCC Technology Institutional Structure: Identifying Convergence in Country Submissions Be careful what you wish for Financial assessment of the technology proposals under the UNFCCC: an E3G-ECN report 3. For further information and to secure interviews with E3G members at COP 15 in Copenhagen please see E3G’s Media Advisory Pack for Copenhagen. Climate and Energy Security - News & Comment, Climate and Energy Security - Delivering a Global Deal 2009-12-14T13:00:20+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/programmes/climate-articles/guardian-the-real-message-of-the-leaked-danish-text/ http://www.e3g.org/programmes/climate-articles/guardian-the-real-message-of-the-leaked-danish-text/#When:16:08:07Z Nick Mabey was asked to give his expert reaction to the leak of Danish text at at the Copenhagen negotiations. His view (copied below) was made as part of wider comment, available at Guardian’s Copenhagen climate conference coverage. Climate policy experts respond to outcry over Danish text Despite anger from developing countries over the leaked document, the negotiations are still on track for success The leaked Danish text provoked only ritualistic reactions from most developing country governments. This is unsurprising. Many of them had already discussed these ideas directly with the Danes. The real message of “leakgate” is hopeful. If these negotiations were really doomed to failure then the leak would have been seized on as an opportunity to stall the talks. This did not happen. In fact the head of the G77 group of developing countries explicitly rejected walking out as a response. This means countries are serious about getting a deal at Copenhagen. They do not intend to be distracted by mischievous interventions and leaks, events which will only proliferate as the negotiations progress. Chinese newspapers correctly focused on the inadequacy of the US emission reductions target, not the Danish leak. The biggest action in Copenhagen today was a dispute between the small island states and the big developing countries over whether China and India should accept legally binding obligations at Copenhagen. This did result in the suspension of negotiations, but because of a dispute over a vital pillar of the climate regime not a newspaper story. This mature attitude by negotiators bodes well for success at Copenhagen. As the fog of war thickens we all have a responsibility to focus on the issues that really count for people and the planet. Exaggerating differences between countries only benefits those who don’t want an ambitious agreement to be reached at Copenhagen.” Nick Mabey is the CEO and Founding Director of E3G. Climate and Energy Security - News & Comment, Climate and Energy Security - Delivering a Global Deal 2009-12-09T16:08:07+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/programmes/climate-articles/the-european-low-carbon-transformation-if-not-now-when/ http://www.e3g.org/programmes/climate-articles/the-european-low-carbon-transformation-if-not-now-when/#When:13:00:34Z Europe at a crossroads The transition to a low carbon economy is already in motion. International revenues from companies providing goods and services related to climate change already exceed the aerospace and defence sectors and could reach nearly €1.35 trillion by 2020 (see note 1 below).  Europe has long recognized the benefits of the low carbon transformation and has played a leadership role at home and internationally by adopting commitments to reduce its emissions ahead of any other major economy. Now is the time to accelerate the pace of the European low carbon transformation. Massive investments will be made in the next years to upgrade and create infrastructure that will operate for several decades. A critical question is how these investments can move Europe toward a low carbon pathway in the long term. If Europe delays the pace of the decarbonisation agenda, it will miss the most cost-effective opportunity in a generation to clean up its infrastructure. The recession adds new impetus for accelerating the low carbon transformation in Europe. Lower emissions due to the economic downturn create a historical opportunity to increase the pace of Europe’s decarbonisation. Recent analysis shows that the fall in emissions caused by the recession has reduced the cost of achieving the 30% target well below the estimates for reaching 20% when that target was agreed as EU policy in December 2008 (see note 2 below). Science also calls for faster action: the world has about five years to begin the low carbon industrial transformation required to move to a 2°C world (see note 3 below).  The IEA has estimated that every year of delay in climate action will add an extra €336 billion to the clean investment needed globally between 2010 and 2030 in the energy sector. Policy for transformation: Beyond “least expensive” compliance tools The low carbon economy will on balance increase employment and economic activity in Europe as imports of fossil fuels are replaced by domestic investment in new technology and highly efficient infrastructure. However, as with any transition it will also create winners and losers. To maintain public support, a just transition must be ensured where jobs are protected and industry losses are minimised. The best way to manage this transition is to put the right policies in place quickly to capture the full benefits of the transformation. The main pillar of EU policy for combating climate change and accelerating the transition to a clean energy economy is the Climate Package, adopted in December 2008 (see note 4 below).  As part of this effort Member States have agreed collectively to reduce GHG emissions by 20 percent relative to 1990 levels by 2020 and to source 20 percent of final energy consumption from renewable sources. The emissions reduction target will rise to 30 percent in the context of a global agreement where other developed countries take on comparable targets and major developing countries contribute adequately. The EU has already committed to reducing emissions by 80-90 percent by 2050. Assuming a linear trajectory this would mean at least a 40 percent reduction by 2020. But today the EU has no real roadmap for moving beyond its current 2020 target apart from hazy statements that an additional 5 percent could come from international offsets generated in developing countries and a further 3 percent from land-use changes. A credible policy strategy for speeding up the European low carbon transformation is needed. The EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) remains the main tool for achieving emission reductions. Unfortunately, current debate has centred solely on reducing the short term cost of compliance with the ETS, with a heavy focus on the use of international offsets. Though offsets reduce immediate compliance costs they lower the incentives for transformational change in Europe. The UK Climate Change Committee has built its assessment of the UK’s long term carbon budget on the assumption that net flows of offsets will cease in large quantities by 2030 when all major economies have binding reduction caps. Relying on a future stream of low cost offsets to reach the EU’s increasingly stringent targets risks facing high costs risks in the future. Transformational change requires innovative policies that scale up investments in energy efficiency, low carbon infrastructure and transport. In the short term, a strong focus must be placed on achieving domestic energy efficiency targets and adopting stronger efficiency standards for buildings and appliances will help companies and consumers capture immediate, negative cost efficiency gains. In the medium and longer term, a fundamental challenge is to ramp up investment in smart grids, other low carbon infrastructure, buildings and transport. The geography of Europe has placed its major renewable energy resources on the periphery: North Sea Wind; Mediterranean solar and Eastern European biomass. Europe will need a pan-European Electricity Grid if it is to efficiently decarbonise its power sector and meet the increased demand for clean power from electric cars. Emissions from transport are growing rapidly and contributing to a larger share of total emissions. Standards and government support will be necessary to boost R&D programs on greener vehicles, advanced engine technologies, hybridisation and electric cars, high-speed rail networks and other clean technology public transportation systems. The quality of the policies promoting innovation will play a pivotal role in consolidating the first-mover advantage of Europe’s low carbon industries and in maintaining a lead in market share in clean technology market. The potential to create low carbon jobs Policies supporting the low carbon industries can catalyse a new generation of low carbon jobs creation and stimulate retooling of current workforce. Estimates vary but agree that strong public policy supporting low carbon industries can have a noticeable effect on jobs. According to the EU, improving current policies so that the target of 20 percent renewable energy in final energy consumption in 2020 can be achieved will provide a net effect of about 410,000 additional jobs. It is estimated that a 30 percent reduction target for Europe could lead to an increase of 1.1 million jobs by 2020 (see note 5 below).  In addition to putting in place strong decarbonisation policies, public support will be needed to build new skills into the European workforce and to enhance existing ones. Without incentives for training and retooling, Europe risks facing supply shortages in the low carbon job marketplace. A recent study for the UK by the Aldersgate Group of companies has shown the need for rapid and accelerated investment in skills if low carbon targets are to be met (see note 6 below). Most of the public discussions about job creation potential have been on clean energy jobs but a broader focus is needed. As the low carbon transformation deepens, more attention should be placed on investing in new skills in a broader set of areas including resource efficiency, energy efficiency, clean transportation, and de-materialisation of products, and green buildings. Financing Europe’s low carbon growth and job creation: building national green infrastructure banks Public policy however will not be enough to catalyse change. Without an adequate finance strategy, low carbon industries will not be able to reach the scale required. This will put a break on job creation opportunities. More aggressive investment is needed in these sectors to lay the foundation for new global European industries. Grasping this opportunity will require creative ways to mobilise funds from risk-averse investors toward energy efficiency, low carbon infrastructure, and transport. The idea of developing green infrastructure banks to help support the low carbon transition is growing in the UK, Germany and even the US. A green infrastructure bank (GIB) can leverage private capital and scale up low carbon investments in Europe. A GIB would put in place multiple public-private financing mechanisms to shift capital toward existing and new infrastructure. This green bank could be self-financing in the medium term, while delivering increased confidence and growth in low carbon markets. Sector-specific banks are not new. In 1958, the European Investment Bank (EIB) was launched to facilitate the integration of Member States. The bank is policy-driven, based on priorities by Member State shareholders and raising funds on the capital market, which it then uses to provide loans and other financial products to projects furthering EU policy objectives. The EIB is already redirecting large amounts of its portfolio towards low carbon sectors and will effectively become a pan-European GIB. However, national GIBs are also needed to undertake more complex and nationally specific tasks, especially helping with local financing issues on energy efficiency and infrastructure. In many countries a GIB could be based on existing national development banks, thought there is a strong argument for building dedicated institutions with focused expertise. A GIB could provide multiple opportunities for Governments to deliver low carbon investments by acting as a mechanism to ensure that Government guaranteed funds are effectively earmarked for green infrastructure allowing them to direct investment of this capital through strict investment criteria. A GIB could act as loan guarantor on behalf of the Government; it could facilitate transparent communication of government policy and reporting on levels of success and finance; and syndicate a delivery of low carbon investment programmes such as a national energy efficiency scheme. A specialized infrastructure bank is preferable to ad hoc financial mechanisms. Firstly, it would provide public sector expertise to deliver public good outcomes within a commercial environment, eliminating some of the conflicts associated with using commercial agents for these tasks. It would also provide on-going innovative capacity to respond to the multiple and often unanticipated demands accruing from the low carbon transition. Finally, a GIB could increase market confidence because the government would be backing its own policies through direct investment thus signalling to investors that low carbon investment is a solid proposition. Final remarks There is no low cost, high carbon future for Europe. Failure to lead the global transformation to a low carbon economy would leave the EU exposed to massive climate change damages and soaring fossil fuel prices as peak oil hits in the next few decades. With a low carbon economy the only viable alternative is how quickly Europe will drive its own transition. Delay often seems attractive as a least cost option, but is not in this case. Europe needs to replace its aging energy infrastructure in the next two decades. Failure to make the new generation of power plants, buildings and factories low carbon will lock in high costs into the future. Grasping the opportunity to change will create jobs and help support the industries of the future. The Chinese have a saying that you cannot cross a ravine by taking small steps. Now is the time for Europe to jump into a low carbon future. Notes 1. HSBC, 2009. Climate Change – September annual index review.  Climate revenues – an industrial reality. 2. E3G, 2009. 30 Percent and Beyond: Strengthening EU Leadership on Climate Change. 3. That is, global average temperature is expected to increase no more than 2 degrees Celsius compared to preindustrial levels. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2007a) Summary for Policymakers.  In Climate Change 2007: Fourth Assessment Report, Synthesis Report (AR4). Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA. 4. European Commission, 2009. Stepping up International Climate Finance: A European Blueprint for the Copenhagen Deal. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, September 2009. 5. The Climate Group & The Office of Tony Blair, September 2009. Cutting the Cost: The Economic Benefits of Collaborative Climate Action. 6. Aldersgate Group, 2009. Mind the Gap: skills for the transition to a low carbon economy. This briefing note was also published in Foreign Policy in Spanish. Climate and Energy Security - Delivering a Global Deal 2009-11-25T13:00:34+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/programmes/climate-articles/tom-burke-on-voice-of-america-environment-ministers-meet-in-effort-to-invig/ http://www.e3g.org/programmes/climate-articles/tom-burke-on-voice-of-america-environment-ministers-meet-in-effort-to-invig/#When:12:45:45Z US President Barack Obama announced on Monday that time had run out on signing a legally binding deal at Copenhagen. Tom Burke was interviewed on this latest statement from the US by Lisa Bryant of Voice of America. The article, ‘Environment Ministers Meet in Effort to Invigorate Climate Talks’ is below as it appeared on Voice of America news , with Tom’s quote highlighted.  Environment Ministers Meet in Effort to Invigorate Climate Talks Environment ministers from about 40 countries are meeting for two days in Copenhagen to revive climate change talks. The ministers meeting comes amid deep discord over whether and when a binding climate change treaty can be reached to replace the 1997 Kyoto Protocol. Sunday, Asian and Pacific nation leaders agreed it is unrealistic to agree to a deal at a world summit in Copenhagen next month. They have called instead for a non-binding political agreement as an interim measure. But several poorer nations, along with some European countries, want Copenhagen to produce a binding treaty.  French Environment Minister Jean Louis Borloo told Reuters news agency the United States is the main problem toward achieving a deal. The U.S. Congress has yet to pass a law capping greenhouse gas emissions, making it difficult for President Barack Obama to act until that happens. Despite the impasse, climate expert Tom Burke believes there are ways of moving forward. Burke is the founding director of E3G, an environmental nongovernmental organization based in London. “I think everybody understands that the president [Obama] wants to get back on board. I think we all recognize that the Congress has a way of being spectacularly parochial in its approach to this subject and that in a sense the president has to find a way around that,” said Burke. “If that is the problem, I think there is a big willingness to try to accommodate that. If there are bigger problems that the U.S. has, that will be more difficult.” There are other roadblocks. Fast-growing nations like China and India are also reluctant to adopt binding greenhouse-gas reduction measures. Richer nations are also at odds over aid to help poorer ones adapt to climate change. And the 192 nations expected at the December Copenhagen summit have yet to agree on fixed targets for cutting greenhouse gas emissions. Climate and Energy Security - Delivering a Global Deal 2009-11-16T12:45:45+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/programmes/climate-articles/unfccc-technology-institutional-structure-identifying-convergence-in-countr/ http://www.e3g.org/programmes/climate-articles/unfccc-technology-institutional-structure-identifying-convergence-in-countr/#When:12:21:39Z This paper identifies the key elements needed to ensure enhanced action on technology transfer and development and then evaluates the approaches taken in major country positions. It finds a number of important convergences in these positions and identifies four types of institutions that recur in country positions: central bodies, dedicated funds, regional institutions and coordinating committees. Matching these institutions to functional needs suggests that a combination of institutional structures best meets all the institutional needs of a technology agreement.  An earlier version of this paper was written by WRI and E3G to assist Chinese and EU participants of the “Informal Workshop on Technology Cooperation and Transfer in Relation to UNFCCC Negotiations,” on October 26, 2009 in Shanghai. The full report is available to download above.  Climate and Energy Security - Delivering a Global Deal 2009-11-04T12:21:39+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/programmes/climate-articles/what-the-security-community-needs-from-copenhagen-washington-roundtable/ http://www.e3g.org/programmes/climate-articles/what-the-security-community-needs-from-copenhagen-washington-roundtable/#When:14:52:53Z On October 22nd, E3G convened a roundtable discussion in Washington entitled ‘What the Security Community needs from Copenhagen’.  This was the 3rd in the series of workshops involving security and climate experts from the U.S. and Europe to explore how to construct a systematic risk management approach to climate change. The UNFCCC’s December meeting in Copenhagen must deliver the foundations of an effective, predictable and institutionally robust climate protection regime in order to preserving security and stability at current levels.  The UN treaty represents an indispensable component of an effective global climate control regime.  However, this will need to be supplemented by additional plurilateral, regional and bilateral cooperation.  In this way the climate change regime has strong analogies to the existing non-proliferation regime, and looks to carry out similar functions in terms of trust-building, monitoring, control and verification of greenhouse gas emissions. If successful, the UN climate talks have the potential to provide significant security benefits in reducing conflict risks and avoiding catastrophic climatic impacts in the coming decades. A successful regime would also provide other indirect benefits by supporting a more collaborative approach to international relations including cooperation on areas such as energy security, conflict prevention, and development.  Alternatively, significant failure at Copenhagen could exacerbate tensions between and within countries, undermining cooperation and leading to a politics of insecurity as countries and communities focus on protecting themselves against climate change impacts, potentially at the expense of others. In order to correctly value the importance of mitigation and adaptation measures, climate change negotiators need to be more aware of existing security community analysis on potential climate change related threats including: loss of territory, statelessness and increased numbers of displaced persons; stress on shared international water resources, e.g. with the melting of glaciers; and tensions surrounding the opening of the Arctic region to resource exploitation and trade.  Climate policy makers could also learn from security community approaches to managing worst case scenarios, as climate change poses significant threats to global security and wellbeing that appear quite likely, are large in magnitude, may unfold relatively swiftly, and are unprecedented in nature. At the same time, it is essential that the security community are highly engaged in the proposed climate change regime, in order to understand the likelihood of it effectively control climate change, as this will impact security planning scenarios; clarify the security impacts of climate change polices; and highlight areas where the climate regime will not address serious security threats. The aim of this meeting was to build on previous discussions and workshops to explore how the international climate regime can help to improve the prospects for continued delivery of high levels of global security.  The questions addressed on the agenda focused on the following issues: Will the planned global international climate regime effectively reduce the risk of significant security threats from climate change? What is the best case scenario for future climate change under a Copenhagen regime? What do current security regimes suggest will be key elements of a successful climate regime? What are the critical risks to the success of the global climate change regime? How can these risks be mitigated and minimised? What are our fall-back options for controlling climate change? In case of Copenhagen failure will the UN Security Council become a forum for climate change? How can the security community help other policy audiences consider credible worst case scenarios inside climate change politics and policy? What is the security community’s role in communicating the security consequences of worst case scenarios to decision makers? Can climate policy makers learn from security community in terms of how to manage and deliver investment in large scale collaborative R&D programmes on low carbon technologies inside limited timescales? How might a crash programme of climate mitigation be prepared (e.g. CCS, CSP, solar, bio-fuels, etc.) in case of more rapid and extreme climate change? Where and how will some of the major security impacts of climate change and climate policy be managed in the international system e.g. increased proliferation risks from expanded use of nuclear power; trans-boundary water tensions due to new water control investment; management of environmental refugees; management of terrestrial and maritime border disputes due to shifting sea-level and resource distribution? How can the international climate regime help stimulate greater investment in early warning systems and conflict prevention and resilience? The workshop was attended by high level experts from various security community professionals including Dr. Jay Gulledge of Pew Climate Centre, Sherri Goodman from CNA, Jennifer Morgan of WRI, Geoff Dabelko of Wilson Centre and Robert McKinnon of Embassy of Australia, Washington. Nick Mabey’s presentation is available to download above. If you would like more information on this project, would like to get involved or be kept in the loop on future workshops, please contact E3G. Climate and Energy Security - Delivering Climate Security 2009-10-28T14:52:53+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/programmes/climate-articles/feasibility-study-on-eu-china-low-carbon-technology-and-investment-demonstr/ http://www.e3g.org/programmes/climate-articles/feasibility-study-on-eu-china-low-carbon-technology-and-investment-demonstr/#When:15:49:34Z E3G’s work on EU-China cooperation continues to grow. Following the successful conceptualisation and demonstration of case studies of Low Carbon Zones, E3G, in cooperation with China International Investment Promotion Agency (CIIPA) conducted a feasibility study on Low Carbon Technology and Investment Demonstration Zones (LCTIDZs). The concept of a Low Carbon Economy has recently gained greater prominence internationally as a result of the impacts of climate change on the environment, economic development and social stability. Therefore, the development of a low carbon economy not only has implications for policy and technology, it can also lead to deeper structural economic and industrial changes and transformation of consumption patterns. EU-China LCTIDZs aim to explore China-specific technology development pathways and strategies to promote low carbon development. It will hopefully provide a good foundation for future policy exchanges and collaborations between the relevant departments in China and the EU, and cooperation between businesses in both regions. The report available to download above, was officially launched at the 13th China International Fair for Investment and Trade held in Xiamen on September 10, 2009. An excerpt from the Press Release by CIIPA is below. Promotion of Low Carbon Investment Cooperation and Industrial Upgrading and Restructuring An important agenda of the conference is the launch of the Report of Feasibility Study on EU-China Low Carbon Technology and Investment Demonstration Zones. This Report is jointly prepared by China International Investment Promotion Agency (CIIPA) and E3G and recommends, inter alia, Pingliang City and Nanjing Yangtze River Industrial Development Zoneas potential demonstration zones. It also explores future project/investment opportunities for major European low carbon technology and investment companies in the relevant cities in China. CIIPA hopes to use the Report as an important guidance for domestic investment promotion agencies and economic zones to promote international cooperation on low carbon technology and investment.  Low carbon economy refers to a new economic development model that is signified by low carbon emission and low carbon consumption. Faced with the concerns of climate change and energy security, international community has widely accepted the role of low carbon economy as the future model of sustainable development; low carbon technology and low carbon development capacity will also become the focus of competition for international investment and technology. The development of low carbon economy is fully coherent to the national aim of constructing a ‘resource saving and environmental friendly’ society, and is also consistent with the strategic plan to transform future economic growth model as envisaged by the Party Central Committee and the State Council. As a result, taking into account China’s actual conditions, it is imperative for China to actively promote indigenous innovation and carry out extensive international cooperation.    CIIPA will act in accordance to the national strategy and will promote international cooperation through investment to obtain international advanced experiences, technologies and finances. This can be achieved via low carbon technology and investment cooperation demonstrations and can contribute to China’s sustainable, science-based and harmonious development. ENDS Download the Feasibility Study in English and Chinese above. Climate and Energy Security - Activities, Europe in the World - EU-China Partnership 2009-09-24T15:49:34+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/programmes/climate-articles/systematic-risk-management-approaches-to-climate-change-london-workshop/ http://www.e3g.org/programmes/climate-articles/systematic-risk-management-approaches-to-climate-change-london-workshop/#When:14:34:29Z E3G hosted a thinking event in early September in London and Washington to discuss systematic risk management approaches to climate change. This was the first of a series of workshops with security and climate experts from the U.S. and Europe to explore how to construct a systematic risk management approach to climate change. The aim of these series is to produce an outline for a paper on risk management and a process to turn this into a published document in advance of Copenhagen. The motivation for holding this session came from the confluence of E3G’s thinking on climate change and security, low carbon innovation, the Copenhagen negotiations and the discussions around real world decarbonistion paths we have been deeply involved in Europe and China. In all these discussions we have been struck by the reluctance of policy makers and processes to fully embrace the ranges of uncertainty around climate change science, impacts and policy delivery and develop clear risk management approaches in response. In the worst case policy is being constructed based on average scenarios for climate risks and impacts and highly optimistic scenarios for policy (e.g. cessation of deforestation by 2030). This approach risks significant failure of climate policies covering mitigation and adaptation to achieve expected outcomes, and consequently could reduce political and public support for strengthening climate policy as an air of fatalism over our ability to prevent climate change takes hold. The risks of not planning for the worst case scenario are well recognised in other areas; most notably national security. An intelligent analyst would be dismissed if they failed to include a 9/11 style terrorist “spectacular” including nuclear weapons in a scenario assessment alongside more probable types of bombing attacks, but this is a good analogy of how climate policy is generally conducted. There has been a debate about how - or even whether - worst case scientific scenarios should be communicated to the general public, but our concern in this process is with elite policy making audiences. The workshop was a pioneering dialogue on the issue in an integrated manner looking at: ranges of uncertainty in the climate science ranges of uncertainty in climate impacts capacity for risk mitigation through adaptation and uncertainties in adaptation effectiveness and unforeseen impacts risks in the impact and delivery of mitigation response measures discussion of risk management approaches to manage critical risk areas and worst case scenarios e.g. how to set of emissions pathways/targets; resilient adaptation strategies; monitoring the onset of extreme climate impacts; greater investment in low carbon R&D; anticipatory investment in grid technology; preparing for “crash programmes” in low carbon energy deployment and deployment of geo-engineering. E3G will be linking this discussion directly to its work on climate security – primarily in the US – where we will be working with the security community to develop a shared approach to “What the US security community needs from Copenhagen” with the aim of influencing the Senate and US Administration to strengthen critical areas of the Copenhagen agreement and domestic legislation. The risk management paper will provide part of the analytical basis for this work as it will mirror classic strategic planning approaches used by the military and other security actors. Participants at the London event included representatives from IEA, LSE, Chatham House, RAND Europe, Bradford University and Scottish Government. Nick Mabey’s presentation is available to download above. If you would like more information on this project, would like to get involved or be kept in the loop on future workshops, please contact E3G.   Climate and Energy Security - Delivering Climate Security 2009-09-22T14:34:29+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/programmes/climate-articles/living-on-earth-radio-mired-in-the-mud-on-the-road-to-copenhagen/ http://www.e3g.org/programmes/climate-articles/living-on-earth-radio-mired-in-the-mud-on-the-road-to-copenhagen/#When:11:06:37Z Following the G8 meeting in L’Aquila, Italy, there has been a lot of coverage on the group’s G8’s commitment to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 80 per cent by 2050 and avoid average global temperatures from rising more than two degrees Celsius. But is it all smoke and mirrors or is there real progress towards a Global Climate Deal at Copenhagen in December 2009? Living on Earth’s Steve Curwood speaks to Jennifer Morgan to get a feel for what this means within international climate negotiations. Mired in the Mud on the Road to Copenhagen G8 leaders failed to persuade developing countries to halve their emissions by 2050. The Obama administration’s debut at the World Economic Summit ends with little progress made toward a global climate change treaty expected by December in Copenhagen. The G8 agreed for the first time that a global temperature increase beyond 2 degrees Celsius would be dangerous, but didn’t set goals that would encourage developing countries, like China and India, to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions. Host Steve Curwood talks with climate diplomacy expert Jennifer Morgan about how the world can work together to get back on the road to Copenhagen. CURWOOD: It’s Living on Earth, I’m Steve Curwood. YOUNG: and I’m Jeff Young. When the leaders of the G8 and major economies got together in Italy, they struck an agreement to prevent average global temperatures from rising more than two degrees Celsius, that’s about three and a half degrees Fahrenheit. And for the first time the G8 agreed to cut greenhouse gas emissions by 80 percent by 2050. CURWOOD: But the G8 couldn’t agree among themselves on how to reach these goals, nor how to help developing countries decarbonize their growing economies. President Obama pledged to keep climate negotiations moving forward between now and the key meeting in December in Copenhagen. “My hope is that between now and Copenhagen President Obama can work with the American public to show how it’s in American’s national interest to move forward on an ambitious deal in Copenhagen.” Obama: Developed countries like my own have a historic responsibility to take the lead. We have the much larger carbon footprint per capita and I know that in the past the United States has sometimes fallen short of meeting our responsibilities, so let me be clear those days are over. CURWOOD: Climate diplomacy expert Jennifer Morgan is with the environmental think tank E3G and joins us on the line now from Berlin. Tell me, Ms. Morgan, what do developed countries have to do to close the gap with developing ones such as China? MORGAN: Well first of all I think that developing countries need to see that this is possible, that we can have economic growth and decarbonizes our economies at the same time. And that means they need to see strong laws in place in developed countries like the United States, Japan and Europe, and those aren’t all out there yet. So they need to see incredible down payments for the short term, for 2020 from developed countries, and they need to see really pragmatic but very fundamental offers on financial support and on technology transfer. Last week Prime Minister Brown from the United Kingdom put a proposal on the table that would, through a range of public and private financing, gather $100 billion to support developing countries to adapt to climate change. Those types of proposals we need to see many more of. CURWOOD: $100 billion dollars from the world. MORGAN: Yes, $100 billion dollars from the world. CURWOOD: So this was the Obama administration’s first appearance on the world summit’s stage on climate change. How did America do? MORGAN: Well I think so you a fundamental change from the previous eight years from these G8s on climate change. You see the adoption of a goal that the world, including the United States, has now said, you know, if you go above 3.5 degree increase in temperature it’s too much – the impacts are too much. And that I think is a real fundamental shift. And President Obama was there. He adopted that. And from that perspective, I think, you see just a massive difference in the way that the G8 has approached this problem. CURWOOD: Still, at this point, it looks like the U.S. Congress is willing to do less than what the European Union says it would like to have for example. So how can President Obama walk that line and still get a credible deal in Copenhagen? MORGAN: I think this is a very challenging issue for President Obama. My hope is that between now and Copenhagen President Obama can work with the American public to show how it’s in American’s national interest to move forward on an ambitious deal in Copenhagen. CURWOOD: Now this was supposed to be President Obama’s chance to talk with the Chinese President Hu, but of course, Mr. Hu has some civil unrest back home – he had to go home before he really could talk about this at the climate meeting. “I think fundamentally now it’s a problem of leadership and courage. You have a game of chicken going on, and people not wanting to blink first.” MORGAN: Yes, very unfortunate, I think. And I think that took certainly some of the dynamic out of the meeting. But there is a very strong dialogue happening between the U.S. and China right now on climate change and energy and I think they’ve gotta find another time to talk soon. CURWOOD: Jennifer Morgan, it seems pretty clear what everybody wants in terms of the climate. Nobody wants to go over 3.5 degrees Fahrenheit. The developing countries want the tools to decarbonize. The developing world wants to have a level playing field. What’s the problem with getting to an agreement? MORGAN: I think fundamentally now it’s a problem of leadership and courage. You have a game of chicken going on, and people not wanting to blink first. And I think people need to understand that this is not a zero sum game, that we need leaders to step forward and to take some risks and to have some courage and to lead, not to wait for others to move first before they move, because the time is much too short for those types of chicken games. CURWOOD: Jennifer Morgan is global climate change director of the environmental think tank E3G. Ms. Morgan thanks for your time. MORGAN: Thank you very much. Climate and Energy Security - News & Comment, Climate and Energy Security - Delivering a Global Deal 2009-07-13T11:06:37+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/programmes/climate-articles/financing-the-uks-low-carbon-transformation/ http://www.e3g.org/programmes/climate-articles/financing-the-uks-low-carbon-transformation/#When:15:06:28Z The financial crisis presents both risks and opportunities to the UK’s low carbon transformation. As public funding will be squeezed, the public will be less willing to see energy prices rise in the short term to pay for low carbon investment. On the other hand, aggressive investment in energy efficiency, renewables and other low carbon infrastructure generates opportunities in the form of immediate well-paid jobs in the UK, lay the foundation for future global industries and help protect the UK from the economic impacts of future oil price shocks. Grasping the economic opportunity of the low carbon transition will require creative ways to mobilise private funds in a risk averse market into public purpose activity. Energy Efficiency, Renewables and Low Carbon Infrastructure E3G and Climate Change Capital produced the three papers above in the run up to the UK Budget examining possible solutions in the areas of efficiency, renewables and infrastructure finance. The UK Government is committed under the EU Renewables Directive to ensure that 15% of the UK’s final energy consumption is renewable by 2020 – a tenfold increase on today’s capacity. “Delivering Centralised Renewables” outlines both policy and financial measures to ensure this target is met. Bearing in mind that a National Energy Efficiency Programme is essential to UK’s green fiscal stimulus and ‘smart’ recovery, the paper entitled “Delivering Energy Efficiency to the Residential Sector” recommends 2 approaches on how one may be funded. Finally, “Accelerating Green Infrastructure Financing” provides a rationale for, and main design features of, three potential interventions: renewable energy investment support, a Green Infrastructure Bank and Green Bonds as a means to raise new finance. The ideas outlined in these papers is being refined and taken forward over the next 6 months. E3G and Climate Change Capital welcome any feedback.  Climate and Energy Security - Thinking, Systems for Change - Low Carbon Finance 2009-07-01T15:06:28+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/programmes/climate-articles/the-future-of-climate-policy/ http://www.e3g.org/programmes/climate-articles/the-future-of-climate-policy/#When:08:12:39Z Tom Burke was recently invited to address The Tomorrow Project at an event held at the Royal Society. His speech is below and available to download too, calling on political will to ‘protect the future of civilisation’. The Future of Climate Policy An idea that has been haunting me since the beginning of the year is that this is the most important year in human history. Ideas do not seek permission before they enter your mind and they are not always the most welcome of guests. This was very definitely an unwelcome idea. It was prompted by the articles run in several newspapers anticipating the events of the year to come. Bravely, they passed judgement on the likelihood of everything from an early election (no) to the bombing of Iran; from the price of oil (higher) to the fall of Mugabe. They were full of prognostications – mostly very gloomy – about the state of the economy. We know that, terrible though consequences of war and recession are, they pass. Climate change is for ever. But it was what they did not say that really caught my attention. None of them seemed to have noticed that in December of this year a meeting far more important than war or recession to the future prosperity and security of all seven billion of us will take place in Copenhagen. We know that, terrible though consequences of war and recession are, they pass. Climate change is for ever. At around that time Brian Eno wrote a piece in the Guardian about the difference between a world in which people feel could be a ‘better place’ and one they feel to be a ‘nightmare of desperation, fear and suspicion’. In the latter world ‘freeloaders and brigands and pirates and cheats will take control.’ Do not overlook, in all talk of rising sea-levels, melting ice-caps and the droughts, floods, fires and diseases that will be the markers of a rapidly changing climate, the fact that riding along with them will be the freeloaders, brigands, pirates and cheats. Brian Eno was writing, as both Martin Wolf and Timothy Garton Ash have also done, about the impact on politics of shifting from a world of abundance to one of scarcity. There is nothing in our knowledge of a world without a stable climate to lead us to believe a changing climate will shift it back. We know that dangerous climate change is a threat to the fragile film of order we humans have built around the chaos of events and call ‘civilisation’. The punctuation of history is denoted by the names of the places where order was restored after chaos had prevailed – Westphalia, Versailles, San Francisco. It is not an exaggeration to say that the implications of what happens – or does not – in Copenhagen in December will do more to shape human destiny for longer than any of them. The reason for this is the unique nature the climate as a human problem. We know that dangerous climate change is a threat to the fragile film of order we humans have built around the chaos of events and call ‘civilisation’. We know, because Europe’s political leaders have said so, that a rise in global average temperature of more than two degrees Celsius is dangerous. It would turn a problem that is serious but manageable into one that is unmanageable and catastrophic. We know from our scientists that greenhouse gas emissions must be moving downwards globally by 2015 if we are to have at best an evens chance of staying below two degrees. It would be rash to put your house on an evens bet, it is something a lot more reckless to be betting civilisation on those odds. The nature of the climate is such that the future cannot redeem today’s mistakes. Once a given concentration of carbon is in the atmosphere, the climate it drives is inexorable even if it takes decades or more to fully express itself. In the most literal sense, the sins of the fathers will indeed be visited on the sons and well beyond the third and fourth generation. We humans do not learn easily. We try and fail and try again. Our progress is incremental and we are prone to repeating our mistakes. We are too often content to let the future redeem the mistakes of the present. Climate change does not suit us. We have little experience with the irrevocable, and dislike exacting time limits. Compared to the diplomatic effort needed to achieve success in Copenhagen that required for a final settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian problem or to deter Iran from seeking nuclear weapons is relatively small. But there is little sign that an effort of the required level of ambition is yet being made. Compare the amount of media coverage, and intensity of political effort, given to the Middle East to that accorded to climate change. History does not have an agenda on which items can be prioritised. Either you deal with the events it throws at you or they deal with you. This is not to diminish in any way the magnitude of those problems nor to argue that less should be done to address them. It is rather to point out the classic human error of allowing the more immediate to obscure the more urgent. History does not have an agenda on which items can be prioritised. Either you deal with the events it throws at you or they deal with you. As Carlyle once remarked “if something be not done, something will do itself and in a way that pleases no-one”*. No leader will want to come away from Copenhagen saying they failed to solve the most serious problem facing humanity. But the appearance of success will be easier to achieve than the substance. It will consist of words and the less the success the more interpretable the words. The Copenhagen negotiations are among the most complex ever undertaken. The goal is to achieve a so-called ‘global deal’ in which the industrialised world agrees to a second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol and agrees to provide finance for adaptation and the transfer of low carbon technologies in return for rest of the world undertaking ‘monitorable, reportable and verifiable’ commitments to reduce their emissions. In reality there are two main, and a number of related negotiations, including those on forestry, going on separately under the same umbrella without, as yet, a clear mechanism for bringing them all together. The issue of the legal form of whatever will be agreed in Copenhagen is one of the least discussed but potentially most difficult of the matters to be resolved. National leaders are currently distracted by the need to engineer an economic recovery. They are increasingly unwilling to impose constraints on economic growth. Furthermore, public finances are already over-stretched by the loss of tax revenues and urgent need to finance economic stimulus packages. This considerably narrows the scope for agreement on the necessary funding for adaptation and technology transfer. Proposals for financing such capital flows rely heavily on a carbon price or permit auction revenues which are themselves dependent on the agreement by the industrialised countries to a second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol. There is thus a considerable risk of a chicken and egg impasse. The first commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol expires at the end of 2012. Two years is the time typically needed to go from reaching such an agreement to its binding commitments coming into force. Delay beyond the end of this year therefore risks undermining the revenues flows needed to get agreement in the first place.  While previous experience suggests that there is some margin to continue negotiating beyond the end of 2009 this margin is small. In any case, uncertainty as to whether or not the world remains on course to develop a global price for carbon lead to future carbon prices being discounted well before the negotiations conclude. This would in turn lead to pressure for a more direct, but less politically deliverable, sourcing of the capital flows to the developing world needed for agreement on the ‘global deal’ to be reached. Balanced against this gloomy prognosis is the re-entry of the United States into the constructive development of the global climate regime. There is no doubt, both from president Obama’s campaign pledges, from the frequent inclusion of references to climate change in his speeches, and from the nature of his appointments to key posts that his administration will now play a full and leading part in addressing this issue globally. However, this will not be an unmixed blessing and the re-engagement will need to be skilfully handled to avoid creating new problems as it solves those which are familiar. Politically, President Obama has pledged to reduce U.S.  domestic emissions to 1990 levels by 2020 and to aim for a reduction of 80% from present levels by 2050. This is an ambitious goal which converges on that of the EU albeit on a different trajectory. The gap between rhetoric and action on climate change in even the most serious of nations is so wide as to justify much scepticism. Without clear signs of that gap closing, the political conditions for an ambitious enough policy agreement in Copenhagen and later will remain elusive. To deliver it will require very tough federal legislation which a majority of commentators in the U.S. think is unlikely to pass this year. There is also a widespread view that the U.S. will not enter into binding international commitments until it has settled its domestic legislation. This would avoid the risk of repeating the Kyoto experience of negotiating an agreement in good faith only to be unable to achieve ratification by the Senate. Should this prove to be the case, the US would not be in a position to join the other Annex 1 countries in agreeing to a second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol in Copenhagen. This is another reason for anticipating that reaching a final agreement might spill over into 2010. It is widely expected that a core condition for achieving agreement to a ‘global deal’ in Copenhagen by the major developing countries such as China, India and Brazil, will be a US agreement to binding targets. Thus a successful ‘deal’ might require a difficult to accomplish alignment of timetables of the UN treaty process and us domestic legislative process. There are four broad outcomes to the negotiations in December. The first is the satisfactory achievement of the so-called ‘global deal’ along the lines I outlined a moment ago. I cannot say from my recent conversations that this is yet in sight. To achieve it will require rather heavier lifting than we have yet seen from Prime Ministers and Presidents. At the other end of the spectrum there remains a possibility of complete breakdown. Issues such as the amount of credible new money available for adaptation or the failure to agree the exact legal form of the ‘deal’ are readily available breakdown points. The highly stressed atmosphere of the concluding stages of climate negotiations is such that breakdown by accident is quite possible. Between these poles, two other outcomes are possible. A partial success could then lead, as it did at Kyoto, to later recovery. Or, a partial success could lead, in ways that are all too familiar from trade negotiations, to a prolonged loss of momentum. Of all the outcomes, this latter is the one that is most dangerous. Political leaders will have got the headline and crossed the problem off the to-do list. But nothing will actually have happened and re-starting the momentum will take time we do not have and will quite likely require some kind of catastrophic event. Much will depend on how well the political leadership of the major countries understand the complexities of the problem and how effective they are at cutting through them to reach agreement on the essentials: preservation of the Kyoto mechanisms so that there continues to be a carbon price; sufficient additional funding for adaptation and technology transition in the developing world and successfully aligning timetables so that the US can again become a full participant in the global regime. This would not solve the problem, but it would keep open the door to its solution. The world is oversupplied with words and images and very short of deeds. The gap between rhetoric and action on climate change in even the most serious of nations is so wide as to justify much scepticism. Without clear signs of that gap closing, the political conditions for an ambitious enough policy agreement in Copenhagen and later will remain elusive. There is an even larger gap coming ever more clearly into view. This is the gap between what climate science says we need to do and what climate politics says is within the realm of the possible. This is encouraging a realist school of climate policy thinkers to emerge. In this view, we should not be trying to achieve ‘unrealistic’ goals. Better, this counsel of despair advises, to go for something achievable and build on that than to shoot for something too ambitious and fail. In other circumstance, with other problems, this might, indeed, be wise counsel. But for the reasons I gave before, with the particular nature of this problem makes such realist thought indistinguishable from defeatism. We do not have any policy problems with climate change. What we are actually short of is the political will to deploy those policy instruments and the knowledge of how best to go about building that political will. I grew up in a world that spent billions of dollars on building weapons it hoped never to use. When they became obsolete we threw them away and built even more sophisticated and expensive weapons which we hoped never to use. We did that for fifty years. The threat of climate change to the prosperity, security and well-being of everyone on the planet, especially anyone under forty, is far more certain than was the threat of the cold war going hot. There is no engineering reason why we cannot make the transition to a carbon neutral energy system by 2050. Nor is there any fundamental economic obstacle as Nick Stern has demonstrated**. But knowing that solving the climate problem will not damage your economy is not the same as knowing how the cost of doing so should be shared between consumers, taxpayers and shareholders. We do not have any policy problems with climate change. We have an extraordinary range of policy ideas to apply to the hugely diverse ways in which the problem will present itself to us. What we are actually short of is the political will to deploy those policy instruments and the knowledge of how best to go about building that political will. Choosing who will win and who will lose is the province of politics. If politics is the art of the possible then the task of political leadership is that of expanding the realm of the possible. I am in no doubt that it is possible to solve this problem, but I wonder if we have the collective political leadership it will take to do so. Address by Mr Tom Burke CBE to The Tomorrow Project, The Royal Society, London, June 18th 2009. *Carlyle, T. (1840): ‘The Condition of England Question’ ** Stern, N. (2006): ‘The Economics of Climate Change’, Cambridge University Press. Climate and Energy Security - Delivering a Global Deal 2009-06-22T08:12:39+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/programmes/climate-articles/blame-games-on-climate-change/ http://www.e3g.org/programmes/climate-articles/blame-games-on-climate-change/#When:08:06:11Z As the climate change negotiations draw to a close at Bonn, Nick Mabey, CEO of E3G and Malini Mehra, CEO of Centre of Social Markets, summarise their thoughts on the state of play. Their article, entitled ‘Blame games on climate change’ has been published as a comment piece by the Guardian. Blame games on climate change If nations can rise above past conflicts, why can’t they work together at the climate change talks in Bonn? This year was meant to be the year of climate change. Yet UN negotiations in Bonn this week towards a global climate agreement in Copenhagen (COP15) in December are stalling amid a flurry of weak commitments and recriminations. This combined with economic anxiety about pledging assistance to poorer countries is threatening to bring progress to a halt. If COP15 is to succeed, climate negotiators will have to learn lessons from the world of peacemaking and raise their game accordingly. “Negotiators do not seem to realise that the Earth’s climate system is not interested in their clever ploys or claims of action.” At present, climate negotiations are a parody of trade talks, with countries jockeying for advantage, and demanding the most from others while taking the least action possible themselves. The debate over “historical responsibility” has clouded focus and undermined the fragile trust between countries that climate change is a common problem that all must commit to solving. Business as usual will not deliver the cuts needed to avoid catastrophic climate change. Neither will politics as usual. Negotiators do not seem to realise that the Earth’s climate system is not interested in their clever ploys or claims of action. It is only interested in the amount of greenhouse gases that remain in the atmosphere. The cry that it is “not fair” to ask China and India to limit their emissions makes no difference to the atmosphere. Every country will need to act radically if we are to avoid devastating impacts. This means that global emissions must drop by 60-80% from current levels by mid-century. If we fail to act, the poorest people in the poorest countries will be the first and the hardest hit. So how do we address the issue of historical responsibility? Rich countries are responsible for over half of historical climate change and far more on a per capita basis. It is also true that most of the growth in future emissions will come from rapidly industrialising countries like China and India. Many different approaches have been proposed to divide up the remaining “carbon space” with sophisticated equity-based formulas. Unsurprisingly, each one seems to advantage the particular country that proposes it. So India wants per capita emissions because it has a growing population. China wants credit for reducing its population and being the workshop of the world. Australia wants credit for being hot. Russia wants credit for being cold. The US argues it is too rich to cut emissions; the Africans that they are too poor. The list goes on. “Just look at what Northern Ireland, South Africa and Rwanda have to teach us. Here politicians and populations have made hard decisions to focus on building a better future, not by ignoring the past, but by acknowledging and managing it in an open way.” Whatever the merits of each country’s argument, the truth is that none of these approaches will be agreed as a basis for action at Copenhagen. However, argument over the past could fatally derail negotiations and deprive everyone of a stable future. We need to step away from this blame game cul-de-sac and learn from the wisdom of successful post-conflict peace processes. Just look at what Northern Ireland, South Africa and Rwanda have to teach us. Here politicians and populations have made hard decisions to focus on building a better future, not by ignoring the past, but by acknowledging and managing it in an open way. Compared to the real level of pain, distrust and grievance in these societies, the often tactical outrage displayed in climate talks seems like play-acting. Sitting down with representatives of groups that have raped, tortured and murdered your loved ones is profoundly hard. It takes maturity, but one finds that people all around the world do it to avoid harm in the future. Compared to this, blaming British coal miners 100 years ago for today’s sea-level rise in India seems a forced and meaningless abstraction. If people who have suffered the immediate horrors of war can find it within themselves to rise above the past, and construct a better future surely we can achieve the same level of maturity in climate politics? Perhaps it is because the impacts of recent conflict are so raw that people are prepared to go to extreme lengths to make peace. The hard-won lessons from these harrowing experiences need to be learned by climate negotiators. If we lack the maturity to deal with climate change, the future is one of mutually assured destruction. Moving away from the mad world of climate politics will require giving greater voice in international negotiations to the actual victims of climate change rather than their often remote representatives. Perhaps we should invite Desmond Tutu to host a climate change truth and reconciliation commission at Copenhagen? Perhaps this is what is needed to focus minds a little more. The climate can wait – but we cannot. Nick Mabey is CEO of E3G (Third Generation Environmentalism) Malini Mehra is CEO of CSM (Centre for Social Markets)   Climate and Energy Security - Delivering a Global Deal 2009-06-12T08:06:11+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/programmes/climate-articles/carbon-capture-and-storage-in-china/ http://www.e3g.org/programmes/climate-articles/carbon-capture-and-storage-in-china/#When:14:46:03Z To prevent climate change from breaching dangerous tipping points, global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions will need to peak before 2020 and fall rapidly thereafter. Developed countries must take the lead by cutting their own emissions sharply and supporting the efforts of developing countries. China has ambitious targets on energy efficiency and renewable energy but will remain dependent on coal for at least the next few decades. Early development and deployment of Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) is therefore essential if China is to play a meaningful role in global emissions reduction. CCS should be seen as one component of an ambitious overall clean energy strategy, not a substitute for other measures. The EU has earmarked funding for 10-12 CCS demonstration plants but the money will not be available for projects in third countries such as China. This leaves question marks over future EU-China cooperation on CCS. The EU needs to be clear on what it wants to achieve and what it is willing to fund. Options range from small-scale technology development to a bigger investment in laying foundations for wider rollout of CCS in China. The Italian G8 or the US-led Major Economies Forum could be possible opportunities to, inter alia, trigger progress on global CCS cooperation as a catalyser for wider efforts to achieve a fair and effective UN agreement on climate change in Copenhagen in December 2009. Download the ‘Carbon Capture in China’ briefing paper prepared for Germanwatch by E3G above.   Climate and Energy Security - Thinking, Europe in the World - EU-China Partnership 2009-05-22T14:46:03+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/programmes/climate-articles/building-the-ambition-coalition-towards-copenhagen-australias-role/ http://www.e3g.org/programmes/climate-articles/building-the-ambition-coalition-towards-copenhagen-australias-role/#When:13:57:17Z In response Prime Minister Kevin Rudd’s submission to the UNFCCC “to reduce Australia’s emissions by 25 per cent on 2000 levels by 2020 if the world agrees to an ambitious global deal…”, Jennifer Morgan wrote an opinion piece for Crikey – Australia’s independent daily e-news service. Building the ambition coalition towards Copenhagen: Australia’s role Climate change is a complex threat delving deep into the national resource base of each country, while at the same time reaching high into the international stratosphere of foreign policy and energy security. If we are to succeed, this tension has to be reconciled, countries have to put forward targets, programmes and policies that are consistent with national circumstances that at the same time don’t drag down the shared response to climate change. For if countries only put forward what is practical and doable at the national level without actively engaging with the rest of the world, its expectations and willingness to act, then a race to the bottom would ensue. This race would encourage a hunkering down mentality, one that builds mechanisms in national legislation to protect against the competitor and ensure that “our” jobs are secure and “our” energy prices do not rise too much. Rather we need a race that encourages the best of each country to come through, that encourages a can-do mentality, that reaches to the outer limits of what works nationally while grasping the outreached hand (not the fist) of other allies around the world ready to begin pragmatic and ambitious action to save humanity from the worst of the climate crisis. By deciding to increase the level of action Australia is ready to implement nationally based on what others are ready to commit to, it seems that Prime Minister Rudd is extending an open hand to others that have yet to put forward specific proposals on their level of effort. Australia is tremendously vulnerable to climate change, now famous both for its fires and its bleaching reefs. Australia’s government has decided a global goal of 450 ppm-e or lower is in its national interest. Australia has made an offer to the rest of the world. Prime Minister Rudd has said if we reach high to tackle this together through a global agreement in Copenhagen, we will reach higher than the 15 percent cut we announced in December. This model is not new, the European Union has also decided on what level of effort it is ready to pursue domestically and then laid out its offer to the world, 10% more. Europe’s offer is also a real one, requiring significant changes in how the EU pursues national energy and economic policies if the world decides to match its level of ambition. Many within Europe are looking to build their future employment gains and export markets on renewables and energy efficiency. Germany is leading the pack, estimating that by 2020 500,000 jobs will have been created from climate change policies and 20 billion euros saved from energy imports. However, Europe’s offer to the world is not complete. It has not come forward with proposals on finance and technology and therefore its international credibility is highly questioned by developing countries. The question is whether Australia will also follow that half-way path, or go further in providing leadership. The final jury on the credibility of Australia’s latest move is still out, for its work is not yet complete. By making its level of effort so dependent on that global outcome, Australia has to work for it. If Australia expects developing countries to take on the types of reductions and actions it has outlined, it must put forward an ambitious proposition on both finance and technology cooperation before the next negotiating session in June. These two areas are of core importance for developing countries and essential to decarbonise their economies. With a full package in hand before June, Australia would be “back” in the international debate. Without finance and technology Australia will remain stuck in its national politics holding it back from implementing cap and trade this year. With such a package in hand, Australia also could engage the United States, encouraging the Obama Administration to make such an offer linking its reduction target with a global agreement. At the moment, some US forces are retreating into protectionist mode, putting forward protectionist proposals, like border tax adjustments and carbon tariffs, that are a non-starter internationally. Australia could be a credible actor to counteract that approach. The world needs a leader right now ready to take ambitious stances on climate change and a global low carbon economic recovery and to work with others to do the same. The coming weeks are a key test to see if Prime Minister Rudd is the man. Jennifer Morgan has over 15 years experience as a climate change advocate within the international negotiations, including advising Tony Blair and the German Chancellor’s chief scientific advisor on diplomatic strategy. Climate and Energy Security - Delivering a Global Deal 2009-05-11T13:57:17+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/programmes/climate-articles/copenhagen-climate-deal-business-briefing-innovation-and-technology-coopera/ http://www.e3g.org/programmes/climate-articles/copenhagen-climate-deal-business-briefing-innovation-and-technology-coopera/#When:13:57:32Z In the midst of the current global recession, bold action will be needed to stimulate the economy, generate jobs and lay the foundations of a sustainable recovery. This action could provide a new impetus for a low carbon economy that is efficient, innovative and sustainable. Some governments, on the national level, are already implementing such measures in an effort to address the range of challenges simultaneously. However, we know that limiting global emissions to levels well below a 2 degrees C rise in temperature will require a step-change in global innovation and diffusion to make a zero-carbon energy economy feasible before 2050. The question is whether Copenhagen can be the global moment when the signal is given that those companies that want to operate and prosper in a low carbon economy will have a leg up, and provide a framework for this to happen. Summary: Copenhagen will be a defining moment in the evolution of the market for low carbon technologies Bold, new thinking on technology cooperation and diffusion is required to accelerate the scale and pace of low carbon innovation and meet our climate, energy security and economic growth goals Business engagement will be crucial to ensure the right frameworks are created to deliver transformational change Underlying the emission reduction trajectories produced by the UNFCCC and IEA are aggressive assumptions on the early commercialisation of key technologies such as high penetration renewables, electric vehicles, low carbon cement and steel production, carbon capture and storage and new biofuels.  While the development of cap and trade systems will help the diffusion of some technologies, it clearly will not drive all of the technologies needed at the scale and speed required. Without a credible global framework to spur action and increase business competition, we will not make the necessary investments to achieve a low carbon transformation. Copenhagen will be crucial to provide this global framework and lay the foundations for a sustained low carbon recovery. This year will be a defining moment in determining the future shape and growth of the global market for low carbon technologies. It is crucial that Copenhagen establishes the right global architecture and acts as an engine for low carbon growth.  For the first time both emissions reductions and technology are front and centre, offering an opportunity to ensure that both goals can be simultaneously achieved. The Copenhagen Agreement must include both targets and actions to curb global emissions and goals and measures to deliver the necessary technology and innovation in order to limit global temperature increases well below 2oC. This will be the only way to provide credible incentives for private investment, avoid high carbon lock-in and deliver future jobs and growth. Global cooperation for technology will be vital to provide our future climate security. To achieve a 2oC world we must simultaneously develop and deploy new and existing technologies in developed and developing countries. However, over last 25 years public energy R&D funding by major developed countries has fallen by 50% in real terms over the last 25 years.  Fundamentally climate related innovation will reach new markets when companies are presented with the right balance of risk and reward. Action is therefore required to increase the size and certainty of markets and overcome other market failures to drive private investment. The private sector should work to ensure Copenhagen provides a strong signal on the future evolution of the carbon market, targeted support for the development and demonstration of technologies, market regulation and access issues and structures to maintain incentives for future innovation investment. This urgent need points to several key questions for business engagement: 1. How can we achieve a global goal to increase public RD&D and diffusion support on the scale required to stabilise temperature rises below 2oC? In the past discussions have focused on either taking emissions reductions targets or technology targets, but it is now clear that we need both. The European Commission has proposed quadrupling energy related RD&D from current levels by 2020. Will this be sufficient? What about other sectors? 2. What institutional structure is required inside and outside of the UNFCCC? How can the UNFCCC link to existing structures? What frameworks are required to ensure outcome based technology cooperation? How can we generate international technology action programmes with private sector involvement for key strategic technologies? 3. What is the best way to facilitate international joint-ventures and public-private partnerships? The Copenhagen Deal is likely to drive more collaborative R&D with emerging economies such as China and India. How can we produce more effective models for co-development and joint-ventures? How can we ensure effective private sector participation in this process? 4. How can we protect incentives for climate-related innovation while enabling the benefits to be shared at the necessary speed? A “protect and share” agreement involving government-to-government commitments for IPR and licensing of climate technology could resolve this dilemma. On the one hand, multilateral funding could help developing countries to strengthen their IPR protection measures consistent with existing commitments under WIPO and the WTO. On the other hand, enhanced IPR protection would be balanced by a framework agreement for the use of existing provisions to accelerate the diffusion of technology. This should include actions such as the use of parallel markets, advance purchase commitments, compulsory licensing, pay to licence systems and the use of Global Commons. How can business and countries come together to have a productive conversation on IPR issues? What will it require to build trust in this area? How can we ensure that taxpayers receive a fair return for supporting private sector activities? For more information or to discuss these issues further please contact Shane Tomlinson. Climate and Energy Security - Delivering a Global Deal 2009-05-04T13:57:32+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/programmes/climate-articles/case-studies-on-low-carbon-zones-in-china/ http://www.e3g.org/programmes/climate-articles/case-studies-on-low-carbon-zones-in-china/#When:12:57:13Z The concept of Low Carbon Zones (LCZs) emerged from joint work by European and Chinese research institutes summarised in a report published in November 2007 entitled “Changing Climates: Interdependencies on Energy and Climate Security for China and Europe”. Chatham House and E3G then used the initial research findings and the results of extensive discussions in China to elaborate the LCZs proposal in a concept paper. China is a vast country with a highly diverse economy and will need a range of low carbon development models. Many Chinese provinces and cities are pursuing low carbon initiatives, some via partnerships with Europe. LCZs would provide a practical framework to scale up these initiatives. The latest in this collection of papers, available to download above (in English and Chinese), builds upon the previous by suggesting some concrete examples of how LCZs would add value to existing Chinese initiatives to move to a low carbon economy, and specifically add value to existing EU-China cooperation, as well as outline practical mechanisms that could be used to channel EU support for LCZs. This paper also outlines the potentially unique contribution of LCZs compared to project or sectoral approaches in delivering integrated packages of support across sectors and combining regulation, finance, technology and market creation. The real value of an LCZ would lie in bringing together the full range of activity – state-of-the-art planning, low carbon buildings, innovation clusters etc—in one geographical region to act as a showcase for low carbon development. Climate and Energy Security - Activities, Europe in the World - EU-China Partnership 2009-03-16T12:57:13+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/programmes/climate-articles/copenhagen-2009-political-risks-briefing/ http://www.e3g.org/programmes/climate-articles/copenhagen-2009-political-risks-briefing/#When:15:08:33Z Summary The effort to reach agreement on the next phase of the global regime to tackle climate change that will culminate in Copenhagen in December this year is arguably the most complex international negotiation ever attempted. Its success or failure will have very far reaching consequences for human prosperity and security. These negotiations are taking place against a back ground of growing concern within the scientific community that climate change is occurring more rapidly, and that its impacts on humanity are sooner and greater, than previously anticipated. The gap between the action needed to avoid dangerous climate change and that yet being taken politically is widening. Three political forces will shape the prospects for a successful outcome: the pressure to arrive at an agreement that moves the world beyond the current regime in terms both of level of ambition and inclusiveness of participation by December; the re-entry of the United States into the effort to construct a global regime to tackle climate change; the impact on the politics of climate change of the depth and length of the global recession. The interaction between these major political factors will add further complexity to already an already difficult process. Furthermore, there are five emerging tensions which could distract or derail the negotiations by further compounding the scope formisunderstanding or mischief. The tensions generated by these issues are potentially highly disruptive to the focussed political effort needed to reach agreement. These are: the choice of carbon taxation or emissions trading as the preferred policy option; an extension of the Kyoto Protocol or the negotiation of a new Protocol which might or might not include the Kyoto mechanisms; whether to base climate policy on emissions targets or cumulative carbon burdens; the primacy of mitigation or adaptation ( including geo-engineering ) as the focus for policy; whether carbon burdens should properly be counted at the point of production or the point of consumption. Together these three forces and five issues make up a political risk landscape that must be successfully navigated in order to reach a worthwhile agreement in Copenhagen. It will be important for political leaders to cut through this morass of issues to ensure that the three most essential elements of progress are achieved. These are: the preservation and strengthening of the Kyoto mechanisms so that there continues to be a carbon price; sufficient genuinely additional funding for adaptation and technology transitions in the developing world to ensure agreement; an alignment of timetables so that the US can successfully rejoin the global regime. The complete briefing is available to download above. Climate and Energy Security - Delivering a Global Deal 2009-02-09T15:08:33+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/programmes/climate-articles/technology-cooperation-more-than-just-a-north-south-deal/ http://www.e3g.org/programmes/climate-articles/technology-cooperation-more-than-just-a-north-south-deal/#When:15:56:29Z To achieve a successful outcome in Copenhagen there is an urgent need for negotiators to focus on cooperative action around innovation, rather than narrow trade-offs between the North and South. As negotiations progress, discussions are increasingly moving to a blinkered debate on the level of financial and technology transfers. This debate is often based on an outdated model which assumes technology will be ‘generated’ in the North and then ‘transferred’ to the South. Continuing on this path will undermine our efforts to prevent dangerous climate change and will limit the scope for agreement in Copenhagen. ... there will need to be a step change in the scale and depth of international strategic cooperation to drive the development of key technologies.” The purpose of the Convention is to drive cooperation to prevent dangerous climate change, not just to focus on perceived trade-offs between developed and developing countries. Limiting global CO2 emissions to levels consistent with 2degreesC rise in temperature will take a step-change in global innovation and diffusion to make a zero-carbon energy economy feasible before 2050. Underlying the emissions reduction trajectories produced by the UNFCCC and IEA are aggressive assumptions on the early commercialisation of key technologies such as carbon capture and storage, new biofuels, high penetration renewables, electric vehicles and low carbon cement and steel production. If some major emission reduction policies fail, or markedly underperform, then more low carbon technology options will be needed earlier than predicted to keep on track. Similarly if climate science continues to worsen, suggesting impacts are occurring faster than we previously thought, we will have to deliver new innovations sooner than is currently anticipated, including those relevant for adaptation. This innovation is not yet happening. The EU is calling for a quadrupling of global R&D spending, but money alone is not enough. Currently, innovation spending in all countries is driven by support for national champions and competitiveness. Collaboration has been reserved for basic science and far from commercial projects such as nuclear fusion. To deliver low carbon technologies there will need to be a step change in the scale and depth of international strategic cooperation to drive the development of key technologies. The framing of the technology debate based on an ‘ask’ and then ‘response’ between developed and developing countries has generated a large amount of distrust and is not a reflection of the way innovation systems currently operate. The agreement at Copenhagen should therefore contain a science based Technology Development Objective,  … delivered through a series of Technology Action Programmes for strategically important technologies, … [and a] pragmatic agreement on a framework for intellectual property rights to protect and share new technologies” In a globalized world innovation is increasingly driven by partnerships which spread across national boundaries; General Electric is a US company who has some of its major research labs in Germany, India and China.  Effective action is required to create a system that builds and leverages these partnerships and which takes and manages risks to develop new disruptive technologies; encourages innovations in business models and supporting infrastructure; and allows for the rapid diffusion of new ideas and technologies after they are developed. To deliver this developed and developing countries alike should focus on delivering overall levels of innovation cooperation, not simply the level of transfers and conditionality. The agreement at Copenhagen should therefore contain a science based Technology Development Objective, which sets an overall goal for increased climate and adaptation innovation. This Objective should be delivered through a series of Technology Action Programmes for strategically important technologies, with an emphasis on those with a key role in developing country markets, and new multilateral and bilateral funding to build developing countries’ own capacity to innovate. The multilateral funding should be directed by an arms length Technology Development Executive under the UNFCCC to build public and private partnerships across a range of different countries, including opportunities for South-South cooperation. A pragmatic agreement on a framework for intellectual property rights to protect and share new technologies while maintaining incentives for innovation will be critical. Such a system would help to fully capture the global public good aspects of climate and adaptation technologies, foster trust and provide opportunities for all parties to benefit from an increased global market for climate innovations. Copenhagen must deliver a new global low carbon innovation system which benefits all countries and hedges against future policy failures and any necessary tightening of emission reduction targets.  These commitments will need to drive much greater cooperation among all countries - whether developed or developing. By focusing on the common knowledge and innovations we need to build together to preserve our common climate security, the negotiations may begin to escape from the narrow focus on transfers which destroys trust and lowers ambition on all sides. This article was written for host country website for COP15. Climate and Energy Security - Delivering a Global Deal 2009-02-02T15:56:29+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/programmes/climate-articles/un-climate-conference-the-countdown-to-copenhagen/ http://www.e3g.org/programmes/climate-articles/un-climate-conference-the-countdown-to-copenhagen/#When:08:01:21Z As the UNFCCC meeting in Poznan (COP 14) becomes becomes a distant memory, Michael McCarthy, Environment Editor of The Independent looks onwards to the next UNFCCC meeting (COP 15) in Copenhagen, in December 2009. In his article (below), McCarthy speaks to Tom Burke about the enormity of the task ahead and who he thinks should be leading the effort. In 331 days’ time, 15,000 officials from 200 countries will gather in the Danish capital with 1 goal: to find a solution to global warming. UN Climate Conference: The countdown to Copenhagen Three hundred and thirty-one days, plus a final frantic fortnight: not very long, really, to put together the most complex and vital agreement the world has ever seen. But that’s all the time there is: in 331 days from now, on 7 December, the UN Climate Conference will open in Copenhagen and the world community will try to agree a solution to the gravest threat it has ever faced: global warming. Between 10,000 and 15,000 officials, advisers, diplomats, campaigners and media personnel from nearly 200 countries, almost certainly joined by limousine-loads of heads of state and government from America’s President Barack Obama down are expected to meet in the Danish capital in one of the most significant gatherings in history. “This is the most complicated deal the world has ever tried to put together” If that sounds like exaggeration, we need only glance at some historical comparisons. The Copenhagen meeting will have a far broader reach and potential impact on the world than the Congress of Vienna, say, the 1814-1815 assembly which attempted to reorder Europe after the Napoleonic wars, or the Paris peace conference of 1919, which tried to construct a new global order after the First World War, or the 1945 meetings at Yalta and Potsdam which tried to do the same after the Second World War. For they were all dealing with national boundaries, politics and political structures, phenomena which of course are vital in human terms, but ephemeral and changeable. Copenhagen will be dealing with something fundamental to life on earth: the stability of the biosphere. Known officially in UN-speak as COP 15 – the 15th meeting of the parties of the UN’s Framework Convention on Climate Change – the meeting in Denmark will try to work out a way for the world to act together to preserve the thin envelope of atmosphere, soil and sea which surrounds our planet and enables us to live, in the face of rising temperatures which threaten to destroy its habitability. All the world’s major governments, including the once-sceptical administration of the US President George Bush, now formally accept that temperature rises have already begun, are likely if unchecked to prove disastrous for human civilisation, and are being caused by emissions of greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide from our power plants, factories and motor vehicles. But if all the major governments now accept it, getting them to agree on how to tackle it still seems a very long way off indeed. The essential problem, to use the jargon, is burden-sharing. We know the world has to cut its CO2 emissions drastically, and soon. But which countries are to cut them, by how much? The Chinese, for example, with their scarcely believable economy growing at 10 per cent a year, have now overtaken the Americans as the biggest carbon emitters; but historically, America has emitted far more; and on a per capita basis, US emissions still dwarf those of China. So the Chinese have felt (so far) that they have a moral right for their economy to grow unchecked, and their carbon emissions to grow with it; but many Americans have felt (so far) that they see no reason to act unilaterally to cut their own CO2 if the Chinese are not willing to do the same. Differences like those stubbornly percolate the whole negotiating process and make achieving a universal agreement mind-bogglingly hard. This is the most complicated deal the world has ever tried to put together,” says Tom Burke, visiting professor at Imperial College and an adviser on climate change to the Foreign Office. “In effect, you’re asking nearly 200 countries to align their energy policies – to create a common world energy policy. If you look at how hard it has been for the member states of the European Union to align their energy policies, you get an idea of the difficulty of attempting it with the whole world.” Yet it has to be done, and the penalty for failure could not be higher. It is just 20 years since the world woke up to the danger of rising carbon emissions destabilising the atmosphere. Two decades ago it seemed a fairly distant threat, prefigured principally in supercomputer climate prediction programmes; something that was likely to happen a comfortably long distance away, such as at the end of the 21st century. Three things have altered since then. First, the changing climate is now visible, not just in computer predictions, but all around us: spring in southern Britain, for example, is arriving about three weeks earlier than it did 40 years ago. At this time last year a red admiral butterfly, an archetypal creature of the summer, was photographed perching on a snowdrop, a flower of the winter – a previously unheard-of occurrence. Second, it has become clear in the past five years that the earth is responding to the increasing CO2 loading of the atmosphere much more rapidly than scientists initially thought. There are numerous examples but to instance just one, the summer sea ice of the Arctic Ocean is melting far more quickly than anyone imagined. Third, it has become apparent, even more recently, that global emissions of CO2 are shooting up at a rate that far exceeds anything the UN’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) thought possible when it sketched out future emissions scenarios in a special report in 2000. Even though we have had 20 years to think about emissions cuts, and 11 years of the Kyoto protocol, the treaty which actually prescribed the first cuts for the industrialised countries, emissions are soaring as never before. Some leading climate scientists are now openly voicing concerns that this makes it increasingly unlikely we can meet the aim of keeping global temperature rise to about 2C above the pre-industrial level, which is generally regarded as the most that may be endured by human society without mortal danger. (We are now at about 0.75 degrees C above pre-industrial, and another 0.6 of a degree is thought to be inevitable because of the CO2 which has already been emitted). Certainly, if we are to have any chance at all at holding the increase to two degrees, there is wide agreement that global emissions have to peak very soon – probably by 2015 or 2016 – and then rapidly decrease, to 80 per cent below present levels by 2050. The later the peak, the greater (and therefore more difficult) the subsequent decrease would have to be. That’s the pathway the world has to follow. Copenhagen offers the chance to set out along it. But even if the deal in December is not as ambitious as scientists and environmentalists insist is necessary – and at the moment, that seems pretty likely – it is vital that there is actually an accord. Disagreement would be a catastrophe. Three conditions, according to Britain’s Energy and Climate Change Secretary, Ed Miliband, have to be fulfilled for Copenhagen to be regarded as a success. First, the wealthy industrialised countries have to agree tough new targets for cutting their C02. Second, the developing countries led by China, even if they do not take on the same sort of numerical targets, have to move away from “business as usual”. And third, the rich nations have to agree a way of financing the developing countries, especially the poorer ones, in the measures they take to adapt to the climate change that is coming anyway. Otherwise they won’t sign up to anything. Securing such a deal will be a matter of political will: a global political consensus will have to be hammered out. It is becoming clear that, over the next 11 months, the world could well do with a high-level political fixer, jetting unceasingly from capital to capital, to pull such a consensus together, in the manner in which the Argentine diplomat, Raul Estrada, managed to pull the original Kyoto agreement together in the Japanese city in December 1997. It could be Britain’s Ed Miliband, according to Tom Burke. “There has to be someone who can put the time in, and go round various capitals and talk to the key people at a very high level, and not just environment ministers,” he says. “Ed Miliband could play that role. He’s known to be close to Gordon Brown, and Britain is reasonably respected for its record on climate change. It doesn’t have to be him. But there probably needs to be someone.” However, Mr Miliband, and the British Government, may face a problem of reduced credibility in climate change terms as a result of two policy decisions likely to be taken in the next few weeks. One, which Mr Miliband will take personally, is whether or not to agree to a new coal-fired power station at Kingsnorth in Kent. If he gives it the go-ahead, without strict controls over its emissions, environmentalists will accuse him of sanctioning a new generation of power plants run on the most carbon-intensive fuel. The other is whether or not to allow Heathrow airport to build a third runway, and thus expand British aviation, whose CO2 emissions are growing faster than those of any other sector. If both these projects go ahead – as seems perfectly possible – there is no doubt that the UK’s position as a potential Copenhagen broker will be weakened. “If countries like Britain, who, for better or worse, are the global leaders, go to Copenhagen with new coal-fired power stations and expanding airports at home, it’s very difficult to see how we will be taken seriously by other countries which have even more serious energy security problems and concerns about economic growth,” said Robin Oakley, the head of climate change at Greenpeace UK. “That leadership can’t just be shown by grandstanding at the meeting. It has to be shown by what we do in our domestic policy.” In the absence of Mr Miliband or any other leading politician emerging as the Copenhagen fixer, the key player in the process is likely to be Barack Obama. The President-elect has already opened a chasm, in terms of climate change policy, between himself and the outgoing George Bush, who, in 2001, withdrew the US from Kyoto and began years of climate policy obstructionism. Mr Bush wanted no truck with emissions cuts of any sort; Mr Obama has pledged he will get US emissions down to 80 per cent of 1990 levels by 2050 (a target identical with Britain’s) and “engage vigorously” with the international negotiating process over the next few months. Hints have been dropped that he may convene meetings of key world leaders to speed the negotiations along. It seems highly likely that he will go to Copenhagen himself – which means every other world leader will want to be present. Whether or not they can do the deal the world needs is another matter. Yet there is no doubt the world needs it. It may seem reasonable to think, in the coldest winter for years, that global warming has gone away, yet nothing could be further from the truth.   Climate and Energy Security - Delivering a Global Deal 2009-01-09T08:01:21+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/programmes/europe-articles/europe-must-complete-its-low-carbon-transition/ http://www.e3g.org/programmes/europe-articles/europe-must-complete-its-low-carbon-transition/#When:12:40:41Z With Europe’s most visible economic project in crisis there is an understandable lack of confidence among politicians delivering on other ambitious objectives. But it is also still true that without a common purpose Europe as a political project will fail. There is another economic arena where a renewed sense of common purpose is urgently needed to preserve European prosperity and security: completing the economic architecture needed to underpin the shift to a low carbon European economy. But while European leaders understand climate change as an environmental challenge, they have yet to fully absorb the economic reforms needed to deliver a low carbon economy. Among economic policy makers tackling climate change is still often seen as either peripheral or actually damaging to economic growth. There is an on-going battle inside every EU member state between finance and environment ministries over the pace of low carbon action. This attitude is out of date and does not reflect the real economic risks in European markets. The shift to a low carbon economy is now a major economic factor shaping real investment decisions across all major sectors of the economy. Unless economic policy makers understand this, and help build the necessary regulatory architecture to underpin the low carbon transition, Europe will face significant short term risks to its energy and economic security. Moving to a low carbon economy involves replacing decades of future payments for fossil fuels with up-front investment in low carbon technologies. Europe will need at least €2.5 trillion of low carbon investment just to meet its 2020 targets. This produces an immediate “pulse” of additional investment in sectors such as electric power and requires a doubling of normal investment rates. Europe needs this increase of investment into new and risky sectors at the same time as it is managing the consequences of the financial crisis. The regulatory response to the financial crisis is also itself slowing flows of infrastructure finance. Some European politicians have suggested managing these risks by freezing climate change policy. But in fact the consequences of such an approach would raise long term political risk and would be economically disastrous. Rolling back Europe’s climate commitments would actually decrease the rate of investment and growth in these sectors. The impact of the low carbon transition on investment risk is largely independent of immediate climate policies.No logical investor is going to risk billions of euros by building an unabated coal power plant in Europe in the hope that it will avoid serious carbon constraints on its earnings over the next 40 years. It is not credible that Europe can rollback its carbon or renewable energy targets in the short term as this would involve too much unpicking of European law. Even a failure of the international climate negotiations would not remove commercial investment risks. Countries would continue to move towards a lower carbon future, even if this is slower than needed. China, Korea, Mexico, Australia, Indonesia, Chile and South Africa along with many US states are making significant low carbon investments. These efforts are driven by multiple motivations and will not evaporate overnight. Governments cannot unilaterally revoke the science of climate change or the investment risks an active climate policy unavoidably brings. Political risk cannot be magically removed from energy markets when they must deliver the public goods of sustainability and security. Europe must take the harder path of actively risk managing the process of decarbonisation based on the reality of how markets, politics and technology choices interact. But neither is the reverse true. Just because investors are not willing to bet against Europe moving to a low carbon economy does not mean they are yet ready to bet on it by investing the billions of Euros needed. In most of Europe climate change policy is not clear enough to deliver an adequate balance of risk and reward to investors. Europe has yet to construct a sustainable economic architecture capable of delivering the low carbon transition. Outside heavily incentivised areas, many private investors are looking to delay investment. They are hedging their bets by moving more strongly into short term options like gas power stations, because this minimises their long term capital exposure to climate policy risk. Some companies are even deciding to move large parts of their investments portfolios to countries outside Europe like Turkey where economic growth is higher, future demand more certain and political risks are perceived to be lower. Europe cannot afford to end up with a half-decarbonised system that fails to deliver the investment needed to keep the lights on in the later part of this decade. This dilemma is most starkly seen in Poland where these risks mean that energy security is unlikely to be secured through private investment in new coal power stations (currently without carbon capture and storage). Poland will need to instead reform its domestic policies to drive investment in energy efficiency, renewables and interconnectors in order to maintain supply as its ageing infrastructure begins to fail. But climate change advocates should find no satisfaction in this. If a country like Poland does experience serious energy security problems many will doubtless point the blame at green policies. It would be hugely damaging if the low carbon transition was blamed for blackouts. So it is in the interest of actors on all sides to see an immediate response to these real investment risks. This economic logic has already been recognised by policymakers in the UK and Germany. They are beginning a far-reaching process of policy strengthening, market reform and financial innovation to address these challenges, though often in the face of serious resistance from finance ministries. This task of regulatory reform and market (re-)creation is extremely daunting. It is not surprising that many want to try and remove the complications of decarbonisation by promoting an alternative scenario where Europe can follow a path dominated by gas power for the next two decades. This would delay fundamental choices on technologies and market reform, but an over-reliance of gas power exposes Europe to short term price volatility and energy security risks, while failing to deliver a robust pathway to a decarbonised economy. To deliver the low carbon economy European governments will need to take more risk out of private markets through regulation and direct financial interventions. This de-risking must be carefully designed, targeted and will often be temporary. It needs to tackle existing oligopolies by strengthening the competitive and market incentives needed to promote new entrants. Risk needs to be actively managed across four areas: politics; finance; technical capacity and market opportunities. Politically, investors need to have increased confidence in the enduring trajectory of European climate and energy policy. This could be done by increasing the European 2020 carbon reduction target to 30%, or by increasing incentives from trading the emission system (ETS) through a set-aside of ETS permits. Investors need to believe in climate targets that are politically sustainable during a time of falling real incomes. The best way to achieve this is by reducing consumer bills through a massive increase in residential energy efficiency investment, using the German model of blending low interest rate loans and targeted subsidies funded from ETS auction revenues. Financially, power sector investors need to see greater certainty from reformed electricity markets which are moved away from commodity market structures and onto systems of long term contracts. Reducing price risk will allow a greater diversity of companies to enter the market for both centralised and distributed power investment. National public banks such as KfW Bankengruppe in Germany and in the UK the new Green Investment Bank should prioritise support to sectors like offshore wind and low cost finance for residential energy efficiency. Alongside the European Investment Bank national banks could help grow the European market for green infrastructure bonds, which would allow these sectors to tap into the €18 trillion in assets held by global pension funds. Technically, there is a need to strengthen European electricity infrastructure so that the large amounts of renewable energy resources on the periphery of the continent can be reliably connected to major demand centres. European leaders should spend as much diplomatic energy on ensuring electricity inside Europe and the neighbourhood as they have on Nabucco. To maintain investment in renewable energy beyond 2015 suppliers will need to have greater visibility of demand into the 2020’s. Otherwise they will build supply chains and factories elsewhere. Greater certainty can be delivered by setting goals for renewable energy to 2030 alongside a clear timeline for decarbonising national power sectors. The need for direct financial intervention raises the importance of resistance to the low carbon agenda among European economic policy makers. Currently, many finance ministries are resisting innovative financial instruments, such as national efficiency financing and European project bonds, on the grounds of fiscal discipline. They argue that launching new financial instruments will undermine restrictions on public debt brought in after the crisis, and damage market confidence in fiscal consolidation. However, these instruments put financial risk onto energy consumers not taxpayers. In all European countries people are more likely to pay their electricity bills than their taxes, so these mechanisms should be financially sustainable and low risk. The fate of the low carbon economy has largely shifted from the hands of environmental policy makers to economic decision makers. The stakes are high and failing to take tough decisions will result in serious economic end energy security problems. We cannot afford the comfortable delusion that investment would flow if only we could remove the uncomfortable implications of climate change. We have to deliver prosperity and security while solving both the climate and financial crises. Member states are beginning to lead the way in developing the necessary regulatory and financial solutions. We now require concerted and cooperative action to implement these reforms across Europe. Europe in the World - Thinking 2011-12-14T12:40:41+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/programmes/europe-articles/driving-down-energy-bills-and-security-of-supply-the-case-for-demand-side-e/ http://www.e3g.org/programmes/europe-articles/driving-down-energy-bills-and-security-of-supply-the-case-for-demand-side-e/#When:16:26:09Z Against the background of rising energy prices driven by volatile fossil fuel costs and investment requirements for new generation, activating the demand side of the power market will be essential in order to reduce consumer bills even if electricity unit costs increase.  The UK Government has recognised that reform of the electricity market is needed in order to attract sufficient levels of investment in energy infrastructure whilst maintaining current standards for security of supply, delivering the low carbon transition and keeping costs down. It is critical that new market structures and institutional arrangements result in the best value for investments across the electricity system. The best way for this to be achieved is for demand side resources (including demand management, demand response and distributed generation – referred to as D3) to be empowered to compete as low cost alternatives to supply side investment.  E3G’s briefing paper outlines the benefits of demand side management and the initiatives required (or already in place) to successfully deliver this. Europe in the World - EU Decarbonisation 2011-11-30T16:26:09+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/programmes/europe-articles/policy-brief-securing-grids-for-a-sustainable-future/ http://www.e3g.org/programmes/europe-articles/policy-brief-securing-grids-for-a-sustainable-future/#When:13:28:57Z Establishing an integrated electricity system capable of delivering Europe’s long term energy policy goals will require substantial investment in transmission infrastructure. The Commission’s Blueprint for an integrated European energy network (See Note 1 below) estimates that some €142 billion will need to be invested in the electricity grid by 2020, while other estimates (See Note 2 below) suggest that the efficient delivery of Europe’s longer term decarbonisation goals may require investment in inter-regional transmission of some €200 billion by 2050. However, the Commission believes that current arrangements will only take up around half the capacity required by 2020, due in part to difficulties in accessing finance, an asymmetry of costs and benefits associated with cross border interconnection and the inability of existing arrangements to capture the benefits of interconnection from a “European” perspective. Investment in interconnection will cause electricity prices to converge thereby creating winners and losers. Consumers in some Member States may be disadvantaged by increased interconnector capacity, but be expected to contribute to the costs of investment. Conversely, some Member States may see congestion reduce without being expected to contribute under existing rules. This asymmetry is likely to present a barrier to the investment in interconnector capacity necessary to deliver Europe’s energy policy goals. It is therefore essential that arrangements to allocate the costs of investment in an equitable fashion are developed. Currently, Europe’s strategic transmission investment programme is defined by the Commission’s Energy Infrastructure Blueprint, together with the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E) 10-year non-binding network development plan (TYNDP) process. ENTSO-E’sfirst TYNDP is essentially a collection of projects identified by national transmission system operators (TSOs). While the 2012 TYNDP will no doubt be an improvement, the extent to which the transmission development process achieves a pan-European rather than national focus remains to be seen. To overcome these challenges and develop a European grid aligned with Europe’s decarbonisation goals while protecting the interests of consumers, new arrangements for electricity transmission planning and financing will be needed. Based on international examples of innovative arrangements or best practice, this Policy Brief sets out the key considerations needed to ensure that the evolving European approach for to infrastructure is coordinated, efficient, competitive, equitable and transparent. Notes: 1.  See “Energy infrastructure priorities for 2020 and beyond – a Blueprint for an integrated European energy network” (DG Energy, 2010), at http://ec.europa.eu/energy/energy2020/infrastructure/index_en.htm. 2.  See “European Climate Foundation (ECF) 2050 Roadmap – A Practical Guide to a Prosperous, Low-carbon Europe” (ECF, 2010), at http://www.roadmap2050.eu. The Policy Brief was written by RAP - Regulatory Assistance Project, with research assistance from E3G’s Jonathan Gaventa. Europe in the World - EU Decarbonisation 2011-11-14T13:28:57+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/programmes/europe-articles/risk-management-credible-options-and-the-future-of-european-renewables-poli/ http://www.e3g.org/programmes/europe-articles/risk-management-credible-options-and-the-future-of-european-renewables-poli/#When:14:48:07Z All long-term scenarios for Europe’s energy system involve considerable risks: the wrong decisions could jeopardise climate and energy security, damage human health and the environment, or lead to unacceptable costs for consumers. Recent events – including the sharp rises in fossil fuel prices accompanying the Arab spring, the nuclear crisis at Fukushima and the Deepwater Horizon oil spill – underline the profound unpredictability of future energy developments. At the same time, the opportunities associated with technological breakthroughs, such as distributed generation or thin film solar, could transform future energy outcomes. When costs and potentials are not yet fully known, there is value in holding options open, to create a ‘policy hedge’ against future uncertainty. The European Union’s renewable energy policy has quickly become a key element of Europe’s strategy for managing the risks to the European economy associated with climate change and fossil fuel price swings. Though sometimes controversial, targets and subsidy mechanisms have served to drive development and deployment of key power technologies and widen the range of options available to deal with the challenges facing European energy systems. However, Europe is rapidly approaching the point where it must decide which potential energy pathways will be kept open and which will be foreclosed. Renewables policy as risk management The EU first adopted policies on renewable energy following the oil shocks of the 1970s. Since then, renewable energy policies have become increasingly sophisticated. All member-states now have financial support mechanisms in place, and the EU’s ‘renewable energy directive’, adopted in 2009, for the first time sets a binding target for 20 per cent of energy consumption to come from renewable sources by 2020. These policies have played two important roles. First, renewables deployment has created an important buffer against the risk that the volatility of fossil fuel prices poses to Europe’s economy. Europe currently imports half of its primary energy and this figure is rising. Declining indigenous resources, combined with oil-linked pricing in the majority of Europe’s gas supply contracts, makes Europe increasingly vulnerable to shifts in international fossil fuel prices – often driven by political, economic and geological uncertainties over which Europe has little foresight or control. When the 20 per cent renewables target was proposed in 2007, it was estimated that the policies to achieve it would add $26 billion per year to the cost of electricity by 2020 – under the baseline assumption of an average oil price of $48 a barrel.(See note 1 below) If the oil price averaged $78/bbl (the highest considered in the study), costs would drop to $0.2 billion per year. This suggests that if oil prices persist at current levels well above $100/bbl, the renewables targets may lead to net savings even without accounting for the carbon benefits. The importance of this fuel price buffer is set to grow as Europe becomes more import-dependent and fossil fuel prices become more volatile. Analysis for the European Climate Foundation found that low-carbon technology pathways (involving significant levels of renewables) would prevent the loss of $300 billion in GDP in the event of a fossil fuel price spike lasting three years from 2020.(See note 2 below) Second, renewables policies have allowed EU countries to gain experience of how low-carbon technologies operate at larger scale. From a very low base, renewable energy consumption has doubled in the last decade and, according to national plans, is on course to nearly double again by 2020 in order to meet the 20 per cent target. The majority of existing power grids were built in an era in which electricity systems were predominately national, power generation was sited relatively close to the points of consumption, and power flows were uni-directional and more predictable. Key technologies have moved from being theoretical possibilities to realistic options for the decarbonisation of Europe’s energy mix. As new technologies are deployed more widely, there is more solid evidence of their potentials and performance. In many cases the costs of technologies have also fallen. According to the European Commission, the costs of producing electricity from wind power have declined by 20 per cent over the nine years to 2006 and those of solar photovoltaic power by 57 per cent.(See note 3 below) Costs are expected to fall considerably further as installed capacity increases. The experience generated by current policies has also made it easier to foresee the risks facing renewable energy in future. For example, the case of Spain shows that overly generous subsidies for certain technologies can create investment bubbles. These can just as quickly burst if policy is then changed and applied retroactively, as was the case in Spain where subsidies for already installed photovoltaic cells were cut considerably. The lesson is that drastic policy changes can damage the prospects for the whole sector. Another interesting example is the development of offshore wind farms in the UK. Large cost reductions were expected from installing such significant volumes of renewables. But experience showed that these cost reductions are difficult to predict far in advance and depend on a range of external factors, such as fluctuating exchange rates, the costs of steel and cement or the availability of cranes and ships.Greater understanding of these conditions will make risks easier to manage, but cannot remove them entirely. The decision juncture At low rates of penetration, renewable technologies can be incorporated into existing fossil based energy systems relatively easily. Existing grids can cope with the power flows; conventional generation can be ramped up or down to respond to intermittency. The key policies to facilitate the spread of renewables are subsidies for research and development and financial incentives for deployment. To enable a move towards higher levels of renewables usage, however, the key policy challenge becomes one of adjusting the energy system as a whole rather than simply paying subsidies. Sufficient investment is unlikely to be forthcoming without confidence in the volume of future market opportunities; this in turn requires energy infrastructures, markets and longer-term policy frameworks conducive to renewable development. Europe faces key decisions in each of these areas over the next few years. A strategic approach to infrastructure The majority of existing power grids were built in an era in which electricity systems were predominately national, power generation was sited relatively close to the points of consumption, and power flows were uni-directional and more predictable. If the proportion of renewable electricity is to increase significantly, these conditions are unlikely to hold. Most of Europe’s large-scale renewable energy resources are located at its periphery (including wind and wave power in the northern seas and solar power around the Mediterranean), away from centres of consumption. Making best use of this potential will require greater volumes of electricity crossing national borders. It is availability rather than demand that largely determines the use of renewables: turbines only turn when the wind is blowing. When such technologies represent a higher proportion of generation, supply and demand must be balanced either across larger geographical areas (the ‘super grid’ approach) or through using new grid technologies to shift generation and consumption profiles (the ‘smart grid’). Both options may offer associated benefits beyond renewables integration. Smart grids increase reliability and efficiency, and allow consumers to have greater control over their energy use. A super-grid could drive European market integration and increase security of supply. However, such new grids will only be built if the EU adopts a more forward looking approach to planning and investment. Traditionally, investments in grids have followed the building of power plants and other generation, even though power lines take significantly longer to build than, say, wind turbines. This sequencing creates a vicious circle: delays in grid connection can undermine investment in new renewable generation; yet without the investment in new generation, the required grids will not be built. In Scotland for example, over 9 gigawatts (GW) of renewables is currently waiting for grid connection and much of this has a connection date later than 2018. (See note 4 below) This circle can only be broken if grid planning becomes anticipatory rather than solely reacting to where generation is already under construction, and regulators and transmission operators accept the risk that some lines will be under-utilised until new generation is built. Some degree of predictability is provided by the new ‘ten year network development plan’ of the European Network of Transmission System Operators (ENTSO-E). The plan is an important starting point for providing more certainty for grid development. However, the current plan is insufficiently aligned with European decarbonisation goals and remains a collection of predominantly national plans. For future iterations, ENTSO-E must be empowered to address longer time horizons (say, 20 years rather than ten) and to push forward long-term transformational projects that could unlock significant volumes of low-carbon investments such as a North Sea grid for offshore wind or a Mediterranean grid for linking large-scale solar generation. Keeping the high renewables option open… will require a widening of the debate from subsidising the use of wind and solar to adjusting the entire energy system to the widespread use of renewables. Public investment must support the construction of these strategically important networks where existing funding mechanisms are insufficient. The majority of new lines are expected to be funded on a regulated tariff basis, whereby the investment costs are repaid through tariff revenue over time. But public financing mechanisms will need to be employed to lower the cost of capital, to fund projects that are innovative or difficult (for example, offshore hubs for connecting wind farms) or where a project has strategic importance for energy security or decarbonisation. Under the ‘energy infrastructure package’, the European Commission is currently developing proposals for infrastructure finance, including insuring project bonds via the European Investment Bank. However the European Council conclusions from February 4th 2011 appeared to prioritise infrastructure designed to meet security of supply and solidarity concerns. The package must be expanded to include the key investments that ensure Europe is able to meet its climate change trajectories. Reoriented power markets Current power market arrangements are designed to drive competition mainly among conventional power plants running on gas and coal. Wholesale electricity prices tend to be based on short-run operational costs and are largely driven by changes in fossil fuel prices. Most renewable power generation, by contrast, has high upfront capital costs but low ongoing operational costs. As the proportion of renewable generation within the electricity market increases, wholesale power prices tend to fall, and it becomes increasingly difficult for any investments to earn back their fixed cost. In several EU member-states, these challenges have led to calls for electricity market reform, including the introduction of ‘capacity payments’ (mechanisms to remunerate the provision of back up capacity rather than electricity sold) to cover fixed costs as well as operational costs. Unless a co-ordinated approach is taken, however, these proposals may sit uneasily alongside the goal of European power market integration, as Georg Zachmann explains elsewhere in this report. The underlying issue behind these dilemmas is the deep uncertainty about how future power markets will operate, and the barriers this uncertainty places on investments in both renewable and conventional generation. To answer both the investment and the integration challenge, European governments will need to develop power market arrangements capable of limiting costs to consumers, managing risks during the low-carbon transition and enabling the emergence of a single European market. An extension of the status quo would fail on each of these counts. A believable story about the future The final criteria needed to ensure the high renewables pathway remains a credible option is a more believable narrative about the future of European energy policies. As currently framed, European renewables policy effectively ends in 2020, a mere nine years away. Post-2020, there are no further renewables targets and no binding decarbonisation targets other than a general ambition to achieve 80-95 per cent carbon reductions by 2050 if other countries take similar action. However, the significant levels of investments in long-lived renewables manufacturing and installation capacity needed to deliver the 2020 targets (for example, the testing facilities, factories and ships needed for offshore wind) is unlikely to materialise without greater certainty over what will happen to renewables policy after the 2020 target date. The European Commission is set to produce a ‘2050 roadmap’ for energy later in 2011, following on from the roadmap for a low- carbon economy published in March. The roadmap is an opportunity to limit this uncertainty and ensure that the high renewables option remains viable. This implies establishing a clear date by which the power sector must be decarbonised;  developing new renewables targets for the 2025 or 2030 time horizon; or pushing forward plant-based emissions performance standards to ensure that more polluting coal or gas-fired power plants cannot crowd out cleaner energy from renewable sources. From subsidies to systemic change Like all evolving technologies, those needed for the use of renewable energy sources entail risks and uncertainty. The financial support schemes that EU governments have put in place for renewables represent a strategic investment to expand available options by driving forward technological development and accumulating experience on risk and costs. Keeping the high renewables option open, however, will require a widening of the debate from subsidising the use of wind and solar to adjusting the entire energy system to the widespread use of renewables. Investors in technologies and supply chains will require greater clarity on how big future demand for renewables will be. They need confidence that Europe’s energy infrastructure will be up to the task, that market arrangements will work efficiently and that policy frameworks will deliver the required decarbonisation trajectory. This requires the EU and its member-states to institute a more strategic approach to infrastructure planning, to reform electricity markets and to adopt longer-term carbon and renewables targets. Unless these decisions are taken quickly, the option of a high renewables pathway to a low-carbon energy system will be effectively foreclosed. Notes 1. Fraunhofer ISI, EEG and ECOFYS, ‘Economic analysis of reaching a 20 per cent share of renewable energy sources in 2020’, August 2006. 2. European Climate Foundation, ‘Roadmap 2050: A practical guide to a prosperous, low-carbon Europe’, 2010. 3. European Commission, ‘Renewable energy: Progressing towards the 2020 target’, January 2011. 4. House of Commons energy and climate change committee, ‘The future of Britain’s electricity networks’, second report of session 2009-10. 5. The UK’s committee on climate change has proposed that power sector emissions should be no greater than 50g CO2/kWh by 2030. This article was written for the latest Centre for European Reform report entitled: GREEN, SAFE, CHEAP: Where next for EU energy policy? Europe in the World - EU Decarbonisation 2011-09-27T14:48:07+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/programmes/europe-articles/re-monopolising-power-reform-of-the-electricity-market-to-meet-climate-chan/ http://www.e3g.org/programmes/europe-articles/re-monopolising-power-reform-of-the-electricity-market-to-meet-climate-chan/#When:16:36:42Z The government published proposals in December to transform the electricity market, billed as the biggest shake-up of the market since privatisation.  The proposals included a new carbon tax to place a floor under the carbon price, a minimum Emissions Performance Standard to exclude new unabated coal-fired power stations, a mechanism to guarantee future electricity prices to low carbon generation and a capacity mechanism to guarantee back-up generation capacity. Some have welcomed the proposals arguing they are needed to give certainty on delivery of the government’s carbon emissions and renewable energy targets, and security of supply.  Others have said that the proposed reforms would sweep away the competitive electricity market as we know it, one of the most notable public policy successes of the last 20 years, creating unnecessary costs for customers. E3G’s Senior Associate Simon Skillings spoke at a recent debate on electricity market reform at Policy Exchange in London. This event discussedd questions including: Is the package likely to achieve greater reductions in carbon emissions? What are the implications for competition in the electricity market? What are the implications for customers and the economy? What are the merits of the various elements of the proposed package of reforms? Simon’s presentation is available to download and the debate available on YouTube. Europe in the World - EU Decarbonisation 2011-03-07T16:36:42+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/programmes/europe-articles/energy-market-reform-e3gs-evidence-at-the-house-of-commons/ http://www.e3g.org/programmes/europe-articles/energy-market-reform-e3gs-evidence-at-the-house-of-commons/#When:12:15:42Z The Energy and Climate Change Select Committee of the House of Commons is conducting an inquiry into Government proposals for electricity market reform. E3G’s Simon Skillings was present at the hearings for this inquiry, held on 18 January and 25 January 2011. In advance of this hearing he also submitted a written submission which is available to download. Simon notes that the current market arrangements in the electricity sector are unlikely to deliver our long-term climate security objectives and the risks of supply are also likely to increase. He goes on surmise that future energy policy should lead to increased future investment to the sector and coerce public acceptance and support, whose lives it inevitably impact.   Europe in the World - EU Decarbonisation 2011-01-21T12:15:42+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/programmes/europe-articles/politically-robust-package-of-power-market-reform/ http://www.e3g.org/programmes/europe-articles/politically-robust-package-of-power-market-reform/#When:14:08:20Z Reform of the GB power market presents an opportunity to build vibrant new markets in the full range of low carbon resources necessary to achieve virtual decarbonisation of the sector by around 2030. These new markets should aim to promote innovation in new technologies and ensure that competition is harnessed to deliver maximum benefits for consumers. This involves opening up the market to new sources of finance and new entrants with business models focussed on delivering the necessary low carbon products and services. The ‘Gold Standard’ market reform project (see note 1 below) has identified the shortcomings of current market arrangements in decarbonising the power sector, key outcomes that market reform must deliver and a set of design specifications for market reform capable of delivering those outcomes. Of paramount importance is the requirement for clarity in high level policy objectives along with a credible delivery vehicle to ensure the necessary outcomes are achieved. This is essential to promote a clear understanding of public value and provide confidence in the enduring nature of the new market arrangements. It is also critically important that there exists a credible transition path that avoids any hiatus in ongoing investments by ensuring that the market remains attractive to existing participants whilst creating the environment to attract additional players going forward. The key problem that the new market arrangements will need to address relates to the fact that wholesale market prices are based on short run marginal costs and will therefore largely be driven by changes in fossil fuel prices for the foreseeable future. The majority of low-carbon generation has no exposure to fossil fuel price volatility in its cost structure and, therefore, future earnings do not benefit from the internal hedge enjoyed by fossil-fuelled plant. Moreover, in the longer term, low marginal-cost generation will increasingly set the marginal price. All investments — but particularly heavily capital-intensive, low-carbon resources like renewables and nuclear — will increasingly be unable to earn a revenue stream sufficient to repay investment costs. Fossil-fuel price volatility (in either direction) sends a ‘mixed message’ to investors that serves to undermine power sector decarbonisation in current markets. Very high future natural gas prices reduce the effect of carbon price as a disincentive to the construction of and/or continued operation of high-carbon plant. Very low gas prices will tend to undermine the effect of carbon prices as a spur to low-carbon investment (see note 2 below). Therefore, to decarbonise the power sector in the requisite time-scale required to meet carbon reduction targets, new market arrangements will need to ensure that investment decisions are robust against either scenario. A range of policies, institutions and regulatory mechanisms will be required to create and sustain new market arrangements that are capable of addressing these shortcomings. This paper contains an E3G proposed package of reforms which has been designed to deliver the required outcomes identified by the Gold Standard project. Apart from illustrating the components of an overall package capable of meeting the design objectives, this package has also been constructed with an eye to ensuring that market reform is politically robust and, therefore, deliverable. This package assumes that a carbon pricing mechanism continues and is designed to leverage the benefits of a carbon price, while at the same time ‘future-proofing’ the market so it can successfully decarbonise, irrespective of future fossil fuel price variability. Carbon pricing will continue to ensure that fossil-fuelled generation becomes increasingly efficient and is dispatched in an optimal manner as long as it remains on the system. In addition, carbon pricing will continue to play a key role in stimulating the participation of the demand-side and other low-carbon resources in delivering system stability. Moreover, carbon pricing will continue to ensure that retail suppliers are exposed to the full cost of fossil-fuelled generation when choosing among resource options to meet their customers’ energy service needs. E3G’s proposed package of policies, institutions and regulatory mechanisms are outlined in the paper available to download above. NOTES: 1. See “GB Power Market Reform: High Level Policy Choices” (October 2010). The ‘Gold Standard’ project is being undertaken by E3G and funded by the European Climate Foundation. It involves contributions and input from the following group of independent experts: Meg Gottstein, Richard Cowart and Michael Hogan, the Regulatory Assistance Project, Matt Philips from the European Climate Foundation, Rob Gross from the Centre for Energy Policy and Technology, Claire Thornhill from the Climate Change Committee Secretariat, Rachel Cary from the Green Alliance, Philip Baker, UKERC, Catherine Mitchell and Bridget Woodman from Exeter University, Stephen Thomas from Greenwich University and Ben Caldecott from Climate Change Capital. 2. For example, the DECC and HMT “Energy Market Assessment” (March 2010) shows the significant price volatility in gas prices between 2000 and 2010 (Chart 3.B) and highlights the impact of future low gas prices and concludes: “The cost of gas is a much more significant driver of the electricity price than the cost of carbon, for example DECC analysis suggests that in 2020 a 50 per cent increase in the cost of carbon allowances would be offset by just a 15 per cent reduction in the cost of gas.” Europe in the World - EU Decarbonisation 2010-11-23T14:08:20+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/programmes/europe-articles/eu-china-alliance-the-power-to-take-the-lead-on-climate-change/ http://www.e3g.org/programmes/europe-articles/eu-china-alliance-the-power-to-take-the-lead-on-climate-change/#When:13:00:39Z The failed negotiations at Copenhagen last year followed by the collapse of legislation in the United States have taken the momentum out of global climate negotiations. As the world now looks for alternative leaders to take helm and raise ambition, Nick Mabey and Bernice Lee of Chatham House explain the role that the EU and China in leading global action on climate change. In this article published by Chinadialogue, Nick Mabey and Bernice Lee explain that greater cooperation between the two parties is the key to seizing investment opportunities that would benefit both economies enormously and put them in a position to lead the transition to a low carbon economy. They identify 4 areas in which cooperation is of high priority – from joint technology portfolios and business models to demonstration opportunities, joint standard development to strategic IPR partnerships. The article is also available to download in Chinese and German.   Europe in the World - EU-China Partnership 2010-11-08T13:00:39+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/programmes/europe-articles/renewables-policy-renewables-obligation-vs.-feed-in-tariffs/ http://www.e3g.org/programmes/europe-articles/renewables-policy-renewables-obligation-vs.-feed-in-tariffs/#When:12:45:08Z The ‘Gold Standard’ market reform project has identified two key questions that need to be addressed when considering a market reform: 1. What market outcomes do we wish to determine – what level and over what timescales? 2. How does the Government ensure that these outcomes are delivered – who is responsible and what is the associated regulatory and governance framework? The particular challenge that market reform needs to address is to attract significant levels of investment in certain technologies and to do so in a way that reduces overall costs. Financing costs will represent a large proportion of overall costs and, therefore, rebalancing risks between investors and customers should be the core objective of market reform. Investment risks will be most effectively reduced by ensuring that a long term market opportunity is available for the chosen technologies that cannot be competed-away by other technologies. Renewables Policy The challenge for renewables policy is to create a long term secure market opportunity for renewables, either for all potential technologies or a subset thereof, and to clarify the regulatory and governance framework which ensures this is delivered. In particular, it is important to recognise that supply chain investment has a market time horizon beyond one decade and, therefore, this market opportunity should be defined well beyond 2020. The current RO arrangements do not fulfil these requirements: There is no clear long term volume target for renewables in the power sector, although most people believe that the Government currently aspires to ensure around 30% of the market is delivered from renewable sources by 2020. Delivery responsibilities and governance are not well defined. Despite the RO being an obligation on suppliers, the ability to use the buy-out mechanism does not create a responsibility for delivery. It is therefore assumed that the Government will use its powers to periodically adjust RO banding levels to meet volume aspirations. The Government needs to clarify the outcomes it is trying to achieve and then ensure that there is a well designed delivery mechanism to achieve these outcomes. The choice between the RO and FITs should therefore be viewed as part of a process to ensure an optimally designed delivery mechanism to hit specified renewable generation targets. However, it must be emphasised that the establishment of these targets represents the cornerstone of renewable policy. RO vs FIT There is now extensive international evidence to inform the detailed design for renewable support mechanisms. The Government undertook a comparative analysis of renewable generation support mechanisms policies in 2008 . This report identified the key issues associated with a move from an RO to FITs: 1. Hiatus: There is a risk that changing the renewables support scheme would lead to a temporary pause in investment as investors understand and assess the new arrangements 2. Grandfathering: It is not possible to continue to operate the RO alongside a FIT scheme such that future revenues of historic investments remain unaffected. The simplest solution is therefore to transfer existing projects onto new FITs such that their revenues remain broadly as expected. It is likely that there will be a cost associated with this transition. 3. Market arrangements: FITs formalise the role of a central delivery agency charged with meeting Government targets. This agency will effectively buy all renewable output and then need to resell this to the market such that market participants can manage wholesale price exposure. This is likely to involve a series of auctions at various forward timescales. 4. Welfare allocation: A vintaged FIT scheme allows tariffs to be regularly adjusted such that they closely track renewable costs, thereby minimising the impact on consumer prices. FITs will not be able to perfectly track costs and, where projects are large and technically immature, there may be advantages in running auctions to aid cost discovery. RO bands, on the other hand, cannot be changed regularly and this significantly increases the likelihood that either investment will be insufficiently incentivised or renewable generators will receive significant welfare rents. 5. Financing costs: FITs remove future commodity price risk from renewable projects and, thereby, stabilise future revenue schemes. This can have a significant impact in reducing overall financing costs. It is not possible to accurately quantify all of these effects. However, the previous work commissioned by the Government suggested a clear and systematic saving in both resource costs and consumer prices associated with a move to a system of FITs. It is extremely difficult to imagine the RO system remaining politically robust far into the future, as volumes of renewable generation become significant, given the welfare allocation problem described above. However, a change to a well-designed FIT system is a major undertaking and will require significant political energy and regulatory effort to deliver the change. The longer it is left before a change is made, the more difficult it will become and the smaller the benefits that will be derived. This suggests that it is important that the change is made as soon as possible and certainly as part of the current package of market reform. Europe in the World - EU Decarbonisation 2010-10-26T12:45:08+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/programmes/europe-articles/emissions-performance-standards-e3g-gives-evidence/ http://www.e3g.org/programmes/europe-articles/emissions-performance-standards-e3g-gives-evidence/#When:14:08:02Z E3G Senior Associate Simon Skillings appeared before the House of Commons Energy and Climate Change Committee on 12 October 2010 to give evidence on the role of Emissions Performance Standards in power generation.  Emissions Performance Standards are policy instruments aimed at driving forward lower carbon generation by placing limits on the carbon intensity of power plant emissions.  In his evidence, Simon argued that an EPS can play a key role in providing investors with greater clarity about the volume of the future market opportunity for low carbon generation.  This will help encourage the development of supply chains for clean technologies.  The evidence session also covered other key issues such as the relationship to electricity market reform and to the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, international implications and issues on how an EPS should be designed. A draft transcript of the evidence session can be viewed on the Energy and Climate Change Committee website     Europe in the World - EU Decarbonisation 2010-10-17T14:08:02+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/programmes/europe-articles/gb-power-market-reform-high-level-policy-choices/ http://www.e3g.org/programmes/europe-articles/gb-power-market-reform-high-level-policy-choices/#When:14:48:51Z The UK power market faces an unprecedented challenge. It is now widely accepted that it will be necessary to have largely decarbonised the power sector by around 2030 in order to set the UK on the path to meet 2050 greenhouse gas reduction targets for the economy as a whole. This in turn will involve the replacement of a large proportion of the existing power generation fleet with new, low carbon, technologies, in addition to radical improvements in the efficiency and responsiveness of energy usage. This raises two major challenges: It is necessary to attract significant levels of investment and to do so in a way that ensures that the total cost of these investments (including financing costs), and their impact on energy prices, are acceptable, to investors, consumers and society as a whole, and Throughout this transition, maintain current levels of system security and the efficient operation of the power system. The existing power market arrangements were not designed to cope with this situation and were implemented at a time in which: Limited new investment was required and the investment that was expected to emerge was in mature generation technologies which could be largely accommodated by existing network infrastructure. There was particular focus on the efficient use of existing assets which incur a high proportion of their costs when burning fossil fuels and whose output can be controlled to meet system stability requirements. The scope for demand response was restricted by the lack of information and control technology, and no market and regulatory rules were developed to recognise the contribution of end-use efficiency as an optimal system despatch/investment option. This paper therefore considers where the existing arrangements will fall short in delivering the required objectives and consequently where market reform is required. Europe in the World - EU Decarbonisation 2010-10-15T14:48:51+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/programmes/europe-articles/emissions-performance-standards-may-lower-costs-of-decarbonisation/ http://www.e3g.org/programmes/europe-articles/emissions-performance-standards-may-lower-costs-of-decarbonisation/#When:10:16:45Z Introducing Emissions Performance Standards for power generation could play a key role in lowering the cost of the low carbon transition, E3G has argued in its response to the House of Commons Energy and Climate Change Committee inquiry into Emissions Performance Standards. The response stresses that an Emissions Performance Standard (EPS) is a useful tool but not a silver bullet solution for decarbonisation.  More fundamental electricity market reform in addition to an EPS will be necessary to ensure sufficient investment in low carbon power generation.  However, an EPS would provide greater certainty to investors on the future market opportunity for low carbon generation, by ensuring low carbon options are not undercut by high carbon generation.  This will ensure that equipment providers for Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) and other low carbon generation options begin investing in the technology development and supply chain capacity now that is necessary in order to begin deployment in 10-20 years time.  Without this clarity for investors and development of supply chains, the overall costs of moving to a low carbon power sector will be significantly higher. The consultation response also evaluates EPS proposals in the context of European policy developments, and identifies the strategic advantage to the UK of becoming an early mover.  As the UK has a growing expertise in CCS technology, well-understood geological storage capacities and a near-term requirement for replacing generation capacity, the introduction of an EPS within the UK would provide strong signals for industrial development to be UK based, and may generate significant commercial opportunity for UK firms. The full response can be downloaded above.   Europe in the World - EU Decarbonisation 2010-09-15T10:16:45+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/programmes/europe-articles/choices-at-stake-for-power-market-reform/ http://www.e3g.org/programmes/europe-articles/choices-at-stake-for-power-market-reform/#When:10:43:23Z Politicians and leaders of energy companies both face a major choice regarding market reform over the coming months. In an article published in New Power magazine, E3G’s Simon Skillings sets out the key choices at stake for government and for business. On the one hand there is the potential to ‘muddle through’ with incremental changes. However, there is also the possibility to seriously explore how the market might be designed to genuinely underpin the transformation through to decarbonisation and the new business opportunities that will arise. Bells and whistles For government, the key question concerns the durability of a newly reformed power market. The coalition agreement spells out a series of, apparently quite clear, reform measures. Nevertheless, there is a rather stark choice facing ministers and one that needs to be addressed before the autumn: are we creating a market framework that can endure for several decades and form the bedrock upon which a decarbonised power system can emerge? Or are we merely adding a few bells and whistles to the current system that may underpin the next wave of investment but will mean, in all likelihood, we will be back considering market design again within, say, five years? For business, the key choice is how to engage with the reform process. On the one hand, there is the desire to minimise the potential for ongoing regulatory and policy change by ensuring that a new market framework is introduced that can credibly survive the transformation to decarbonisation. However, there is a chance that this will involve a major change to the market risk landscape and render current business models obsolete. On the other hand, it is tempting to focus on short term business targets and try to negotiate piecemeal changes to the market that make it easier to justify current investment plans to the capital markets, albeit in the knowledge that significant ongoing policy risks remain. Neither way forward can or should be viewed as the ‘easy’ choice. Simon is a Senior Associate at E3G. The full article as published in New Power Magazine is available to download above. Europe in the World - EU Decarbonisation 2010-08-16T10:43:23+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/programmes/europe-articles/an-e3g-response-to-the-european-commissions-energy-strategy-2011-2020-consu/ http://www.e3g.org/programmes/europe-articles/an-e3g-response-to-the-european-commissions-energy-strategy-2011-2020-consu/#When:10:57:34Z The European Commission is developing an Energy Strategy for 2011-2020.  In response to the consultation, E3G welcomed the Commission’s renewed focus on completing the internal energy market, achieving energy savings and promoting low-carbon innovation.  Our main conclusions and recommendations are: The period to 2020 will be a crucial foundation stage for developing Europe’s energy system to 2050. The longer-term 2050 perspective must be integral to the shorter term 2011-2020 strategy. The transition to a low-carbon energy system presents significant economic opportunity, for growth, jobs and new products and markets. Realising these opportunities should be a key objective of the strategy alongside the more narrow evaluation of costs. Energy is a system, not a single sector. Opportunities for efficiency gains and carbon reduction exist at all stages of energy consumption and use. Realising these opportunities will require a holistic approach utilising a package of measures, rather than a single ‘silver bullet’ solution. The full consultation response is available to download above. Europe in the World - EU Decarbonisation 2010-07-02T10:57:34+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/programmes/europe-articles/pathways-mapped-out-to-zero-carbon-power-sector/ http://www.e3g.org/programmes/europe-articles/pathways-mapped-out-to-zero-carbon-power-sector/#When:12:56:37Z A major new report published this week shows that a zero carbon European power sector can be achieved at comparable levels of cost and reliability as the current high-carbon trajectory. The Roadmap 2050 study, led by the European Climate Foundation (ECF), modeled the macroeconomic, grid and system security implications of a range of pathways to a zero carbon power sector, based on different levels of renewables, CCS and nuclear generation. Based on these analytics, the policy aspect of the report was co-authored by E3G and ECF to kick-start the conversation amongst policy makers, regulators, investors and other stakeholders about how a decarbonised power sector and an 80-95% economy-wide carbon reduction can be achieved. Nick Mabey, E3G’s CEO comments: The report shows the benefits of the low-carbon pathway far outweigh the challenges and that a commitment now to a low-carbon transformation of the energy sector is the winning strategy for competitiveness, jobs and prosperity in the UK and Europe. Achieving a minimum 80% CO2e reductions in 2050 based on zero carbon power generation in Europe is technically feasible and makes compelling economic sense.” The core elements to enabling these changes, the report argues, are: Aggressively pursuing energy efficiency gains, and recognising energy efficiency as an essential zero-carbon supply-side resource; Commercialisation of a variety of emerging low carbon generation options (such as offshore wind, solar PV and carbon capture and storage), and energy market reform to ensure timely retirement of high carbon assets and investment in sufficient replacement low carbon infrastructure; Increasing grid interconnections between power systems to balance different forms of generation, and significantly improving ‘demand response’ through smart grid applications. Recommendations Specific areas for the EU to progress are: Action to convert the non-binding 2020 efficiency goal into a firm requirement to deliver the target, whilst allowing Member States flexibility in how to do so; The need to develop the EU ETS to meet current 2050 greenhouse gas reduction goals, alongside additional, complementary measures that reinforce incentives to invest in low/zero carbon resources, rule out investment in long-lived high-carbon generation and overcome market barriers to energy efficiency measures; A new ‘Climate and Resources’ framework to create the policy mix that will efficiently deliver the climate targets and address resource constraints across sectors beyond 2020 and out to 2050; A review of EU budget allocation to ensure appropriate funding is allocated to investments in renewables, CCS, energy efficiency and network infrastructure; Expansion of the ACER/ENTSO-E mandates to develop a strategic interconnection plan out to 2050 and to ensure it facilitates full decarbonization and the optimisation of resources across Member States. Key areas for Member States to progress are: Adopt aggressive targets and strategies for the deployment of energy efficiency measures that will double to triple the current rate of overall energy efficiency improvement; Consider the need for deployment targets beyond 2020 for key renewables generation technologies such as off-shore wind, solar PV; consider parallel deployment strategies for carbon capture and storage, especially in heavy industry; Initiate a review of wholesale market arrangements to ensure that incentives promote investments in energy efficiency and other demand-side resources, system balancing and low carbon generation sources in addition to supporting efficient cross border trading; Explore regional alignments with neighbouring Member States around strategic low-carbon resource development, networks planning and execution, and wholesale market design and operation; A review of the mandate of the network regulators within the framework of the internal energy market to create a robust investment framework that enables the upgrade and roll-out of smart infrastructures at transmission and distribution levels; Establish a timetable for the implementation of fully smart power networks, maximising opportunities for demand response and distributed generation; Review spatial and environmental planning laws to ensure they are fit for purpose; Ensure that sources of funding, financial institutions and risk allocation are appropriately aligned to ensure that the new low carbon infrastructure can be readily and cost-effectively financed.   Europe in the World - EU Decarbonisation 2010-04-14T12:56:37+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/programmes/europe-articles/the-value-proposition-for-a-european-supergrid/ http://www.e3g.org/programmes/europe-articles/the-value-proposition-for-a-european-supergrid/#When:15:29:28Z The concept of a European Supergrid – a network of high-voltage international electricity interconnectors that enable power to be transmitted across Europe – is gaining prominence as a core element of proposals for a decarbonised European power sector. It would enable energy to be transported from remote locations where renewable sources are plentiful to the demand centres where energy is consumed.  It has also been put forward as a valuable tool for electricity system balancing and for resolving the intermittency issues associated with some forms of renewable power. Beyond climate change, it could also offer important benefits in terms of facilitating efficient energy markets and supporting energy security aims. However, delivering a European Supergrid is not simply a question of building more wires.  It involves connecting power markets across the European Union and its neighbours, and may entail potentially significant implications for the way in which energy is planned, governed and used.  To succeed, it will require careful negotiation through the permitting and regulatory systems of dozens of local, regional and national authorities, considerable investment in infrastructure, and potentially wide-ranging alternations to the design of institutions, regulations and markets. Over the course of 2010, E3G will be addressing these issues through a high-level review of the overall value proposition for the Supergrid.  Elements for further examination will include: Value propositions Option value: A key advantage of a European Supergrid is the role it could play in creating options for the early decarbonisation of the European power system, without creating a dependence on one particular mix of generation.  This is of particular importance given the uncertainty associated with the development and deployment of many key low carbon technologies.  It will be important to evaluate the nature and scope of this ‘option value’ for energy decision-making at European and member state level, and how the Supergrid may contribute to managing the risks associated with the transition to a low carbon economy. The reasonable expectation of the development of a Supergrid will also influence investment decisions at a firm level, as it changes perceptions of market opportunities and competitive advantage and market integration will lead to a shift in price expectations.  The role of the Supergrid in altering the parameters of power market investment choices for individual actors will need to be explored. Market efficiency: There are strong parallels between the idea a European single energy market and the Supergrid concept.  Despite a considerable push for a European single energy market for several decades, electricity and gas markets still remain highly fragmented, nationally focused and monopolistic in character.  This creates economic inefficiencies and counterproductive locational signals.  Greater integration between energy markets could enable greater competition, efficiency and lower energy prices for many consumers, as well as enabling power generation plant to be sited in locations that are cost effective rather than nationally expedient.  However, to bring about a single electricity market, more physical capacity for cross-border energy flows are needed, alongside greater integration of market rules.  It will be important to map out the extent of the shared agenda between single energy market reforms and Supergrid proposals to determine how co-benefits can be achieved. Energy security: The development of a European Supergrid could have a major influence on the dynamics of debates about national and European energy security, and this needs to be further explored.  A pan-European electricity grid would create new interdependencies: many countries will become more reliant of electricity generated in other EU member states and their neighbours, while energy export opportunities will also develop.  However, a pan-European grid would also provide an important buffer against gas supply interruptions and other disruptions to power generation.  It may also entail reduced consumption of gas and other fossil fuels in the medium to long term, due to greater integration of renewable energy and reduced need for ‘peak load’ electricity.  This, in turn, will have implications for the EU’s relationships with its current energy suppliers, and may also raise questions about potential trade-offs between construction of new gas pipelines and electricity interconnections. Needs and cost A number of long term visions for a European Supergrid have been developed, most notably ECF’s Roadmap 2050 project.  These overarching views need to be supplemented with a more finely-grained assessment of infrastructure needs and cost for different pathways to 2030, with a view to identifying priority areas for progress.  Current momentum in grid development and network development plans will also need to be evaluated to determine whether the required trajectory is likely to be achieved. Delivery and risks Historically, the business case for new interconnections has been based on the expected inter-regional flows of electricity based on known generation capacities.  This means that the construction of networks often follows that of generation, even though transmission lines often take much longer to be built.  However, the size of the Supergrid and the speed in which it would need to be delivered means that a more strategic approach may be needed, alongside coordination between governments, regulators and transmission system operators.  With the implementation of the Third Energy Package and a growing orientation towards regional power trading platforms, the institutional context for constructing interconnections is becoming more international but also more complex.  A key task will be to evaluate whether the existing arrangements are adequate to ensure a strategic long-term approach to European grids will be developed, and whether new bodies such as ENTSO-E and ACER are sufficiently empowered to enable such a strategic approach to be delivered. Together with the institutional mechanisms, it will also be important to understand not only the risks that a Supergrid seeks to manage, but also the delivery risks that a pan-European grid may encounter.  Some of these are technological – e.g. the potential of inter-regional HVDC lines – while others are more economic, regulatory or political in nature.  Particular challenges include: creating mechanisms for appropriately distributing the costs of new interconnections among the beneficiaries; integrating member state energy policy priorities and concerns into a European framework; and developing smarter approaches to permitting and regulation that enable swifter decisions while safeguarding local democratic concerns. This project focuses specifically on long-distance transmission of electricity, rather than applying new technologies to manage demand and integrate renewables – the ‘Smart Grid’.  However the Supergrid and Smart Grid concepts are closely linked, and E3G will be assessing the technological development of Smart Grids in a separate stream of work. Europe in the World - EU Decarbonisation 2010-04-06T15:29:28+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/programmes/europe-articles/uk-power-sector-market-reform-the-case-for-action/ http://www.e3g.org/programmes/europe-articles/uk-power-sector-market-reform-the-case-for-action/#When:15:52:04Z There is emerging consensus over the important early actions that need to be taken if we are to meet our 2050 decarbonisation objectives. In particular, the widespread and urgent deployment of energy efficiency measures and the early decarbonisation of power generation. Momentum behaviour by market actors is not going to deliver these objectives and change is necessary to kick-start the transition. Indeed, it is likely to directly threaten security of energy supplies as potential investors defer making the necessary investment decisions. Significant investment risk is an endemic feature of the power sector which can be expected to continue for decades to come and market reform will be critical in changing investor perceptions of the opportunities and risks ahead. It is therefore an essential component in triggering and sustaining power sector decarbonisation. It also has the potential to impact on energy retail markets and could help transform the behaviour and experience of energy consumers. A new paper by E3G’s Senior Associate Simon Skillings explains why market reform is necessary and how the current arrangements are affecting the behaviour of market participants. Narratives It will not be possible to effectively engage in a process to define the necessary market reforms until the Government develops a clear and credible forward looking narrative for its long term role in the market. There are currently a number of plausible narratives that could be implied by Government policy but each of these would lead to very different requirements for market reform. The paper sets out three possible narratives: ‘market driven’, ‘resource planning’ and ‘keeping options open’ and explains the market reform agendas that would be required under each situation. The choices faced by Government are intensely political and this note does not attempt to suggest a recommended way forward. The key objective is to ensure that Government recognises the choices that it will need to make and some of the policy implications that will result. Europe in the World - EU Decarbonisation 2010-02-16T15:52:04+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/programmes/europe-articles/a-road-map-to-deliver-smart-grid-in-the-uk/ http://www.e3g.org/programmes/europe-articles/a-road-map-to-deliver-smart-grid-in-the-uk/#When:16:00:16Z The concept of a ‘smart grid’ involves the combination of instrumentation, communications and analytics that allows power network infrastructure to be operated in a dynamic and efficient manner - as opposed to the ‘passive’ operational approach which is currently the norm in the UK. The challenges of climate change and system security, in particular the ability to accommodate significant volumes of decentralised and renewable generation, requires that the network infrastructure must be upgraded to enable smart operation. Failure to do so will act as a major obstacle in the transition to a low carbon economy. However, progress in upgrading the network has so far been hindered by a series of obstacles.  In particular, the current regulatory regime is not well designed to encourage network operators to embrace new technological opportunities and this is exacerbated by the extent of the risk and uncertainty involved. The government has a key role to play in injecting the necessary momentum by providing strong direction to the regulator on the outcomes that must be delivered, and by ensuring the appropriate financing routes are in place. In a briefing paper entitled ‘A Road Map to Deliver Smart Grid in the UK’ published by Green Alliance, E3G’s Senior Associate Simon Skillings sets out an ambitious but practical set of actions that are necessary to drive the transition to smart grids.  This should be phased in three stages, designed to ensure that network developments do not obstruct or slow down the decarbonisation of the power system: Prepare (2010 – 2015): Early in this period the government must identify a series of key indicators and associated targets for the implementation of smart grid and ensure that the regulator is obliged to deliver these targets. The network operators need to develop their plans to meet the targets and this will need to be based on sufficient testing and trialling of the solutions to be adopted. Finally, the regulator will need to ensure that the appropriate regulatory and commercial arrangements are in place to drive the subsequent deployment process. Enable (2015 – 2025): During this decade the power network needs to become fully automated and interconnected and this process must be driven by obliging the regulator to ensure that staged targets are met against a series of key indicators. These indicators might include parameters which specify the system coverage of instrumentation, grid efficiency achieved, carbon reduced from a more efficient grid, proportion of despatchable demand, capacity of non-generation balancing services and progress with key strategic interconnectors. Deliver (2025 onwards): The power system will have changed enormously by this time and the regulatory and commercial arrangements for the networks must support the ongoing progress towards a fully decarbonisation future. The paper is available to download here. Europe in the World - EU Decarbonisation 2010-01-26T16:00:16+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/programmes/europe-articles/delivering-a-zero-emissions-power-sector-policy-challenges/ http://www.e3g.org/programmes/europe-articles/delivering-a-zero-emissions-power-sector-policy-challenges/#When:15:20:03Z Creating a virtually zero emission EU power sector by around 2030 will require transformational change: Climate science suggests increasing urgency in the need to reduce carbon emissions; It is widely accepted that the power sector will play a key role in decarbonising the overall economy: the crucial technologies are already available to create a carbon free power sector and this, in turn, will create electrification options to decarbonise other sectors; Current momentum behaviour appears to be a long way from that required to deliver a zero carbon power sector over the necessary timescales and some major changes will be needed to the market and regulatory framework. High level conclusions E3G has initiated a work programme to drive forward this agenda.  This E3G working paper sets out the high level conclusions of our initial engagement process with stakeholders who are close to the policy debate, and the key questions and issues it has raised.  Emerging findings include: Amid much discussion by stakeholders and policy-makers, there is considerable confusion about what needs to be delivered and by when, yet this seems an essential requirement to engender momentum into the political process. This issue is clouded by the strong ‘optimism bias’ from advocates of a particular technology and from policy makers who assume that their policies will inevitably deliver the desired outcomes. Yet all experience of deployment projects for new/complex technologies suggests that these are plagued by cost and timescale overruns. It is crucial to recognise the risk that policies might fail to deliver desired outcomes. Delivering transformational change in power sector policy therefore seems to depend critically on a broad acceptance that ‘carbon targets are too important to miss’ and enough money needs to be invested to leave only a small residual risk of failure. We cannot afford to put all our ‘eggs’ in one delivery ‘basket’. The challenge is therefore to create a roadmap which drives forward a range of technical options and does not at this stage exclude the possibility of any longer term low carbon fuel mix. The policy landscape across the EU is complex and the potential need for reform is significant. While the ability to drive through key changes will depend on the political opportunities that arise, clearly action at EU level is needed to reinforce the future carbon constraint and associated carbon price;  mandate delivery of energy efficiency targets; fund energy efficiency deployment strategies; identify and fund new strategic interconnectors with potential to access significant renewable energy resource; fund smart grid pilot projects; and establish common framework for regulating networks to deliver smart grid. Action by key Member States could provide: deployment strategies for energy efficiency; reform of the regulatory framework to deliver smart grid; and reform of the electricity wholesale market to drive forward investment in low carbon generation. Europe in the World - EU Decarbonisation 2009-11-25T15:20:03+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/programmes/europe-articles/investment-momentum-for-decarbonising-the-eu-power-sector/ http://www.e3g.org/programmes/europe-articles/investment-momentum-for-decarbonising-the-eu-power-sector/#When:14:58:45Z Power generation in the EU is at a crossroads.  Up to half of current generation capacity will be decommissioned over the next 20 years, and policy pressures on climate change and energy security are changing investment frameworks. However, investment climates remain very uncertain, as a result of price, regulatory and delivery risks as well as factors resulting from the global economic downturn. To inform thinking on policy change and energy market reform, E3G has produced a background paper to review current evidence on investment momentum in the EU power sector, focusing primarily on power generation.  It also looks at plausible scenarios of future investment needs based on current policy frameworks, and compares these to alternative low carbon scenarios.  As well as an EU overview, five country case studies are presented: UK, Germany, France, Spain and Poland.  Meet demand The review finds that a significant increase in investment volumes will be needed in all future scenarios for new generation capacity across Europe, to replace decommissioned plants and meet demand.  Total investment volumes increase under all scenarios.  The amount of investment needed to meet decarbonisation goals is higher than under “business as usual” scenarios, but is of a broadly similar magnitude.  When fuel costs are taken into account, the overall additional costs of low carbon generation may be negligible.  However, although there has been a recent growth in investment in renewables and low carbon technologies, ‘business as usual’ investment patterns and new fossil fuel generation capacity in the planning pipeline risk ‘locking in’ high carbon generation and making future carbon reduction targets impossible to meet. Europe in the World - EU Decarbonisation 2009-11-18T14:58:45+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/programmes/europe-articles/making-choices-over-china-eu-china-co-operation-on-energy-and-climate/ http://www.e3g.org/programmes/europe-articles/making-choices-over-china-eu-china-co-operation-on-energy-and-climate/#When:16:32:43Z The EU needs China to move rapidly towards a low carbon economy. Even with strong leadership at the highest level in China, this will not be easy, given the country’s scale, diversity and development needs. The building of an effective UN climate change agreement is an important component of this process. But it is also crucial that the EU develops close bilateral ties with China. Such a relationship would help accelerate China’s transition to a low-carbon economy by making the most of Europe’s technology and expertise, as well as the dense commercial links between the two economies.  Nick Mabey, CEO for E3G’s recently wrote a policy brief for the Centre for European Reform (CER). Below is the related Press Release as written by CER. Press Release The EU has a vital interest in ensuring that China moves rapidly towards a low carbon economy. Even with strong leadership at the highest level in China, this will not be easy, given the country’s scale, diversity and development needs. The building of an effective UN climate change agreement is an important component of this process and Europe must work hard to ensure that the Copenhagen summit in December 2009 is a success. But it is also crucial that the EU makes better use of its technology, expertise, investment and trade relationship to speed up China’s transition to a low-carbon economy. In this new CER policy brief, Nick Mabey, Chief Executive of E3G, argues that the European Commission and EU member-states need to make the following choices if Europe is to fulfil the potential of the EU-China relationship: Recognise the strategic importance of energy and climate security as a leading factor in EU-China relations; Agree a clear and strong role for EU-China bilateral relations as part of Europe’s overall climate change strategy; Agree to progressively align the climate change co-operation strategies of the EU and the individual member-states. To this end, the Commission and member-states should pool at least half of their China funding under a common strategy by 2013; Take the lead in convening trilateral discussions between the EU, China and the US to resolve critical and contentious issues, starting with a drive to establish a shared basis for technology co-operation and the resolution of trade questions, such as the issue of carbon tariffs; Agree to fast-track EU-China co-operation projects at the EU-China summit in November 2009. These should include the demonstration and deployment of carbon capture and storage (CCS) and the development of joint Low Carbon Investment and Technology Development Zones in China. ENDS Notes for editors: 1. Nick Mabey is Chief Executive of E3G. He can be contacted on + +44 (0) 20 7234 9890. 2. This paper can be downloaded from the CER website (http://www.cer.org.uk) or by contacting Kate Mullineux at kate@cer.org.uk or on +44 20 7233 1199. Europe in the World - EU-China Partnership 2009-11-16T16:32:43+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/programmes/europe-articles/market-distorting-impacts-of-free-eua-allocation-to-energy-intensive-indust/ http://www.e3g.org/programmes/europe-articles/market-distorting-impacts-of-free-eua-allocation-to-energy-intensive-indust/#When:15:55:59Z The European Parliament’s Environment Committee recently supported a revision of the EU’s Emission Trading System which will help deliver the Union’s target of a 20% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 2020. Against strong industry lobbying, the Committee supported a key proposal to limit the allocation of free permits to energy intensive industries. On September 26, 2008 in a letter to Commission President, José Manuel Barroso and Competition Commissioner, Neelie Kroes, E3G and WWF detailed their concerns on the impacts of continuing efforts by some Member States to secure free allocations to the cement and steel industries in particular. On 5 November EU competition officials raided cement companies it suspects formed an illegal cartel to hike prices for the building trade.  The text of the letter follows below, and a pdf version is attached for download. A separate document entitled ‘Ten Reasons’ details the background on the letter below. WWF and E3G letter: Market distorting impacts of free EUA allocation to energy intensive industries 30 September 2008 Commission President José Manuel Barroso Competition Commissioner Neelie Kroes Dear Commissioner, As civil society groups active on European climate change issues, we wish to register our concern over the competition and market distorting impacts of proposals for the free allocation of emissions allowances to energy intensive industries within the EU. Europe has set a goal of limiting global temperature rise to below 2°C. This goal will require Europe to reduce its domestic GHG emissions by 80–95% by 2050. Such a radical transformation to a zero carbon economy will require high levels of innovation, and maximum creation of opportunities for new market entrants to emerge providing lower carbon products, services and materials. Giving free emission allowances to EU industries such as steel, concrete and aluminium will undermine innovation and competition in low carbon products. Allocation of free permits will either remove carbon cost pass through or give high carbon companies additional financial resources. This will raise barriers to entry for lower carbon alternatives to these products in the construction industry, notably: timber laminates, recycled materials, low carbon concrete and advanced high strength steel products. It will also disadvantage architects, engineers and designers who are producing new designs for buildings and other infrastructure which have reduced overall material use, and thus lower embodied carbon emissions. Without such innovation, it is unlikely that the EU will reach its internal CO2 targets, or be able to develop models for decarbonisation which can be used by other countries and form a basis for European competitiveness in the future. We do not consider the rationale for granting free permits to have any credible economic basis as most of these industries are not at immediate risk from international competition. In particular, the cement industry is highly closed to competition within Europe, as evidenced by the high variation of cement prices across the continent. Recent increases in shipping costs have placed a de facto €50 per tonne carbon tax on imports of cement and steel into the EU from Asia, further reducing competitive pressures. A similar situation of closed national markets with significant barriers to new entry seems to exist in the construction industry. We urge DG Competition to ensure that market distorting and anti-competitive subsidies are not given to these industries in the form of free allowances. We would also welcome an investigation into market barriers to competition and new entry in the European construction industry, which we believe may be slowing the introduction of new low carbon alternatives. Europe will need to construct an open, competitive and dynamic market in low carbon construction services if it is to deliver its climate change goals. Yours sincerely, Nick Mabey Chief Executive, E3G Third Generation Environmentalism Stefan Singer Director Global Energy Policy, WWF CC: Commission Vice-President Günter Verheugen Commissioner Stavros Dimas Commissioner Andris Piebalgs Director General Philip Lowe Georgs Andrejevs MEP Johannes Blokland MEP Dorette Corbey MEP Avril Doyle MEP Lena Ek MEP Jill Evans MEP Elisa Ferreira MEP Petru Filip MEP Satu Hassi MEP Bilyana Ilieva Raeva MEP Alain Lipietz MEP Caroline Lucas MEP Linda McAvan MEP Esko Seppänen MEP Kyriacos Triantaphyllides MEP Cornelis Visser MEP Corien Wortmann-Kool MEP   Europe in the World - News & Comment, Europe in the World - Activities 2008-11-10T15:55:59+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/programmes/europe-articles/europe-delivering-the-global-deal/ http://www.e3g.org/programmes/europe-articles/europe-delivering-the-global-deal/#When:12:47:01Z The political conditions do not exist for a global climate deal. In a recent presentation, E3G Chief Executive Nick Mabey highlights the priorities for EU climate action in 2008. European leadership is vital, but EU climate politics are vulnerable and need investment. Europe must immediately focus on shaping its strategic relationships with the US and China, and key decisions by non-environmental actors. An ambitious global climate deal is in Europe’s interests and cannot be achieved without strong EU leadership. Europeans recognise that the threat of climate change is real and urgent and that the benefits of moving to a low carbon economy outweigh the costs. The EU has also gone further than any other major economy to put in place concrete domestic policies to support the transition. And yet as the global climate negotiations approach a critical moment the EU is wavering on its domestic commitments and lacks a clear diplomacy strategy to shape the positions of key international partners. Attached is a presentation, made at July’s meeting for the European Economic and Social Committee’s Sustainable Development Observatory, in which E3G’s Chief Executive Nick Mabey highlights the priorities for EU climate action in 2008: implementing domestic energy and climate package; building bridges with China and the US; and drawing up credible proposals for technological and financial support to developing countries. Europe in the World - News & Comment, Europe in the World - Activities 2008-07-22T12:47:01+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/programmes/europe-articles/invitation-an-eu-budget-for-fighting-climate-change/ http://www.e3g.org/programmes/europe-articles/invitation-an-eu-budget-for-fighting-climate-change/#When:09:49:00Z We are very pleased to publicise a discussion event in Paris, where we will be participating along with colleagues from IDDRI, IEEP, and Green Alliance: Monday 16 June 2008, Conference from 5 to 7 pm at Science Po, amphithéâtre Jean Moulin 13, rue de l’Université – Paris VII (M° Saint-Germain-des-Près or Rue du Bac) An EU Budget for fighting Climate Change? Following public consultations, initiated in 2007 by the European Commission in the framework of the European Union’s budget reform, climate change has been identified as a major new challenge which will have significant impacts. It appears increasingly likely that the challenges for the first decades of this century will be the transformation of development models, the invention of a new industrial revolution, and the success of the energy transition to reduce our dependence on fossil fuels. The choices that Europe makes will therefore be decisive, and numerous international stakeholders expect Europe to transform its leadership on environmental negotiations into an implementation of appropriate policies. Although limited, the budget of the EU can be an essential tool for the implementation of such policies, but the current European budget still reflects long-established policy priorities mainly designed to protect and maintain European agriculture. Three recognised European organisations – IEEP (Turning the EU Budget into an Instrument to Support the Fight Against Climate Change), Green Alliance (Investing in our Future) and E3G (A European Budget for the Future) – have submitted reports as part of the review process. It is important to hear these organisations together and compare their points of view to those of a representative of the Council and a member of the Parliament, as people who know the internal thought processes of European institutions. Round table discussions chaired by Laurence Tubiana, director of Iddri and of the Sciences Po Sustainable Development Center, in the presence of: Stephen Hale, Director, Green Alliance Marc Pallemaerts, Senior Fellow and Head of Environmental Governance Research Team, IEEP Jesse Scott, Programme Leader, E3G Denis Simonneau, Cabinet Director at the State Secretary responsible for European Affairs Simultaneous interpretation between French and English will be provided during the conference. Please confirm your participation before 13th June 2008. Europe in the World - Activities 2008-06-06T09:49:00+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/programmes/europe-articles/invitation-quel-budget-de-lunion-europeenne-pour-lutter-contre-le-changemen/ http://www.e3g.org/programmes/europe-articles/invitation-quel-budget-de-lunion-europeenne-pour-lutter-contre-le-changemen/#When:09:38:00Z L’Institut du développement durable et des relations internationales (Iddri) et la Chaire développement durable de Sciences Po vous invitent à une conférence: Lundi 16 Juin 2008, Conférence de 17h00 à 19h00 à Sciences Po, amphithéâtre Jean Moulin 13, rue de l’Université – Paris VII (M° Saint-Germain-des-Près ou Rue du Bac) Quel budget de l’Union européenne pour lutter contre le changement climatique ? Suite aux consultations publiques initiées en 2007 par la Commission européenne dans le cadre de la réforme du budget de l’Union européenne, le changement climatique a été identifié comme un nouvel enjeu majeur dont les impacts seront significatifs. Il nous apparaît de plus en plus que le défi des premières décennies de notre siècle est celui de la transformation des modèles de développement, de l’avènement d’une nouvelle révolution industrielle, de la réussite de la transition énergétique impliquant une réduction de notre dépendance aux énergies fossiles. Les choix que l’Europe fera seront à ce titre déterminants, et nombreux sont les acteurs de la scène internationale qui attendent que l’Europe transforme son leadership sur les négociations environnementales par la mise en place de politiques adéquates. Le budget de l’Union, quoique limité, peut être un outil privilégié de mise en œuvre de cette politique, mais le budget actuel de l’Union demeure le reflet de priorités politiques anciennes essentiellement tournées vers la protection et le soutien de l’agriculture européenne. Trois organisations européennes reconnues - l’IEEP (Turning the EU Budget into an Instrument to Support the Fight Against Climate Change), Green Alliance (Investing in our Future) et E3G (A European Budget for the Future) - ont soumis des rapports à l’occasion du processus de réexamen. Il a paru important de les entendre ensemble et de rapprocher leur point de vue de ceux qui ont eu connu de l’intérieur le processus de réflexion des institutions européennes, avec un représentant du Conseil et un membre du Parlement. Table ronde animée par Laurence Tubiana, directrice de l’Iddri et de la chaire développement durable de Sciences Po, en présence de: Stephen Hale, Director, Green Alliance Marc Pallemaerts, Senior Fellow and Head of Environmental Governance Research Team, IEEP Jesse Scott, Programme Leader, E3G Denis Simonneau, Directeur de Cabinet au Secrétaire d’État chargé des Affaires européennes La traduction simultanée anglais-français sera assurée pendant la conférence. Merci de bien vouloir confirmer votre participation avant le 13 juin 2008. Europe in the World - Activities 2008-06-06T09:38:00+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/programmes/europe-articles/un-budget-europeen-pour-lavenir/ http://www.e3g.org/programmes/europe-articles/un-budget-europeen-pour-lavenir/#When:09:21:00Z In April E3G submitted a thinkpiece to the European Commission’s consultation on the future of the EU Budget. We’ve now produced a French version of our paper - the summary follows below and the full version is attached in pdf format for download. We’ll be discussing this paper at an event in Paris on 16th June, hosted by IDDRI and Sciences Po. Un budget européen pour l’avenir Principes pour la réforme du budget européen Nick Mabey, Jennifer Morgan, Jesse Scott, Rebecca Bertram Résumé L’Europe a besoin d’un budget qui réponde aux défis futurs et non aux débats politiques passés. La révision du budget déterminera la forme du budget européen jusqu’en 2020 : il convient de procéder à un changement radical pour que le budget reflète effectivement les priorités futures des Européens. Le budget de l’UE représente seulement 1% du PIB européen, et ce pourcentage n’a pas cessé de diminuer au cours de ces 20 dernières années. Ce n’est non pas une augmentation insoutenable et inconsidérée du budget qui pourrait représenter un danger lors de cette révision du budget mais bien l’incapacité à déterminer des priorités claires. Centrer le débat sur les limites budgétaires à ce stade entraînerait un retour à de vieux reflexes, nuisibles au débat d’idées. Le budget de l’UE est modeste et devrait donc se concentrer sur les secteurs qui présentent une haute valeur ajoutée dans les domaines où l’Europe a choisi d’agir de manière concertée. Le budget devrait refléter les priorités du traité de Lisbonne et privilégier, d’une part, les actions qui permettent d’asseoir le rôle européen dans le monde et, d’autre part, les infrastructures et innovations nécessaires pour mener à bien ce rôle. L’Europe est un chef de file dans le changement climatique, mais les priorités de l’Union que sont la sécurité énergétique et climatique ne sont pas inscrites dans le budget actuel. Il n’y a pas un seul État membre qui puisse investir dans un nouveau système d’énergie européen à faible taux d’émission de CO2, ou assurer l’investissement de taille nécessaire au développement de technologies telles que le captage et le stockage de CO2 ou l’énergie solaire concentrée. Des plans européens ambitieux pour la mise en place de nouvelles technologies et infrastructures n’ont toujours pas été financés, ce qui réduit d’autant plus la crédibilité européenne vis-à-vis du secteur industriel et des autres pays. Une option pourrait être de créer un nouveau budget -limité dans le temps- dédié à la sécurité énergétique et climatique, co-financé par l’Union européenne et les États membres, qui inclurait la vente aux enchères de permis d’émission de CO2. Les Européens ne pourront aspirer à la sécurité climatique que si les grands pays en développement tels que la Chine et l’Inde commencent à réduire leurs émissions de gaz à effet de serre. Ces pays sont encore pauvres et ont bien moins contribué au changement climatique que l’Europe. Pour obtenir un accord international, l’Europe pourrait avoir à dépenser entre 30 et 100 milliards d’euros par an pour aider ces pays à réduire leurs émissions ; le budget de l’UE apparaît être le relais logique pour assurer un partage équitable de ces coûts entre les différents Etats membres. L’Europe doit relever des défis importants liés aux questions de migration, d’instabilité et de pauvreté qui touchent son voisinage immédiat ; le changement climatique ne fera qu’exacerber tous ces problèmes. Le budget devrait soutenir le nouveau service pour l’action extérieure de l’UE afin de trouver une solution à ces problèmes et de promouvoir la stabilité et la prospérité à long terme dans son voisinage. Les citoyens européens estiment que le budget européen est à la fois une décision et un projet qui demeure éloigné de leurs propres réalités, et manque, qui plus est, de légitimité à leurs yeux. Les Européens devraient être directement consultés pour fixer les priorités budgétaires générales. Cette consultation pourrait pourrait prendre la forme d’un processus participatif – comme un sondage à caractère délibératif (deliberative polling) – en association avec le Parlement européen. Une option plus radicale consisterait à utiliser le processus électoral européen prévu en 2009 pour soumettre les priorités budgétaires directement au vote des citoyens. Europe in the World - News & Comment, Europe in the World - Thinking 2008-06-06T09:21:00+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/programmes/europe-articles/ein-budget-fuer-die-zukunft/ http://www.e3g.org/programmes/europe-articles/ein-budget-fuer-die-zukunft/#When:13:04:01Z Last month E3G submitted a thinkpiece to the European Commission’s consultation on the future of the EU Budget. We’ve now produced a German version of our paper - the summary follows below and the full version is attached in pdf format for download. Ein Budget für die Zukunft Prinzipien für die Reform des EU-Haushalts Von Nick Mabey, Jennifer Morgan, Jesse Scott, Rebecca Bertram Zusammenfassung: Europa braucht einen Haushalt, der neuen Herausforderungen, nicht aber alten politischen Diskussionen gerecht wird. Das anstehende Haushaltsverfahren soll das EU-Budget bis 2020 festlegen. Das erfordert einen grundlegenden Wandel,  damit er die künftigen Prioritäten der Europäer angemessen widerspiegeln kann. Der EU-Haushalt entspricht etwa einem Prozent des gesamteuropäischen Bruttoinlandsprodukts,  wobei dieser Anteil in den vergangen 20 Jahren ständig geschrumpft ist. Die Gefahr liegt nicht etwa darin, dass der Haushalt wächst, sondern dass es wieder nicht gelingt, darin klar neue Prioritäten zu setzen. Wer sich heute ausschließlich auf die Finanzierbarkeit orientiert, wird unweigerlich in alte, rückwärtsgerichtete Muster abrutschen. Weil der EU-Haushalt nur einen geringen Umfang hat, sollten die Haushaltsverhandlungen darauf gerichtet sein, den Mehrwert für alle Europäer zu steigern, besonders auf den Feldern, auf denen die EU bereits gemeinsam auftritt. Der künftige Haushalt muss deshalb, auf der Grundlage des Vertrages von Lissabon, der EU dazu verhelfen, zum einen ihre internationale Gestaltungsfähigkeit zu erhöhen, zum anderen die europäische Infrastruktur so umzubauen, dass Innovation Europa-weit gefördert wird. Die Union hat in der internationalen Klimapolitik eine globale Führungsrolle übernmmen. Allerdings werden die neuen Klima- und Energieprioritäten im Haushalt noch nicht widergespiegelt. Kein Mitgliedsland ist heute auf sich allein gestellt in der Lage, in ein neues europäisches kohlenstoffarmes Energiesystem zu investieren oder die erheblichen Investitionssummen für schadstoffarme Technologien, wie z.B. CCS aufzubringen. Ehrgeizige Pläne für neue Technologien und Infrastruktur scheitern immer noch an mangelnder Finanzierung, mit nachteiligen Folgen für die Glaubwürdigkeit das industrielle Ansehen und den internationalen Einfluß der EU. Um dem abzuhelfen, sollte ein Sonder-Haushalt für Energie- und Klimasicherheit erwogen werden, der von der EU und den Mitgliedstaaten zu finanzieren wäre. Die EU wird für sich keine Klimasicherheit erreichen, wenn nicht auch die wichtigsten Schwellenländer wie China und Indien ihre Emissionen rapide senken. Diese Länder sind oft unterentwickelt und haben in der Vergangenheit zur heutigen Klimakrise nicht beigetragen. Um ihre Zustimmung zu einem bindendeninternationalen Klima-Abkommen zu gewinnen, wird die EU zwischen €30-100 Milliarden bereitstellen müssen, damit diese Länder ihren Energiesektor entsprechend anpassen. Der EU-Haushalt ermöglicht dafür eine gerechte Lastenverteilung unter den Mitgliedsländern. Die Europäische Union steht durch Migration und wachsende, von Armut bedingte Instabilität in seinen Nachbarregionen vor großen Herausforderungen, die durch den Klimawandel zusätzlich verschärft werden. Deshalb sollte der EU- Haushalt sich an der Finanzierung des im Vertrag von Lissabon vorgesehenen europäischen diplomatischen Dienstes beteiligen, um auf jene Regionen besser einwirken zu können. Der jetzige EU-Haushalt ist für den europäischen Bürger zu fern und leidet daher unter einem Mangel an demokratischer Identifikationskraft. Deshalb ist es für die Union vorrangig, die Prioritäten des Budgets mit jenen der europäischen Öffentlichkeit in Einklang zu bringen. Die Wahlen zum Europäischen Parlament im Sommer 2009 böten die Möglichkeit, die Wähler auf dem Stimmzettel ihre Prioritäten ankreuzen zu lassen. Europe in the World - Thinking 2008-05-08T13:04:01+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/programmes/europe-articles/a-european-budget-for-the-future/ http://www.e3g.org/programmes/europe-articles/a-european-budget-for-the-future/#When:09:30:00Z The European Commission is currently undertaking a review of the EU Budget, with the aim of making it fit for the purposes of the 21st Century. E3G has submitted a thinkpiece to the Commission’s consultation, and we will be working further on this topic over the coming months. The summary of our paper follows below, the full version is attached in pdf format for download. Summary Europe needs a budget which reflects its future challenges, not its past political arguments. The budget review will effectively fix the shape of the European budget until 2020: there needs to be a radical shift if it is to reflect the future priorities of Europeans. The EU budget is only 1% of European GDP, and this proportion has consistently fallen over the last 20 years. The danger of the budget review is not that it will result in an unsustainably expanded budget, but that it will fail to set clear priorities. Focus on budget limits at this stage will drive debate into old, backward looking patterns. The EU budget is small, and should be focused on areas of high added value where Europe has chosen to act together. The budget should reflect the Lisbon Treaty and be refocused on supporting a stronger European role in shaping a globalising world, and delivering the critical shared infrastructure and innovation needed to support this. Europe has taken a global lead on climate change, but the priorities of energy and climate security are not reflected in the current budget. No one member state can invest in a new low carbon European power system, or provide the huge investment needed to develop technologies such as carbon capture and storage or concentrated solar power. Ambitious European plans for new technology and infrastructure are currently unfunded; reducing European credibility with industry and other countries. One option could be to create a new (time-limited) energy and climate security budget, co-financed by European and member state resources, including auctioning of carbon permits. Europeans will not have climate security unless large developing countries such as China and India begin to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions. These countries are still poor and have contributed far less to climate change than Europe. To deliver global agreement Europe may have to spend €30-100 billion every year to help these countries decarbonise; the EU budget is the logical vehicle through which to fairly share these costs between countries.  Europe faces significant challenges of migration, instability and poverty in its immediate neighbourhood; climate change will exacerbate all these problems. The budget should provide greater support for the new External Action Service of the EU in tackling these issues, and promoting long term stability and prosperity. European citizens feel that the European budget is a distant decision and project, and suffers from a lack of legitimacy. Europeans should be directly engaged in setting overall budget priorities. This could be done through a participative process – eg: deliberative polling – in association with the European Parliament. A more radical option is to use the 2009 European election process to put a question on budget priorities directly to citizens at the ballot. Europe in the World - Thinking 2008-04-16T09:30:00+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/programmes/europe-articles/europa-in-lume-romanian-pamphlet-now-published/ http://www.e3g.org/programmes/europe-articles/europa-in-lume-romanian-pamphlet-now-published/#When:11:31:00Z Thanks to the support of our colleagues at the Regional Environmental Centre, the Romanian language version of our ‘Europe in the World’ pamphlet has now been published. The full version of the pamphlet is attached here for download as a pdf [400Kb]. Following below is the summary to provide a taster of the pamphlet’s arguments about the future of the EU in an interdependent world. Europa în lume: Decizii politice pentru siguranţă şi prosperitate Europa nu reuşeşte să ia deciziile politice necesare pentru a garanta siguranţă şi prosperitate cetăţenilor ei într-o lume interdependentă. Trebuie să cultive un nou sens al direcţiei pentru a face faţă cu succes provocărilor din anii următori. Broşura ‘Europa în lume’ prezintă cum se pot realiza toate acestea. Pamphlet Cover Image O nouă viziune pentru Europa în lume Cele mai serioase probleme globale ale secolului XXI, de la terorism la schimbările climatice, de la migraţia în masă la crimă organizată, nu pot fi soluţionate prin acţiuni solitare, întreprinse de fiecare stat în parte. Acestea pot fi eliminate doar cu ajutorul puterii necoercitive dezvoltate de Europa în ultima jumătate de secol. Europa deţine resursele economice, coeziunea socială şi organizarea politică care îi permit să realizeze acest lucru, dar are nevoie de o perspectivă modernă pentru cetăţenii săi, construită pe o viziune clară a locului său în lume. Această viziune ar trebui să redea încrederea cetăţenilor europeni şi să recurgă la resursele unice ale Europei pentru a răspunde provocărilor ridicate de interdependenţă. Va fi nevoie însă de o serie de decizii politice foarte diferite de cele actuale. Deciziile politice pe care trebuie să le luăm acum vor contura viitorul Europei, obiectivele sale şi identitatea sa. Broşura ‘Europa în lume’ prezintă cinci decizii esenţiale: Redefinirea succesului Stabilirea unei cooperări intergeneraţionale Obţinerea siguranţei energetice şi a siguranţei climatice Investirea în prosperitatea Chinei Un buget european pentru viitor.   Europe in the World - News & Comment, Europe in the World - Pamphlet 2008-02-13T11:31:00+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/programmes/europe-articles/central-and-eastern-europes-climate-change-opportunity/ http://www.e3g.org/programmes/europe-articles/central-and-eastern-europes-climate-change-opportunity/#When:11:26:00Z “Missing today’s chance to build a low-carbon economy would be a costly mistake handed on to future generations”, is the argument we make in an opinion article published in the Regional Environmental Centre’s Green Horizons magazine. A pdf version of the magazine is available for download from the Green Horizons website. Central and Eastern Europe’s climate change opportunity By Tom Burke, Chris Littlecott & Nick Mabey We are living at a pivotal time in terms of Europe’s future, and taking the right decisions now could enable decades of investment in clean technologies and smart infrastructure. This would ensure the creation of millions of good jobs across Europe and underpin the creation of a new, inclusive social contract. This is a one-off opportunity for the direct development of a new ‘green industrial revolution.’ The citizens of CEE member states definitely want to part of this opportunity, but can they ensure that their leaders will look to the future rather than the past? The efforts of environmental organisations and civil society groups will be central to making sure that they do, and they could start by focusing attention on opportunities contained in the EU Budget Review. The political context for action on climate change has improved over the past three years, while an upturn in economic growth has restored some much needed confidence. The European Commission (EC) in particular has recognised the importance of an outward-looking and future-focused European project. It has rightly identified the environment as a core issue that binds Europeans together. Strong leadership from former UK Prime Minister Blair, German Chancellor Merkel and EC President Barroso has helped to secure agreement on ambitious climate and energy aims. But, of course, it is one thing for politicians to set a policy agenda, and a distinctly different challenge to actually follow through with action to reach those goals. Europe is now in a different phase. Its ability to rise to the climate change challenge is the litmus test of its legitimacy and practical value. The decisions taken now will shape the future of all of Europe and determine its place in the world. The challenge for CEE member states In January 2008, Bulgaria and Romania will celebrate their first anniversary as EU members. Their regional neighbours will then have been members for four years, and could quite rightly expect to lose the ‘new member state’ tag. Indeed, Slovenia will take over the reins of the EU presidency. In the broad view, the enlargement of the EU to 25, and then 27, members has been a great success. As prosperity has improved steadily, so too has economic confidence—even if social confidence sometimes wanes as a consequence of changing patterns of family life. Similarly, CEE member states have added a new dimension to EU politics. Their geographical position and historical experience has made them quick to grasp that the projection of Europe’s role in the world and the maintenance of security and prosperity at home are two sides of the same coin. They also know that, in an unstable world, they will be the border regions receiving environmental refugees and economic migrants. They have similarly made felt their hard-won experience of liberty—on issues ranging from securing energy supplies to support for democracy worldwide. Now these countries are facing, perhaps, their biggest test yet: namely, a transition of status within the EU. For the next two years should see not just an end to the EU’s internal institutional disputes that have plagued the recent past, but also the achievement of a global deal on climate change and the foundations for a radical new EU budget. In all of these processes, the attitude and political leadership of CEE member states will be crucial for delivering an EU that can project its value into the future. The key question is whether CEE leaders will push forward as a motor for EU action with a politics of opportunity; or will they retreat into a politics of poverty? The former alternative would seek to maximize today’s catalytic opportunities for economic modernisation and environmental sustainability, while the latter risks seeing the region leapfrogged by China and India in the deployment of new technologies. At present, the signs are mixed. The politics of poverty The recently launched EU Budget Review aims to identify how the EU should spend its money from 2013 onwards. Given the tortuous nature of budget politics, it may well be that any new approach might not be fully implemented until 2020. The review aims to ensure that EU spending adds value, rather than simply redistributing money that could be best spent directly by member states. It wants to make sure that EU spending is effective in achieving economic and social goals.  Recent decisions to increase transparency over the receipt of EU funds from the Common Agricultural Policy and Structural Funds are clear attempts to apply more pressure for their revision, which has caused a certain amount of unease that the review will look to cut funding to CEE countries. At the same time, the EU is developing policy pathways to deliver up to 30% reductions in carbon emissions by 2020, with 20% targets for energy efficiency and renewables. It also plans to roll out a series of demonstration plants for carbon capture and storage technology (CCS). Yet CEE countries, instead of driving these debates forward, have responded to the National Allocation Plans for carbon emissions from the European Commission with legal challenges and protests that they are too severe and too expensive. Driving this current defensive approach is the plea of ‘poverty.’ This is a tactic that has been used in the past by other new member states, but the subsequent rapid success of Ireland, Spain and others means that it has now lost much of its rhetorical power as a long-term justification for funding. And this is certainly the case for most (although not all) CEE member states as they attempt to project this plea forward 13 years into the future. Given recent rates of growth and the general economic benefits of EU membership, the time is right for the region to pursue a more positive approach. We must be very clear on this point: CEE member states rightly deserve significant financial support from the EU as they continue to modernise. That is not in question. What is in doubt, however, is what should be the focus of the funding. For the region has far more to gain by pushing for a radical new budget focused on the EU’s core added-value activities, thereby placing major investments in energy and climate at the heart of the EU. Such a budget would give CEE leaders the opportunity to channel investment into the creation of a new clean-energy economy, which would simply not be possible under the continuance of the old EU budget framework, designed as it was for the challenges of the 1980s. The politics of opportunity The transition to a low carbon economy is the best opportunity to modernise infrastructure, industry, housing stock and energy production that we will ever see. It could possibly create and guarantee millions of new European jobs, improve energy security, and spur the renewal of low-carbon, people-friendly cities. It is vital that these changes are made now, as current fossil-fuelled investments are continuing to tack on expensive liabilities for today’s younger generations, rather than creating new low-carbon assets. CEE countries are positioned to receive the greatest gains from this transformation. Major improvements in energy efficiency will increase energy security and improve trade balances, in addition to generating financial benefits through carbon trading. And the region’s population has strong technical, scientific and industrial skills that are all crucial for the successful development, manufacture and deployment of new low-carbon goods and services throughout Europe and beyond. The key to securing all of these objectives will be effective investment, which will come from both public and private sources. By taking a positive stance on the EU Budget Reform, CEE leaders could leverage funding that will provide their economies with the low carbon foundations that will be needed in an era of increasingly severe energy and climate constraints. Used this way, EU money would pave the way for a major deployment of climate compatible electricity generation, low carbon transport systems, domestic and commercial energy efficiency improvements and widespread deployment of renewable energy technologies. Such an approach would solve many political problems. It would demonstrate the EU’s relevance and added value, and would reduce the vulnerability of economies to energy price shocks and the political influence of energy exporters. It would also be a major step towards meeting climate targets and jobs and competitiveness goals, and would also strengthen the EU’s leadership capacity on climate change. Finally, it would be a major driver for greater prosperity and improved quality of life throughout the EU and beyond. This article draws on E3G’s pamphlet titled: Europe in the World: Political choices for security and prosperity. Europe in the World - News & Comment 2007-12-17T11:26:00+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/about/news-articles/job-opportunity-finance-administration-manager-london/ http://www.e3g.org/about/news-articles/job-opportunity-finance-administration-manager-london/#When:12:03:35Z *Deadline extended* to February 3, 2012. About the role The Finance and Administration Manager will be responsible for managing the day-to-day accounting and financial processes, leading the continuing development of our project management systems and overseeing the management of office services. The successful candidate will work closely with the executive directors and reporting to the Chief Operating Officer and the Board. Main duties will include: Monitoring cash flows Producing monthly management accounts and cash flow forecasts Helping to prepare the annual budget and rolling annual forecasts Preparation of accounts for audit Supporting grant applications and liaising with funders over information they require Preparation of payroll Maintenance of in-house time-sheet system Preparation and monitoring of project budgets VAT returns Office services management Requirements: Gained a full and recognised CCAB qualification At least two years experience of managing the finance function within a growing and busy organisation, as well as a thorough understanding of management accounting and project management. Experience in a not-for-profit environment is desirable Solid organisational skills and ability to meet deadlines Strong communication skills, both written and verbal, and an ability to liaise across all parts of the organisation Exposure to web site management A good working knowledge of MS Word, Excel and Powerpoint is required. Experience with databases would be an advantage, as would be a willingness to engage with IT-related tasks. Terms E3G aims to offer a competitive salary, including pension contributions, which is commensurate to the level of experience and performance expected from this position. Closing date for applications is 5pm BST, February 3, 2012. Interested candidates should submit a current CV and a covering letter explaining their interest in the position to Meera Shah. Interviews will take place over January 2011. Job Opportunities 2011-12-06T12:03:35+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/about/news-articles/media-briefing-unfccc-cop-17-durban-south-africa/ http://www.e3g.org/about/news-articles/media-briefing-unfccc-cop-17-durban-south-africa/#When:15:01:42Z UNFCCC COP 17 - Durban, South Africa 28 November-9 December 2011 E3G – Third Generation Environmentalism is a leading environmental policy think tank with offices across the world. As an independent not-for-profit organisation, E3G works closely with NGOs, governments and business thus providing unparalleled insight and access to the politics of climate change. E3G offers a dynamic, experienced and influential team of experts to provide in-depth analysis and commentary on EU, US and China as well as specialising on climate finance, technology (transfer), transparency (MRV), mitigation and legal form (the Kyoto Protocol).  Prior to COP 17, E3G and Chatham House will be hosting a teleconference on Friday 18th November, 10am GMT to provide a briefing for journalists on the expectations of and the politics in Durban. To join the teleconferences, please contact Meera Shah or +44 (0)207 593 2020. During COP 17, E3G’s Durban team will be available for interviews and briefings to provide political updates, insights and commentary. For real time updates follow us on Twitter (@EthreeG) and Facebook. For interviews: E3G team possess professional media experience and contribute towards a variety of broadcast, print and online media outlets. Our leading experts can be contacted on the number above too. Dial in numbers. *Participant pin: 356544* United Kingdom   08444730112 Austria   082040001503 Belgium   070359945 Canada   1 213 289 3444 France   0821230748 Germany   01803001178 Germany mobile   015702488303 Ireland   0818270007 Italy   848390166 Netherlands   0870001901 Poland   0801003543 South Africa   0875500375 Spain   902885318 Sweden   09392066400 Switzerland   0848560190 United States   1 415 363 0833 Press Releases 2011-11-16T15:01:42+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/about/news-articles/e3g-is-recruiting-energy-and-climate-change-senior-policy-advisor-berlin/ http://www.e3g.org/about/news-articles/e3g-is-recruiting-energy-and-climate-change-senior-policy-advisor-berlin/#When:16:09:03Z The application deadline for this role has now been extended to 5pm BST on October 21. Previous applicants need not re-send their applications. Effective incentives are needed to drive the transformation to a global low carbon economy over the next 50 years if we are to limit average global temperature rises below 2°C. Europe is the first major economy to commit to this scale of transformation, and as such will drive much of the necessary political, technological, policy and social innovation needed to deliver the global transformation. E3G is committed to help accelerate Europe’s path-finding role in developing the low carbon economy. E3G has been working in this area since 2004 with notable successes such as helping reframing EU political debates around energy and climate security; securing EU funding for a programme of CCS demonstration plants; being a core partner in the landmark Roadmap 2050 study; and establishing a UK Green Investment Bank. E3G has recently secured funding for the next five years to accelerate decarbonisation of the EU power sector, with a focus on electricity market reform, EU electricity grids and smart grid markets. E3G is also expanding its European work on low carbon finance, clean infrastructure and the green economy. In light of this expansion E3G wishes to strengthen its European team by hiring a Senior Energy and Climate Change Policy Advisor based in Berlin, with a particular focus on EU energy infrastructure issues. The successful candidate will work as part of a ten person team working on EU climate and energy policy based across E3G’s London, Brussels and Berlin offices. Specific tasks will involve: Developing a structured and strategic understanding of European energy and climate change policy with a focus on the issues surrounding the evolution of EU energy infrastructure (supergrid, smart grids, gas infrastructure). Working to influence decision makers across Europe to support stronger investment in strategic electricity infrastructure, including through the coordination of multi-stakeholder coalitions. Carrying out policy and institutional research on energy issues, focused pieces of analysis, including quantitative work and preparing reports and short briefings on topics for a range of policy and political audiences. Managing specific influencing and research projects, including coordinating external stakeholders and contractors. Acting as a key E3G interlocutor on specific domestic European climate change and energy policy issues across Europe with senior decision makers, the media and the public. Building a strong understanding of German domestic energy and climate change politics and policy. Deepening and expanding E3G’s collaboration with a core group of partner institutions in Germany. Playing a full part in E3G’s internal strategy process and the European energy and climate team. Supporting the development of E3G Berlin. E3G operates a “flat” organisational structure and aims to give staff members the opportunity to grow their responsibilities for delivering and managing projects. We are specifically looking for an individual with the potential to take on increasingly more responsibilities and progress to the role of Programme Leader. E3G’s European Climate Change Programme E3G has an established set of programmes on European decarbonisation and a range of areas where we are seeking to expand our work. The Senior Policy Advisor will be responsible for delivery of specific parts of these programmes and be involved in indentifying and developing new high impact areas: Elaborating and animating a coherent EU energy and climate security strategy: building on the existing EU energy and climate security package to deepen the understanding and support in Europe for a compelling and coherent approach to delivering European energy goals and the transformation to a low carbon economy. Particularly engaging critical constituencies outside the climate and energy field, for example, national political leadership groups, national security actors, foreign ministries and economic ministries. Decarbonisation of the European Power Sector: developing and delivering broad support for the strategic case for rapid decarbonisation of the EU power sector by the mid-2030s. Delivering specific policy outcomes on electricity market reform, supergrid investment (including on the North Sea Grid) and smart grid RD&D and deployment. European Low Carbon Finance: building on E3G’s successful work in creating a UK Green Investment Bank to target specific high leverage reforms to European financing of low carbon investment at Member State and European (EIB/EBRD) levels. Focusing on energy efficiency, infrastructure and the power sector. European Green Economy: developing a compelling analytical case for, and a policy programme to deliver, the economic, energy security and competitiveness benefits of an accelerated move to a low carbon, resilient and resource efficient economy in the EU. Work with EU Political, Business and Civil Society Coalitions: developing E3G’s relationships with key political, business and civil society coalitions, including forming strategic relationships with a small number of highly aligned partners. Experience The Energy and Climate Change Senior Policy Advisor will: Be committed to achieving E3G’s objectives, and to working in an innovative and entrepreneurial manner. She/he will have strong strategic and political understanding, will prioritise achieving outcomes over running activities, and be capable of inspiring and facilitating action by others. Have at least 5 years of professional experience, perhaps more, as an acknowledged high flyer with a significant record of achievements. Have significant experience of energy policy issues, with an emphasis on climate change, energy security, electricity markets, infrastructure and investment processes. Ideally, have expertise in quantitative and/or technical analysis of energy systems and various types of energy system modelling. Ideally, have experience of building consensus in Europe around sensitive issues, creating and facilitating dialogue and agreement. Be used to operating internationally, with a high degree of cultural sensitivity. Have strong written and spoken English and German. Be able to operate confidently both at an “expert” level, in the worlds of government, business, finance, the media, and civil society. Terms This position is based in E3G’s Berlin office. It is programmed for 2 years, on a renewable one year contract, starting as soon as possible. E3G offers a competitive salary consistent with the experience and performance levels expected of the successful candidate. Closing date for applications is 5pm BST on September 30th, 2011. Interested candidates should submit a current CV (including two referees) and a covering letter explaining their interest in the position to Meera Shah. Job Opportunities 2011-09-12T16:09:03+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/about/news-articles/huhne-should-confront-critics-by-prioritising-demand-reduction-in-energy-ma/ http://www.e3g.org/about/news-articles/huhne-should-confront-critics-by-prioritising-demand-reduction-in-energy-ma/#When:09:07:12Z Chris Huhne, the Energy & Climate Change Secretary, is being urged by an alliance of business, investors and NGOs to minimise energy costs by putting demand reduction at the heart of the White Paper, to be announced today. Driving energy bills down as global prices go up is an imperative for Britain’s businesses and consumers. This means DECC’s White Paper on Energy Market Reform must prioritise demand reduction over new generation. Vigorous demand reduction is by far the cheapest way to guarantee energy security while reducing carbon emissions. Following the criticism that the Government’s new Energy Market Reform proposals will drive up consumer bills, an alliance of NGOs and businesses, which includes GE, National Grid and Cisco Systems, called on the Government to prioritise incentives for managing energy demand. [Note 1] Making energy demand reduction a priority is a huge and necessary strategic shift,” said Nick Mabey, Chief Executive of E3G. “For twenty years the design of the electricity market has effectively blocked investment in the demand side. This has raised costs to consumers and increased our exposure to volatile global energy markets.” Up until recently the Government has focused on developing measures to build new low carbon energy supply. A shift to prioritise demand reduction would demonstrate that the Government understands the opportunity it affords to minimise consumer bills and open up the market for new demand side businesses. The business alliance is advocating ‘feed-in tariffs’ (long-term contracts that provide guaranteed revenue) for demand reduction is one of the solutions for demonstrating the Government is serious about putting energy demand management at the heart of the reforms. This would put them on an equivalent basis with the feed-in tariffs that the White Paper is likely to propose for new low carbon energy supply. A focus on demand side investment is the only credible way to keep bills down while meeting the UK’s low carbon targets. Any increased dependency on simple gas-fired power stations risks repetition of the type of price rises seen this year, driven by the aftermath of Fukushima and political instability in the Middle East [Note 2]. There is no low cost, high carbon option,” continued Mabey. “Most of our power stations need replacing in the next 10 years and if the UK fails to build low carbon infrastructure, UK consumers will be held hostage to rising and volatile fossil fuel prices. The recent price hikes by British Gas are testament to that risk.  But these price rises can be minimised by designing a market that incentivises a reduction in energy demand.” Notes: 1.    Demand side is key to energy reform Sir, The government is undertaking the biggest shake-up of the British electricity market since privatisation in 1990 and is due to publish its white paper on energy market reform next week. However, one of the best opportunities to manage rising consumer energy bills could be lost if the government fails to implement reforms aimed at demand-side management, such as demand response and energy efficiency. Increasing fossil fuel costs and a growing need for new investment in low carbon power are leading to increasing electricity prices. But the impact on consumers’ energy bills can be managed provided the government ensures energy efficiency and demand response measures are at the heart of energy market reform. This should include a commitment that long-term contracts and tariffs are offered for electricity demand reduction and not just for electricity supply. If the government wants to protect consumers while moving towards a low carbon power system, it must ensure a fair and equivalent treatment for the demand side of the market. Ed Matthew – Director, Transform UK Magued Eldaief – Managing Director, GE Energy UK Dimitri Zenghelis – Senior Economic Adviser, Cisco Systems Steve Holliday – Chief Executive, National Grid Ben Caldecott – Head of European Policy, Climate Change Capital Graham Meeks – Director, Combined Heat & Power Association Paul King – Chief Executive, UK Green Building Council Jenny Saunders – Chief Executive, National Energy Action John Sauven—Executive Director, Greenpeace Nick Mabey—Chief Executive, E3G http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/6c4537e8-a8f8-11e0-ab62-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1RUrpMZHR 2.    OfGem’s most recent supply report firmly attributed recent energy price rises to political instability impacting global fossil markets not the impact of green energy investment as claimed in some sources. For more information: please contact a.    Nick Mabey, Chief Executive of E3G Tel: 07949 768771 b.    Ed Matthew, Director of Transform UK – investment for a clear energy future Tel:  07827 157906 http://www.transformuk.org   Press Releases 2011-07-12T09:07:12+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/about/news-articles/decision-time-on-nuclear-power/ http://www.e3g.org/about/news-articles/decision-time-on-nuclear-power/#When:13:42:46Z In the aftermath of the nuclear disaster in Fukushima, and the German government deciding to scrap its nuclear energy programme, is it time for the UK to follow suit? Instead of building a new generation of nuclear power stations, should we instead let them pass into history, and follow the Germans in focusing instead on renewable energy? Doing that would be a disaster, say the proponents of nuclear power. Nuclear is a clean and reliable option and ruling it out would make it impossible to meet our carbon targets. E3G’s Tom Burke was part of a panel of experts on BBC Radio 4’s Decision Time discussing the future of nuclear in the UK. Tom sums up his thoughts below: Since Fukushima there has been a significant weakening of the appetite for further nuclear power in both Japan and Germany. US nuclear development has stalled for economic reasons despite the enthusiasm, and willingness to subsidise, of both the Administration and the Congress. Reaction elsewhere in the world has been muted but cautious. Even the most favourably disposed of commentators is anticipating a slowing down of what was already, outside of Asia, a rather feeble renaissance. Germany has now announced it will accelerate the phase out of nuclear power and invest even more heavily in renewable electricity. Japan has not been quite so emphatic but has shifted its energy outlook in a similar direction. These developments, together with the massive investments in China, India and Korea will further accelerate the already rapid decline in costs of the renewables, especially solar. Meanwhile, nuclear costs were already rising by 5-7% real per annum and may now rise further. Add the $200 billion bill still to come for relocating and compensating the 100,000 or so Japanese whose lives have been destroyed by Fukushima and the enthusiasm of governments for nuclear may cool further.” Other panellists on the show included: Tim Eggar: He was Energy Minister in the last Conservative government and in recent years has been advising the government on its energy policy. Sir David King: He was the government’s Chief Scientific Adviser for seven years, and is now Director of the Smith School of Enterprise and the Environment at Oxford University. Tessa Munt: An anti-nuclear campaigner and Lib Dem MP, she also has a personal interest: the first of the new generation of nuclear power stations is being planned next to her constituency. Anne McElvoy, who has written for many papers, and is now public policy editor at The Economist, to describe how journalists would deal with this issue, and how we are part of the political process – not just reporting on it. Listen to a recording of the show above.   E3G in the Media 2011-07-04T13:42:46+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/about/news-articles/clegg-announces-legislation-to-set-up-the-green-investment-bank-full-indepe/ http://www.e3g.org/about/news-articles/clegg-announces-legislation-to-set-up-the-green-investment-bank-full-indepe/#When:13:13:40Z Nick Clegg, the Deputy Prime Minster, announced today legislation to set up the Green Investment Bank and “full, independent borrowing powers” to borrow from the capital markets. The decision was strongly welcomed by Transform UK, the alliance of business, investors and charities who founded the campaign for the Green Investment Bank two years ago and who have been calling for legislation and full borrowing powers as core campaign asks. As E3G’s Founding Director, Tom Burke noted, Today’s announcement that the Green Investment Bank will be established in legislation and have full powers to borrow from capital markets was the second blow in a week, following the agreement on the 4th carbon budget, to those mandarins who continue to believe that the PM and the DPM are not serious about making this the greenest government ever. Ed Matthew, Director of Transform UK said: Confirmation of legislation and full, independent borrowing powers is a major step forward. It is absolutely critical to ensure the Green Investment Bank is an enduring institution, operationally independent and able to maximize its leverage from the capital markets. It will give a real boost to investor confidence in the institution. In a big shift on energy policy Nick Clegg also stated that the Government will look at using the Green Investment Bank to support the Green Deal home energy efficiency programme, another key campaign ask of the Transform UK alliance. The Government had previously ruled out a role for the bank but has had a change of heart after concerns were expressed from a wide range of business and finance stakeholders that low cost finance was essential to kick start the programme. Ed Matthew said: The Green Investment Bank is the glue that will hold together the Green Deal.  It will reduce the level of subsidy required to make the scheme fly and gives the UK a fighting chance to develop a world beating home energy efficiency programme. For more information please contact: Ed Matthew – Director, Transform UK, E3G by phone: 07827 157906 or . Website:  http://www.transformuk.org News and Announcements 2011-05-23T13:13:40+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/about/news-articles/treasury-clips-wings-of-green-investment-bank/ http://www.e3g.org/about/news-articles/treasury-clips-wings-of-green-investment-bank/#When:15:41:24Z For Immediate Release – Wednesday 23rd March 2011 Months of speculation over whether the Green Investment Bank will be a proper bank or a fund was ended today when it was revealed in the Budget that the Government will set up the world’s first public green bank with total funding of £3 billion. Transform UK, the business and civil society alliance that founded the campaign for a Green Investment Bank, spoke to a Senior Minister in Number 10 who confirmed that the Green Investment Bank would be set up in legislation, borrowing powers would be enshrined within its constitution and a shadow Board swiftly set up. However, in a serious blow to the potential for the Green Investment Bank to drive forward green growth, the Treasury has succeeded in delaying the application of these borrowing powers until at least 2015 and subject to the Government meeting its debt targets. The power to borrow is what gives the Green Investment Bank its potential to leverage the huge resources held by institutional investors into the low carbon economy. In the UK alone they have assets of £4 Trillion. Seven leading investment companies recently stated in a letter to the Prime Minister that they would be keen to buy Government backed Green Bonds issued by the Green Investment Bank. The Government announced today that the capitalization of the Green Investment Bank with a total of £3 billion could leverage in £15 billion into the low carbon economy. But with the power to borrow £10 billion they could have leveraged in another £50 billion to spark a clean tech jobs boom. Ingrid Holmes, a low carbon finance expert from the climate change think tank E3G and one of the UK’s leading policy experts on the Green Investment Bank said:  Confirmation of the world’s first public green bank is a mile stone. But a delay in borrowing means a delay in green growth. It’s a bit like buying a powerful car but being forced to drive it around with the hand brake on. If the Government is really serious about delivering growth then they must take the handbrake off and let the Green Investment Bank borrow from the word go.” Ed Matthew, Director of Transform UK said: Allowing the Green Investment Bank to borrow is the key to generating growth and re-booting the UK economy. By delaying this power until the economy has recovered is like a doctor waiting for a seriously ill patient to recover before giving him life saving medicine. Commitment to a set up a proper public green bank is to be strongly welcomed but this decision on borrowing drives a dirty, high carbon truck through the heart of their growth strategy. Green growth is the key to economic recovery.” —ENDS— For more information please contact: Ed Matthew, Director, Transform UK, Tel: 07827 157906 Ingrid Holmes, Programme Leader – Low Carbon Finance, E3G Tel:  07825 829592 Note 1: Ministerial Support for a proper bank with the power to borrow: Chris Huhne, the Secretary of State for Energy & Climate Change said at the end of 2010 that “A bank is a bank. The prime minister has said it is going to be a bank. Everybody knows what a bank is. Ducks quack and banks borrow”.  When asked by Joan Walley, a member of the Commons Liaison Committee whether the Green Investment Bank would be a real bank and not a fund , the Prime Minister David Cameron said ‘yes’. Vince Cable, the Secretary of State for Business told the Commons Environmental Audit Committee (EAC) during its Green Investment Bank investigation in February that it would be a real bank with the power to borrow. Note 2: Support from Parliament for a real bank with the power to borrow: The EAC strongly recommended in its final report launched on 11th March that the bank was a real bank with the power to borrow. They said this was a ‘red line’ and stated that “The UK could lose out on hundreds of billions of pounds of vital investment in green energy projects if the Government waters down its plans for a Green Investment Bank”. Note 3: Support from business and civil society for a real bank with the power to borrow: The campaign for a proper Green Investment Bank with the power to borrow has received huge support from UK business and civil society groups. Over 50 major stakeholders put their name to a national advert calling for a real bank with the power to raise Green Bonds. They included:  Axa, Bank of America Merrill Lynch, Jaguar-Land Rover, Pepsico, National Grid, Institute of Civil Engineers, The Climate Group, TUC, Environmental Industries Commission, Renewable Energy Association, Green Building Council, Climate Change Capital, the Aldersgate Group, WWF, Friends of the Earth, E3G and Green Alliance.  Note 4 : George Osborne’s Commitment in 2009 to Green the Treasury in an Opinion published in the Independent on Sunday on Tuesday 24th November 2009:  “ Instead of the Treasury blocking green reform, I want a Conservative Treasury to lead the development of the low carbon economy and finance a green recovery….Under a Conservative government, the Treasury will no longer be the cuckoo in the Whitehall nest when it comes to climate change. If I become Chancellor, the Treasury will become a green ally, not a foe.”   Press Releases 2011-03-23T15:41:24+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/about/news-articles/green-bank-could-generate-hundreds-of-billions-of-investment-for-uk-economy/ http://www.e3g.org/about/news-articles/green-bank-could-generate-hundreds-of-billions-of-investment-for-uk-economy/#When:22:01:12Z An influential Parliamentary Committee today concluded that the Government must set up a proper Green Investment Bank with the power to issue Green Bonds if it wants to reap the benefits of green growth and meet the UK’s climate change targets. The findings of the investigation by the Environmental Audit Committee into the Green Investment Bank come less than two weeks before the Budget when the Government is expected to announce whether it will be a proper bank or just a fund. The Committee’s report concludes: For us, a red-line is that the Green Investment Bank is a bank, explicitly charged with a specific green investment purpose and backed by government, that is able to lever in the large sums needed to deliver the hundreds of billions of pounds of required green infrastructure. The Coalition Agreement promised to establish a Green Investment Bank and the Chancellor pledged £1 billion to capitalise it in the Spending Review, plus unspecified proceeds from the sale of government assets. Evidence presented to the Environmental Audit Committee by energy companies, NGOs and financial institutions suggests that between £200 billion and £1 trillion of private sector investment is needed over the next 10-20 years if the UK is to meet its climate change and renewable energy targets. Accountants Ernst and Young told the inquiry that traditional sources of private sector capital are only likely to deliver £50 - £80 billion of investment in energy infrastructure by 2025 – leaving the UK with a massive investment shortfall. The report argues that establishing a proper Investment Bank is crucial in order to lever in the unprecedented levels of private sector investment needed. Ed Matthew, Director of Transform UK, who coordinates the national alliance for a Green Investment Bank said: Today the Environmental Audit Committee put a price on success –  a proper Green Investment Bank could leverage hundreds of billions in vital investment. This is the shot in the arm the UK economy needs. The only cost the Treasury should consider is the cost of failure to unleash this institution’s massive potential to re-power our economy. Transform UK is calling on the Government to confirm at the Budget that : The GIB will be a proper bank with the power to borrow. The GIB will have the power to issue bonds with Government guarantee. The GIB is given at least £4 billion of initial capitalization. The GIB prioritises investment in renewables & energy efficiency. That legislation will be brought forward at the end of 2011 to set up the GIB in law to ensure it is effective, accountable and transparent and fully operational in 2012. —ENDS— For further information please contact Ed Matthew, Director of Transform UK: Tel: 07827 157906 /  Email: ed.matthew@e3g.org  Notes to Editors: EAC Report:  To access the full report on the Green Investment Bank by the Environmental Audit Committee is available please contact the Committee’s media officer Nicholas Davies on 020 7219 3297 / 07917 488 141 Transform UK campaigns for solutions to accelerate investment into the low carbon economy. Transform UK founded the campaign for the Green Investment Bank in February 2008 and coordinates the national alliance of NGO’s, Unions, Business and Investors seeking to create an ambitious institution that will play a successful role in cutting greenhouse gas emissions and generating green growth. For more information about Transform UK’s campaign for the Green Investment Bank go to our website. Press Releases 2011-03-10T22:01:12+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/about/news-articles/ny-times-rush-to-renewable-energy-generates-enormous-financial-questions-in/ http://www.e3g.org/about/news-articles/ny-times-rush-to-renewable-energy-generates-enormous-financial-questions-in/#When:15:34:01Z The spectacular growth in recent years in the number and size of renewable energy sources across the European Union—particularly wind and solar power—driven by high subsidies and government rhetoric on climate change has left the national electricity grids scrambling to cope. Jeremy Lovell of ClimateWire reports in the NY Times on obstacles facing Europe’s low carbon transformation. Rush to Renewable Energy Generates ‘Enormous’ Financial Questions in Europe By JEREMY LOVELL of ClimateWire Published: March 1, 2011 The spectacular growth in recent years in the number and size of renewable energy sources across the European Union—particularly wind and solar power—driven by high subsidies and government rhetoric on climate change has left the national electricity grids scrambling to cope. “Basically, governments have allowed the buildup of wind without thinking through the grid consequences,” Oxford University economist Dieter Helm told ClimateWire. “There are two responses: Stop wasting so much on the rapid development of wind and its questionable economics, or plough on regardless, in which case enormous grid investments are urgently needed.” Estimated costs of strengthening, upgrading and smartening the grids are put at up to €100 billion ($138 billion) over the next decade alone at a time when budgets remain extremely tight and as governments either impose or contemplate cutting their generous subsidy schemes. And that only takes into account onshore networks. The costs and technical obstacles rise in multiples when adding in the proposed massive expansion of offshore wind capacity and how to get that highly variable source of power where it is needed, when it is needed and as it is produced. We are in danger of being able to build renewables faster than we can build the grid, so we need to build the grid much faster,” Nick Mabey of influential environmental think tank E3G told ClimateWire. “The question is, then, who pays for it?” Should governments subsidize grid development as they have done renewables’ capacity, or should it be left to market forces through the increasingly sophisticated international electricity trading market? There is also the issue of built-in capacity redundancy both of production and transportation of the electricity generated by wind and solar, let alone the thorny question of storage. Lots of wind power with nowhere to go Germany, with more than 26 gigawatts of installed wind power capacity by mid-2010 according to the World Wind Power Association, is No. 1 in the European Union and No. 3 in the world after the United States and China. But it habitually produces only about 5 gigawatts of actual wind power, and when recently that output shot up to a record of more than 20 GW on a particularly windy weekend, cross-border connections to grids in neighboring countries had to be shut down because they couldn’t handle the surging power. There are already lots of constraints on the grid—for example, Danish wind blocks the German grid. You can do it if you optimally build it, which raises the question of when are you going to optimally build an optimal grid,” said Mabey. “The Germans need to build 17,000 kilometers [10,653 miles] of new grid just internally.” There are already so-called interconnectors carrying power between various E.U. states, including between the United Kingdom and France and Denmark and Germany. There are also plans afoot to build a 1.4 GW capacity line under the Pyrenees between Spain—with a highly developed wind and solar power industry—and France that will double the power capacity between the two countries. With the United Kingdom, for one, aiming to get some 30 GW of electricity from wind farms in the North Sea within the next decade as part of its E.U. target to get 15 percent of its power—equivalent to about 40 percent of its electricity—from renewables by 2020, there are also proposals to build a giant subsea grid to bring that power ashore. To that end, the United Kingdom in December signed a memorandum of understanding with nine other northern European states—Germany, France, Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, Ireland, Luxembourg and Norway—to study the possibility of building a €30 billion ($41.4 billion) grid in the North Sea that could be producing 100 GW of electricity within 20 years if all current plans come to fruition. ‘Who pays?’ becomes a high-voltage question “We are watching with interest the North Sea grid discussions. But at the moment, we don’t fully understand who will pay for it and how it will be developed,” said Julian Leslie of the United Kingdom’s National Grid. Experts say there is an animated technical and financial discussion already under way around the North Sea grid, including whether it is even desirable given the complications of where to place the grid connections and substations involved as well as some calculations that suggest development of a grid would be more expensive than simple point-to-point connections. If those issues are resolved and the North Sea grid does get developed, the idea would be for it in turn to form part of the much-debated European supergrid, supposed to be able to seamlessly transport power from the wind-rich north and sun-soaked south to the center, from where most of the demand originates. But that, too, has its problems—not just of power loss and heat generation over long distances, but also of public acceptability and cost. As with onshore wind farms, there is frequent public outcry over the placement of power pylons. Yet burying the power cables not only doubles the cost, it also raises the technical problem that at least when suspended in the air, the cables are naturally cooled, whereas underground, there is no such process. “The idea of the interconnected E.U. supergrid is not without challenges,” said Nick Jenkins, a professor of renewable energy at Cardiff University. “When you dive into the detail, there are more questions left unanswered than answered. The truth is that no one knows the answer.” A study earlier this year by German company Energynautics commissioned by Greenpeace found that grid upgrades totaling up to 140 GW of capacity would be necessary across the European Union and eastern and northern Europe to cope with the vast increase planned in renewable energy. Confronting an ‘island attitude’ This ambitious outline, which the study describes as a minimum, is likewise not without its problems. It takes about 10 years to get planning permission for a new line. Countries are still struggling to build their own networks, let alone when it comes to crossing borders,” said Mabey. “The only country really doing it is China—using European technology.” There is an island attitude in Europe—although it is starting to break down a bit. People have to trust their neighbors. There is a certain reticence among technocrats and politicians alike. What people see as acceptable depends on who and where you are,” he added. There is also the age-old issue of whether it is better to stay with the devil you know than the one you don’t in the shape of the competition between old friend gas and upstart renewables. Recent experience with Russia—which supplies about a quarter of the European Union’s gas—suddenly turning off or diverting supplies due to money disputes with Ukraine, through which most of it passes, have raised fears about energy security. But while this has given some added impetus to renewables—as is also likely to be the case with the oil price spike due to the current turmoil in the Middle East—it has also boosted interest in massive new gas pipelines to diversify sources of gas supply. “The core discussion is no longer nukes versus renewable. That is long gone,” said Mabey. “It has become pipes versus wires. Do we want to stay reliant on Russian gas or use our own resources to achieve energy security?” But for Helm, the answer lies in the ground. “Given the revolution shale gas has brought to world gas markets, my own view would be slow down on the wind investment and concentrate on building gas to substitute for coal quickly and cheaply. This really would at the international level make a big difference to emissions.” E3G in the Media 2011-03-03T15:34:01+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/about/news-articles/monica-araya-on-the-cartagena-dialogue/ http://www.e3g.org/about/news-articles/monica-araya-on-the-cartagena-dialogue/#When:14:40:10Z Monica Araya was recently asked to write a piece for the main climate blogging platform in Latin America, www.intercambioclimatico.com.  Her article, in Spanish, is below. It is also available to to read here. El DIALOGO DE CARTAGENA: UNA ALIANZA SUI GENERIS EN LAS NEGOCIACIONES CLIMATICAS El 11 de diciembre pasado la comunidad internacional fue categórica en la Cumbre Climática de las Naciones Unidas: “optamos por consenso”.* Las divisiones entre países aún prevalecen y los Acuerdos de Cancún no garantizan la seguridad climática, pero ese día ganó el espíritu pragmático que necesitaban las negociaciones bajo Convención Marco de Naciones Unidas de Cambio Climático para reponerse de la lesión de Copenhagen.  El resultado de la Cumbre – y la destreza diplomática mexicana y de la Secretaría de Convención - sorprendieron incluso a los comentadores más optimistas (que eran pocos).  Poco más de un mes después, la pregunta es cómo diseñar aumentar la ambición de los esfuerzos y cómo darles la forma jurídica adecuada. En el siglo XXI una marco global que garantice la seguridad climática requiere poner de acuerdo entre Estados Unidos y China—el “G2” las dos principales economías y los dos mayores emisores de gases de invernadero del mundo. Y no hay una solución aún para resolver este rompecabezas geopolítico.  Pero la parálisis del “G2” no debe reducirnos a un rol de observadores pasivos y mucho menos a un papel de víctimas. En Cancún los países pragmáticos y progresistas –sobretodo los pequeños y que tenemos más que perder si hay un colapso de la diplomacia— optamos por ser proactivos y propositivos. Tuvimos una Presidencia mexicana paciente y abierta al diálogo para que Cancún diera la señal clave necesaria: no hay solución definitiva (en mitigación y su forma jurídica) pero si hay un camino intermedio la construcción de una arquitectura climática.  Esa noche –y pocas veces esto ocurre—la comunidad internacional rebatió el disenso. Para los países progresistas esto fue un logro y aún lo celebramos. Pero detrás del telón hubo dinámicas importantes y Cancún mostró también que las alianzas por el clima pueden y deben incorporar voces de los países en desarrollo y a los países desarrollados. Abrir nuevos diálogo es el mejor antídoto para la parálisis porque sólo así se contrarresta, con propuestas de calidad, los impulsos unilateral de aquellos que por ser grandes o ser inflexibles (o ambos) amenazan con romper el consenso. Una dinámica prometedora que tuvo lugar en Cancún, y en la cual participé, fue la el Diálogo de Cartagena para la Acción Progresista. En mi opinión es la plataforma más imaginativa y constructiva que existe en las negociaciones climáticas actualmente. ¿Qué es el Diálogo de Cartagena? Este Diálogo surgió como un esfuerzo espontáneo e informal de elaborar textos de negociación en Copenhagen. Dado el amargo resultado de la COP15, un pequeño grupo de negociadores/as decidió rescatar el trabajo en conjunto y convertirlo en una plataforma positiva.  La crisis activan las ideas más diestras. Fue así como se gestó espacio informal, abierto a los países con ideas afines: construir un régimen ambicioso, comprensivo y jurídicamente vinculante a través de posiciones constructivas y tengan como objetivo continuar con o promover economías de bajo carbono en el mediano y largo plazo en el ámbito doméstico. La meta principal de estos países es que que las negociaciones avancen y que tienen la voluntad de trabajar juntos positivamente y proactivamente dentro de y con otros grupos regionales.  Por ejemplo, en el Diálogo de Cartagena discutimos abiertamente el razonamiento detrás de las distintas posiciones (“¿Qué quiere país X lograr con esto y por qué?”), aclaramos malentendidos (“He escuchado que tu bloque se opone a Y, es verdad?”) para explorar áreas de convergencia en las negociaciones (“Que les parece un párrafo que sugiera….”). Pero lo que hay que aclarar es que este Diálogo no es una bloque negociador y no tiene la intención desafiar los bloques de negaciones.  El diálogo es un foro de discusión para el intercambio de opiniones y para explorar opciones y textos que puedan generar apoyo de otras partes y consenso. ¿Por qué Diálogo de Cartagena? El nombre se debe a que la primera reunión del Grupo tuvo lugar en Cartagena en Colombia en Marzo de 2010. El Diálogo se reunió en las islas Maldivas en julio de 2010 y por tercera vez en Costa Rica (Octubre-Noviembre de 2010).  También hubo reuniones informales en Bonn y en Tianjin, China. En 2010 participaron en una o más reuniones: Antigua y Barbuda, Australia, Bangladesh, Bélgica, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Etiopía, la Comisión Europea, Francia, Alemania, Ghana, Guatemala, Indonesia, Malawi, Maldivas, Islas Marshal, México (como Presidente de la COP16 en Cancún), Países Bajos, Nueva Zelandia, Noruega, Panamá, Perú, Ruanda, República Dominicana, Samoa, España, Tanzania, Tailandia, Timor-Leste, Reino Unido y Uruguay. Lo más inspirador del Diálogo, en mi opinión, es ese inusual y refrescante espíritu constructivo en que procede el intercambio de ideas. Son discusiones francas fuera de los salones de negociación formal de manera que hay espacio seguro para explorar áreas de interés común en un ambiente fluido y sin presiones.  Se respira una ambiente de confianza –muy diferente al que prevalece en las plenarias que tienden a ser polarizante y que lleva a la parálisis. De Cancún a Durban Dadas las frágiles condiciones políticas de cara a Cancún, un objetivo clave durante 2010 de cara a la cumbre en México era lograr convergencia.  Necesitábamos sentar el precedente de que era posible un acuerdo que capturar aquello con lo cual ‘podemos vivir’ aunque no tienen el cien por ciento de que mi país individualmente quiere (e incluso si tiene algunos párrafos que no nos gustan del todo).  Y se logró. En Cancún el Diálogo de Cartagena se reunió diariamente a la 1pm y muchas veces lo hicimos en las noches en subgrupos para buscar textos de consenso, para tomar el pulso a las negociaciones y para explorar estrategias frente a los países más inflexibles. La próxima reunión del Diálogo será en Malawi en Marzo de 2011.  Allí tendremos un intercambio de ideas sobre como hacer aportes positivos y estratégicos de cara a la COP17 en Durban. Llegar a acuerdos entre gobiernos de casi 200 países es complejo – y muchas veces frustrante. No hay una receta para el éxito. Pero sabemos los ingredientes: disciplina, mejores oídos y menos gritos.  Con el Diálogo hemos explorado como funciona la “ingeniería de la convergencia” y lo innovador es que hemos articulado la única plataforma informal que incluye tanto a países en desarrollo como a desarrollados.  El reto en 2011 es inyectar la ambición y certidumbre jurídica para acercarnos hacia los objetivos de seguridad climática que nos pide la ciencia – y la conciencia. **Sabemos que Bolivia tuvo objecciones pero los abogados internacionales nos han recordado que consenso no significa unanimidad. Monica@arayanet.com. Monica es Asesora Asociada de E3G en Londres y Asesora de la delegación costarricense en las negociaciones climáticas (http://www.monica-araya.com).  Esta es una opinión personal no atribuible a E3G o al Gobierno de Costa Rica. Press Releases 2011-02-02T14:40:10+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/about/news-articles/e3g-in-the-news-in-chile/ http://www.e3g.org/about/news-articles/e3g-in-the-news-in-chile/#When:13:24:13Z Monica Araya was interviewed in Chile’s main financial newspaper - diario financiero - and one of the main political radio programmes. In the interviews she talks about the need for Chile to develop a low carbon, resilient strategy to avoid the current deadlock between energy companies on the one hand and environmentalists on the other. Listen to the interview with Radio Duna below. DIARIO FINACIERO CHILE Miércoles 24 de noviembre de 2010, 5:00 AM edicion impresa Mónica Araya, Senior Associate en Third Generation Environmentalism “Hay una clara indicación de que Chile es muy vulnerable al cambio climático” María Ignacia Alvear C. Un gran reto para nuestro país ha sido desarrollar energías convencionales sin afectar al medio ambiente, lo que ha generado intensos debates durante los últimos meses donde se enfrentan las perspectivas “medio ambiente versus crecimiento”. “¿Qué hacemos para manejar la transición de una economía actual a una economía futura donde el tema energético es tema principal?”, se pregunta la experta en medio ambiente Mónica Araya, senior Associate de la consultora británica Third Generation Environmentalism. Para ella, lo importante es invitar a más sectores a participar del debate para que distintas perspectivas aporten y no se genere una “discusión idelológica”. -En Chile hay un dilema de cómo producir energía sin contaminar. ¿Cuáles son las alternativas en energías tradicionales? -Probablemente habrá un debate muy paralizante entre el sector energético y las ONGs.Una sugerencia sería lo que han hecho otros países, como el Reino Unido en cuanto a crear una estrategia nacional de crecimiento y competitividad de bajo carbono. Ahí se tiene una plataforma de discusión muchísimo más productiva. -¿Cómo le parece que se ha desarrollado la discusión energética en Chile? -Me parece que el debate es visto como ecologista y eso es entendible, pero tiene que cambiar, porque este debate necesita gente de todos los sectores, que tenga una perspectiva emprendedora, que no sea “medioambiente versus crecimiento”, que no sea una pelea entre las eléctricas y los ecologistas. Hay que tener una ventana abierta al mundo porque hay muchísimo que se está haciendo a nivel internacional que sería muy útil para Chile. Podría ser interesante para el sector empresarial y el sector inversionista tener más detalles de cómo otros países están haciendo esa transición. Hay que subrayar que en el debate nacional los chilenos no están solos. -Dentro de este debate “ambiente versus crecimiento” se han creado conflictos como el de Hidroaysén… -Esa parálisis que se ve es porque se están asumiendo posiciones muy extremas de ambos lados. Si un grupo ecologista insiste en que no puede haber más crecimiento y la solución es no crecer, en un país como Chile lo veo sumamente difícil y poco realista. Lo mismo ocurre si el sector privado se rehusa a ver una economía, por ejemplo, de bajo carbono porque sólo quiere hacer plantas que son más baratas. -¿Cuál debería ser la tendencia que Chile debiera seguir para desarrollar un programa nuclear? -Si hubiera una discusión sobre la energía nuclear en Chile, lo importante es poner en perspectiva las ventajas y las desventajas. La gran ventaja es que es baja en carbono. Lo complicado es qué comunidad quiere una planta nuclear al lado, y el tema de los desechos, además del costo, porque no es una energía que se sostiene por sí sola. En un contexto chileno donde no se subsidia la energía solar ni la eólica, no entiendo cómo va a cuadrar la ecuación nuclear. -¿Cuáles serían las posibles soluciones al debate energético? -Creo que ha llegado el momento en Chile de hacer una estrategia de país, de crecimiento de bajo carbono. En los años que vienen, hay varias iniciativas caminando que podrían llegar a ese tipo de conversación, no sólo a nivel de gobierno, porque esto no puede hacerse a puertas cerradas, sino que también con el sector privado y la sociedad civil. Hay una clara indicación de que Chile es muy vulnerable al cambio climático. Y ese debate de vulnerabilidad chilena tiene que entrar en la perspectiva nacional de discusión sobre competitividad, porque el sector minero va a necesitar agua, el sector agrícola va a necesitar agua. El descarbonizar la matriz energética tiene que incluir la perspectiva de cómo se va a ver Chile en 30 años. No es inteligente reducir la decisión a sólo si el precio de la energía sube o no. -¿Qué tan importante es el punto de bajar las emisiones? -Aunque las emisiones chilenas son pequeñas en el contexto internacional, los niveles de emisiones están creciendo mucho más que el promedio de los países de la OCDE. Es mucho más visible ahora. Por lo que el argumento de que Chile emite poco no va a durar mucho tiempo. E3G in the Media 2010-11-26T13:24:13+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/about/news-articles/e3g-news-martin-frick-joins-e3g-as-berlin-representative/ http://www.e3g.org/about/news-articles/e3g-news-martin-frick-joins-e3g-as-berlin-representative/#When:08:00:15Z His presence will strengthen the diplomatic and foreign policy dimension of E3G’s work and provide a distinctively German (non-Anglo Saxon) view to E3G thinking.  Martin’s background places him well for this role given his placement in the German Foreign Ministry where, among other issues he led EU negotiations on the establishment of the Human Rights Commission at the UN. In addition, Martin has recently worked on climate change in the run up to Copenhagen as part of the World Humanitarian Forum.  Nick Mabey CEO says “We welcome Martin aboard and look forward to strengthening E3G together.”  Martin Frick’s full biography is available here.  News and Announcements 2010-11-22T08:00:15+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/about/news-articles/transformuk-launches-its-website/ http://www.e3g.org/about/news-articles/transformuk-launches-its-website/#When:15:09:53Z Transform UK, An E3G programme area, has launched its website: http://www.transformuk.org .  Transform UK, set up in 2009, is an alliance that campaigns to accelerate investment into the low carbon economy.Transform UK identifies and delivers transformational solutions to help build climate, energy and economic security.  The coalition includes a broad range of stakeholders representing civil society, unions, academics, think tanks, business and finance.  Its flagship project and the first campaign priority for Transform UK has been the creation of the Green Investment Bank which the government has recently confirmed it will set up.  News and Announcements 2010-11-17T15:09:53+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/about/news-articles/e3g-news-new-roles-for-martin-rands-and-shane-tomlinson/ http://www.e3g.org/about/news-articles/e3g-news-new-roles-for-martin-rands-and-shane-tomlinson/#When:14:31:48Z To mark E3G’s continued growth and development, E3G is pleased to announce new roles for Martin Rands and Shane Tomlinson. Martin Rands joined E3G at its inception as a Finance Director and a Board member. Martin has been appointed as E3G’s first Chief Operating Officer (COO), expanding his role to explicitly take responsibility for the delivery and management of E3G’s internal management and infrastructure. Shane Tomlinson has been appointed to a new position of Director of Development and will also join the E3G Board. In addition to his programme management responsibilities Shane will take overall charge of delivering E3G’s internal knowledge management and capacity building systems – including development of E3G network capacity in London, Berlin, Brussels and Washington. Nick Mabey, CEO of E3G commented on promotion This development is a testament to Shane and Martin’s enormous contribution to the growth and success of E3G. I am looking forward to working with them as we grow now and in future.” ENDS Notes to Editors 1. E3G is an independent, non-profit international organisation operating in the public interest to accelerate the global transition to sustainable development. E3G builds cross-sectoral coalitions to achieve carefully defined outcomes, chosen for their capacity to leverage change. E3G works closely with like-minded partners in government, politics, business, civil society, science, the media, public interest foundations and elsewhere. More information is available at http://www.e3g.org.  2. Martin’s full bio is available here. 3. Shane’s full bio is available here. 4. For more information, please call E3G on +44 (0)20 7234 9880.   News and Announcements 2010-07-07T14:31:48+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/about/news-articles/queens-speech-bill-to-create-green-investment-bank/ http://www.e3g.org/about/news-articles/queens-speech-bill-to-create-green-investment-bank/#When:08:35:04Z In the Queen’s speech later today it is expected that an Energy Security and Green Economy Bill will be introduced which will include provisions to set up a Green Investment Bank. The decision of the coalition Government to press ahead with the creation of this landmark investment institution has received strong support from a broad range of business, finance and charity stakeholders. It has the potential to significantly accelerate private sector investment into the low carbon economy to help boost economic growth and deliver energy and climate security. A report published today by the climate change think tank E3G sets out how the Green Investment Bank could work, including the need for a clear mandate to deliver the low carbon transition. Even if wholly owned by the Government the bank would not impact on public finances if it was given full independence and it could prioritise investment in strategically significant sectors such as energy efficiency and renewable energy. E3G is calling for the bank to be set up within a year and for the Government to provide at least £2 billion in capitalisation initially to get the Bank off the ground. This could leverage tens of billions more in private sector investment to build a low carbon, competitive and secure energy system. Ingrid Holmes, Programme Leader on Low Carbon Finance for E3G and author of the report said: By 2030 we need a zero carbon power sector and every home will need to be made super energy efficient. This will require an unprecedented surge of capital investment This can only be achieved with the support of the Green Investment Bank which can play a pivotal role in reducing the risk for investors and blazing the trail for a prosperous low carbon transition.” For more information please contact: Ed Matthew: Coordinator of Transform UK – The Campaign to Re-Power Britain E3G Tel: 07827 157 906 Press Releases 2010-05-25T08:35:04+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/about/news-articles/leaked-un-assessment-focuses-on-tonnes-rather-than-transformation/ http://www.e3g.org/about/news-articles/leaked-un-assessment-focuses-on-tonnes-rather-than-transformation/#When:19:59:18Z A leaked internal UN assessment of pledges and voluntary commitments made so far by developed and developing countries is distracting from the critical issues being debated in Copenhagen, said Nick Mabey, Chief Executive of E3G. The report claims that countries must close a gap of between 1.9 Gt and 4.2 Gt in their 2020 emissions in order to achieve a CO2 concentration level consistent with keeping temperature rise to 2°C or below.  The UN is focusing on tonnes rather than transformation”, Mabey said.  “The number of tonnes in 2020 is important, but it is only one step along the way to a zero carbon energy system and the broader global transition to low carbon, climate resilient economies.  Measuring success based only on the ‘gigatonne gap’ is a distraction.”  The report’s claim that missing this target puts the world on a path to 3°C is misleading and not backed by any further analysis. Missing a 2020 target by 1 gigatonne does not put the world on a 3°C path; this difference is in the error band of measurement. What will keep us on a dangerous path is a failure to change the trajectory of energy investment in major economies. We do not want a false peak in emissions in 2020 due to one-off cuts in deforestation, which is then overwhelmed by unchanged emissions growth in the energy sector”. Mabey added. The UN assessment underplays the importance of potential loopholes such as allowing countries like Russia to keep their “hot air” surplus of Assigned Amount Units and weak rules for emissions from Land Use and Land Use Change (LULUCF).  How these loopholes are handled is far more important than the headline numbers.  Further, any progress over the next decade will quickly be overwhelmed unless steps are taken now to enable major countries to cut emissions drastically beyond 2020.  There’s a lot of uncertainty around these figures” Mabey said.  “The key point is that preventing catastrophic climate change will require all countries to move rapidly onto low carbon pathways. Building a strong international framework to drive that transformation, and translating that framework into a binding treaty, is the real challenge.” ENDS 1. E3G is an independent, non-profit European organisation operating in the public interest to accelerate the global transition to sustainable development. 2. For further information contact Nick Mabey on +44 (0) 7949 768 771.   News and Announcements, Press Releases 2009-12-18T19:59:18+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/about/news-articles/copenhagen-week-2-closing-the-deal/ http://www.e3g.org/about/news-articles/copenhagen-week-2-closing-the-deal/#When:13:22:00Z Ten key questions determining the future of everyone on the planet will be answered by the end of next week. 1. Will we stay below two degrees or are we headed for a four degree world? 2. Will the US re-enter or wreck the global climate regime? 3. Are we headed for a legally binding treaty or more talks about talks? 4. Is there enough real money on the table? 5. Are we working on one or two treaties? 6. Will border tax adjustments break the deal? 7. Will China accept international scrutiny of its actions? 8. Did we save the Maldives? 9. Did we get a headline or an outcome? 10. Did the leaders turning up help or hinder? E3G, Third Generation Environmentalism has one of the planet’s most influential and experienced teams of climate change activists in Copenhagen. Specialising in the politics of climate change, they have played a key role over the past two years brokering stronger alignment between governments, business and NGOs on core issues such as the 20C goal, the need to complete a treaty by June 2010, the inclusion of bunker fuels, the technology transition and climate security. With offices in London, Brussels, Beijing and Washington, E3G has mobilised its extensive networks of leaders within government, business and the NGO community to tunnel through geographic, institutional and political barriers to promote a high ambition outcome from Copenhagen. As the fog of war thickens during this crucial week E3G will have a team of eight exceptionally well connected people monitoring and shaping events and available for background briefing and on the record comment. More details available in the Media Advisory available to download above.   Press Releases, E3G in the Media 2009-12-14T13:22:00+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/about/news-articles/power-sector-roadmap-overlooks-climate-science/ http://www.e3g.org/about/news-articles/power-sector-roadmap-overlooks-climate-science/#When:13:00:25Z Electricity industry claims that emissions cuts can wait until 2025 are not in line with climate science, according to Nick Mabey, Chief Executive of E3G. A report released today by a coalition of power sector industry bodies criticises the 2020 targets under negotiation at Copenhagen and argues that “there will be limited emissions reductions before 2020, with the major reductions occurring in the 2025–2040 period”. Nick Mabey commented: The science of climate change is clear: global carbon emissions need to peak by 2015 and carbon reductions are needed by 2020. Power sector emissions can be reduced substantially by 2020 through proactive energy efficiency measures and deployment of renewables and other low carbon technologies.  Waiting for 15 to 30 years for emissions reductions could be disastrous.” He criticised the electricity industry report on three accounts: The report accepts the IPCC recommendation of 60-80% CO2 reductions in developed countries by 2050, but ignores the IPCC recommendation of a peak in global emissions by 2015. The industry report suggests significant reductions would not occur for 15-30 years. This is at odds with the science: the final number in 2050 is less important than the ‘area under the curve’, or the total emissions between now and then. The report acknowledges that around half of carbon savings by 2050 will come through energy efficiency improvements, but does not consider the potential for using energy efficiency measures to achieving greater near-term emissions reductions. The potential for renewables to be used for emissions reductions in the near term are assessed pessimistically, while clean coal technologies and nuclear are assessed optimistically.  ENDS Editor’s Notes: 1.    E3G is an independent, non-profit European organisation operating in the public interest to accelerate the global transition to sustainable development.  2.    The ‘Roadmap for a Low-Carbon Power Sector by 2050’, by the International Electricity Partnership, a coalition of industry bodies, is available here. 3.    For further information please contact E3G. Press Releases 2009-12-14T13:00:25+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/about/news-articles/government-floats-possible-uk-green-investment-bank/ http://www.e3g.org/about/news-articles/government-floats-possible-uk-green-investment-bank/#When:16:00:05Z The Government seems to have learnt from the experience of the last few years that it will need more than pledges and targets to drive the £700 billion of low carbon investment required to meet our carbon targets over the next two decades” commented Nick Mabey, Chief Executive of E3G, on the signalling of government interest in establishing a UK Green Investment bank in today’s pre-budget report (PBR). Buried deep inside the PBR was a potentially radical transformation of the UK low carbon investment landscape; a review of the case for creating a dedicated UK Green Investment Bank. The PBR gave a remit to the new body Infrastructure UK (IUK) to: explore, amongst other options, the case for a low carbon investment institution IUK will report back to the government in advance of the budget in March 2010. This proposal follows concerted lobbying over the past year in favour of a Green Investment Bank from a wide range of business and environmental groups. The idea has also been supported by the Conservative Party. A broad consensus emerging is that a UK Green Investment Bank would help reduce the risk of investment in renewable energy, energy efficiency and low carbon energy and transport infrastructure. By reducing risk and effectively facilitating public-private partnerships, a UK Green Investment Bank would speed up progress towards the UK’s carbon targets and lower costs to the consumer and taxpayer. “The UK is already falling behind other major economies in building a low carbon future. A Green Investment Bank financed at sufficient scale would help us take the lead and meet our climate change targets at the lowest cost. The Government should announce a concrete proposal for a Green Investment Bank in the 2010 Budget”, Nick Mabey concluded. Ends Editor’s Notes: 1. E3G is an independent, non-profit European organisation operating in the public interest to accelerate the global transition to sustainable development. 2. E3G has been working on Green Infrastructure Bank proposals since early 2009, and published a paper in collaboration with Climate Change Capital. 3. The PBR statement can be found here. 4. Cross-sectoral support for the Green Investment Bank can be found at the Aldesgate Group and the Green Alliance. 5. The Conservative Party announcement on a Green Investment Bank can be found here. 6. For further information please contact E3G’s Chief Executive Nick Mabey. Press Releases 2009-12-09T16:00:05+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/about/news-articles/guardian-shane-tomlinson-on-green-technology/ http://www.e3g.org/about/news-articles/guardian-shane-tomlinson-on-green-technology/#When:07:00:12Z Shane Tomlinson was interviewed by Alok Jha of The Guardian on green technology and the framework on disseminating it effectively. The article below appeared in The Guardian on Monday 23 November. Global body needed to direct green technology, G77 says Developing nations call for UN body to police battle on climate change A green technology body with powers to direct a worldwide transition away from a high-carbon economy is needed to combat climate change, according to the world’s developing nations. While most negotiations ahead of the UN’s climate change summit in Copenhagen next month have been concerned with which nations should slash greenhouse gas emissions and by how much, the method in which these cuts will be achieved has received far less attention. Yet the importance of green technology – from wind turbines to electric cars to zero-carbon buildings – is enormous. Developing nations argue that the costs should be paid by the rich nations, and that a new global body is required, perhaps working as part of the UN, to direct the world’s low-carbon transformation in sectors as diverse as power, transport and heavy industry. We know that, to limit global temperature rises to below 2C, we’ll need a step change in global innovation and technology transfer,” said Shane Tomlinson of environment consultants E3G. In the period to 2020, it’s vital we avoid high carbon lock-in. The infrastructure decisions that developing countries are taking today, such as new power stations, are going to determine their emissions pathways for 20-30 years.” In the short term, that means rolling out proven technologies such as onshore and offshore wind power, solar photovoltaics and energy efficiency measures. A recent analysis by the Climate Group found that, to meet the emissions targets already agreed by nations, 9.3bn tonnes of CO2 must be prevented from entering the atmosphere by 2020. But these will not be enough for the deep cuts – 80% or more on 1990 levels – that many rich countries will have to deliver by 2050, if the world is to limit warming to the 2C that scientists agree is the safe limit. By then, according to the International Energy Agency, 17 technologies will have to be developed and rolled out to deliver a reduction of 42bn tonnes of CO2. Most of that technology – ranging from carbon capture and storage, solar power and zero-emission vehicles – will need to be deployed in emerging economies. At Copenhagen, the first decision on technology will be to decide if a new co-ordinating body should have powers to command the clean tech roll out. The G77 [group of developing nations] and China have proposed a new central executive, political body,” said Tomlinson. It would be part of the existing UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, which administers the Kyoto protocol. However, Europe and the US want only an advisory committee – their main concern is that a strong political body may end up channelling funds into state enterprises rather than keeping a level playing field for all businesses. Developing countries say an advisory body would have little power to drive the dramatic changes needed. The polarised debate has led some to compare the sharing of IP in green technology to arguments over whether pharmaceutical companies should give up patents for expensively developed HIV or malaria drugs in those nations blighted by the illnesses. Alia al-Dalli, deputy resident representative in Morocco for the United Nations Development Programme, said that without local education programmes, the only winners from Copenhagen will be multinational technology companies. “Capacity-development is very important – people need to be educated and aware. You’ve got to be able to produce technologies by the south for the south, in the south,” she said. “It will not merely be technology transfer.” Ambuj Sagar, a professor of policy studies at the Indian Institute of Technology – Delhi, said: “The best step would be if we stopped using the term technology transfer and started using something like innovation co-operation to signify that this is not a simple issue. It is not a hand-off from producers of technology to users of technology. We need co-operation instead of a simple reliance on markets to tackle what is an immense challenge.”   E3G in the Media 2009-11-23T07:00:12+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/about/news-articles/nick-mabey-quoted-in-the-huffington-post-by-william-s-becker/ http://www.e3g.org/about/news-articles/nick-mabey-quoted-in-the-huffington-post-by-william-s-becker/#When:17:44:26Z William S. Becker, Executive Director of Presidential Climate Action Project has written a series of articles for The Huffington Post on ‘Road to Copenhagen’. One of these – Part 2: Risky Business quotes Nick Mabey’s ‘Delivering Climate Security: International Security Responses to a Climate Changed World’ extensively. Partly arising from Mr. Becker’s participation at E3G’s Washington Roundtable ‘What the Security Community needs from Copenhagen’, the article outlines the involvement of the security sector – including the military - in climate change activities. He recommends using a risk management basis towards climate change, concluding with 10 steps on ‘how national and international leaders can do a better job as risk managers’. Below is the full article as it appeared in The Huffington Post on November 3rd. Road to Copenhagen - Part 2: Risky Business The evidence is irrefutable: Climate change poses enormous risks to economic stability, public health, ecosystem services, and national security, as well as to the environment. How should we manage those risks? The first step is to acknowledge them. The second is to start listening to the experts who manage risks for a living. Over the past two months, I’ve attended several meetings of military and civilian experts in security, intelligence and risk assessment. They were unanimous in concluding that 1) the risks of climate change are growing rapidly; 2) those risks are routinely underestimated by policy makers; and 3) little is being done to plan for contingencies, even in those regions of the world likely to suffer the most and even though the suffering already has begun. One meeting of security and risk experts was organized by Nick Mabey, a former advisor to Prime Minister Tony Blair and now the leader of E3G, a nonprofit organization based in Europe to promote sustainable development. Our mission was to explore how the science of risk assessment and management should be applied to climate change. In a Whitehall Paper written last year, Mabey explained: Climate change will be one of the critical forces shaping the coming century…it will fundamentally alter the way we live, the risks we face and how we interact in an increasingly interdependent world.” While scientists and environmentalists have been sounding warnings for years, an open discussion of the security risks of climate change started only a couple of years ago. In November 2007, the Center for Strategic and International Security and the Center for a New American Security issued “The Age of Consequences”; in June 2008, a blue-ribbon panel of high-level former military leaders, convened by the Center for Naval Analysis, concluded that global warming is a “threat multiplier” that will destabilize some of the world’s most volatile regions. That finding was confirmed a year later by the National Intelligence Council in its first-ever assessment of climate change. It was confirmed again recently by the CIA’s creation of a new Center on Climate Change and National Security to centralize its expertise on “the effect environmental factors can have on political, economic, and social stability overseas.” On Oct. 28, retired U.S. military officers warned the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee about the risks that climate change and fossil energy pose to national security. “Our economic, energy and climate change challenges are all inextricably linked,” retired Vice Adm. Dennis McGinn testified. “If we don’t address these challenges in a bold way and timely way, fragile governments have great potential to become failed states ... a virile breathing ground for extremism.” A day later in Washington, D.C., the same message was delivered in a joint statement issued by active and retired military leaders from Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin American and the United States. In addition to calling on all governments to work for an “ambitious and equitable” international agreement at Copenhagen, the officers urged governments to make sure the security implications of climate change are integrated into their military strategies. Mabey notes that climate risks - including drought and famine, loss of fisheries, coastal inundation, invasive migrations of climate refugees, natural disasters and water shortages - could go two ways. They could motivate nations to collaborate more on conflict prevention, contingency planning, economic development and disaster prevention and response; or, they could cause more tensions within and between countries, leading to conflict. An example of collaboration are the Oslo Guidelines on the use of the military and civil defense agencies in disaster relief operations. An example of tension is the fence India has built along its 2,500 miles border with Bangladesh, in part to keep out illegal immigrants - a problem that may reach crisis proportions as residents of Bangladesh flee extreme weather, flooding and sea-level rise. As many as 30 million residents of Bangladesh could become “climate refugees” by mid-century, forced from their homes by sea-level rise, according to one government official there.  Public officials tend to be risk-averse in matters with potential political consequences. Now they must become risk-savvy. If some of them feel uncertain about the severity of climate change, that’s not a reason to disregard risk; in fact, risk increases with uncertainty. They should not base policy on whether scientists’ predictions of severe climate change are probable, but whether they are plausible. Because political leaders typically don’t think like risk managers, “the risk of severe outcomes (from climate change) is greater than the public and policymakers generally perceive,” according to Jay Gulledge, Senior Scientist at the Pew Center on Global Climate Change. Here are 10 ideas on how national and international leaders can do a better job as risk managers: 1. Policy-makers must listen to risk professionals and acknowledge the rapidly increasing dangers of climate change. Nearly all of us practice some risk management in our lives. That’s why we buy health insurance, liability insurance, homeowner’s insurance, long-term care insurance and vehicle insurance. Risk management is no less important in regard to global warming. 2. Elected officials must listen to the climate science community. At the same time, scientists must clearly communicate the upper end of plausible climate risks rather than middle-ground risks. Politicians and policy makers tend to flock to the middle of the risk spectrum - a kind of Goldilocks and the Three Bears tendency where we want risks that are not too hot and not too cold. Good risk management requires that we anticipate and prepare for the worst. 3. Climate scientists should interact regularly with risk, security, public health, and disaster prevention and response agencies to help them anticipate and cope with emerging climate impacts. 4. To minimize climate risks, national leaders must find an effective balance between sovereignty and international collaboration. Existing international institutions probably will prove inadequate to deal with the unprecedented demands of climate change; new international institutions and mechanisms will be needed. 5. Public officials and citizens alike must invest in prevention - in other words, mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions to reduce the danger of climate change, and adaptation measures that reduce the intensity of climate crises. We should not wait for the crises to arrive, any more than we can wait to buy auto insurance until we’re in the middle of a head-on collision. 6. Nations should begin serious contingency planning now, internally and with other countries in their regions. Some of the most severe climate change will involve nations where historic tensions already exist. India and Pakistan, or India and Bangladesh come to mind. The time to plan is now, in hopes the overriding threat of climate change will be the external enemy that draws old adversaries together. 7. Local officials should build risk assessment and management into infrastructure and climate adaptation projects. The World Bank estimates that 40 percent of development aid investment is at risk from climate change. To avoid carbon lock-in (i.e., actions that lock us in to greenhouse gas emissions for decades), we must stop building conventional coal plants and making other long-term carbon commitments. But we must also avoid “vulnerability lock-in”. The critical infrastructure we build today - ranging from power and water treatment plants to hospitals and vital transportation systems - should be designed for resilience and located to avoid floods, sea level rise and other impacts of climate change. 8. The Executive Branch and Congress should regularly review climate risks to determine whether federal agencies have the authority and resources they need to respond rapidly to emerging worst-case scenarios. An even more interesting issue is whether the Executive Branch has sufficient power to prevent climate emergencies without Congressional interference - for example, by redefining 100-year floodplains based on anticipated future flooding rather than past flooding, and restricting development within predicted flood zones. 9. Governments must put adequate resources into research that improves our understanding of how climate change will affect us at the regional and local levels. Research should include “perfect storm” events where multiple impacts and stresses occur simultaneously. 10. Governments should classify climate change as a national security issue in budgeting as well as planning. According to the Institute for Policy Studies, the Bush administration allocated $88 to military forces in 2008 for every dollar it earmarked for climate stabilization. President Obama’s stimulus package and first budget narrowed the security-climate gap to 9:1 - a dramatic improvement, but still not an adequate reflection that low-carbon technologies and resources have become critical tools of conflict prevention, global stability and national defense. We are rapidly approaching a time when the nations most threatened by climate change will regard coal-burning as an act of aggression and when nations will conflict over who gets dwindling supplies of finite resources. That makes solar collectors and wind turbines as important as conventional weapons in our national defense arsenal. As I’ve written before, our biggest risk is that we’ll fail to close the gap between what scientists tell us is necessary and what politicians believe is possible. We won’t be able to narrow that gap until elected officials worldwide accept that the security risk of failing to act on climate change is far greater than the political risks of bold preventive action. This article appeared in The Huffington Post on November 3rd. E3G in the Media 2009-11-05T17:44:26+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/about/news-articles/the-debate-must-focus-on-the-human-cost/ http://www.e3g.org/about/news-articles/the-debate-must-focus-on-the-human-cost/#When:13:08:50Z Between 150 and 200 million people could be displaced by rising sea levels by 2050 The doctors are right about the scale of the health catastrophe that will result from a failure to deal with climate change. So far, the public debate on climate has focused mainly on the science and the economics. We have been made very aware of what dealing with climate change might do to business, and nothing like aware enough about what failing to deal with it will do to people. The recent publication of The Anatomy of a Silent Crisis by the Global Humanitarian Forum has brought this issue into much clearer focus. It found that climate change already causes some 300,000 deaths a year and seriously affects 325 million people. It concluded that four billion people were vulnerable to climate change and half a billion at extreme risk. The number of people permanently displaced by rising sea levels, floods and droughts could reach 150 to 200 million by 2050. The most dramatic effects of climate change on health are those that result directly from extreme weather events. The Forum’s report estimated that by 2030 the health of some 660 million people might be seriously affected by natural disasters. This is almost twice the number of people expected to suffer from diabetes by then. As the doctors point out, other health impacts will arise from changes in the distribution or frequency of occurrence of disease carriers. A third set of climate impacts affecting health arise from the infrastructure disruptions generated by a changing climate. Extreme weather events not only do direct harm to people, they also destroy or prevent access to hospitals and clinics. The displacement and conflict resulting from loss of food or clean water cause not only physical harm, but also much mental distress – as yet a much overlooked aspect of the health effects of climate change. The doctors are also right to emphasise the importance of the politics. Tackling climate change successfully is well within the envelope of our engineering and economic competence. Politics is the art of the possible. The art of political leadership is to expand the realm of the possible. If the grim prospect outlined by the doctors is to be avoided, what is needed between now and Copenhagen is much more than politics as usual. The political leaders assembling in New York and Pittsburgh in the next two weeks must now launch a political surge on climate change. Tom Burke is a founding director of E3G and a visiting professor at Imperial and University Colleges, London This article appeared in The Independent on Wednesday 16th September, 2009.   E3G in the Media 2009-09-16T13:08:50+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/about/news-articles/ny-times-united-kingdom-faces-a-quandary-over-new-nuclear-or-coal-power/ http://www.e3g.org/about/news-articles/ny-times-united-kingdom-faces-a-quandary-over-new-nuclear-or-coal-power/#When:17:12:09Z The UK has a legally binding commitment to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions by 34% by 2020, and 80% by 2050 on 1990 figures. Given that emissions from power stations account for about 37% of all UK CO2 emissions, what direction will the energy industry take in a carbon constrained world? Tom Burke speaks to Jeremy Lovell of ClimateWire about the alternatives to including nuclear power in the future energy mix. The article was featured in the New York Times on August 27th, 2009. United Kingdom Faces a Quandary Over New Nuclear or Coal Power The United Kingdom is nearing a crucial decision as it tries to tackle the climate crisis—whether to make a major push into new nuclear power or to proliferate coal-fired power plants constructed so their carbon emissions are captured and safely stored. While U.S. officials and America’s utility industry continue to mull this question, Britain’s decisional clock is ticking much faster. At stake are not just the government’s pressing legal commitments to slash the country’s contribution to global emissions of climate-changing carbon gases, but also a stated policy goal of reducing dependence on energy imports from unstable regions. In a recent report on the country’s future energy mix, Malcolm Wicks—a former energy minister and now Prime Minister Gordon Brown’s special representative on international energy—called for a tripling of the amount of electricity produced from nuclear power plants from 12.5 percent of the national total now to 35 percent to 40 percent by 2030. “At a time when the UK is becoming increasingly reliant on imported fossil fuels we need to ask whether the UK should be more ambitious on nuclear power. When national security considerations are added to climate change exigencies I believe the answer is yes,” wrote Wicks. It was the first time the government has been so specific on the desired size of the new nuclear contribution. It has made it clear for some years that it favors a new generation of nuclear power plants as the existing fleet is progressively closed down due to old age. Nuclear sees itself rapidly expanding The nuclear industry, which provides 6.3 percent of the world’s primary energy production, sees itself as central to this equation. It forecasts a minimum five-fold rise in nuclear power by the end of the century worldwide. Its forecasts for the United Kingdom are broadly in line with that global picture. But there is a potential catch. The French and German power utility companies that have so far expressed an interest in building new nuclear plants in Britain have made it clear they will not make the massive capital outlay needed—a 1.5-gigawatt nuclear power plant would cost an estimated $2 billion-$3 billion to build—without price guarantees. But guaranteeing future carbon prices or electricity prices would amount to a large bet that would put government money at risk. If the price went below the guaranteed minimum the government—in other words, the taxpayers—would have to pick up the difference. U.K. officials have repeatedly said they will not put public money into new nuclear. Tom Burke, a respected climate change commentator with London-based environmental think tank E3G, says this is all dangerous nonsense. Nuclear is not the answer. There is no way it can replace a significant amount of coal globally. What is needed in Britain is a serious focus on energy efficiency, a swift development of and promotion of carbon capture and storage, electrification of the terrestrial transport system and more renewables,” he said. But so far the government is pushing nuclear and only paying lip service to the others. There have been a lot of words but little action.” Could there be a coal renaissance? Into this ring steps the British coal industry, long believed to have been dead after the mine closures of the 1980s when cheap imports replaced more expensive domestic coal. But it is actually undergoing something of a renaissance. Domestic production of coal is currently around 18 million tonnes a year and is seen rising to around 20 million tonnes. That is about one-third of current demand of 60 million tonnes, although that total is expected to fall to around 40 million tonnes over time. The trouble is that coal, the dirtiest of fossil fuels, is part of the climate problem, so how can it also be seen as part of the solution? The answer is to stop the emissions from burning it from entering the atmosphere in the first place. That can be through a combination of increased combustion efficiency and carbon capture and storage—the latter being the much sought-after climate silver bullet. However, the technology is untried on a commercial scale. Added to that is the fact that as it stands, capturing emissions from burning fossil fuels like coal and gas for electricity production requires so much energy that it reduces burning efficiency by around one quarter. In short, to produce a given electricity output with capture and storage technology fitted to the power plant means burning 25 percent to 30 percent more fuel. Age and regulation takes its toll on existing plants One factor that is pushing the United Kingdom to make a prompt policy decision is the fact that around one-third of the country’s electricity generating capacity will be taken out of service by 2016 due to a combination of old age and E.U. emission reduction legislation aimed specifically at fossil-fueled power plants. Currently renewables like wind, waves, tidal, hydro and solar supply barely 5 percent of the country’s electricity—a figure that under E.U. rules must rise to around 35 percent by 2020. And they have their own set of problems, not least of which are cost and the production of a sometimes wildly fluctuating output. Gas is a potential interim answer, as although it still produces carbon emissions they are far less than from coal. But gas has its own political dynamic with Britain’s North Sea reserves rapidly running out. That leaves gas-rich Russia, with its looming potential of tieing political strings to future supplies. Once a net exporter of gas, Britain now expects up to half of supplies expected to be imported within a decade. Because gas supplies have for years been literally in the backyard, Britain has neglected to build gas storage facilities. Some experts fear this lack of storage will become an Achilles heel, exposing consumers to the more expensive price gyrations of the spot market. “Nuclear will not be able to bridge the electricity generation gap in time and nor will renewables, so it comes down to a choice between coal and gas—whether carbon abated, partially abated or unabated,” said David Brewer of Coalpro, the confederation of UK coal producers. “Of those two energy sources coal comes from a wider variety of places and is far less open to political instability than gas,” he added. Is the answer in Alaska? Indeed coal is very widely available and in plentiful—although not infinite—supply. It is also in steeply rising demand as countries such as India and China fuel their booming economic growth with its power. The U.S. Energy Information Administration sees world coal demand rising by 49 percent between 2006 and 2030, with almost all of that rise occurring in developing non-OECD countries. A recent report from the clean coal section of the International Energy Agency noted that coal demand was roughly 5.5 gigatonnes a year, but it warned that declared commercially proven reserves looked likely to be insufficient to meet predicted demand in 2030. However, commercially proven reserves are a fraction of the Earth’s mineable coal deposits. The IEA report notes that estimates of coal resources in Alaska—the amount of coal that is assumed to be in the ground but that has not yet been fully measured—at just over 5,000 gigatonnes, or about 1,000 years’ supply at current levels of demand. “There is an absolutely enormous amount of coal in the world. The extent of its exploitability will depend on price and that will rise over this century as the gas and oil run out,” said Coalpro’s Brewer. “The world is not going to run out of coal anytime soon.” E3G in the Media 2009-08-27T17:12:09+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/about/news-articles/jennifer-morgan-moves-to-the-world-resources-institute/ http://www.e3g.org/about/news-articles/jennifer-morgan-moves-to-the-world-resources-institute/#When:15:28:17Z E3G’s Director for Global Climate Change – Jennifer Morgan – has been appointed as the World Resources Institute’s next Director of its Climate and Energy Programme; succeeding Jonathan Pershing who joined the Obama Administration as Deputy Special Envoy for Climate Change earlier this year. E3G’s CEO, Nick Mabey, said, Although we are sorry to lose someone with Jennifer’s unique talents, we are also proud to see her move back to the US to take such an important role at WRI. E3G and WRI have a longstanding organizational relationship, and Jennifer’s move will help strengthen our collaboration in the common effort to fight climate change.” As Director of Global Climate Change at E3G, Jennifer has been responsible for E3G’s Global Deal Programme. Jennifer’s work has focused on EU relations on climate and energy security with China and the United States, and the global discussions on the future of the climate regime post-2012. She joined E3G in October 2006 from WWF-International where she led their global climate change team. Jennifer’s tenure saw E3G deliver significant progress on many of its priority climate change outcomes: EU agreement to fund 10-12 large-scale CCS demonstration plants; A growing programme of Low Carbon Zone pilot projects in China; and The creation and founding of the Global Campaign for Climate Action, which now serves as a hub for public mobilisation for the Copenhagen negotiations. “Jennifer joined E3G when we were still a fledgling outfit, and has been integral to delivering our core outcomes and helping to our growth into a sustainable organization. Jennifer will continue to be engaged with E3G’s work in the run up to Copenhagen Conference in December. We also look forward to retaining her valuable input as a non-executive director on the E3G board”, Mabey continued. At WRI, Jennifer will be leading a team of more than 40 people that conduct research and develop policy and business options that promote international and U.S. responses to climate change. WRI President Jonathan Lash said, “At this crucial time in the climate change and energy challenges, we are fortunate to have someone as experienced and talented as Jennifer. She will be a strong leader for WRI’s top-notch team of climate experts.” Morgan added, “This is a pivotal moment in time to avoid the worst impacts of climate change. I think WRI can play a key role in transforming the conventional debate and building new coalitions. We can map a pathway to a prosperous future for the people and the planet.” Jennifer Morgan will join WRI from 10th September 2009. Jennifer will also become a non-executive director of the E3G Board from that date. Ends   Editor’s Notes: 1. E3G is an independent, non-profit European organisation operating in the public interest to accelerate the global transition to sustainable development. E3G builds cross-sectoral coalitions to achieve carefully defined outcomes, chosen for their capacity to leverage change. E3G works closely with like-minded partners in government, politics, business, civil society, science, the media, public interest foundations and elsewhere. More information is available at http://www.e3g.org.  2. The World Resources Institute (http://www.wri.org) is an environmental think tank that goes beyond research to find practical ways to protect the earth and improve people’s lives. 3. For further information please contact Meera Shah at E3G on 0207 234 9880 or by email . News and Announcements, Press Releases 2009-08-03T15:28:17+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/about/news-articles/blame-games-on-climate-change/ http://www.e3g.org/about/news-articles/blame-games-on-climate-change/#When:13:23:02Z As the climate change negotiations draw to a close at Bonn, Nick Mabey, CEO of E3G and Malini Mehra, CEO of Centre of Social Markets, summarise their thoughts on the state of play. Their article, entitled ‘Blame games on climate change’ has been published as a comment piece by the Guardian. Blame games on climate change If nations can rise above past conflicts, why can’t they work together at the climate change talks in Bonn? This year was meant to be the year of climate change. Yet UN negotiations in Bonn this week towards a global climate agreement in Copenhagen (COP15) in December are stalling amid a flurry of weak commitments and recriminations. This combined with economic anxiety about pledging assistance to poorer countries is threatening to bring progress to a halt. If COP15 is to succeed, climate negotiators will have to learn lessons from the world of peacemaking and raise their game accordingly. “Negotiators do not seem to realise that the Earth’s climate system is not interested in their clever ploys or claims of action.” At present, climate negotiations are a parody of trade talks, with countries jockeying for advantage, and demanding the most from others while taking the least action possible themselves. The debate over “historical responsibility” has clouded focus and undermined the fragile trust between countries that climate change is a common problem that all must commit to solving. Business as usual will not deliver the cuts needed to avoid catastrophic climate change. Neither will politics as usual. Negotiators do not seem to realise that the Earth’s climate system is not interested in their clever ploys or claims of action. It is only interested in the amount of greenhouse gases that remain in the atmosphere. The cry that it is “not fair” to ask China and India to limit their emissions makes no difference to the atmosphere. Every country will need to act radically if we are to avoid devastating impacts. This means that global emissions must drop by 60-80% from current levels by mid-century. If we fail to act, the poorest people in the poorest countries will be the first and the hardest hit. So how do we address the issue of historical responsibility? Rich countries are responsible for over half of historical climate change and far more on a per capita basis. It is also true that most of the growth in future emissions will come from rapidly industrialising countries like China and India. Many different approaches have been proposed to divide up the remaining “carbon space” with sophisticated equity-based formulas. Unsurprisingly, each one seems to advantage the particular country that proposes it. So India wants per capita emissions because it has a growing population. China wants credit for reducing its population and being the workshop of the world. Australia wants credit for being hot. Russia wants credit for being cold. The US argues it is too rich to cut emissions; the Africans that they are too poor. The list goes on. “Just look at what Northern Ireland, South Africa and Rwanda have to teach us. Here politicians and populations have made hard decisions to focus on building a better future, not by ignoring the past, but by acknowledging and managing it in an open way.” Whatever the merits of each country’s argument, the truth is that none of these approaches will be agreed as a basis for action at Copenhagen. However, argument over the past could fatally derail negotiations and deprive everyone of a stable future. We need to step away from this blame game cul-de-sac and learn from the wisdom of successful post-conflict peace processes. Just look at what Northern Ireland, South Africa and Rwanda have to teach us. Here politicians and populations have made hard decisions to focus on building a better future, not by ignoring the past, but by acknowledging and managing it in an open way. Compared to the real level of pain, distrust and grievance in these societies, the often tactical outrage displayed in climate talks seems like play-acting. Sitting down with representatives of groups that have raped, tortured and murdered your loved ones is profoundly hard. It takes maturity, but one finds that people all around the world do it to avoid harm in the future. Compared to this, blaming British coal miners 100 years ago for today’s sea-level rise in India seems a forced and meaningless abstraction. If people who have suffered the immediate horrors of war can find it within themselves to rise above the past, and construct a better future surely we can achieve the same level of maturity in climate politics? Perhaps it is because the impacts of recent conflict are so raw that people are prepared to go to extreme lengths to make peace. The hard-won lessons from these harrowing experiences need to be learned by climate negotiators. If we lack the maturity to deal with climate change, the future is one of mutually assured destruction. Moving away from the mad world of climate politics will require giving greater voice in international negotiations to the actual victims of climate change rather than their often remote representatives. Perhaps we should invite Desmond Tutu to host a climate change truth and reconciliation commission at Copenhagen? Perhaps this is what is needed to focus minds a little more. The climate can wait – but we cannot. Nick Mabey is CEO of E3G (Third Generation Environmentalism) Malini Mehra is CEO of CSM (Centre for Social Markets)   E3G in the Media 2009-06-12T13:23:02+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/about/news-articles/e3g-wri-side-event-at-unfccc-mrv-institutions-and-issues1/ http://www.e3g.org/about/news-articles/e3g-wri-side-event-at-unfccc-mrv-institutions-and-issues1/#When:13:13:19Z E3G and World Resources Institute (WRI) hosted a side event at the UNFCCC Climate Change talks in Bonn, Germany on 3 June 2009 from 19:30 to 21:00. The event, entitled Measurable, Reportable and Verifiable Institutions & Issues: matching support and actions with examples from China, featured presentations by Hilary McMahon, Senior Associate from WRI and Teng Fei from the Institute of Energy, Environment and Economy at Tsinghua University in China. The event was chaired by Jennifer Morgan of E3G and panelists included: Zou Ji - School of Environment and Natural Resources, Renmin University Juergen Lefevere - Policy Coordinator, International Climate Negotiations, European Commission Jane Ellis - Principle Analyst, Climate Change OECD Tailored Approach: Examples from China In considering how a tailored approach to individual country actions would work under a global agreement, it is worth assessing examples of countries policies and measures that can be measured, reported and verified and examining how countries themselves currently undertake mitigation policies and measures. China provides a rich set of examples of such policies due to its active efforts to cut its growth in energy use and its dependence on fossil fuels. Although many of these policies are new or only reaching the implementation stage, there are others that already have MRV structures associated with them. Based on two recent publications: Mitigation Actions in China: Measurement, Reporting and Verification, published jointly with WRI and Tsinghua University on behalf of E3G (available to download above), and Keeping Track: National Positions and Design Elements of an MRV Framework, a WRI Working Paper, the presentations provided an overview of MRV issues generally as well as new research outlining the systems China has in place to report and verify its current domestic actions, in order to provide lessons for an international system under a post-2012 climate regime. Discussion from the audience and panelists focused on the lessons learned from the research combined with an assessment of current Party submissions on these topics and implications for the two tracks of the MRV debate; MRV of developing country enhanced actions, and MRV of developed country finance, technology and capacity building support. Key topics under discussion included the following: The purpose of MRV as a tool for implementation of Party commitments and as a tool to assess the implementation of a post-2012 Agreement; What should be MRV’d under a post-2012 climate regime: e.g.  national communications; Technology Needs Assessments; low carbon development plans; EGTT performance indicators; Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions; and other systems already in place; The effectiveness of an MRV system on policies and measures and overall effectiveness of the policies; and The relevance for the current UNFCCC negotiations process including: the aim of the MRV system; the timeframe; quantification; institutional arrangements including matching support with actions; and building trust. L-R: Jane Ellis, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; Jürgen Lefevere, European Commission; Ji Zou, Renmin University of China and WRI; Jennifer Morgan, E3G; Fei Teng, Tsinghua University, China; and Hilary McMahon, WRI A video recording of the event and the presentations are available on the UNFCCC website; IISD’s Reporting Service also provides a brief summary. *Photo Copyright to IISD/Markus Staas. News and Announcements 2009-06-03T13:13:19+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/about/news-articles/un-climate-conference-the-countdown-to-copenhagen/ http://www.e3g.org/about/news-articles/un-climate-conference-the-countdown-to-copenhagen/#When:16:19:29Z As the UNFCCC meeting in Poznan (COP 14) becomes becomes a distant memory, Michael McCarthy, Environment Editor of The Independent looks onwards to the next UNFCCC meeting (COP 15) in Copenhagen, in December 2009. In his article (below), McCarthy speaks to Tom Burke about the enormity of the task ahead and who he thinks should be leading the effort. In 331 days’ time, 15,000 officials from 200 countries will gather in the Danish capital with 1 goal: to find a solution to global warming. UN Climate Conference: The countdown to Copenhagen Three hundred and thirty-one days, plus a final frantic fortnight: not very long, really, to put together the most complex and vital agreement the world has ever seen. But that’s all the time there is: in 331 days from now, on 7 December, the UN Climate Conference will open in Copenhagen and the world community will try to agree a solution to the gravest threat it has ever faced: global warming. Between 10,000 and 15,000 officials, advisers, diplomats, campaigners and media personnel from nearly 200 countries, almost certainly joined by limousine-loads of heads of state and government from America’s President Barack Obama down are expected to meet in the Danish capital in one of the most significant gatherings in history. “This is the most complicated deal the world has ever tried to put together” If that sounds like exaggeration, we need only glance at some historical comparisons. The Copenhagen meeting will have a far broader reach and potential impact on the world than the Congress of Vienna, say, the 1814-1815 assembly which attempted to reorder Europe after the Napoleonic wars, or the Paris peace conference of 1919, which tried to construct a new global order after the First World War, or the 1945 meetings at Yalta and Potsdam which tried to do the same after the Second World War. For they were all dealing with national boundaries, politics and political structures, phenomena which of course are vital in human terms, but ephemeral and changeable. Copenhagen will be dealing with something fundamental to life on earth: the stability of the biosphere. Known officially in UN-speak as COP 15 – the 15th meeting of the parties of the UN’s Framework Convention on Climate Change – the meeting in Denmark will try to work out a way for the world to act together to preserve the thin envelope of atmosphere, soil and sea which surrounds our planet and enables us to live, in the face of rising temperatures which threaten to destroy its habitability. All the world’s major governments, including the once-sceptical administration of the US President George Bush, now formally accept that temperature rises have already begun, are likely if unchecked to prove disastrous for human civilisation, and are being caused by emissions of greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide from our power plants, factories and motor vehicles. But if all the major governments now accept it, getting them to agree on how to tackle it still seems a very long way off indeed. The essential problem, to use the jargon, is burden-sharing. We know the world has to cut its CO2 emissions drastically, and soon. But which countries are to cut them, by how much? The Chinese, for example, with their scarcely believable economy growing at 10 per cent a year, have now overtaken the Americans as the biggest carbon emitters; but historically, America has emitted far more; and on a per capita basis, US emissions still dwarf those of China. So the Chinese have felt (so far) that they have a moral right for their economy to grow unchecked, and their carbon emissions to grow with it; but many Americans have felt (so far) that they see no reason to act unilaterally to cut their own CO2 if the Chinese are not willing to do the same. Differences like those stubbornly percolate the whole negotiating process and make achieving a universal agreement mind-bogglingly hard. This is the most complicated deal the world has ever tried to put together,” says Tom Burke, visiting professor at Imperial College and an adviser on climate change to the Foreign Office. “In effect, you’re asking nearly 200 countries to align their energy policies – to create a common world energy policy. If you look at how hard it has been for the member states of the European Union to align their energy policies, you get an idea of the difficulty of attempting it with the whole world.” Yet it has to be done, and the penalty for failure could not be higher. It is just 20 years since the world woke up to the danger of rising carbon emissions destabilising the atmosphere. Two decades ago it seemed a fairly distant threat, prefigured principally in supercomputer climate prediction programmes; something that was likely to happen a comfortably long distance away, such as at the end of the 21st century. Three things have altered since then. First, the changing climate is now visible, not just in computer predictions, but all around us: spring in southern Britain, for example, is arriving about three weeks earlier than it did 40 years ago. At this time last year a red admiral butterfly, an archetypal creature of the summer, was photographed perching on a snowdrop, a flower of the winter – a previously unheard-of occurrence. Second, it has become clear in the past five years that the earth is responding to the increasing CO2 loading of the atmosphere much more rapidly than scientists initially thought. There are numerous examples but to instance just one, the summer sea ice of the Arctic Ocean is melting far more quickly than anyone imagined. Third, it has become apparent, even more recently, that global emissions of CO2 are shooting up at a rate that far exceeds anything the UN’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) thought possible when it sketched out future emissions scenarios in a special report in 2000. Even though we have had 20 years to think about emissions cuts, and 11 years of the Kyoto protocol, the treaty which actually prescribed the first cuts for the industrialised countries, emissions are soaring as never before. Some leading climate scientists are now openly voicing concerns that this makes it increasingly unlikely we can meet the aim of keeping global temperature rise to about 2C above the pre-industrial level, which is generally regarded as the most that may be endured by human society without mortal danger. (We are now at about 0.75 degrees C above pre-industrial, and another 0.6 of a degree is thought to be inevitable because of the CO2 which has already been emitted). Certainly, if we are to have any chance at all at holding the increase to two degrees, there is wide agreement that global emissions have to peak very soon – probably by 2015 or 2016 – and then rapidly decrease, to 80 per cent below present levels by 2050. The later the peak, the greater (and therefore more difficult) the subsequent decrease would have to be. That’s the pathway the world has to follow. Copenhagen offers the chance to set out along it. But even if the deal in December is not as ambitious as scientists and environmentalists insist is necessary – and at the moment, that seems pretty likely – it is vital that there is actually an accord. Disagreement would be a catastrophe. Three conditions, according to Britain’s Energy and Climate Change Secretary, Ed Miliband, have to be fulfilled for Copenhagen to be regarded as a success. First, the wealthy industrialised countries have to agree tough new targets for cutting their C02. Second, the developing countries led by China, even if they do not take on the same sort of numerical targets, have to move away from “business as usual”. And third, the rich nations have to agree a way of financing the developing countries, especially the poorer ones, in the measures they take to adapt to the climate change that is coming anyway. Otherwise they won’t sign up to anything. Securing such a deal will be a matter of political will: a global political consensus will have to be hammered out. It is becoming clear that, over the next 11 months, the world could well do with a high-level political fixer, jetting unceasingly from capital to capital, to pull such a consensus together, in the manner in which the Argentine diplomat, Raul Estrada, managed to pull the original Kyoto agreement together in the Japanese city in December 1997. It could be Britain’s Ed Miliband, according to Tom Burke. “There has to be someone who can put the time in, and go round various capitals and talk to the key people at a very high level, and not just environment ministers,” he says. “Ed Miliband could play that role. He’s known to be close to Gordon Brown, and Britain is reasonably respected for its record on climate change. It doesn’t have to be him. But there probably needs to be someone.” However, Mr Miliband, and the British Government, may face a problem of reduced credibility in climate change terms as a result of two policy decisions likely to be taken in the next few weeks. One, which Mr Miliband will take personally, is whether or not to agree to a new coal-fired power station at Kingsnorth in Kent. If he gives it the go-ahead, without strict controls over its emissions, environmentalists will accuse him of sanctioning a new generation of power plants run on the most carbon-intensive fuel. The other is whether or not to allow Heathrow airport to build a third runway, and thus expand British aviation, whose CO2 emissions are growing faster than those of any other sector. If both these projects go ahead – as seems perfectly possible – there is no doubt that the UK’s position as a potential Copenhagen broker will be weakened. “If countries like Britain, who, for better or worse, are the global leaders, go to Copenhagen with new coal-fired power stations and expanding airports at home, it’s very difficult to see how we will be taken seriously by other countries which have even more serious energy security problems and concerns about economic growth,” said Robin Oakley, the head of climate change at Greenpeace UK. “That leadership can’t just be shown by grandstanding at the meeting. It has to be shown by what we do in our domestic policy.” In the absence of Mr Miliband or any other leading politician emerging as the Copenhagen fixer, the key player in the process is likely to be Barack Obama. The President-elect has already opened a chasm, in terms of climate change policy, between himself and the outgoing George Bush, who, in 2001, withdrew the US from Kyoto and began years of climate policy obstructionism. Mr Bush wanted no truck with emissions cuts of any sort; Mr Obama has pledged he will get US emissions down to 80 per cent of 1990 levels by 2050 (a target identical with Britain’s) and “engage vigorously” with the international negotiating process over the next few months. Hints have been dropped that he may convene meetings of key world leaders to speed the negotiations along. It seems highly likely that he will go to Copenhagen himself – which means every other world leader will want to be present. Whether or not they can do the deal the world needs is another matter. Yet there is no doubt the world needs it. It may seem reasonable to think, in the coldest winter for years, that global warming has gone away, yet nothing could be further from the truth.   E3G in the Media 2009-01-09T16:19:29+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/about/news-articles/christian-science-monitor-building-trust-tops-global-climate-agenda/ http://www.e3g.org/about/news-articles/christian-science-monitor-building-trust-tops-global-climate-agenda/#When:15:34:35Z As the negotiations in Poznan kick off, Peter N. Spotts of The Christian Science Monitor looks into the intricacies of the negotiations, focusing on actions that are required vs. the challenges that various groups face. Jennifer Morgan speaks about the role of the US administration, in the past and the future. Building trust tops global climate agenda Talks start Monday in Poland for a post-Kyoto climate treaty. A year-long push to devise a new global climate-change treaty – one that picks up where the Kyoto Protocol leaves off – gets under way Monday in Poland, with delegates from more than 190 nations set to resume grappling with the thorny issues of how much more to cut greenhouse-gas emissions and who will pay. As in past climate negotiations, industrialized and developing countries bring different expectations to the talks – and the need to build trust between the two will be vital as a new treaty takes shape. The reason? Unlike the 1997 Kyoto agreement, this treaty will cover both developing and industrialized countries, but poorer countries worry that the developed world will not provide enough aid to help pay for emission-reduction or adaptation efforts. Part of the talks, which run Dec. 1-12, will focus on strengthening aid approaches. The discussions, sponsored by the United Nations, aim ultimately to produce an accord that cuts global emissions enough by the end of the century to prevent a “dangerous” human influence on climate from occurring. A “dangerous” scenario, according to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), has generally come to mean holding global warming to 2 degrees Celsius (3.6 degrees Fahrenheit) above preindustrial levels by 2100. If global average temperatures rise much above that, many researchers say, the world risks significant increases in sea levels, the number of severe storms, and the duration of droughts. Coral reefs and marine creatures crucial to the ocean food chain, moreover, face a threat from acidic water as the oceans take up some of the carbon dioxide that industrial activities and deforestation produce. In this early round in Poznan, Poland, though, a key achievement would be to approve the working groups that are to draft the treaty text and the schedule for completing it. Completing a draft treaty in time for the 2009 climate conference in Copenhagen “is not a done deal,” says Alden Meyer, director for strategy and policy at the Union of Concerned Scientists in Washington. The meeting in Poznan represents “an opportunity, but it’s no guarantee.” The talks take place under some imposing challenges. Greenhouse-gas emissions currently outstrip the highest emission scenario in last year’s climate reports from the UN’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). In 2007, China replaced the United States as the world’s top greenhouse-gas emitter. India is on a course toward third place. Even Europe reportedly is staring at the prospect of building about 50 coal-fired power plants, heavy carbon emitters, between now and 2013. Proponents argue that they’re cheap and provide energy security for a part of the world that relies heavily on Russia for natural gas and oil. In Poznan, developed countries “need to confirm that emissions-reduction targets need to be in line with science to [keep temperature increases] below 2 degrees Celsius,” says Stephan Singer, who heads the European climate and energy unit at the World Wildlife Fund. “Targets must be legally binding and not voluntary.” To stand a chance of meeting that goal, industrial nations would need to reduce emissions 25 to 40 percent below 1990 levels by 2020, and by 80 to 95 percent by 2050, according to the IPCC. Developing countries would have to “deviate substantially” from business as usual. The authors of that IPCC estimate now say that rising emissions and glacial politics “make it almost unfeasible to reach relatively low global emission levels in 2020.” Meanwhile, the financial crisis in the US – the worst since the Great Depression – has gone global, raising anew the issue of costs of emissions reductions. An IPCC analysis, released Friday, estimates that the cost of cutting global emissions by 25 percent by 2030 is growing. Last year’s estimate put the figure at about $200 billion a year. Friday’s update increased the estimated cost by 170 percent. During a press conference in Warsaw last week, Yvo de Boer, the UNFCCC’s executive secretary, acknowledged that the financial crisis “will throw a shadow over the climate-change negotiations.” Several climate-policy specialists in the US and Europe note that the election of Barack Obama, along with leadership changes on key congressional committees, may brighten prospects for a new climate pact. Negotiations are expected to begin in earnest in Bonn in March, after the front-door keys to the White House have changed hands. Mr. Obama has argued that the financial crisis marks an opportunity to restructure the economy to emphasize energy efficiency and green technologies. Yet many remain cautious. We’ve heard good rhetoric in the past, during the Clinton-Gore administration,” says Jennifer Morgan, climate-change program director for E3G, an environmental think tank and advocacy group in London. “But they didn’t do much.” A diplomat who keeps close tabs on developing-country delegations sees Obama’s recent pledge to reduce US greenhouse-gas emissions to 1990 levels by 2020 and by an additional 80 percent by 2050 as an example of politics as usual. “That’s Obama kicking the can down the road and leaving the leadership for the next president,” he says. The Kyoto Protocol calls for emissions among industrial countries to fall an average of 5 percent below 1990 levels by 2012, he notes. Still, some US environmental-group leaders note that Obama’s 2020 number would represent a big change, especially given the trend in US emissions over the past eight years. One way to make up for the perceived lack of vigor in that target would be for the US to pursue ways to help the developing world pay for its mitigation and adaptation efforts, they say. Financing, in fact, is a critical issue at the Poznan talks, say climate policy specialists. Developing countries have offered the most ideas for how to set up adaptation and technology-transfer money, they say. Among industrial countries, Norway and the European Union have suggested some ideas. Norway is committing some $2.8 billion to fight deforestation. But much remains to be done. One proposal that has gained traction among tropical and industrial countries involves earning carbon credits as a financial incentive in exchange for meeting commitments to crack down on tropical deforestation. The approach holds potential for reducing a proportion of greenhouse-gas emissions, advocates say. It also could serve as a model to show other developing countries that if they can’t commit to economy wide emissions reductions, it is possible to commit to reductions in a specific economic sector, such as cement making or forestry. But the idea remains controversial among some environmental advocates and groups that focus on the rights of indigenous people who live in and around tropical forests. “It would trigger a land grab that would endanger forest-dependent communities,” says Joseph Zacune, climate-change coordinator for Friends of the Earth International. “Including forests in a carbon market would create another huge offsetting scheme that will allow the rich world to buy their way out of carbon emissions reduction.” Mark Rice-Oxley in London contributed to this report. E3G in the Media 2008-12-01T15:34:35+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/about/news-articles/new-e3g-office-visitor-directions/ http://www.e3g.org/about/news-articles/new-e3g-office-visitor-directions/#When:13:23:57Z Our transition from our old home in the Science Museum is now almost complete, and right now we’re busily unpacking boxes at our new office in Borough High Street. Attached here in pdf format for download are our updated directions for visitors. E3G Address Details E3G Office: Visitor Directions Visiting E3G The new E3G office is located at 210 Borough High Street, just 20 metres from Borough Tube Station. E3G Location Map If arriving by Tube, turn right upon exiting the station. The E3G office can then be found at ‘In Tuition House’, just after ‘The Trinity’ Public House and next to ‘Café Chantilly’. Press the buzzer on the right hand side of the door to speak to the E3G office and gain access to the building. In the event that no one is present, please contact the main reception of In Tuition house. The E3G office is on the fourth floor - the lift and stairs are straight ahead as you enter the building. By Tube The E3G office is located just 20 metres from Borough Station* – Northern Line (Bank Branch). London Bridge Station – Jubilee Line and Northern Line (Bank Branch) – is just a 10 minute walk down Borough High Street Monument Station – Circle and District Lines – is a further 15 minute walk across London Bridge. Bus connections from Monument direct to the E3G office are available on routes 21, 35, 40, and 133. *Please note that Borough Station is currently exit only between 8am-10am and 5pm-7pm due to lift repair work. By Bus Routes C10, 35, 40, 133, and 343 all stop on Borough High Street directly in front of the E3G office (bus stops A, C and D on the pdf map attached), while route 21 stops on Great Dover Street around the corner. News and Announcements 2008-07-02T13:23:57+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/about/news-articles/cnncom-g8-summit-preview/ http://www.e3g.org/about/news-articles/cnncom-g8-summit-preview/#When:15:46:00Z With the 2008 G8 summit fast approaching, CNN.com has looked ahead at the possible outcomes on climate change. Included in their interviews with “world leaders working at the sharp end of combating climate change” was E3G’s own Tom Burke. The environmental policy advisor: Tom Burke Tom Burke is a British environmental policy advisor to Rio Tinto plc, one of the world’s largest mining and resource companies. He is also the founding director of E3G, a not for profit organization that works to promote sustainable development. As well as chairing numerous environmental forums, he was formerly the executive director of Friends of the Earth. CNN: What do you expect from the G8 summit? Burke: Unless the developing world see the developed world as being serious about climate change then it’s going to be very hard to get agreements in Copenhagen [UN climate change conference in 2009] and right now China, India and other countries look at what we’re doing rather than what we’re saying and they quite correctly come to the conclusion that we’re not serious. The way we indicated that we’re serious is by putting real money into the carbon capture and storage (CCS) demonstration projects. That would help create the political conditions under which agreement can be met in Copenhagen. My personal view is that I don’t think the political conditions are really there, so what you’ll get in Toyako is just more words. You won’t get a decision, just words they can all live with and sound as if something serious is going to happen, but it won’t amount to a real political bargain which is what ought to come out of the G8. The leaders should all go home and put some real money in CCS. It just needs the current leaders to recognize that this is a problem that threatens the prosperity and security of every single citizen in their countries, and they’re not doing very much about it yet. There’s been a build up from the G8 energy ministers meeting [in early June] that carbon capture and storage (CCS) is an imperative and not an option. Coal is going to get burnt and if that coal gets burnt without carbon capture and storage then you accelerate climate change beyond the bounds of reason. We’ve got to stop dithering on CCS and recognize it’s an imperative and what we really need to do is get the 30 or so demonstration project around the world up and running right away. That’s the kind of thing you really need to do, and that means spending money. That’s not going to be done by carbon prices or some sort of carbon mechanism, it’s only going to be done if governments decide to spend the money to accelerate the demonstration projects right away. CNN: What would you say to the G8 leaders? Burke: The short version is: “Stop stealing our kids’ future.” They really do need to get real about what we have got to do to avoid catastrophic climate change—it’s too late to avoid dangerous climate change—and that means spending massive amounts of money on transforming the energy infrastructure If they want to know what they can do to make a difference right now, go home and spend some money on carbon capture and storage. E3G in the Media 2008-06-20T15:46:00+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/programmes/foreign-articles/nick-mabey-at-east-west-institute-global-conference-on-preventive-action/ http://www.e3g.org/programmes/foreign-articles/nick-mabey-at-east-west-institute-global-conference-on-preventive-action/#When:15:00:05Z As deputy co-Chair of the working group which supported the Task Force on Preventative Diplomacy, Nick Mabey was recently invited to provide keynote remarks at East West Institute‘s Global Conference on Preventive Action in Brussels. The conference brought together a wide range of practitioners from international, regional and civil organizations and responded to calls for diplomacy that forestalls violent conflicts rather than responding to them after the fact. Having previously been a senior advisor in the UK Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit leading work on national and international policy areas, including: energy, climate change, countries at risk of instability, organised crime and fisheries, Nick has extensive experience in the field of preventive action. His speech covers 3 main areas of focus: The preventative security agenda is at a critical juncture. Changes in the political environment mean that there are opportunities to make a decisive step forward, but these are balanced by risks of retreat and will not be realised without a step-change in the quality and quantity of concerted influencing by the advocates of preventative action. The ability to take advantage of these opportunities will require a far clearer shared understanding of what success would look like in 5-10 years. It also needs a more sophisticated analysis of barriers to systemic change than merely blaming a lack of political will for inaction. Achieving these goals will require change and open-mindedness from all stakeholders. Change will need to be driven by far stronger dialogue – especially with the ‘traditional’ security community – and shaped by more credible analysis of the investment case for prevention. Early wins will be needed in some key areas, supported by more effective public campaigning and the engagement of a wider range of actors including regional organisations and emerging powers. The full speech is available to download above. New Foreign Policy - Activities 2010-12-08T15:00:05+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/programmes/foreign-articles/expanding-the-realm-of-the-possible/ http://www.e3g.org/programmes/foreign-articles/expanding-the-realm-of-the-possible/#When:12:33:52Z In a powerful, though sadly little noticed, speech Britain’s new Foreign Secretary has spelt out what may come to be known as the Hague doctrine on the politics of climate change. Speaking at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, he moved climate change firmly off the environmental agenda and on to that of foreign ministers. At the heart of his argument was the blunt observation that an ‘effective response to climate change underpins our security and prosperity.’ As he went on to say, ‘You cannot have food, water, or energy security without climate security.’ A point that has been underscored by reports from around the world of food riots triggered by the sharp price rises flowing from a summer of extreme weather events. He went on to point out that the United Nations had been created in ‘the aftermath of conflagration’ to establish the primacy of cooperation over conflict and to build an open and fair international system embedded in the rule of law. A failure to tackle climate change would threaten these values on which an unprecedented era of prosperity and security had been constructed. He was dismissive of the argument that we should abandon hope in negotiating a legally binding global treaty on climate change. Politicians not processes determine outcomes. He identified the lack of political will as the real obstacle to securing a binding agreement on climate change. Creating the necessary political will is a job for foreign policy. ‘The fundamental purpose of foreign policy is to shift the political debate, to create the political space for leaders and negotiators to reach agreement.’ This is the first time anyone clearly differentiated the negotiating process on climate change from the political process. As Hague argues, the one takes place in a space cleared by the other. When negotiations stall, as they frequently do in international relations, you do not give up the goal, you work to expand the realm of the politically possible. He went on to support strongly a unilateral move now by the EU to a 30% reduction commitment as an example of just how to do so. He also announced that he and his German counterpart, Guido Westerwelle, had agreed to task their diplomats to work together to reinforce the momentum of climate diplomacy. This is the most cogent speech on climate change yet to come from a Foreign Minister. What will matter now is whether Hague sows viable resource seeds into the furrow he has ploughed. At a time of profound fiscal constraint that really will measure the extent to which he himself possesses the political will he hopes to see in others. New Foreign Policy - News & Comment 2010-09-30T12:33:52+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/programmes/foreign-articles/civil-society-open-letter-eu-high-representative-and-external-action-servic/ http://www.e3g.org/programmes/foreign-articles/civil-society-open-letter-eu-high-representative-and-external-action-servic/#When:12:46:10Z The implementation of the Lisbon Treaty’s High Representative and the long awaited EU External Action Service has been causing great concern amongst several major civil society organisations. The current set of Brussels proposals seem to be designed to preclude any chance of a coherent and adequately resourced EU foreign policy that can tackle cross-cutting 21st-century problems. In order to support their work with “fight back” in public debate, ten such organisations have written a joint letter to EU27 Foreign Ministers, the whole Commission College, and the press. The text of the letter is below. CIVIL SOCIETY OPEN LETTER TO EUROPEAN COUNCIL PRESIDENT, EUROPEAN COMMISSIONERS AND EU27 FOREIGN MINISTERS: 22 MARCH 2010 Dear Council President, Dear Commission President and Commissioners, Dear Foreign Ministers, Our ten organisations share a long-standing conviction that Europe needs stronger and more coherent external action in order to deliver on its strategic objectives in the rest of the world. The EU External Action Service created by the Lisbon Treaty is a once in a lifetime opportunity to respond to this challenge, creating a strategy and a service fit for 21st-century security. As practitioners from the environmental, security, peace-building, development and human rights communities, we are appalled by the current debate among the Brussels institutions on implementing the EAS. This will not deliver the EU’s key external action objectives, which are clearly set out in the Treaty as: promoting “democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law”. The Treaty has created the High Representative assisted by the EAS to “conduct [and] ensure the consistency of [and] be responsible for” external action. Brussels turf wars over this terminology threaten to make the EAS unfit for purpose in 3 ways: Strategic policy coherence: the High Representative’s authority to ensure consistency across all EU external action is crucial. How can Europe have a coherent policy toward an increasingly assertive China if trade, human rights and climate policies are dealt with in separate silos? Coherence also requires the EAS to have adequate oversight of strategic and multiannual country programming commitments led by other departments, such as Overseas Development Aid. Staff expertise: delivery of EU objectives will require political analysis and skills from beyond the traditional diplomatic toolkit. The EAS must be able to recruit among Member State and Commission staff from all areas of government, not just diplomatic streams – e.g. from economics, development, security and energy ministries. The staffing rules must also be flexible enough to accommodate world class expertise, detailed political knowledge and language skills from outside public administration. It is vital that the staffing rules do not limit the High Representative’s access to talent. Mandates to address critical priorities: the current implementing decisions should include a short-list of priority areas for enhanced coordination this year, including: China, climate change and energy security, conflict prevention, Africa, and Neighbourhood Policy. We call on Brussels and the Member States to re-focus on creating a strong, stand-alone EAS, not dominated by any of the current institutions. The European Commission needs to support Catherine Ashton’s proposal for country desks which can coordinate across policy areas. The European Parliament should worry less about budgetary micro-management over appointments, and instead lead a broad and bold consultation on the objectives of EU external action. 1. Bertelsmann Stiftung 2. Centre for European Reform 3. demosEUROPA 4. E3G Third Generation Environmentalism 5. East West Institute 6. Global Witness 7. IDDRI 8. International Alert 9. International Crisis Group 10. Open Society Institute If you would like to comment on or know more about this letter please contact E3G on +44 207 234 9880 or by email. New Foreign Policy - Activities 2010-03-22T12:46:10+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/programmes/foreign-articles/making-the-difference-strengthening-capacities-to-respond-to-crises-and-sec/ http://www.e3g.org/programmes/foreign-articles/making-the-difference-strengthening-capacities-to-respond-to-crises-and-sec/#When:13:26:42Z More than 10 years ago, the EU launched its Common Foreign Security Policy, following a meeting of leading policy makers and practitioners in security issues, especially conflict prevention and crises response. Since then, the European Commission continues to bring these experts together bi-annually to continue the discussions. Following the 2007 review of the European Security Strategy, there was consensus that the discussions require wider, coherent, timely and more comprehensive focus on conflict and crises.  Nick Mabey attended one such meeting recently, entitled ‘Making the Difference: Strengthening Capacities to Respond to Crises and Security Threats’ in Brussels. As rapporteur to the session focusing on climate change and its links to security, Nick Mabey provides his assessment of the discussions, and recommendations, below. Nick also recently presented at the European Commission’s Green Week 2009 on Climate Change and International Security; his presentation is available to download above.  Rapporteur’s Report of Session on Climate Security, 4th June 2009 Context 1. Uncontrolled climate change would result in 5-7degrees C global temperature rise by 2100. Making the lives of billions of people unviable in their current homes, disrupting global food supplies and causing many millions of deaths. The security impacts of these changes cannot be contained and ‘adaptation’ will not be a global option. There is no guarantee that current levels of security and economic openness can be maintained even in the richest countries under this scenario. Avoiding a high risk of this scenario requires global greenhouse gas emissions to peak between 2015 – 2020. Without a substantive agreement at Copenhagen this year this will be unobtainable. 2. The impacts of climate change on security and livelihoods are already with us. Even if aggressive mitigation action is agreed this year and fully implemented, lags in natural systems mean that the impacts of climate change will continue to worsen at the same pace for at least another 40 years. Responding to these emergencies will overwhelm already overstretched humanitarian and peace building budgets. Climate change will increasingly act as a risk multiplier to stability and peace in fragile states which lack the political, economic and technical resilience to adapt peacefully. Sweden may be able to adapt peacefully to climate change pressures, but very few countries in today’s world are like Sweden. The EU’s neighbourhood is particularly vulnerable, with a large number of states which are both fragile and climate vulnerable. EU development aid needs to incorporate climate inside poverty reduction and peace building programmes. 3. It has been said that climate changes everything and that is true for security. Climate change does not just increase instability and conflict risks – it must be addressed in many other foreign policy and security areas if they are to succeed, For example, climate change and climate policy will have profound impacts on instability and security in Afghanistan; EU-Russia energy relations; nuclear proliferation; new Arctic border and resource claims; trans-boundary water and fisheries disputes; extremism; extremism and the legitimacy of international systems. Understanding and responding to the impacts of climate change must become a standard part of security sector analysis and policy generation. 4. The time to respond to these growing threats is now. Excuses that climate change predictions are uncertain are irrelevant. Climate change projections are at least as accurate, and usually better, than any other information used in medium to long term security planning. Our understanding of climate and conflict links is at least as good as analysis of other political and social drivers of instability. 5. The real challenge is that our current security systems are very poor at responding to these types of risks and threats even when analysis is clear. Too often we wait until events unfold because our institutions cannot effectively respond to early warning of risk. We need to shift from a reactive to a risk management approach in order to efficiently and effectively reduce and manage climate change security risks in the coming decades. We need to motivate greater investment in building country resilience from the bottom-up and through stronger international and regional systems. This will require new tools for supporting decisions; new expertise for managing complex risks; new incentives for multi-disciplinary working, cooperation and mainstreaming; and new budgets for delivering joined-up responses across institutions. Implementing these reforms will bring additional benefits beyond the climate security issue as many other security issues require these type of responses. Similar reforms have failed in the past because of entrenched cultures and interests. Perhaps it will take an issue as big as climate change to generate the political will to drive some of the necessary institutional changes in how we secure stability, peace and security. Recommendations: 1. EU should continue its leadership in climate security by fully implementing and funding institutionalisation of the actions in the December 2008 EU Climate Security Route map. 2. In support of an ambitious ‘Global Climate Deal’, the EU security community should draw up a clear analysis and statement outlining: “What is needed at Copenhagen to deliver European Climate Security”. This should be discussed with partners, especially in the US, China, India and South Africa, aiming for some agreed international positions at the Swedish Climate Security Conference planned for October 2009. 3. EU + Member States should carry out an assessment of the impact worsening climate change on humanitarian spending over the next 10-15 years. A target should be agreed for increased spending and a large shift of resources begun from reactive to preventive action which currently makes up only 5% of humanitarian spending; perhaps with an aspirational target of preventative activity making up 30% of spending by 2015? 4. Following recommendations agreed in the EU Climate Security Routemap, the EC + Member States should agree a major 2-year programme to develop multi-disciplinary planning and analysis tools for use by policy makers and field practitioners in order to better guide investment in climate resilience and risk management. 5. In the event of the Lisbon treaty passing this year, the European Council should make a strategic commitment that issues of tackling climate and resource security will be at the heart of the mission and structure of the new EU External Action service. Defining it as an organisation which will be fit for purpose to manage the complex risks of the 21st century, and not one solely rooted in the diplomatic traditions of 19th century power conflicts. New Foreign Policy - News & Comment, New Foreign Policy - Activities 2009-06-26T13:26:42+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/programmes/foreign-articles/the-future-of-climate-policy/ http://www.e3g.org/programmes/foreign-articles/the-future-of-climate-policy/#When:13:54:09Z Tom Burke was recently invited to address The Tomorrow Project at an event held at the Royal Society. His speech is below and available to download too, calling on political will to ‘protect the future of civilisation’. The Future of Climate Policy An idea that has been haunting me since the beginning of the year is that this is the most important year in human history. Ideas do not seek permission before they enter your mind and they are not always the most welcome of guests. This was very definitely an unwelcome idea. It was prompted by the articles run in several newspapers anticipating the events of the year to come. Bravely, they passed judgement on the likelihood of everything from an early election (no) to the bombing of Iran; from the price of oil (higher) to the fall of Mugabe. They were full of prognostications – mostly very gloomy – about the state of the economy. We know that, terrible though consequences of war and recession are, they pass. Climate change is for ever. But it was what they did not say that really caught my attention. None of them seemed to have noticed that in December of this year a meeting far more important than war or recession to the future prosperity and security of all seven billion of us will take place in Copenhagen. We know that, terrible though consequences of war and recession are, they pass. Climate change is for ever. At around that time Brian Eno wrote a piece in the Guardian about the difference between a world in which people feel could be a ‘better place’ and one they feel to be a ‘nightmare of desperation, fear and suspicion’. In the latter world ‘freeloaders and brigands and pirates and cheats will take control.’ Do not overlook, in all talk of rising sea-levels, melting ice-caps and the droughts, floods, fires and diseases that will be the markers of a rapidly changing climate, the fact that riding along with them will be the freeloaders, brigands, pirates and cheats. Brian Eno was writing, as both Martin Wolf and Timothy Garton Ash have also done, about the impact on politics of shifting from a world of abundance to one of scarcity. There is nothing in our knowledge of a world without a stable climate to lead us to believe a changing climate will shift it back. We know that dangerous climate change is a threat to the fragile film of order we humans have built around the chaos of events and call ‘civilisation’. The punctuation of history is denoted by the names of the places where order was restored after chaos had prevailed – Westphalia, Versailles, San Francisco. It is not an exaggeration to say that the implications of what happens – or does not – in Copenhagen in December will do more to shape human destiny for longer than any of them. The reason for this is the unique nature the climate as a human problem. We know that dangerous climate change is a threat to the fragile film of order we humans have built around the chaos of events and call ‘civilisation’. We know, because Europe’s political leaders have said so, that a rise in global average temperature of more than two degrees Celsius is dangerous. It would turn a problem that is serious but manageable into one that is unmanageable and catastrophic. We know from our scientists that greenhouse gas emissions must be moving downwards globally by 2015 if we are to have at best an evens chance of staying below two degrees. It would be rash to put your house on an evens bet, it is something a lot more reckless to be betting civilisation on those odds. The nature of the climate is such that the future cannot redeem today’s mistakes. Once a given concentration of carbon is in the atmosphere, the climate it drives is inexorable even if it takes decades or more to fully express itself. In the most literal sense, the sins of the fathers will indeed be visited on the sons and well beyond the third and fourth generation. We humans do not learn easily. We try and fail and try again. Our progress is incremental and we are prone to repeating our mistakes. We are too often content to let the future redeem the mistakes of the present. Climate change does not suit us. We have little experience with the irrevocable, and dislike exacting time limits. Compared to the diplomatic effort needed to achieve success in Copenhagen that required for a final settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian problem or to deter Iran from seeking nuclear weapons is relatively small. But there is little sign that an effort of the required level of ambition is yet being made. Compare the amount of media coverage, and intensity of political effort, given to the Middle East to that accorded to climate change. History does not have an agenda on which items can be prioritised. Either you deal with the events it throws at you or they deal with you. This is not to diminish in any way the magnitude of those problems nor to argue that less should be done to address them. It is rather to point out the classic human error of allowing the more immediate to obscure the more urgent. History does not have an agenda on which items can be prioritised. Either you deal with the events it throws at you or they deal with you. As Carlyle once remarked “if something be not done, something will do itself and in a way that pleases no-one”*. No leader will want to come away from Copenhagen saying they failed to solve the most serious problem facing humanity. But the appearance of success will be easier to achieve than the substance. It will consist of words and the less the success the more interpretable the words. The Copenhagen negotiations are among the most complex ever undertaken. The goal is to achieve a so-called ‘global deal’ in which the industrialised world agrees to a second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol and agrees to provide finance for adaptation and the transfer of low carbon technologies in return for rest of the world undertaking ‘monitorable, reportable and verifiable’ commitments to reduce their emissions. In reality there are two main, and a number of related negotiations, including those on forestry, going on separately under the same umbrella without, as yet, a clear mechanism for bringing them all together. The issue of the legal form of whatever will be agreed in Copenhagen is one of the least discussed but potentially most difficult of the matters to be resolved. National leaders are currently distracted by the need to engineer an economic recovery. They are increasingly unwilling to impose constraints on economic growth. Furthermore, public finances are already over-stretched by the loss of tax revenues and urgent need to finance economic stimulus packages. This considerably narrows the scope for agreement on the necessary funding for adaptation and technology transfer. Proposals for financing such capital flows rely heavily on a carbon price or permit auction revenues which are themselves dependent on the agreement by the industrialised countries to a second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol. There is thus a considerable risk of a chicken and egg impasse. The first commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol expires at the end of 2012. Two years is the time typically needed to go from reaching such an agreement to its binding commitments coming into force. Delay beyond the end of this year therefore risks undermining the revenues flows needed to get agreement in the first place.  While previous experience suggests that there is some margin to continue negotiating beyond the end of 2009 this margin is small. In any case, uncertainty as to whether or not the world remains on course to develop a global price for carbon lead to future carbon prices being discounted well before the negotiations conclude. This would in turn lead to pressure for a more direct, but less politically deliverable, sourcing of the capital flows to the developing world needed for agreement on the ‘global deal’ to be reached. Balanced against this gloomy prognosis is the re-entry of the United States into the constructive development of the global climate regime. There is no doubt, both from president Obama’s campaign pledges, from the frequent inclusion of references to climate change in his speeches, and from the nature of his appointments to key posts that his administration will now play a full and leading part in addressing this issue globally. However, this will not be an unmixed blessing and the re-engagement will need to be skilfully handled to avoid creating new problems as it solves those which are familiar. Politically, President Obama has pledged to reduce U.S.  domestic emissions to 1990 levels by 2020 and to aim for a reduction of 80% from present levels by 2050. This is an ambitious goal which converges on that of the EU albeit on a different trajectory. The gap between rhetoric and action on climate change in even the most serious of nations is so wide as to justify much scepticism. Without clear signs of that gap closing, the political conditions for an ambitious enough policy agreement in Copenhagen and later will remain elusive. To deliver it will require very tough federal legislation which a majority of commentators in the U.S. think is unlikely to pass this year. There is also a widespread view that the U.S. will not enter into binding international commitments until it has settled its domestic legislation. This would avoid the risk of repeating the Kyoto experience of negotiating an agreement in good faith only to be unable to achieve ratification by the Senate. Should this prove to be the case, the US would not be in a position to join the other Annex 1 countries in agreeing to a second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol in Copenhagen. This is another reason for anticipating that reaching a final agreement might spill over into 2010. It is widely expected that a core condition for achieving agreement to a ‘global deal’ in Copenhagen by the major developing countries such as China, India and Brazil, will be a US agreement to binding targets. Thus a successful ‘deal’ might require a difficult to accomplish alignment of timetables of the UN treaty process and us domestic legislative process. There are four broad outcomes to the negotiations in December. The first is the satisfactory achievement of the so-called ‘global deal’ along the lines I outlined a moment ago. I cannot say from my recent conversations that this is yet in sight. To achieve it will require rather heavier lifting than we have yet seen from Prime Ministers and Presidents. At the other end of the spectrum there remains a possibility of complete breakdown. Issues such as the amount of credible new money available for adaptation or the failure to agree the exact legal form of the ‘deal’ are readily available breakdown points. The highly stressed atmosphere of the concluding stages of climate negotiations is such that breakdown by accident is quite possible. Between these poles, two other outcomes are possible. A partial success could then lead, as it did at Kyoto, to later recovery. Or, a partial success could lead, in ways that are all too familiar from trade negotiations, to a prolonged loss of momentum. Of all the outcomes, this latter is the one that is most dangerous. Political leaders will have got the headline and crossed the problem off the to-do list. But nothing will actually have happened and re-starting the momentum will take time we do not have and will quite likely require some kind of catastrophic event. Much will depend on how well the political leadership of the major countries understand the complexities of the problem and how effective they are at cutting through them to reach agreement on the essentials: preservation of the Kyoto mechanisms so that there continues to be a carbon price; sufficient additional funding for adaptation and technology transition in the developing world and successfully aligning timetables so that the US can again become a full participant in the global regime. This would not solve the problem, but it would keep open the door to its solution. The world is oversupplied with words and images and very short of deeds. The gap between rhetoric and action on climate change in even the most serious of nations is so wide as to justify much scepticism. Without clear signs of that gap closing, the political conditions for an ambitious enough policy agreement in Copenhagen and later will remain elusive. There is an even larger gap coming ever more clearly into view. This is the gap between what climate science says we need to do and what climate politics says is within the realm of the possible. This is encouraging a realist school of climate policy thinkers to emerge. In this view, we should not be trying to achieve ‘unrealistic’ goals. Better, this counsel of despair advises, to go for something achievable and build on that than to shoot for something too ambitious and fail. In other circumstance, with other problems, this might, indeed, be wise counsel. But for the reasons I gave before, with the particular nature of this problem makes such realist thought indistinguishable from defeatism. We do not have any policy problems with climate change. What we are actually short of is the political will to deploy those policy instruments and the knowledge of how best to go about building that political will. I grew up in a world that spent billions of dollars on building weapons it hoped never to use. When they became obsolete we threw them away and built even more sophisticated and expensive weapons which we hoped never to use. We did that for fifty years. The threat of climate change to the prosperity, security and well-being of everyone on the planet, especially anyone under forty, is far more certain than was the threat of the cold war going hot. There is no engineering reason why we cannot make the transition to a carbon neutral energy system by 2050. Nor is there any fundamental economic obstacle as Nick Stern has demonstrated**. But knowing that solving the climate problem will not damage your economy is not the same as knowing how the cost of doing so should be shared between consumers, taxpayers and shareholders. We do not have any policy problems with climate change. We have an extraordinary range of policy ideas to apply to the hugely diverse ways in which the problem will present itself to us. What we are actually short of is the political will to deploy those policy instruments and the knowledge of how best to go about building that political will. Choosing who will win and who will lose is the province of politics. If politics is the art of the possible then the task of political leadership is that of expanding the realm of the possible. I am in no doubt that it is possible to solve this problem, but I wonder if we have the collective political leadership it will take to do so. Address by Mr Tom Burke CBE to The Tomorrow Project, The Royal Society, London, June 18th 2009. *Carlyle, T. (1840): ‘The Condition of England Question’ ** Stern, N. (2006): ‘The Economics of Climate Change’, Cambridge University Press. New Foreign Policy - News & Comment 2009-06-22T13:54:09+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/programmes/foreign-articles/a-transatlantic-agenda-on-climate-security/ http://www.e3g.org/programmes/foreign-articles/a-transatlantic-agenda-on-climate-security/#When:13:59:11Z In February 2009, E3G’s CEO Nick Mabey spoke at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars exploring a possible Transatlantic Agenda for addressing climate security threats. Issue of National Security There is a growing consensus that climate change is a serious national security threat. This threat has been brought to light by a steady drumbeat of reports, analyses, and high-level meetings among government security analysts and military and foreign think tanks in the US and EU.  They report that rising resource scarcity and environmental degradation due to climate change will be a threat multiplier, particularly in the most fragile regions of the world, will cause migrations that will lead to additional conflict, and will add tensions even in stable regions.  At the moment most of the discussions around climate change think about it as basically an economic problem … but essentially life will continue as we expect it. But if you look at the science, and particularly the most recent science, you see that that’s a very unlikely scenario unless we make quite radical changes.” Last year saw the first US National Intelligence Estimate to consider the impacts of climate change on security, the inclusion of climate change in the National Intelligence Council’s forward trends studies for the first time and major investments by the CIA, DOE and others into analysis of climate change impacts.  At the same time, the European Council has made climate security a top priority in its Security Strategy.  The December 2008 report from the EU High Representative stated that climate change should be in the mainstream of EU foreign and security policies and institutions, and the European Council agreed a route map of actions to begin this process. So, what’s the role of security people in this debate? They need to go out and tell leaders that they will not be able to guarantee security in a world where we don’t control climate change” Despite this growing consensus, current climate change politics and policy do not adequately reflect credible worst case scenarios.  The failure to acknowledge and prepare for the worst case scenarios, the probability of which is not small, is as dangerous in the case of climate change as it is for terrorism and WMD proliferation.  Without a strategy to avoid worst case scenarios, security actors can give no credible guarantee of current security levels.  …unless we have the authority of the security and the foreign policy establishments at the table saying what the national interest is, and what risks we need to avoid, there is no chance of delivering the billions, in fact, trillions, of dollars needed to create a new clean energy and economy…” The following are some of the key elements of the Transatlantic Agenda: Develop a common position on what Copenhagen needs to do to deliver climate security; Develop common risk management strategy including on role of strategic technology development; Agree broad strategic approach to cooperation with China on technology, IPR and low carbon investment; and Preliminary agreement on where to handle critical climate security issues in the international system and stronger collaboration on risk assessment issues. Nick’s full presentation is available to download above. New Foreign Policy - Activities, New Foreign Policy - Thinking 2009-02-19T13:59:11+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/programmes/foreign-articles/invitation-climate-change-and-security-the-geopolitics-of-tomorrow/ http://www.e3g.org/programmes/foreign-articles/invitation-climate-change-and-security-the-geopolitics-of-tomorrow/#When:13:20:06Z The reality of climate change will require fundamental changes to the practice of international relations. Impacting on strategic interests, alliances, borders, threats, economic relationships, comparative advantages and the nature of international cooperation, climate change geopolitics will extend far outside the environment sphere, and will link old problems in new ways. Managing the complexity of collective security will become an ever more important part of foreign policy. Climate Change and Security: The geopolitics of tomorrow The Centre and E3G invite you to a discussion on the security implications of climate change. Tuesday 20 May from 13:00 to 14:30 with a sandwich lunch served from 12:30 to 13:00 With: Nick Mabey (Chief Executive, E3G) and Steven Everts (Special Counsellor in the Cabinet of High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana), Chaired by Martin Porter Security sector actors must communicate the security implications and costs of uncontrolled and extreme climate change to political leaders and the public. The security sector has the vital - and expensively acquired - experience of how government can drive technological development and infrastructure deployment at scale. Climate change is also a security opportunity. A low-carbon global economy will be a far more energy-secure economy, as clean local energy sources lower rising geopolitical tensions over fossil fuel reserves. Nick Mabey is the author of Delivering Climate Security: International Security Responses to a Climate Changed World, published in April 2008 by the Royal United Services Institute. This will be the first of a series of events at The Centre on the Climate Security theme. Details of following events will be publicised soon. To register, please send an email with ‘Climate Change and Security’ in the subject field and stating clearly your name and organisation to . The Centre Avenue Marnix 22 B-1000 Brussels New Foreign Policy - Activities 2008-05-08T13:20:06+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/programmes/foreign-articles/new-frameworks-for-delivering-global-climate-and-energy-security/ http://www.e3g.org/programmes/foreign-articles/new-frameworks-for-delivering-global-climate-and-energy-security/#When:13:05:14Z Until very recently Climate Protection and Energy Security have been viewed as largely contradictory or separate objectives. This week saw the Athens Summit on Climate Change and Energy Security strive to overthrow this zero-sum mentality. E3G Chief Executive Nick Mabey has been a member of the advisory board planning the summit, and also contributed a major presentation for the session “The Environment and Energy Communities Meet: Finding Common Ground for Energy and Climate Security”. Nick’s presentation “Beyond Zero Sum Politics: New Frameworks for delivering Global Climate and Energy Security” is attached here in pdf format for download. It outlines the need for closer cooperation between major energy consumers to secure energy and climate security; giving an agenda for collaboration to underpin and strengthen the UN climate change negotiations. Commenting on the unprecedented nature of the summit, Nick Mabey said: We need to create more coherence between energy and climate change policies. The fact that the Athens Summit has brought together the energy security and climate change communities for the first time at a major event shows how far we have to go in developing a common vision of a clean and secure energy future”. Mainstream energy analysts are still predicting rapid growth in the use of oil and gas in the coming decades, and predicting increasing tensions over dwindling resources concentrated in a few unstable regions of the world. But the logic of climate change requires concerted efforts to dramatically limit demand and expand low carbon, domestic energy sources which will provide a more secure energy future. The cooperation needed between major energy consumers to accelerate the innovation and use of new clean technologies could also be the cornerstone of cooperation on traditional energy security issues such as managing stability in producing countries and ensuring transparency of fossil fuel reserves and revenues. This would radically alter how we perceive and pursue ‘national interests’ in respect to energy security, with a movement away from the narrow focus of today’s state-led approaches, added Nick Mabey: In the battle against climate change our most important relationships around energy will be with major consumers, and relationships with fossil fuel producing countries will become relatively less important.” New Foreign Policy - Thinking 2008-05-07T13:05:14+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/programmes/foreign-articles/delivering-climate-security-nick-mabey-interview/ http://www.e3g.org/programmes/foreign-articles/delivering-climate-security-nick-mabey-interview/#When:12:55:03Z Following on from the publication of Nick Mabey’s report ‘Delivering Climate Security’, BusinessGreen.com have interviewed Nick on the topic, including discussion of the implications for business. The full interview follows below: “Climate Change represents an existential threat” Former senior advisor to the UK Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit, Nick Mabey, warns that governments and businesses must begin to frame climate change as a global security issue James Murray, BusinessGreen, 07 May 2008 BusinessGreen.com: You recently wrote a report for the Royal United Services Institute warning that unless climate change is brought under control we could see a century long conflict on a scale of the two World Wars. What basis do you have for such a shocking prediction? Nick Mabey: The prediction is based directly on the Stern Report, although it is worth noting that Stern has said recently that he underestimated scale of the problem in that report. If you take Stern and the IPCC’s projections – that if we don’t control emissions then an increase in temperature of between five and six degrees by the end of the century and the triggering of irreversible carbon feedbacks are both possible – then that means areas that are home to hundreds of millions, if not billions, of people will become uninhabitable. In a perfect world, we’d realise the Earth is big enough to successfully relocate those people and we’d cope, but conflict analysis tells you that managing that level of disruption will result in major conflicts. But aren’t predictions of five to six degree increases in temperature based on worst case scenarios? Well, if you take the science seriously you have to accept the worst case scenarios as possible, and the role of security analysts is to always plan for those worst case scenarios. If those predictions come to pass than then World War scale conflicts are entirely realistic. The 9/11 committee in the US famously said that the security flaws in the lead up to the attacks were down to a “failure of imagination”; we are now seeing a same failure of imagination across the security sector with regards to climate change. So what can be done? The question for the UK defence sector is how do we secure the safety and interests of 60 million British citizens and 450 million Europeans in the light of climate change threats, and the answer is that you just can’t do it, or at least not in the style to which we’ve all become accustomed. The simple fact is we have to curb climate change and the security sector needs to accept that this is a security issue. Climate change is not just an issue for economists and environmentalists, it threatens the underlying social and economic conditions of every part of our society and that makes it a security issue. Climate change represents what security analysts refer to as an existential threat. It will disrupt everything. Trade, for example, will collapse, and to an extent we are already seeing that happen with recent food shortages. You only need a very small breakdown between supply and demand, and you are already seeing riots in places such as Haiti. Why do you think the issue of climate change has not been more widely regarded as a security threat? The environmentalists and economists are very bad at discussing these issues. Environmentalists don’t want to be portrayed as scaremongers and economists always assume that contracts are honoured, which makes them hard to model worst case scenarios. In contrast, security analysts start with the assumption contracts and treaties will be broken – that is why a lot of the climate change modelling work that is now so high profile started in the security sector. How do you see these conflict risks manifesting themselves? There are a lot of different avenues that can be explored when you start to look for direct impacts. Africa obviously faces huge climate change threats, as does Central Asia. We are already seeing low level insurgencies in northern China and northern India that are directly linked to climate-related land and resource issues. The most likely hot spots are places where the political situation amplifies the climate situation. There is an assumption that adaptation to social systems will be able to counter the worst climate change effects – that in effect we will all behave like Sweden and learn to get along. But what people struggle to accept is that in a lot of places climate change will instead drive old enmities. That is what has happened in Darfur where people are realising that the core issue behind the conflict is drought, land and resources, all of which have been used to spark old political grievances. What other areas do you see being at risk? Small island states in the Caribbean and Pacific also face serious risks. If we see an increase in the incidence of tropical storms that leaves those economies having to rebuild once every few years instead of once a decade then that becomes a huge drain on GDP. The second biggest indicator of future conflict after the existence of past conflict is falling GDP and that is what many of these countries are likely to face. Again, we are already seeing this happen where large populations of urban poor and rising food and fuel prices result in falling real GDP and serious unrest. What can businesses do to help mitigate these risks? The most urgent thing that they can do is assess what contribution they can make to tackle climate change. Although, internally they also need to look carefully at what these risks mean for their own operations. In particular, they need to look much more seriously at the long term climate and security risks present in the countries they decide to invest in. They should be asking how the country will be affected by climate change and resource scarcity and they have to be aware that expropriation of businesses by governments will only become more likely as resources become constrained. The politics of insecurity invariably sees governments attempt to exert greater control over the market, and nationalisation of businesses and resources will become increasingly likely under these scenarios. Are firms doing this level of risk assessment? Big multinationals undertake this type of scenario planning, but there is certainly a greater focus on it now than there has been in the past – in no small part because investors are demanding that it is done. The bottom line is that unless firms do this analysis properly they will end up making very bad investment decisions. Firms can reduce their exposure to some of the risks you have outlined, but more generally what can they do to help ensure these worst case scenarios are not realised? Businesses are going to have to take a more positive – or perhaps that should be less risk averse – approach to IP [intellectual property] sharing and government environmental policies. A lot of businesses still take a narrow short term view about environmental legislation and that will prove hugely damaging unless it is challenged and business leaders begin to understand a more co-operative approach is required. There will also have to be an acceptance that tackling climate change will be hugely disruptive and will require change in a lot of industries. Some industries will lose out, but others will benefit hugely. As a rule of thumb business models that are built on intelligence and design will be well positioned, while those relying on intense use of resources will face problems. New Foreign Policy - News & Comment 2008-05-07T12:55:03+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/programmes/foreign-articles/sustainability-and-foreign-policy/ http://www.e3g.org/programmes/foreign-articles/sustainability-and-foreign-policy/#When:08:22:01Z In collaboration with the Centre for the Study of Global Governance at the London School of Economics, the Institute for Public Policy Research has today launched a new book entitled “Progressive Foreign Policy: New Directions for the UK”. The publication states that it “aims to generate some innovative thinking on the major foreign policy challenges facing the UK over the next ten years, to articulate a distinctively progressive view of foreign policy, and to outline some new policy ideas in specific areas”. The book includes a chapter authored by E3G Chief Executive Nick Mabey. Entitled “Sustainability and Foreign Policy”, it focuses on: the scale of the global environmental challenge, with a particular focus on climate change; linkages between environmental pressures and violent conflict; three priorities that the UK government should take to respond to environmental problems: 1. improve the UK’s own performance on environmental issues 2. promote a bigger role for Europe in tackling environmental problems 3. at the global level, to strengthen global environmental governance and to enhance international cooperation on environmental issues. A pdf version of Nick’s chapter is available and attached for download. New Foreign Policy - Thinking 2007-09-06T08:22:01+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/programmes/foreign-articles/international-development-and-global-public-goods-an-analytical-framework/ http://www.e3g.org/programmes/foreign-articles/international-development-and-global-public-goods-an-analytical-framework/#When:12:49:00Z In an increasingly interdependent world, sustainable development issues are ever more transboundary in nature. Last year we were commissioned by the UK’s Department for International Development to develop a major new analytical framework on the topic of Global Public Goods (GPGs)*. We’re now in a position to share some of our thinking on this more widely, and have attached for download the conceptual framework we presented. This was the starting point for more in-depth E3G analysis on 9 key GPGs. This framework outlines the important links between the provision of global public goods and poverty reduction; barriers to the production of GPGs; and key strategic considerations for development agencies as they make investments. Developing effective strategies for cooperation over GPG provision holds the key to solving many of the most pressing sustainable development challenges facing the world today - including tackling climate change, peace and security and anti-corruption issues. As part of E3G’s core mission to deliver sustainable development outcomes, we would be interested in working with other institutions in this field to help them develop their own strategies. Do contact us if you would like to learn more about our approach. * Whilst this work was commissioned by DFID, it does not necessarily reflect DFID policy – instead it represents our opinions as authors. New Foreign Policy - Thinking 2007-08-29T12:49:00+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/programmes/foreign-articles/security-trends-and-threat-misperceptions/ http://www.e3g.org/programmes/foreign-articles/security-trends-and-threat-misperceptions/#When:11:47:00Z The Smith Institute has recently launched a new publication entitled “Britain and Security” which includes a chapter authored by E3G Chief Executive Nick Mabey. The publication analyses the security challenges facing Britain in the face of “international and domestic terrorism; energy insecurity; organised crime; infectious disease; and the consequences of conflicts and instability elsewhere in the world”. Nick Mabey’s chapter is titled “Security trends and threat misperceptions”, and focuses on: The security challenges of growing interdependence Four trends to watch – organised crime and corruption, infectious diseases, financial stability, and energy and climate security Reducing the risks of instability and conflict Rebalancing the strategic mix             The full text follows below and is also attached in PDF format for download. The whole publication can be downloaded from The Smith Institute website.               Security Trends and Threat Misperceptions Contribution to ‘Britain and Security’ ed. Dr Paul Cornish, published by The Smith Institute Nick Mabey Beyond Intent: The Security Challenges of Growing Interdependence The threat of terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction dominates the conventional security agenda, and in doing so often obscures trends which have far larger impacts on the security and prosperity of UK citizens and companies. These threats emerge from the rapidly growing interdependence which is the defining feature of our world: an interdependence that is deepening through multiple channels of communication, trade, investment, migration, and the impact of economic pressures on the supply of natural resources and climate stability. The spectacular rise of China illustrates how these changes will affect the global security landscape, in both positive and negative ways. China is radically changing the global economic power balance, leading to concerns about competitiveness and future military threats. China’s interventions in Africa, Central Asia and South Asia to secure access to energy and minerals are affecting the whole range of security concerns: from limiting Security Council action against Iran and Darfur, to weakening the international community’s influence in moving regimes like Myanmar and Zimbabwe towards democratic reforms. China will become the world’s largest emitter of greenhouse gases in the next five to 10 years. But while traditional military strategists – particularly in Washington – focus on the threat from China’s future economic and military strength, the reality is that it is China’s weakness that is the biggest challenge to UK and global security over the few decades. China is still a relatively poor and developing country, undergoing profound and destabilising changes. Chinese leaders estimate that they must grow at around 7% per annum to prevent internal social unrest, and they need to secure the energy supplies to achieve this. China’s inability to compete against the US in political, financial or military influence is a key reason for it striking energy deals with “pariah” states such as Sudan, Iran, Myanmar and Angola; with India (the world’s largest democracy) following close behind. China’s fears about destabilising shortages of food and water are also driving its relationships in Latin America and Africa, to secure access to fertile land. China’s economic need to use its major domestic energy reserves of coal is behind the rapid rise in greenhouse gas emissions. China is trying to manage the domestic tensions caused by its growth, but is hampered by the immaturity of its political, governance and social systems. Ambitious targets to increase energy efficiency and lower oil imports have been missed; policies to save water and reduce pollution are not implemented; outbreaks of infectious diseases such as severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) are covered up; people traffickers continue to send economic migrants to Europe; and regulation to prevent land expropriation for commercial development is ignored leading to 70,000 public protests every year. In the past we would perhaps have seen these as internal matters for the Chinese to deal with, and that an internal crisis in China could have been welcomed as reducing their global influence. But interdependence now means that we cannot afford for China to fail. The majority of the economic growth driving these tensions is devoted to producing exports for the developed world, often from factories owned and built by foreign companies. A failed China would bring global economic depression and probably a more dangerous and hostile regime into power. A hostile China would be less interested and less able to control its greenhouse gas emissions, which constitute a direct threat to the UK. China is just the most visible example of how our security and prosperity is becoming ever more intertwined with what was previously called the developing world. UK security and stability will be increasingly determined by the ability of India, Brazil, Mexico, Indonesia, South Africa and many others to manage the tensions of industrialisation and globalisation. In this context, traditional security policies of deterrence and containment will increasingly fail to deliver. For these threats there is often no malign intent to identify and then deter, and we have in any case often chosen increasingly to intertwine ourselves with the sources of these challenges. Four Trends to Watch Interdependence heightens our exposure to governance failures and instability elsewhere in the world. These risks are being heightened by four key trends that will strengthen over the coming decades. Organised crime and corruption Before 9/11, international security discussions frequently focused on the rapid growth of organised crime as one of the largest security threats. Though terrorism has largely displaced organised crime as a priority in security and intelligence agencies, at least in the USA and Europe, crime remains a core concern. Illegal drug use alone costs the UK £24 billion every year in crime, health and policing costs. Online fraud and extortion are increasingly a trans-boundary problem, with a growing incidence in the UK of infrastructure attacks. The markets supplied by international organised crime are estimated to be worth around $1 trillion annually. Market growth is fastest in urban areas in newly industrialised countries, and in Africa, which is fast becoming a major transit and demand area for illegal drugs; in 2004, five of the seven fastest growing markets for heroin were in Sub-Saharan Africa. International organised crime undermines and corrupts supply and transit countries, and leads to high levels of violence. Latin America shows these impacts very clearly. Crime-related violence is the major cause of death for young men in five Latin American countries, and costs the continent $138 billion every year as well as financing urban and rural narco-insurgencies in several countries. Organised crime by its nature corrupts public institutions, particularly law enforcement and border systems; global money laundering activity alone is estimated to involve annual flows of $800 billion. Around 85% of Class A drugs are sourced in countries classified as unstable; for example, Afghanistan, Columbia and Burma. Transdniestria in Moldova is an example where organised criminal networks involved in the arms and drug trade are closely linked to the ruling elite and have become embedded in the institutions of the country. This is driving instability on Europe’s borders and spreading corruption to other countries, as well as increasing the risk of terrorists gaining access to sophisticated weaponry. Organised crime creates an illegal infrastructure which is readily exploited by terrorist groups that do not themselves have the financial power to bribe officials. Al-Qaeda’s global budget has been estimated at between $10-50 million a year, which is dwarfed by organised crime flows in its core operating areas in Asia, Middle East and East Africa. Drug-smuggling networks are thought to have provided the transit routes to take Afghani insurgents to Iraq for training in the manufacture and tactics of “improvised explosive devices”. Worldwide, there are over 35 reported cases of close links between international organised crime and terrorist groups. Organised crime in the UK is also funding conflict; for example, through extortion and fraud the Tamil community in London is a source of funds for the Tamil Tigers, and the Turkish Kurdish community for the PKK. The globalisation of transit routes and the demand for illegal commodities will make law enforcement action against organised crime groups increasingly complex, and will spread the destabilising impact of corruption widely. Infectious diseases As increased interconnectedness increases opportunities for organised crime it also raises the potential speed, scope and severity of infectious disease epidemics. A serious global flu pandemic could cause global economic loses of $800 billion, owing to knock-on macroeconomic effects. Following the experience of the avian flu and SARS outbreaks in Asia, estimates of the direct economic losses in Asia from a future pandemic lie between $99 billion and $283 billion. Containing the spread of pandemics depends on effective global monitoring and surveillance, and on prompt and efficient action by counties where the outbreak occurs. A threat that is harder to control is the evolution and spread of drug resistant diseases – from TB in Russia to HIV in Africa – which is hastened by poor prescribing and medication practices. Drug resistant strains of dangerous diseases already present a growing threat to the UK, and this will only increase as global travel intensifies and the number of drug resistant strains increases. Financial stability Much of the economic impact of pandemics is caused by the precipitation of a financial crisis following a rapid decline in investor confidence. The fragility of the international financial system to such shocks was exemplified by the impact of the relatively small Thai economy in triggering the Asian financial crisis, in which Indonesian GDP was reduced by a startling 20%. Over the last 30 years financial crises have reduced global GDP by around $8 trillion, with percentage impacts split evenly between developed and developing countries. However, the impacts on political stability are more severe in developing countries where increased unemployment is not cushioned by social safety nets and savings are low. The increasing integration of global financial markets both stabilises the overall system by increasing overall global liquidity, and destabilises the system by making contagion effects from unstable to stable economies more likely. The ability to monitor and predict these crises is limited by their overall complexity – each financial crisis is unique – and by the continuing lack of financial transparency in major economies such as China and India. Though the UK, along with other developed economies, has been relatively insulated from recent financial crises, our exposure can only grow in the coming decades. The UK’s high economic dependence on financial markets makes it particularly vulnerable to serious crisis. Energy and climate security Of all the systemic threats, energy and climate security is likely to become the defining issue for international relations in the coming decades. Instability in oil-exporting countries was estimated to add a $10-$15 bbl premium to oil prices in 2006, costing the UK between $6 billion and $9 billion a year; far more than estimates of the cost of any terrorist attack. The recent rise in oil prices have cost low-income countries $270 billion, compared with net aid flows of $85 billion, reducing the pace of economic growth and poverty reduction. Reserves of oil and gas will become increasingly concentrated in the OPEC countries and Russia, as overall supply reduces and long term prices rise. This is already increasing the political influence of fossil fuel exporters at the regional level – for example, with Russia having an increasing influence in preventing democratic reforms and conflict resolution efforts in Europe’s eastern neighbourhood. Scarcity is driving geopolitical competition among major energy-consuming nations, which often has the perverse effect of further destabilising supplier countries by preventing necessary political and economic reform. Fears about energy security continue to drive military planning for intervention in oil-producing regions and protection of strategic assets and transit routes, and increasingly also investment in more secure energy alternatives such as coal, biofuels, renewables and nuclear energy. Countries such as China, India and the USA are turning to coal to satisfy their energy security, and the lifetime greenhouse gas emissions of all planned coal power stations would equal total global emissions from the Industrial Revolution to 1970. If these investments go ahead without carbon sequestration, the world will be committed to over 6°C of global temperature rise by the second half of the century, with devastating impacts on global prosperity and security. The alternative of investing in more nuclear power raises serious issues over nuclear proliferation. Experts estimate that an aggressive programme of new nuclear build would see a tripling of global installed nuclear capacity over the next 40 years – half of which would be in developing countries, many of which are unstable, such as Nigeria and Indonesia. This would only have a modest impact on reducing climate change (about 10% of total carbon reduction needed by 2050), but a major impact in the spread of nuclear technology and fuels. In the medium term, the costs of energy insecurity will be dwarfed by the impacts of climate change, which could produce impacts of 5-20% of GDP from 2050 – with negative effects highest for poor people in poor countries, who are least able to adapt. However the security and stability impacts of a changing climate will arrive much earlier than major economic disruptions. Average global temperatures may only have risen by 0.7°C owing to climate change, but the impact on marginal areas has been large. Major droughts in Sahelian Africa have been linked to climate change and El Niño events. These abnormal conditions have pushed traditional resource management regimes beyond breaking point, resulting in a wave of migration and low-intensity conflict across the region. The roots of the Darfur conflict in part lie with the communalisation of conflicts between pastoral and agricultural groups over access to scarce resources. Even without climate change, increased population and industrial demand means that by 2025 over 60% of the global population will be living in countries with significant water stress. Among those areas where water supply is vulnerable to early climate change, where the natural resource base is weak, where governance is poor and where communal tensions already exist over resources, several areas stand out as highly at risk, including North and Sahelian Africa, the Middle East, Central Asia and several small island states. More severe climate changes, including rapid sea level rise from the melting of major ice sheets, would severely affect major coastal populations in South Asia and Africa, especially Bangladesh. The water supply of over 1 billion people is at risk from declining Himalayan glaciers which feed the major rivers in India and China. Sea fisheries which provide primary protein for 800 million people are already being disrupted by climate change. These large events will produce mass migration, including across international borders, and severe conflict over remaining access to water basins and other resources. Adaptation to help cope with these changes will require expenditure of between $10 billion to $40 billion per year, and increased humanitarian costs from natural disasters and environmental refugees estimated to be between $30 billion and $60 billion by 2015. This compares to current total aid expenditures of round $100m, climbing to $150m by 2015. The peacekeeping costs of responding to endemic instability from climate change would be far higher, as would be the consequent impacts on security. Reducing the Risks of Instability and Conflict Though the negative trends above pose growing security threats to the UK, they are neither inevitable nor entirely without positive features. The growth of the global economy, fuelled by global trade and investment, is also raising people out of poverty, strengthening managerial and governance systems and providing state resources to ensure stability and security. However, for many countries the negative factors outweigh any positive trends, and are compounded by destabilising demographic trends increasing the proportion of young men, by economic transformation and by the HIV/AIDS epidemic. HIV/AIDS disproportionately affects working-age and professional people, reducing the capacity of the country to manage tension peacefully; in many African countries 80% of the armed forces are HIV positive compared to 5-10% of the general population. Many weak governments have few resources to manage these threats and reduce the risk of instability and conflict. State weakness is particularly correlated with the incidence of “grand corruption”, much of which is related to industrialised country investment, and which imposes annual costs of between $1 trillion and $1.5 trillion on the world economy. The impact of global instability on UK security, as opposed to humanitarian or poverty reduction goals, is never straightforward, but these threats should not be dismissed on the grounds that the countries concerned are far away and that future conflict and instability can never be exactly predicted. The major driver of asylum seekers moving into the UK has been internal conflict and state failure, and refugee camps have provided ideal recruitment camps for extremist movements globally. The UK’s long term strategy to engage and foster moderate Islam, especially in the European neighbourhood, would be fatally undermined by the emergence of endemic instability and economic decline in these countries; a scenario which is highly likely given current trends and an absence of serious economic and political reforms. Rebalancing the Strategic Mix A broad-based security strategy needs to take into account these trends as both drivers of direct security threats and inhibitors of successful security responses. It would take a long-term and systemic approach to managing these risks, through a combination of four generic strategic approaches, which span foreign and domestic policy: Isolation – closing/restricting borders, pursuing self-sufficiency in energy; Buffering – reducing exposure to global shocks, for instance building national oil reserves, vaccine stocks, diversifying export markets; Reaction – rapid response to emergent threats, for instance through military intervention and international police activity on drugs and international crime; and Prevention – investing in global, regional and national governance networks to reduce instability and strengthen governance of key threats                             There is no simple strategic solution to these complex problems; all responses are costly and have different probabilities of success. Interventions must be targeted and sustained if they are to be effective, and no country can work everywhere. The effectiveness of each approach is heavily determined by the prevailing political context and willingness of others to cooperate. There has been much analysis of the ineffectiveness of reactive responses in controlling the international illegal drugs trade, as prices continue to fall in all major markets. However, investment in strengthening national policing systems in supplier and transit states (such as Columbia, Afghanistan and Jamaica) has also met with mixed success. UK energy security policy has so far focused on EU market liberalisation. But with the decline in national oil and gas reserves, the UK now needs to reduce exposure to volatile markets through efficiency and renewable energy, and through much stronger engagement on energy and climate security with other countries through the EU. The reality of UK security policy is that choices between these approaches are often made implicitly, and are heavily determined by existing institutional structures. The current security architecture is designed essentially to deliver isolation and reaction strategies, and it tends to underinvest in resilience and preventive strategies. Except for high-profile missions such as Iraq and Afghanistan, the UK security machinery finds it difficult to maintain a long term strategic focus on delivering reform and stability in any region. The result is an unbalanced portfolio of action and funding which does not reflect the relative size of different security threats. The UK spends only £40 million on tackling organised crime overseas, and £200 million on preventing crisis and conflict (including UN and EU contributions but excluding peacekeeping missions and general development aid), compared with an annual armed forces budget of £35 billion. The UK is one of the largest global investors in preventive responses globally, but still has a large imbalance between its capability to project force and its capability to project stability, enforcement and good governance. This approach does not mean cutting the UK’s ability to project hard power, but complementing it with new capabilities to deliver stability and security. It is vital that the security benefits of such investment are clearly prioritised, in order to strengthen the political impetus behind such interventions. A good example is the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative launched by the UK in 2002, which works with resource-rich countries and oil and mining companies to make payments to public authorities transparent and so less prone to corruption. Given the very strong links between badly managed resource extraction, corruption and conflict, this probably represents one of the UK’s most effective conflict prevention and security initiatives. However, it is still primarily seen as a development policy (and though created in the Cabinet Office is now led by the Department for International Development), which reduces the political priority given to engaging countries such as China, which are essential to its long term success but have yet to cooperate. Following the spate of civil wars in the 1990s there was political pressure in the USA, the UK, Germany and others to invest in new forms of preventive security capability. However, this political push has disappeared since 9/11 and many of the reform processes have stalled. The failure to produce sustainable stability in Iraq and Afghanistan and potentially Congo is also leading to a louder call from “neo-realists” to retreat to a mainly reactive approach, avoiding “nation building” and merely intervening on a short term basis to attack perceived threats. But events in Somalia show the danger in taking a short-term approach to building security, as this allows the creation of “ungoverned spaces” and weak governance, which undermines a range of security objectives – not least, the attempt to win hearts and minds in the Muslim world. It is unsurprising that there have been failures, given our weak capacity and short experience of stabilising countries and building governance systems; but this has been a failure of implementation, not strategy. The emerging successes in the Balkans, Aceh, East Timor and Sierra Leone, among others, show that with concerted long-term effort by the international community, security and stability can be achieved in these areas. The task is to move forward with a more ambitious and balanced security agenda, which will require some fundamental reforms in the security architecture. The danger is that current proposals to combine and centralise UK security architecture around anti-terrorism strategy will result in only strengthening capability to deliver hard security and intelligence cooperation. While important, this will further marginalise and weaken the UK’s ability to anticipate, prevent and respond to more complex and long-term threats driven by the trends above, and will undermine our ability to deliver a long-term strategy towards global Muslim extremism. The UK should reinvigorate its role in pioneering new approaches to facing these threats, as it did through leadership on the International Criminal Court, the “responsibility to protect” agenda, and increasing global peacekeeping capability. The coming years also give the opportunity to reshape the EU’s security capability, as the revived constitutional debate brings back discussion of a strengthened security architecture, including a new EU external action service. As enlargement has shown, if deployed imaginatively the political and economic scale of the EU provides a unique ability to promote stability and good governance; particularly important in North Africa, the Caucasus and Central Asia and through partnership with the African Union into Sub-Saharan Africa. Terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are core security threats, but they often obscure the importance of other threats to the UK’s security and prosperity. In an interdependent world, a security strategy must of course address short-term hard security threats, but must also be able to motivate the long-term investment in cooperative institutions, relationships and governance needed to tackle underlying drivers of insecurity and conflict and the negative side of globalisation. New Foreign Policy - Thinking 2007-08-07T11:47:00+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/programmes/foreign-articles/report-on-uk-foreign-office-could-do-better/ http://www.e3g.org/programmes/foreign-articles/report-on-uk-foreign-office-could-do-better/#When:10:23:00Z The House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee has now published its report on Trade, Development and Environment: The Role of the FCO. E3G Chief Executive Nick Mabey gave evidence to the committee, so it is interesting to see how their recommendations reflect his suggestions - particularly in the areas of security threats, environmental expertise, fragmented strategy and leadership by example. Here’s some details from the EAC Press Notice: The EAC acknowledges that the FCO is doing some good work on a number of international environmental issues, and commends the Rt. Hon Margaret Beckett MP, the Foreign Secretary, for making climate change a key international priority for the FCO. The recent appointment of a Special Representative on Climate Change and the Foreign Secretary’s robust argument for the consideration of climate change at the UN Security Council is evidence of the diplomatic effort that the FCO is putting behind this issue. Nevertheless, the EAC has major concerns that the FCO is neglecting a number of key international challenges including biodiversity loss and environmental degradation. The EAC is concerned that the structure of the FCO is not up to the task of dealing with the challenges posed by international environmental degradation. In addition, the EAC found that the UK Government’s likely failure to meet its domestic target on reducing carbon emissions, as well as certain actions relating to biodiversity protection, might undermine our ability to address these issues on the international stage. Some further conclusions of the EAC report are set out below: FCO Policy Although the FCO is doing some good work, evidence suggests that overall the FCO is placing less of an emphasis on non-climate related environmental challenges. This could have a damaging impact on our ability to tackle some international environmental issues such as biodiversity loss. The FCO appears to be failing to explore the links between natural resource protection and conflict prevention and resolution. As a result of restructuring the FCO has lost much of its environmental expertise. The training of FCO staff, and secondments from other departments, can only in part address this shortfall. Therefore the FCO should expand greatly the proportion of externally-appointed environmental specialists in its employ. In addition, career diplomats with a environmental focus must be developed. The Government must do more The UK’s international environmental policy is fragmented, which has a negative impact on the Government’s ability to meet international environmental challenges.  A new international environmental strategy must be developed, adopted and owned by a number of departments, incorporating issues including security, trade, foreign policy and development. To enable the UK to be effective at international environmental diplomacy it is crucial that the Government demonstrates its commitment to sustainable development principles though all its actions, and in particular it must not renege on international and domestic environmental commitments. Therefore the EAC believes that, although the UK will meet its international targets under Kyoto, failure to reach its more demanding domestic target on carbon emission reduction, will result in the loss of the political leadership demonstrated by the UK through its adoption. The consequences of missing this target are all the more negative as current scientific information indicates that the Kyoto targets fall well short of the scale of effort required to meet the challenge of climate change. The Government is also undermining its position on international biodiversity protection by its failure to tackle adequately the risk of continued environmental decline and species extinctions in the UK Overseas Territories. New Foreign Policy - News & Comment 2007-05-23T10:23:00+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/programmes/foreign-articles/preventive-diplomacy-new-taskforce-launched/ http://www.e3g.org/programmes/foreign-articles/preventive-diplomacy-new-taskforce-launched/#When:12:57:00Z 22nd May saw the launch of a new International Taskforce for Preventive Diplomacy, an initiative of the EastWest Institute. E3G Chief Executive Nick Mabey is the Vice Chair of this new group, which will be looking for practical ways to improve preventative diplomacy and reduce the risk of conflict and instability. It will particularly focus on the role of scarce natural resources, climate change, and energy as drivers of conflict. The taskforce states that it aims to motivate the international community to prevent violent conflict.” and that it has one goal: to build domestic and international political will to shorten the time between early warning and effective early response to prevent violent conflicts.” Further information about the launch of the taskforce is available in this EWI Press Release. New Foreign Policy - Activities 2007-05-22T12:57:00+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/programmes/foreign-articles/sustainability-and-foreign-policy-the-role-of-the-fco/ http://www.e3g.org/programmes/foreign-articles/sustainability-and-foreign-policy-the-role-of-the-fco/#When:14:04:00Z The Trade, Development and Environment Sub-Committee of the UK Parliament’s Environmental Audit Committee has recently been undertaking an inquiry into the role of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) in delivering the UK’s international environmental objectives. E3G was invited to submit a paper setting out our perspectives on the role of the FCO. Nick Mabey’s working paper in response ‘Sustainability and Foreign Policy’ is attached as a pdf download. Nick also contributed written evidence to some questions from the inquiry team - we’ll provide a link to those just as soon as they are published on the EAC website. Update (16th May): Nick’s written answers to the EAC’s questions have now been published online. Here they are: 1. Do you feel that the recent restructuring at the FCO, in which the Environmental Policy Department was incorporated into the Sustainable Development and Business Group and Climate Change and Energy Group, has resulted in a loss of focus and expertise on environmental issues? The restructuring strengthened the FCO’s role on climate change to an extent, though the hoped for synthesis of climate and energy security has yet to really emerge in the group. The focus on other environmental issues has been severely damaged by the restructuring. As these issues require significant literacy and longevity of expertise to have an effective diplomatic impact, the lack of a clear focal point or career anchor in the FCO has diminished its ability to integrate environmental issues successfully into its mainstream work (eg on environmental factors and conflict, corruption and governance/democracy), or provide an adequate diplomatic support function for DEFRA. 2. You called for a new international body to provide international leadership and a watchdog role on environmental issues (a World Environment Organisation). The issue of a new environmental body was also visited in our inquiry on the UN Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MA). Can you comment on this? I don’t think the main rationale for a WEO is managing the trade and environment interface, though this has attracted political support for the idea from some in the trade community concerned with the WTO’s mission creep into these areas. The main reason to construct a WEO is to produce more effective and powerful environmental leadership and governance, and this should be the priority in moving the idea forward. Such a WEO would—as you suggest—have a core focus on areas such as ecosystem services—taking forward the work of the MA—but also provide a more coherent approach to issues of environmental governance, environment rights and democracy, corruption and illegal trade, compliance and capacity building—all of which are very fragmented in the current system. A buy product of this would be a more focused dialogue with the WTO, but it is no panacea to the ability of the WTO to override environmental rules for trade purposes—these issues do have to be addressed in the WTO itself as well. 3. You talked of the need to increase specialist environmental/sustainable development expertise across Government. This was something that we raised with the Minister. He said that they had an extensive SD training programme for all staff, and that they had a number of secondees from DEFRA. Would you say that this degree of expertise is adequate to the task in the FCO? No. The issues the FCO deals with are different to those in DEFRA and changing rapidly. Many of the areas where FCO could add most value are still developing and are intellectually and institutionally immature, for example: Climate change diplomacy and the links to energy security; environmental technology cooperation; climate security and environmental stress; resource management, conflict and corporate behaviour; international environmental governance; environmental democracy and rights. There is no off the shelf training available to teach generalists how to approach these issues. DEFRA does not effectively cover these areas either. Effective diplomacy requires people to have cutting edge skills and be in touch with networks of key thinkers and actors. This requires both serious in-depth training and a career path where experience and networks can be built. This is the approach taken for FCO staff on major countries and institutions—China, India, EU—where on top of six to 12 months of dedicated language training staff can expect several tours of duty on a related region/country/institution—thus giving them incentives to maintain and build their knowledge and understanding over time. It is strange that a similar investment is not made on environmental issues, which by their very nature are international and require successful diplomacy to deliver UK interests. This type of internal capacity should be supplemented by external secondees from academia, NGOs and business—as has been successfully pioneered in the human rights and science and technology areas in FCO, and was a key part of EPD from 1999-2003. 4. You called for the creation of a new UK international environmental strategy. I anticipate that the Government would simply argue that its Sustainable Development Strategy provides this. I assume that you feel that this existing strategy is not detailed enough? The current SDS does not give a clear set of UK priorities beyond climate change, or a detailed set of focal areas for deploying UK assets. It has no clear views on the key institutional and governance issues the UK wishes to see addressed, or the core upcoming environmental challenges. Finally, any useful strategy would also need a frank and confidential assessment of the political landscape and where the UK needs to engage with key allies and opponents to achieve its goals. This type of conversation exists for climate change but only in a very ad hoc manner for other issues. The absence of a strategy is skewing the UK towards a focus on climate change mitigation policy, while ignoring that successful and peaceful adaptation to the inevitable changes in the climate will require far more effective and resilient governance of natural resources and ecosystems in the short to medium term—especially given the proximate stresses of population growth and economic development.   New Foreign Policy - News & Comment, New Foreign Policy - Thinking 2007-04-02T14:04:00+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/programmes/foreign-articles/world-economic-forum-world-is-more-vulnerable-to-global-risks/ http://www.e3g.org/programmes/foreign-articles/world-economic-forum-world-is-more-vulnerable-to-global-risks/#When:12:35:01Z Last week the World Economic Forum (WEF) held its annual meeting in Davos, Switzerland, providing an occasion for politicians and business leaders to discuss the current global economic and political situation. Speeches by Blair et al may have grabbed the limelight this time around (at least in the absence of the celebrities of previous years), but perhaps more overlooked has been the WEF’s significant focus on global risks and our collective capacity to respond. Global risks – global responses required Back in 2004, the WEF founded the Global Risk Network in an attempt to bring together cross-sectoral responses to a new set of emerging global risks: In an increasingly complex and interconnected global environment, risks can no longer be contained within geographical or system boundaries. No one company, industry or state can successfully understand and mitigate global risks.” For this year’s WEF annual meeting, the network’s Report on Global Risks highlights that the world is neither prepared nor adequately equipped to effectively deal with increasing global risks. Companies, governments and global governance structures all need to respond better. Out of 23 global risks studied by the Global Risk Network, almost all have increased over the last year, although at different rates. At the same time, processes to detect and mitigate risks have not progressed accordingly, despite improvements in some areas such as collaboration on counterterrorism. Dealing with Risk Interdependencies When it comes to seeking to regulate global risks, the report puts a particularly strong emphasis on: The interdependencies between global risks, the importance of taking an integrated risk management approach to major global challenges and the necessity of attempting to deal with root causes of global risks rather than reacting to the consequences.” Two innovative recommendations are put forward to meet these challenges: Appointing Country Risk Officers. Inspired from existing risk managers in the private sector, they would endow governments with a hub for mitigating global risks across departments and to escape a silo-based approach. Flexible ‘Coalitions of the willing’ of relevant governments and companies around specific risk issues. These would allow mitigation strategies to come about from dynamic interaction between business and governmental representatives, “allowing risk mitigation to be a process of gradually-expanding alliances rather than a proposition requiring permanent consensus.” Greatest risk: Climate Change Concerns about climate change have increased tremendously among political and business leaders. A poll of participants prior to the annual meeting of the WEF revealed that one in five, compared to less than one in ten a year ago, considered tackling climate change to be the biggest priority world leaders should concentrate on. This was confirmed in a special brainstorm and discussion session of the WEF entitled ‘The Shifting Power Equation: Exploring the Implications’ where participants were asked to consider “which shift will have the most impact on the world in the coming years, and which shift is the global community least ready for?”. The session summary reports that: In a final vote, participants chose climate change (38%) and emerging markets (32.9%) as the issues that will have the greatest impact in the coming years, and climate change (55%) and inequality (12.2%) as two issues that the world is least ready for.”An indicator of 21st century success The Report on Global Risks echoes this concern, highlighting the fact that: Climate change is now seen as one of the defining challenges of the 21st century and as a global risk with impacts far beyond the environment.” Given the interconnected nature of global risks, successful action to mitigate global warming could also improve economies’ resilience to oil price instability by shifting the energy supply of developed countries to low-carbon sources. But equally, in the absence of successful action, climate instability is likely to trigger major civil and interstate wars within the next 50 years. As a consequence, the report doesn’t shy away from stating the importance of climate change over the coming decades: The way in which climate change is dealt with at the global level will be a leading indicator of the world’s capacity to manage globalisation in an equitable and sustainable way.” Progress – but how much? Although it is somewhat reassuring for policy makers to see businesses turning to acknowledge the significance of the climate change risk, it is hard to assess to what extent any tangible advances are effectively coming out of the WEF in terms of impetus for international action. The announcement last week of the new US Climate Action Partnership between businesses and NGOs seems more like concrete progress on that front. As always, the proof of the pudding is in the eating. We’ll be watching with interest to see whether actions on the top issues of climate change, global trade and globalisation really do flow from WEF members over the coming year, as was pledged in the closing session: We are the epicentre of world engagement. It’s not just the results of the four days that flow out of here. The initiatives will continue so when we are back here in 2008 we can say something really did happen,” concluded E. Neville Isdell, Chairman and CEO, The Coca-Cola Company. New Foreign Policy - News & Comment 2007-01-30T12:35:01+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/programmes/foreign-articles/how-power-has-shifted/ http://www.e3g.org/programmes/foreign-articles/how-power-has-shifted/#When:11:20:00Z Another excellent article from Timothy Garton Ash in today’s Guardian analyses the impact of globalisation on international power relations. Written from the World Economic Forum in Davos, his view is that The unipolar moment of US supremacy has passed. Power is now diffused between multiple states and groups.” The two major trends shaping the current international system are, in his view, the “Asian renaissance and energy race”. The latter in particular is gifting influence to a new category of “explotiative powers” - the major exporters of oil and gas. After also discussing the influence of terrorism and the “15 minutes of power” granted to individuals by the internet, his final three paragraphs go a long way to setting out the challenge that must be responded to by the emerging New Foreign Policy. I think they are worth copying in full: So the new power equation is a complex differential one. This also means that the world is more difficult than ever to “manage” in the way envisaged by the architects of the post-1945 international order. (States themselves are also becoming more difficult for governments to manage internally, and for some of the same reasons.) The existing international institutions no longer reflect today’s complex realities. This world cries out for new structures of global governance, but the very multi-level, multipolar diffusion of power makes that harder to achieve.” According to a report in the International Herald Tribune, a couple of years ago the National Intelligence Council of the United States played through a number of scenarios for the world in 2020. The only reasonably attractive option was one in which multiple powers addressed global challenges jointly with non-state actors. They called it “Davos world”.” The real question is not whether such a world is desirable but how it might be achieved. In economics, there is a mechanism for coping with worldwide complexity: regulated markets. They do the job inadequately, of course, and often unfairly; but for now, they still do the job. There is no equivalent mechanism to address the new worldwide complexity of politics. Simply saying “reform the UN” or “reform the WTO” won’t get us far. Here is the next great challenge, revealed by the mountain-top camera of Davos.” Here at E3G, we are continuing to work on a programme of activities which can help governments and others to respond to this challenge. More details will follow over the coming months. New Foreign Policy - News & Comment 2007-01-25T11:20:00+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/programmes/foreign-articles/environment-and-security-an-inventory-of-policies-and-practices/ http://www.e3g.org/programmes/foreign-articles/environment-and-security-an-inventory-of-policies-and-practices/#When:09:45:01Z The Institute for Environmental Security has just launched a new publication, which features a foreward by E3G’s Nick Mabey. Drawing on his previous experience as team leader of the UK Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit work on ‘Countries at Risk of Instability’, Nick sets out an overview of the challenge facing security analysts as they grapple with the increasing threats from environmental instability and resource scarcity. Nick’s foreward follows below and is also attached as a pdf download. About the Report Inventory of Environment and Security Policies and Practices (IESPP). An Overview of Strategies and Initiatives of Selected Governments, International Organisations and Inter-Governmental Organisations. This report provides an easy to use comparative overview of existing governmental and inter-governmental positions and actions dealing with the relationship between environment, security and sustainable development. Focusing on selected OECD Member States, including several EU Member States, the report describes the environment and security policies and practices of 13 counties as well as 7 international / intergovernmental organisations. The IESPP report illustrates how the selected governments / IGOs have addressed their stated environmental security priorities through various policies, programmes and projects with respect to eight key themes. Foreward, Nick Mabey, E3G Conflict over natural resources, whether driven by need or greed, has always been a part of human society. There is also strong evidence that social tensions driven by past climatic change destroyed many advanced societies; such as the long-wave droughts which drove the collapse of early civilisations in Mesopotamia and Peru. The coming decades will see rising resource scarcity, greater environmental degradation and increasingly disruptive climatic change. In fact, in an increasingly uncertain world these trends are disturbingly predictable. The question is whether increasing environmental and resource pressures will reduce security and stability, or will our political, governance and security systems be able to manage them peacefully? The lack of focus on environmental security issues found by the research in this volume could suggest that security professionals in the major developed powers hold the more optimistic view. More disturbingly it could indicate that these new realities have yet to be integrated into security strategies and policy frameworks. However, these issues are fast rising up the global political agenda. Geopolitical competition for fossil and mineral resources has become the main source of 19th centurystyle “great power” tensions in today’s interdependent world. By empowering autocratic rulers in Africa and Central Asia against their people, this competition is also setting the stage for violent internal crisis and the consequent disruption of energy supplies. Security issues where resource and environmental factors play key roles are the stuff of day-to-day foreign policy: from land conflicts between pastoralists and agriculturalists in Darfur; to the role of oil in fuelling and sustaining of separatist conflict in the Niger Delta and Aceh. Many countries already face significant challenges in coping with existing climate variability; for example, the World Bank estimates that floods and drought in Kenya in the late 1990s resulted in direct economic costs of $4.8 billion, or 22% of GDP per annum. Though each particular crisis or conflict has its own unique dynamic based on local politics, economics and history; strong patterns are clear. The corrupting influence of point source revenues – whether from natural resources, drugs, pipelines or weapons - on elites is the most powerful source of underdevelopment and failing economies. The World Bank estimates that over the last 40 years developing countries without major natural resources have grown 2-3 times faster than those with high resource endowment. Politicised revenue allocation from natural resources based around ethnic, religious or regional lines has been a major driver of internal conflict. Natural resource revenues are feeding corruption and organised crime, which destabilise governments and at the extreme finance conflict and provide a logistical infrastructure for international terrorism. Politicised allocation of water and land is constantly driving low level conflict, which can spark into major violence when linked to ethnic, national and other divisions. Migration inside countries, from Africa to Latin America. There is no lack of tools and policy options to address these issues. A wealth of experience exists on managing environmental disputes, designing governance systems, anti-corruption measures, resource allocation mechanisms and participative resources management that could be used to reduce instability risks. There are also a wealth of international agreements – on forests, water, environmental democracy, desertification, conflict resources – which could be strengthened as foreign policy tools. However, despite a few high profile exceptions such as the action to control trade in “conflict diamonds”, there has been a lack of concerted international effort to address the resource and environmental roots of instability. Cases which have been addressed have required extensive campaigning from non-governmental groups to secure action. In a world of rising scarcity this reactive approach will not preserve security and stability. Strategists always caution against fighting the last war, and the need to explore future threats away from the biases of current priorities. However, despite a plethora of recent reports - from the Africa Commission, the UN High Level Panel and even the Pentagon - identifying competition for oil and gas supply, resource scarcity and climate change as key drivers of political stress and conflict; the impact on practical action has been weak. It is perhaps unsurprising that the identification of a new threat does not by itself result in an effective response. It takes time for countries to understand the strategic importance of new threats on their vital interests, and to reorder existing priorities. It takes even longer to develop effective instruments to respond. Security systems formed in the strategic certainties of the Cold War have struggled to respond to a new fluid strategic environment where the source of threats is constantly shifting. But this is changing. The lessons of the past decade and in particular the Balkan Wars, Rwanda and 9/11 have radically transformed national security priorities. Across the major powers these now focus less on the strength of other countries, and more on the need to tackle instability and failing states; to achieve energy security; prevent the development of “ungoverned spaces” open to abuse by terrorists and organised criminals; and address the internal conflicts which can breed and support international terrorism. Tackling these threats requires a very different type of security apparatus typified by three core approaches: Preventive: greater emphasis on effective governance, prevention of conflict, and stabilisation of countries after conflict and crisis have emerged. Integrated: the need for “whole government approaches” which combine military, diplomatic, developmental and justice system capabilities. Convergent: ensuring the complementarities between different policy objectives and instruments are assessed when in setting priorities; for example, the economic, developmental and security benefits of tackling illegal logging. These principles are also familiar as forming the core of “sustainable development” policy approaches, and in many ways security policy is becoming more like other areas of international policy. At the core of the challenge is how to motivate consistent investment of financial and political capital into long term prevention of conflict and reduction of instability. This is a major task of strategic and public sector reform, and will take years to complete. There is also a chance that the emergence of more traditional military threats could reverse this progress. Assuming this reversal does not happen, these trends will make it easier to incorporate environmental and resource issues into security policy, but only as one driver of future risks. Security strategies also need to better integrate other rising structural risks of instability driven by HIV/AIDs, religious fundamentalism, economic dislocation from trade shifts, rapid urbanisation and drug trafficking and use. Understanding how these different issues interlink and re-enforce vulnerability to crisis and conflict is at the core of defining effective responses. For example, how will commodity dependence, trade liberalisation, organised crime, youth unemployment and climate change evolve to impact the stability of the Caribbean? How will this affect organised crime and the drug trade, and what can be done to lower the risk of crisis? This survey shows that many countries are currently undertaking reforms to improve their conflict prevention and crisis response architectures. However, there is a need for much more radical and concerted change if security objectives are to be met. Work carried out by UK Prime Ministers Strategy Unit (“Investing in Prevention”, 2005) showed that despite recent improvements, government systems have significant weaknesses in developing strategic approaches to reducing structural risks of instability and conflict in the medium to long term. These weaknesses are deeply rooted in all parts of government systems, and not confined to commonly discussed issues of deficient early warning and insufficient political will to act. There is a critical opportunity to accelerate the process of systemic reform in the next few years. The political imperative for better systems to tackle crises is growing, not least in the European Union and its neighbourhood. The experience of DRC, Afghanistan and Iraq has further strengthened the cost-benefit case for investing in prevention. The increased emphasis on poverty reduction has liberated larger financial resources to be invested in fragile states, particularly in Africa; most of which are economically dependent on natural resources. Rising awareness of the future impacts of climate change is increasing attention on the environmental drivers of instability. Experts on the environmental and resource aspects of security can help drive these changes in governments, along with actors from the development, health and conflict prevention communities. A joined-up approach outside governments will help drive joined-up action from governments. This is probably best done through a focus on critical “problem clusters”, rather than in a “grand theory” of system redesign, and there are many candidate areas. Progress is already being made to strengthen international processes to prevent the use of natural resources to fund conflict, but more could be done to extend and deepen this approach. More effort could be given to managing the negative cycle of natural resource mismanagement, corruption, underdevelopment and instability, especially in energy exporting countries in Africa and Central Asia. A much more detailed picture of the impact of climate change on stability, and the links between climate security and energy security, is needed to drive medium to long-term security and energy policy. Though progress may be slow it is happening, and it is critical that the opportunities of the coming years are taken. The growing impacts of climate change will multiply all these tensions, and the experience of the last decade is that climatic changes will happen faster than we currently expect. If effective systems for preventive action are not built the international community will face multiple re-enforcing crises, and be left trying to patch up societies with an expensive combination of humanitarian and military intervention, but little chance of sustainable success. Copyright © 2006 Institute for Environmental Security, The Hague New Foreign Policy - News & Comment, New Foreign Policy - Thinking 2006-10-24T09:45:01+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/programmes/foreign-articles/evidence-to-the-foreign-affairs-committee/ http://www.e3g.org/programmes/foreign-articles/evidence-to-the-foreign-affairs-committee/#When:14:59:02Z On the 26th April John Ashton gave evidence to the Foreign Affairs Commitee of the House of Commons for their report into East Asia. The focus of his evidence was on the environmental consequences of the rise of China and the need for proactive European engagement. The report of the Committee has just been published and you can now find the transcript of John’s evidence online (click on ‘next’ at the bottom of the evidence webpage for the concluding section). The second section of the Committee’s report includes reference to John’s evidence - particularly in paragraphs 45 to 61. New Foreign Policy - News & Comment 2006-08-13T14:59:02+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/programmes/foreign-articles/blogging-global-public-goods/ http://www.e3g.org/programmes/foreign-articles/blogging-global-public-goods/#When:13:03:01Z Clive Bates of the UK’s Environment Agency attended our session at DFID today on Global Public Goods, and was sufficiently stimulated to make a post about it on his own blog. Clive also refers to us as “ubiquitous penseurs of globalisation”, but I’m not sure if that is a compliment… New Foreign Policy - News & Comment, New Foreign Policy - Activities 2006-08-03T13:03:01+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/programmes/foreign-articles/environment-and-security-a-forward-agenda/ http://www.e3g.org/programmes/foreign-articles/environment-and-security-a-forward-agenda/#When:10:57:00Z In his previous role at the UK Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit, E3G Chief Executive Nick Mabey led work analysing Countries at Risk of Instability. The challenges faced by these countries in many ways give us an indication of the likely security challenges of a resource constrained world. Nick has recently made a number of speeches on the theme of environment and security, and has drawn together some of the key issues facing policy makers. A pdf version of Nick’s new briefing paper is attached for download, the text also follows below. The growing environment and security challenge Conflict over natural resources, whether driven by need or greed, has always been a part of human society. There is also strong evidence that social tensions driven by past climatic change destroyed many advanced societies; such as the long-wave droughts which drove the collapse of early civilisations in Mesopotamia and Peru. The coming decades will see rising resource scarcity, greater environmental degradation and increasingly disruptive climatic change. In fact, in an increasingly uncertain world these trends are disturbingly predictable. The question is whether increasing environmental and resource pressures will reduce security and stability, or will our political, governance and security systems be able to manage them peacefully? The lack of focus on environmental security issues in national security systems found by many researchers could suggest that security professionals in the major developed powers hold the more optimistic view. More disturbingly it could indicate that these new realities have yet to be integrated into security strategies and policy frameworks. However, these issues are fast rising up the global political agenda. Geopolitical competition for fossil and mineral resources has become the main source of 19th century-style “great power” tensions in today’s interdependent world. By empowering autocratic rulers in Africa and Central Asia against their people, this competition is also setting the stage for violent internal crisis and the consequent disruption of energy supplies. Security issues where resource and environmental factors play key roles are the stuff of day-to-day foreign policy: from land conflicts between pastorists and agriculturalists in Darfur; to the role of oil in fuelling and sustaining of separatist conflict in the Niger Delta and Aceh. Many countries already face significant challenges in coping with existing climate variability; for example, the World Bank estimates that floods and drought in Kenya in the late 1990s resulted in direct economic costs of $4.8 billion, or 22% of GDP per annum. Though each particular crisis or conflict has its own unique dynamic based on local politics, economics and history; strong patterns are clear. The corrupting influence of point source revenues – whether from natural resources, drugs, pipelines or weapons - on elites is the most powerful source of underdevelopment and failing economies. The World Bank estimates that over the last 40 years developing countries without major natural resources have grown 2-3 times faster than those with high resource endowment. Politicised revenue allocation from natural resources based around ethnic, religious or regional lines has been a major driver of internal conflict. Natural resource revenues are feeding corruption and organised crime, which destabilise governments and at the extreme finance conflict and provide a logistical infrastructure for international terrorism. Politicised allocation of water and land is constantly driving low level conflict, which can spark into major violence when linked to ethnic, national and other divisions. Migration away from environmentally degraded regions causes confrontation across borders and inside countries, from Africa to Latin America. New Responses, New Tools There is no lack of tools and policy options to address these issues. A wealth of experience exists on managing environmental disputes, designing governance systems, anti-corruption measures, resource allocation mechanisms and participative resources management that could be used to reduce instability risks. There are also a wealth of international agreements – on forests, water, environmental democracy, desertification, conflict resources – which could be strengthened as foreign policy tools. However, despite a few high profile exceptions such as the action to control trade in “conflict diamonds”, there has been a lack of concerted international effort to address the resource and environmental roots of instability. Cases which have been addressed have required extensive campaigning from non-governmental groups to secure action. In a world of rising scarcity this reactive approach will not preserve security and stability. Strategists always caution against fighting the last war, and the need to explore future threats away from the biases of current priorities. However, despite a plethora of recent reports - from the Africa Commission, the UN High Level Panel and even the Pentagon - identifying competition for oil and gas supply, resource scarcity and climate change as key drivers of political stress and conflict; the impact on practical action has been weak. It is perhaps unsurprising that the identification of a new threat does not by itself result in an effective response. It takes time for countries to understand the strategic importance of new threats on their vital interests, and to reorder existing priorities. It takes even longer to develop effective instruments to respond. Security systems formed in the strategic certainties of the Cold War have struggled to respond to a new fluid strategic environment where the source of threats is constantly shifting. But this is changing. The lessons of the past decade, and in particular the Balkan Wars, Rwanda and 9/11 have radically transformed national security priorities. Across the major powers these now focus less on the strength of other countries, and more on the need to tackle instability and failing states; to achieve energy security; prevent the development of “ungoverned spaces” open to abuse by terrorists and organised criminals; and address the internal conflicts which can breed and support international terrorism. Tackling these threats requires a very different type of security apparatus typified by three core approaches: Preventive: greater emphasis on effective governance, prevention of conflict, and stabilisation of countries after conflict and crisis have emerged. Integrated: the need for “whole government approaches” which combine military, diplomatic, developmental and justice system capabilities. Convergent: ensuring the complementarities between different policy objectives and instruments are assessed when in setting priorities; for example, the economic, developmental and security benefits of tackling illegal logging.These principles are also familiar as forming the core of “sustainable development” policy approaches, and in many ways security policy is becoming more like other areas of international policy. At the core of the challenge is how to motivate consistent investment of financial and political capital into long term prevention of conflict and reduction of instability. Driving Security System Reform This is a major task of strategic and public sector reform, and will take years to complete. There is also a chance that the emergence of more traditional military threats could reverse this progress. Assuming this reversal does not happen, these trends will make it easier to incorporate environmental and resource issues into security policy, but only as one driver of future risks. Security strategies also need to better integrate other rising structural risks of instability driven by HIV/AIDs, religious fundamentalism, economic dislocation from trade shifts, rapid urbanisation and drug trafficking and use. Understanding how these different issues interlink and re-enforce vulnerability to crisis and conflict is at the core of defining effective responses. For example, how will commodity dependence, trade liberalisation, organised crime, youth unemployment and climate change evolve to impact the stability of the Caribbean? How will this affect organised crime and the drug trade, and what can be done to lower the risk of crisis? Many countries are currently undertaking reforms to improve their conflict prevention and crisis response architectures. However, there is a need for much more radical and concerted change if security objectives are to be met. Work carried out by UK Prime Ministers Strategy Unit (“Investing in Prevention”, 2005, available at www.strategy.gov.uk) showed that despite recent improvements, government systems have significant weaknesses in developing strategic approaches to reducing structural risks of instability and conflict in the medium to long term. These weaknesses are deeply rooted in all parts of government systems, and not confined to commonly discussed issues of deficient early warning and insufficient political will to act. There is a critical opportunity to accelerate the process of systemic reform in the next few years. The political imperative for better systems to tackle crises is growing, not least in the European Union and its neighbourhood. The experience of DRC, Afghanistan and Iraq has further strengthened the cost-benefit case for investing in prevention. The increased emphasis on poverty reduction has liberated larger financial resources to be invested in fragile states, particularly in Africa; most of which are economically dependent on natural resources. Rising awareness of the future impacts of climate change is increasing attention on the environmental drivers of instability. Experts on the environmental and resource aspects of security can help drive these changes in governments, along with actors from the development, health and conflict prevention communities. A joined-up approach outside governments will help drive joined-up action from governments. This is probably best done through a focus on critical “problem clusters”, rather than in a “grand theory” of system redesign, and there are many candidate areas. Progress is already being made to strengthen international processes to prevent the use of natural resources to fund conflict, but more could be done to extend and deepen this approach. More effort could be given to managing the negative cycle of natural resource mismanagement, corruption, underdevelopment and instability, especially in energy exporting countries in Africa and Central Asia. A much more detailed picture of the impact of climate change on stability, and the links between climate security and energy security, is needed to drive medium to long-term security and energy policy. Though progress may be slow it is happening, and it is critical that the opportunities of the coming years are taken. The growing impacts of climate change will multiply all these tensions, and the experience of the last decade is that climatic changes will happen faster than we currently expect. If effective systems for preventive action are not built the international community will face multiple re-enforcing crises, and be left trying to patch up societies with an expensive combination of humanitarian and military intervention, but little chance of sustainable success. New Foreign Policy - Thinking 2006-07-28T10:57:00+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/programmes/foreign-articles/climate-change-and-environmental-security/ http://www.e3g.org/programmes/foreign-articles/climate-change-and-environmental-security/#When:12:39:01Z From the 9 - 12 May 2004, The Institute for Environmental Security organised The Hague Conference on Environment, Security and Sustainable Development, held at The Peace Palace, The Hague, The Netherlands. Two E3G articles featured elsewhere on our site were used as background material for the conference: The Geopolitics of Climate Change by John Ashton and Tom Burke Europe’s Mars Mission by John Ashton The pdf versions of both articles as used at the conference are attached here.   New Foreign Policy - Thinking 2004-05-09T12:39:01+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/programmes/foreign-articles/the-end-of-foreign-policy/ http://www.e3g.org/programmes/foreign-articles/the-end-of-foreign-policy/#When:12:45:00Z During 2001, the founders of E3G contributed to the influential pamphlet ‘The End of Foreign Policy?: British Interests, Global Linkages and Natural Limits’ published by Peter Hain MP. This set out the ways in which foreign policy, and foreign ministries, would need to be re-cast in an interdependent and highly connected world. As a direct result two EU states restructured their foreign ministries. A pdf version of the pamphlet is attached for download. Copies of the printed version of the pamphlet are available for purchase from Chatham House. New Foreign Policy - Thinking 2001-01-15T12:45:00+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/programmes/systems-articles/green-investment-bank/ http://www.e3g.org/programmes/systems-articles/green-investment-bank/#When:14:14:13Z In April 2010 the UK Government committed £3 billion in start up finance for the Green Investment Bank (GIB).  This was followed in May 2011 with the publication of a high level business model and early sector focus for the GIB on offshore wind, efficiency and waste investments.  A GIB Advisory Group, Chaired by Sir Adrian Montague, has been appointed to help advise on the set up and strategic direction of the Bank. It is due to start operating in its ‘incubation phase’ in April 2012, becoming fully operational once State Aid clearance has been given − which expected in 2012/2013. The GIB will have the power to borrow from the capital markets in 2015, subject to GDP falling as a percentage of public sector net debt. The history At the end of 2008 E3G was asked to think about how, if the UK were to apply a fiscal stimulus to the UK economy, it could be used to stimulate green investment. It quickly became clear that the institutional framework required to quickly and efficiently push public money out into the economy was missing in the UK and the idea of a Green Investment Bank was born. In March 2009, E3G and Climate Change Capital published a series of papers looking at ways in which the Government could grasp the economic opportunity of the low carbon transition to mobilise private funds in a risk-averse market into public purpose activities. This included a paper entitled Financing the UK’s Low Carbon Transformation which proposed the establishment of a Green Infrastructure Bank to “catalyse (rather than crowd-out) private sector investment through the effective and efficient use public finance to implement low carbon infrastructure investment through a variety of public/private finance approaches”.  While the UK Government at that time did not take up the proposals, a wider debate was seeded and led to a series of related papers being published − notably by the Environmental Audit Committee, Aldersgate Group, Green Alliance and the Policy Exchange. In November 2010, the then Shadow Chancellor George Osbourne announced that the Conservative Party would be consulting on the creation of a Green Investment Bank. This announcement was followed by the creation of a high profile working group − the Green Investment Bank Commission − in February 2010, chaired by Bob Wigley, Chairman of Yell Group Plc. Both E3G and Climate Change Capital were selected to become members of the Commission, which was charged with providing independent advice to the Conservative Party on the role, scale and focus for the Bank. In May 2010, following the UK’s General Election, E3G published Green Infrastructure Bank, green bonds and policy outlining the role the GIB could play in accelerating the UK’s low carbon transformation, including more detailed thinking on the role of green bonds in scaling up available capital and in driving energy efficiency investment via the GIB in particular. These papers had formed the basis of E3G’s advocacy work on the GIB and set out a framework for thinking about how the bank should be set up, operate and identify priority projects to ensure it effectively manages the tension between delivering public good and acting as a commercial organisation without crowding out private capital. In July 2010 the Green Investment Bank Commission’s report ‘Unlocking Investment to Deliver Britain’s Low Carbon Future’ was published. The Commission recommended that the GIB be established to act in the public interest to identify and address market failures and investment barriers over the long term. The report stated the GIB should sit alongside the Committee on Climate Change, which advises Government on legally binding climate change targets, and provide financial advice to Government on climate change-related investment issues. In August 2010, the UK Government formally set up a Government Green Investment Bank Working Group. In September 2011 an independent report by Ernst & Young indicated that initial capitalisation of £4 billion to £6 billion over four years was needed for a credible institution to be established. In October 2010, under the Comprehensive Spending Review, £1 billion was allocated as start up capital. In March 2011 a further £2 billion was allocated from the UK Budget to the Bank. In October 2010 the Parliamentary Environmental Audit Committee set up an inquiry into the GIB, publishing its final report in March 2011. Following this, in May 2011, the Government’s ‘Update on the Green Investment Bank’ was published. This document sets out the GIB’s mission as follows. ‘The GIB’s mission will be to accelerate private sector investment in the UK’s transition to a green economy. Its initial remit will be to focus on green infrastructure assets. It will work to a ‘double bottom line’ of both achieving significant green impact and making financial returns. It will also operate independently and at arm’s length from Government, which will agree its strategic priorities over Spending Review periods.’ Details of the high level business model and early sector focus for the GIB were set down, including: The GIB will support the Government’s green policy objectives and will focus initially on offshore wind, waste and energy efficiency sectors; The GIB will play a key role in addressing financial market failures and use a range of product interventions to achieve its aims; The GIB will be set up as an enduring institution and will be enshrined in Statute; The GIB will have powers to borrow and will apply for a banking license. Implementation will consist of three phases: Phase 1 − Incubation: From April 2012 to achieving State Aid clearance, with investments structured so that either (i) no state aid is involved (because the Government is participating on fully commercial terms); or (ii) the projects are within the scope of existing state aid exemptions and approvals. Phase II – Establishment: Following state aid approval, the GIB will evolve into a stand-alone institution. In this phase, the GIB will be created as a fully operational institution with a well-defined organisational structure and operating model and will act as a provider of financial support and investment for the green economy. Its set-up and scale will, to a large extent, depend on its sector and product distribution focus. Phase III – Borrowing powers: From April 2015, and if public sector net debt is falling as a percentage of GDP, the GIB will acquire borrowing powers. This will enable it to broaden the scope of its product offering and sector focus and to become a significant lender for green investments across a wider range of sectors if the case for market failure of capital provision is made. The GIB Advisory Group Chair − Sir Adrian Montague − was also appointed, followed, in August 2011, by the GIB Advisory Group Members. The Group’s remit is to advise Ministers on the establishment and strategic direction of the Bank. Next steps Legislation for the GIB is expected in 2012 and the GIB’s State Aid Application is due to be submitted to the European Commission at the end of 2011. Official GIB webpage The UK Government’s Green Investment Bank website with relevant materials can be accessed at http://www.bis.gov.uk/greeninvestmentbank Advocacy E3G builds coalitions and has worked with a number of other organisations to deliver political support for a high ambition Bank.  These include: The Aldersgate Group Green Alliance Institute of Civil Engineers The Green Investment Bank advocacy campaign has been coordinated by Transform UK, an alliance of investors, businesses and NGOs committed to accelerating investment into the low carbon economy. E3G continues to work on this issue. For further details please contact: Ingrid Holmes or Ed Matthew. Systems for Change - Low Carbon Finance 2011-12-01T14:14:13+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/programmes/systems-articles/ends-these-plans-for-planning-need-urgent-rethinking/ http://www.e3g.org/programmes/systems-articles/ends-these-plans-for-planning-need-urgent-rethinking/#When:14:56:11Z There is almost certainly a good case to be made for simplifying the planning system by reducing the large volume of planning guidance issued by central government. But the government has not even tried to make it. Instead it has made an argument so clearly implausible that even the Daily Telegraph has seen fit to take up arms against it. The planning system, we are told, is a major obstacle to economic growth. Growth is now the primary imperative of government policy. Therefore, the planning system must be made to generate growth. We are also short of houses because the planning system discourages investment by housebuilders. Out must go 1,000 pages of planning regulations and in must come 58 pages of sloppily drafted good intentions. No one should doubt the government’s appetite for growth. The economy grew by a mere 0.2% in the last quarter. The accuracy implied by a number this precise is wholly misleading when it comes to the economy. All we really know is that it did not grow a lot – and nor did it shrink very much. Nevertheless, such is the government’s hunger for growth that it is now proposing to throw out more than 60 years of successful planning in its pursuit. This will not generate much growth of any kind, let alone green growth. But it will certainly destroy the government’s claim to be “the greenest government ever”. The proposed National Policy Planning Framework will create a presumption in favour of sustainable development. This sounds green enough but is in fact just a cynical word play dreamed up by a malign alliance of Treasury mandarins and Murdoch-trained spin doctors. As the rest of the document makes clear, any development not specifically forbidden will now be approved. What the government actually means by ‘sustainable development’ is the tired old Treasury mantra of ‘sustained growth’ – that is, growth that goes on for ever. It definitely does not mean growth that recognises environmental risks and constraints. Indeed, at one point it specifically instructs councils that retail and leisure needs must not be “compromised by limited site availability”. This is not a policy based on any evidence worthy of the word. It is actually a demonstration of something Goebbels understood: if you repeat a lie often enough it will be mistaken for the truth. The planning system has not been a significant constraint on development in Britain, now or in the past, no matter how many tabloid-friendly anecdotes are thrown up in shabby surveys from business associations. As the government’s own statistics make clear, more than 80% of planning applications are approved. Of those refusals that are appealed, some 90% are then approved. This means less than 15% of planning applications are refused. It is hardly inconceivable that one in ten planning applications may actually be bad enough to warrant refusal. As for house-building, if the planning system is such an obstacle why do the housebuilders have a quarter of a million permitted dwelling sites in the south-east alone that they have yet to build on? The main constraints on development and thus growth are stagnating real incomes, the exhaustion of personal credit, the reluctance of banks to lend and the collapse of confidence in public policy on too many fronts to remember. If you underinvest for decades in competence and capacity in local and central government, you should not be completely surprised when it takes longer and longer to get anything at all done. We know exactly what we need to do to generate growth and what is more, growth that would also be green. Investing in the infrastructure for a carbon-neutral resource-efficient economy will kick-start the growth that is currently missing and make our economy more resilient to the price shocks of an age of scarcity. We need to spend many billions of pounds of public and private money on the grid enhancements, high-speed rail network, carbon capture and storage pipelines, distributed generation technologies, integrated recycling plants, energy efficiency improvements and electric vehicle charging networks that are the platforms for growth of the economy as a whole. These investments would underpin national prosperity in the 21st century in exactly the way the motorway networks underpinned prosperity in the 20th century and the railways in the 19th century. It is clear that the government has learned nothing about its own political heartlands from its recent searing experience with trying to sell the public forests. Whatever its actual intentions – which are likely to have been perfectly decent in the case of Greg Clarke – this policy proposal is now firmly cast, along with the Red Tape Challenge, as an ideologically driven sop to its business contributors. Paradoxically, this sorry farrago is likely to be bad for growth and for business. This government has, until now, escaped any political backlash for taking forward the previous government’s policy on infrastructure planning. This is the planning that really matters for growth. Now that the shires and the NGOs are fully aroused these waters are likely to become a lot more turbulent. The battering that the high-speed two (HS2) rail link is currently receiving is a harbinger of rows to come that will impede growth, some of which would be honestly green. The current planning system, for all the frustration it causes to business leaders who are compelled to take the interests of others into account, was pretty predictable as the success rate of applications demonstrates. This predictability has now been removed. Local communities and their allies in the pressure groups will now feel thoroughly entitled to use every possible opportunity to delay and defeat development projects they dislike. If you abandon a rules-based approach to life you should not be surprised when others feel that they no longer have to play by the rules. Tom Burke is a founding director of E3G and a visiting professor at Imperial and University Colleges, London. He also advises Rio Tinto. This article was written by Tom Burke for the Political Commentary in ENDS report. Systems for Change - News & Comment 2011-10-20T14:56:11+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/programmes/systems-articles/green-investment-bank-qa/ http://www.e3g.org/programmes/systems-articles/green-investment-bank-qa/#When:12:26:37Z 1. Why is the GIB needed? An investment of £750 billion is needed by 2025 to help decarbonise the UK economy. The Green Investment Bank (GIB) is required to help secure this investment. It can achieve this at least cost to the taxpayer and can act as a catalyst for green growth. 2. How would the GIB work? It should work with the market to identify and address market failures that limit private investment in low carbon infrastructure and businesses. It would do this by providing financial advice to Government, technical advice to projects/businesses, and by developing financial products to share risk and lever in private capital. 3. Why can’t the private sector deliver the low carbon investment needed without the GIB? The risks involved (technology- and policy-related) combined with the scale of capital required over a relatively short time period compared to the balance sheets of the traditional finance providers (including banks and utility companies) mean the capital needed to decarbonise the UK will not be forthcoming. Analysis by Ernst and Young indicates that for the energy sector, for example, only 10−20 percent of the capital required to 2025 will be secured without a GIB to facilitate capital flows. 4. Why not create another fund or quango? Government has a long track record of developing a variety of ad hoc responses to investment challenges such as the CCS Competition, the UK Innovations Investment Fund, TIFU − that have failed to effectively address the underlying issues. Some stand-alone initiatives have also failed at very significant cost to the public purse, for example, the Metronet PPP, which was bailed out by the Government to the tune of ~£2bn in 2008. Infrastructure UK’s National Infrastructure Plan supports this view noting that for the last few decades the Government’s approach to infrastructure investment has been “timid, uncoordinated, incremental and wasteful” and that this must change. A GIB fund or quango also can’t reach the scale needed because it can’t issue bonds to leverage its capital base (see next point). A fund or quango would also lack the range of professional expertise required to address uncertainty in the investment challenges that lie ahead. The low carbon transition will be a multi-decade process of change delivered through the deployment of new assets that carry significant risks. It will also occur over several business cycles through which we can expect to see contractions in capital availability, while momentum is still needed. A permanent and responsive capability in the form of the GIB is needed to build on our learning from (Public Finance Institute) PFI and public-private partnerships structures and ensure greater value for money for the taxpayer is delivered in future. 5. How much private sector capital could the GIB leverage? The GIB could leverage many times its capital base. There are no fixed rules about how much private sector capital could be leveraged by the GIB. However, using existing public banks as examples, using shareholder capital: Caixa Geral de Depositos in Portugal (equity of €7.16bn) leverages x17. ICO in Spain (equity of €2.38bn) leverages x22. KfW Bankengruppe in Germany (equity of €13.1bn) leverages x31. France’s Caisse De Depots et Consignations (equity of €23.5bn) leverages x10. All these organisations then achieve a further round of leverage through co-investment in projects with the private sector.  To illustrate, assuming the GIB leverages £4−5bn provided by the Government as equity by ~ x20 over the first 10 years it will raise ~£80bn in bonds from private sector investors and lever in an additional ~£260bn in private capital through co-investments. This will go a long way to closing the low carbon energy finance gap. 6. Does the GIB need to raise its own bonds? Yes. Requiring all the capital to be channelled from Government funds is inefficient and unwieldy − it also compromises the operational independence of the GIB from Government. Bonds are an efficient way for the GIB to access the vast pools of lower cost institutional investors capital; other European public banks regularly use such bond issuances to back their investment plans. To help close the low carbon investment gap the GB must have the power to issue its own bonds. 7. Will GIB bonds compete with gilts? Once it is fully established and has its own Statute defining its day to day operational independence from Government, the GIB is expected to carry an AA or A rating.  This lower rating means GIB bonds will not be competing with AAA-rated gilts, appealing instead to investors looking for investment grade products with slightly higher yields. In the early years, however, it will be desirable for very modest issuances of GIB bonds (a few billion) to carry a statutory guarantee to establish them in the marketplace: in this case they will be AAA rated. Any conflict that may arise between issuances of GIB bonds and gilts can be managed through the Government’s Debt Management Office (which issues gilts) being contracted by the GIB to raise GIB bonds for it. This will ensure a coordination of UK debt issuances and offer cost savings to the GIB via outsourcing this function to experts. (Continued…) 8. Will the GIB crowd-out private investment? No. Defined by the principle of additionality the GIB would have a mandate to invest only in assets the private sector currently does not invest enough in. In addition, a cap (perhaps 30−50%) could be placed on the amount of capital the GIB can invest in any single project. The GIB could also have a policy of refinancing assets with private sector capital once the riskier construction phase is complete and assets are operational with stable cash flows. 9. Will it be on HMG’s balance sheet? Off-balance sheet treatment for the GIB can be technically achieved from day one but it carries significant risks because it will limit the ability of the GIB to raise its own capital and will not send the strong signal required by the financial community that the Government is seriously committed to decarbonising the economy.  Over time the GIB could be designated off-balance sheet − and so it should be designed with this in mind. Requirements for longer term off balance sheet treatment include: independence from Government set out in Statute to clearly limit Government liabilities; an independent management team; a clear and auditable investment policy; and sufficient capitalisation. In its early phase the GIB should be set up as an on balance sheet institution with the ability to issue a modest amount of bonds that are guaranteed by the Government to create confidence despite the lack of an investment track record.  As the GIB develops an investment track record and a rating, explicit Government support can be removed and other investors invited to become shareholders and the ‘mature’ and off balance sheet GIB created. 10. Isn’t Government taking on large potential liabilities by setting up a GIB? No. We expect risk would be spread over a wide portfolio of projects − none of which individually is big enough to bring down the bank. 11. How quickly could a GIB be set up? A ‘Shadow GIB’ could be established as a limited company within months and begin the work of setting up the GIB. This will involve making practical arrangements for setting up the institution and preparing to recruit staff but also working with Government to finalise the design of the mandate, policies, business plan and products that will be needed to address specific market failures. The Shadow GIB could be ‘open for business’ and making investments by the end of 2011. In parallel a Bill should be making its way through Parliament to establish the GIB in Statute so that the GIB is launched in full in 2012. 12. Does the GIB need an Act of Parliament? Yes. An Act of Parliament is required to ensure full accountability to Parliament in terms of how public funds are spent by the GIB in the pursuit of delivering the UK’s carbon targets.  It is also needed to ensure the GIB operates independently of Government and that risk is properly managed. The Statute gives the GIB protection from short-term Government interference that might mean it is pressured into investing inappropriately. The Statute’s function is to lock down strong governance structures and operational policies that manage the tension between being a political creation but needing to act commercially. It is also necessary to achieve the medium term aspiration to have a GIB that is off balance sheet − independence from Government is one of the key requirements.  13. Won’t the GIB lead to an increase in public spending? In the short term the GIB is likely to appear on the Government’s balance sheet. But spending on the GIB is different to public spending on welfare or even school or hospitals − it is backed by assets that can be recycled to the private sector for profit.  There is no such thing as a jobless recovery. Following the very significant cuts announced in October’s Comprehensive Spending Review, 2.5m private sector jobs must be created over the next 5 years to support the growth on which the Government’s budgetary forecasts are based. This will require an investment and export boom on a scale not seen since post Second World War reconstruction.  A strong evidence base links infrastructure investment to growth, and jobs. Any short term impact of the GIB on the UK’s balance sheet must be seen in the context of being backed by assets delivering growth, jobs and tax receipts to the Treasury. Government investment in the GIB will more than pay for itself. The GIB can be the catalyst for economic recovery and a green jobs boom. 14. Is the GIB needed for the Green Deal? Yes. The sheer volume of funds needed (upwards of £7bn per year) in a short time period to support Green Deal investment are too vast compared to the balance sheets of the energy utilities and banks who might fund it and who have competing calls on their capital. As highlighted in analysis by Ernst and Young, these traditional providers of finance can provide only 10−20% of the capital required. In addition, the Green Deal has no financial track record and is not well understood by investors – so it is generally regarded as unsecured consumer finance. This perception is a barrier to raising capital and will push up the returns expected: this means the Green Deal is regarded by many investors as either un-financable ¬or financeable only in the context of high returns, which will make the loans more expensive for householders. A variety of measures could be used by the GIB to address these issues including providing initial finance, offering loan warehousing facilities and reactiviting the securitsation markets. All these measures can help bring down the cost of capital and so reduce the cost of the loans to consumers. This is critical if the loans are to bring down the energy bills of consumers. This Q&A is also available to download at the TransformUK website. Systems for Change - Low Carbon Finance 2011-01-14T12:26:37+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/programmes/systems-articles/practical-systems-thinking-the-challenge-of-tackling-complex-problems-in-da/ http://www.e3g.org/programmes/systems-articles/practical-systems-thinking-the-challenge-of-tackling-complex-problems-in-da/#When:13:53:55Z Nick Mabey recently invited to present a keynote speech at the Howard Baker Center for Public Policy. The Conference on the Formulation of Energy and Climate Policy: Toward an Open and Transparent Process was held from June 18th - 19th at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scolars. Panelists respond to the president’s call for greater transparency and collaboration in policy-making and the need for a coherent energy path forward for the nation. Nick’s presentation is available to download above. Vidoes of the various speeches are available on Woodrow Wilson Center’s website too. Systems for Change - Thinking 2009-06-22T13:53:55+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/programmes/systems-articles/the-challenge-for-government-part-ii/ http://www.e3g.org/programmes/systems-articles/the-challenge-for-government-part-ii/#When:10:55:00Z The Environmental Audit Committee inquiry into “The structure and operation of government and the challenge of climate change” is being well-provided with E3G thinking. Yesterday saw Tom Burke give evidence, following on from Nick Mabey’s earlier contributions. Tom’s evidence draws on his long experience as a special adviser to previous Environment Ministers, as well as his more recent role as Chair of the Review of Environmental Governance in Northern Ireland. Amongst other matters, Tom discussed the division between political leadership and institutional delivery; the (lack of) priority given to the environment; departmental cultures; and the energy review. Systems for Change - Thinking 2007-07-04T10:55:00+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/programmes/systems-articles/climate-change-the-challenge-for-government/ http://www.e3g.org/programmes/systems-articles/climate-change-the-challenge-for-government/#When:13:06:01Z On the 19th June, E3G Chief Executive Nick Mabey gave evidence to the Environmental Audit Committee inquiry into “The structure and operation of government and the challenge of climate change”. The discussion covered areas as diverse as political leadership, civil service culture, the role of the proposed Office of Climate Change, risk management and inter-departmental working. The uncorrected transcript of Nick’s evidence is now available online. Nick’s evidence starts at Q36, halfway down the webpage. We’ll aim to provide a download version just as soon as it is published. Systems for Change - Thinking 2007-06-26T13:06:01+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/programmes/systems-articles/practical-sustainable-development/ http://www.e3g.org/programmes/systems-articles/practical-sustainable-development/#When:13:23:01Z Nick Mabey gave a presentation on ‘Practical Sustainable Development: the challenge of long term strategy in day to day government’ at a Wilton Park conference over the weekend. The conference “Sustainable Development: Managing the transition experience of emerging markets and the UK” brought together individuals from partner countries involved in the UK’s ongoing Sustainable Development Dialogues. Nick’s presentation focusses on his experience in the UK Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit. A copy of his presentation is attached. Systems for Change - News & Comment, Systems for Change - Activities 2006-07-10T13:23:01+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/programmes/systems-articles/technology-policy-at-mit/ http://www.e3g.org/programmes/systems-articles/technology-policy-at-mit/#When:15:09:01Z E3G’s Nick Mabey has been participating in the 30th Anniversary of the Technology and Policy Program at the Massachusettes Institute of Technology. His presentation to fellow alumni is attached. Systems for Change - News & Comment, Systems for Change - Thinking 2006-06-08T15:09:01+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/programmes/systems-articles/the-challenge-of-long-term-strategy/ http://www.e3g.org/programmes/systems-articles/the-challenge-of-long-term-strategy/#When:07:29:00Z Achieving sustainable development requires long term choices in complex uncertain areas which don’t fit neatly into established government departments. However, this aspiration runs counter to the short-term realities of day-to-day government - and the media driven deadlines of modern politics. E3G Founding Director Nick Mabey recently gave a presentation on this theme to a seminar at the International Centre for the Environment, University of Bath. Nick Mabey’s presentation ‘Practical Sustainable Development: the challenge of long term strategy in day to day Government’ analyses the challenges of making sustainable development a reality. It includes a series of real policy cases studies from his work in the Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit, and suggests how these problems can be overcome. The case studies presented include fisheries policy, energy strategy and countries at risk of instability. Nick also describes how the policy proposals of interest groups fall short when placed in the context of the choices that decision-makers can take. Nick Mabey’s presentation is attached here for download in pdf format. Systems for Change - Thinking 2006-03-14T07:29:00+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/concept/concept-articles/climate-campaign-strategy-a-critique-of-the-common-cause-approach/ http://www.e3g.org/concept/concept-articles/climate-campaign-strategy-a-critique-of-the-common-cause-approach/#When:09:48:58Z www.climatestrategy.org newsletter 66 presents a critique of the traditional ‘common cause’ approach environmentalists have taken to engaging the public with their cause.  I think this paper is something everyone involved in campaigning should read.  It is the best analysis I have read of why the environment community is losing public opinion on climate change. It is a great antidote to the implicit arrogance of so much environmental campaigning. This is achieved by demonstrating that changing people’s opinion by means of a moral crusade repeatedly fails and changing outcomes rather than minds is the key to campaign success.  Renewing Environmentalism 2010-11-08T09:48:58+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/concept/concept-articles/cities-civilisation-and-the-climate/ http://www.e3g.org/concept/concept-articles/cities-civilisation-and-the-climate/#When:09:41:36Z Tom Burke recently wrote an article for CEOs for Cities discussing the link between the development of cities and the resulting resource scarcity. Cities, Civilisation and Climate Civilisation is the thin film of order that human beings with ingenuity and imagination have constructed around the chaos of events. In a rapidly changing climate this is at its most brittle in our cities. More than half the world’s population now live in cities and in some countries it is over 75%. This proportion will grow as the century advances. Throughout human history the development of cities has marked the advance of civilisation. This advance is now at risk and with it the future of cities. Cities are the centres of art, learning and culture. They are sources of immense creativity and innovation. They power economies, drive knowledge and skills ever upwards. They provide access to jobs and services of extraordinary value and diversity. For centuries they have delivered a higher quality of life to more people than is ever possible in rural areas. It is not surprising that they have consistently been a magnet for migration both between and within nations. As a result they have grown larger ever more rapidly. In 1900, the London in which I live was the largest city in the world. Its population was six and a half million. Today it is about to drop out of the top twenty. Nine cities now have populations of more than ten million people and 650 over 1 million. In 1900 all of the top ten cities were in industrialised nations. Now only two are. But size has been bought at a price. Once upon a time cities directly controlled most of the hinterland on which they depended for food, energy, resources and markets for their manufactures. The city states of Italy or the myriad principalities of Germany were the result. In the market near where I live there is still a board from the 19th Century detailing the tolls for driving the live sheep and cattle over London Bridge to feed the city’s inhabitants. Now cities no longer have any direct control over the far flung logistical networks on which they depend for food, energy, raw materials and water. Rather they rely on being able to generate sufficient revenues to buy them on global markets and ship them from every corner of the world. These logistical systems themselves rely on huge, expensive and vulnerable reticulated networks of roads, power, pipe and rail lines, fibre optic cables and the rest of the complex infrastructure that underpins a modern city. Cities are also the dominant centres of governance and political power. They are, in effect, the key nodes in the operating system that makes all the astounding possibilities of 21st Century life – the applications if you like - work. Dysfunctional cities mean dysfunctional government and the chaos that accompanies it. We have seen what happens when that operating system collapses. Five years on, and with all the capabilities and resources of the United States to hand, New Orleans is a long way from having fully recovered from hurricane Katrina. You cannot claim that Katrina was caused by climate change, but you cannot doubt the graphic insight it gave into what climate change might mean. Except that it will not only be happening in one city. The floods in Pakistan illustrate what happens when extreme weather events go to scale. More than a tenth of the country’s population has been affected, several cities inundated, millions of homes destroyed, businesses disrupted, infrastructure destroyed. Again, this may not be a consequence of climate change, but it is an example of what life might be like in a world 4°C hotter than today. We are moving from an age of abundance to one of scarcity. Food, water and energy supplies are all under increasing stress. Demand for food is projected to double by the middle of the century. Almost half the world’s population will be experiencing severe water stress within twenty years. Global primary energy demand will increase by a third in the same period and with it carbon emissions will increase by forty percent. Climate change is a stress multiplier making it more difficult to tackle these crucial resource issues. Energy security, food security, water security and climate security are the interconnected substrates of the economy. They are the pillars of prosperity. As the stability of those pillars degrades so too do the prospects for the economy. As these resource pillars become more insecure so the stress on the logistical systems and infrastructure that makes life in cities not only tolerable, but possible at all, grows. And with it, the cost of keeping them viable. Eventually these burdens will become unbearable and life in cities will go from being desirable to being intolerable. These stresses on the pillars of prosperity are not unmanageable. We already possess the essential knowledge, technologies and skills to do so effectively. It is also clear that there are no fundamental economic barriers to doing so. However, there will be fundamental changes in the current pattern of economic winners and losers. Some industries, the oil industry for example, will disappear. Others will grow dramatically. This makes the politics very difficult. The world is currently on course for a 4°C temperature rise, possibly by as soon as 2060. The climate change we are now experiencing is the result of a rise of about 1°C. We have no idea of whether civilisation can cope with a change as rapid and dramatic as that which will occur with in the lifetime of anyone under forty if we do not urgently deal with climate change. But we do know, from the windows on the future provided by New Orleans and Pakistan, just how difficult it will be for cities to cope. A 4°C hotter world will turn most of the advantages of city life into disadvantages. As stresses over food, water and energy mount, order and security will decline. The logistic ligatures that now tie cities to their extended hinterland will become overburdened and will progressively fail. Tom Burke is a Visiting Professor at Imperial and University Colleges, London and a Founding Director of E3G, Third Generation Environmentalism.   21st Century Sustainable Development 2010-09-07T09:41:36+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/concept/concept-articles/a-real-shift-in-green-politics/ http://www.e3g.org/concept/concept-articles/a-real-shift-in-green-politics/#When:16:38:07Z The Independent on Sunday today carried an excellent piece by veteran environmental journalist Geoffrey Lean today, in which he teases apart the increasingly green appearance of UK politicians. The article, Today, the plastic bag. Tomorrow… even more words? , points out that even Boris Johnson has made efforts to shake off his previous anti-environment reputation in his bid to become Mayor of London. Lean questions whether such shows of greenery are really here to stay, but does find evidence to show that they might be: As Bob Worcester, doyen of British pollsters, puts it: “The politicians are running scared of not being seen to be green enough.” And Ipsos Mori, the firm that he founded, reports that Britons are beginning to match their concern with action – with 80 per cent now recycling, two-thirds buying some organic and fairly traded products, and half buying green goods and taking steps to reduce their energy consumption at home. “Something is happening that is not just another fashionable wave,” says Professor Tom Burke from Imperial College London, one of the country’s shrewdest green commentators. “We are seeing the mainstreaming of environmentalism.” He likens it to how the US Democratic nomination race is about “whether you care most about the present or the future. Clinton is all about the present, as is the British Government. But Obama and the politics of the environment are about the future.” But as always, the proof of the pudding will be in the eating - and its a something that the future itself will decide. Renewing Environmentalism 2008-03-02T16:38:07+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/concept/concept-articles/third-generation-environmentalism-a-mini-manifesto/ http://www.e3g.org/concept/concept-articles/third-generation-environmentalism-a-mini-manifesto/#When:09:03:00Z Back in the early days of E3G, we produced a short introductory manifesto to describe who we were and what we were trying to do. Much of the institutional information that document contained has now been superseded as E3G itself has evolved and grown. But our analysis of the reasons why a new approach was required has stood the test of time rather better. Here below is a snapshot of our early thinking from 2004. Third Generation Environmentalism: Only Connect John Ashton, Tom Burke, Nick Mabey The first generation of environmentalism focussed on the conservation of species and habitats. The second generation widened that focus to include pollution and natural resources. Campaigning from outside the established institutions, the environment movement in the 20th Century brilliantly succeeded in building consciousness of the harm human beings are doing to their planet and thus to themselves. It has been less successful in changing the choices and behaviours that cause that harm. Third generation environmentalism builds on this success. The third generation of environmentalists are not outsiders. They are to be found at all levels in bureaucracies, corporations, universities, trades unions, professional associations, voluntary organisations and elsewhere throughout the world. They are for solutions rather than against problems. They know that no one nation, organisation or person can deliver lasting environmental change. They will work with anyone, anywhere, who has something better to offer the environment. E3G is an environmental organisation for the 21st Century. Its mission is to turn arguments into achievements by working with the hundreds of thousands of third generation environmentalists to be found within the existing matrices of power and influence. E3G does not have a new environmental agenda. It has a different approach to the current agenda. Moving the Agenda Stabilising the climate, halting the collapse of ecosystems, building sustainable communities, meeting our long term needs for water, energy, food, health, fibre and minerals responsibly are core challenges of the 21st Century. Failure will undermine civilisation itself. National, economic and personal security are all undermined by a degraded environment. Political instability, poverty and ill health all increase as environmental quality declines. Humanity is not fundamentally short of the resources, technology and capital to deliver security and prosperity to all of the eight billion people that will soon share our planet. We know now how to do this without irreparably degrading the environment which supports all our livelihoods. But our inability to put resources, technologies and capital together in ways that are sustainable is ever more apparent. Wherever you look, unsolved problems mount while the means to solve them lie unused. Making it Work The roots of today’s environmental problems lie deep in our current institutions and political processes. They are faults with the system as a whole. By their very nature, environmental problems cannot be dealt with from silos – from one government department, industry sector or advocacy position alone. Changing institutional and political structures is a long term goal. In the meantime, we must make our existing system work better. The E3G vision is that we can do much more with the structures and institutions we already have. We must enable third generation environmentalists to work better together across the institutional and political boundaries that obstruct change. We believe that the information and communication technologies we now possess create new and under-used opportunities to mobilise effective responses to environmental challenges. Our task is to accelerate the transition to sustainable development. Our role is to design new solutions to sustainable development problems fully engaging the realms of technology and economics, politics and culture. We are guided by: the need to link the possible to the practical by connecting reachable goals to next steps; the need to build coalitions of support concurrently with policy proposals; the need to create new tools and methods for problem solving; the need to harness and align existing personal, professional and policy commitments; the need to trace solutions through departmental and disciplinary boundaries.Beginnings E3G is a work in progress. It began as an idea – that it was time for a third generation of environmental action. For the past eighteen months we have worked together and with others to turn that idea into a robust concept. We are now engaged in a further eighteen months of proving the concept – testing its application in the real world through a variety of projects. We have developed a new model for an environmental organisation. At first, environmentalists believed that if enough good quality information and media profile could be generated on environmental issues progress would eventually occur. Now we all know better. The scale and urgency of the environmental problems facing humanity are such that this is not enough. More is needed. Knowledge and public awareness must be actively drilled deeper into our decision making processes. The first two generations of environmentalists clearly identified the problems and defined the goals we must reach – a stable climate, greatly increased resource efficiency, sustainable management of biological resources, reduced exposure to dangerous chemicals and radioactivity. The third generation’s priority is to engage that knowledge and awareness more effectively so that those goals are reached. E3G will forge a stronger connection between what must be done and how things get done. E3G adds value through our experience of the way institutions work and our networks of relationships with aware insiders everywhere. This is why our activities are structured differently from those of other environmental bodies. It is not our job to research and campaign on the environment, duplicating the work of others. Rather, we take goals that are widely discussed, but rarely reached, and add the focus and political momentum necessary to turn aspiration into accomplishment. Renewing Environmentalism 2007-09-09T09:03:00+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/concept/concept-articles/environment-and-business-in-the-21st-century/ http://www.e3g.org/concept/concept-articles/environment-and-business-in-the-21st-century/#When:11:20:00Z On the 9th November 2006, E3G’s Tom Burke gave the annual Barclay Foundation Lecture at Templeton College, Oxford. Speaking on the topic of ‘Environment and Business in the 21st Century: Risks, Rewards and Responses’ Tom laid out his assessment of the challenge facing businesses and governments as they seek to tackle the hard politics of the environment. An edited version of Tom’s speech was featured in the winter 2007 edition of the Templeton College Newsletter. The full text of Tom’s speech follows below, and is also attached in pdf format for download. Environment and Business in the 21st Century: Risks, Rewards and Responses. The Evelyne and Clifford H Barclay Foundation Lecture, Templeton College, Oxford. Address by Mr Tom Burke CBE, 9th November 2006. Let me begin by thanking Michael Earl and Stephen Barclay for the invitation to address you this evening. This was a completely unexpected honour and not one for which I am well prepared by prior experience. John Templeton exhorted us to ‘work at being a humble person’. Following in the footsteps of such distinguished previous lecturers as Eddie George and Charles Handy means I am not finding that so hard to do this evening. I am better prepared to live up to one of his other precepts as ‘one who, according to the customs of his time, might be branded a heretic’. More than thirty years working as an environmentalist have made me rather familiar with the theory and practise of heresy. But there have been many over those years who sought assiduously to bring me back to whatever they conceived of as the true faith. This has meant that I have received a rather superior education as leading figures in many walks of life went out of their way make sure that I fully understood the workings of their institution or profession. It has also paved the way for a somewhat chequered career – though that might be far too organised a word for my rather erratic passage through the environmental NGOs, government and business. But it does mean that I have been privileged to experience the hugely challenging issues of the environment from a variety of perspectives. It also means that I have drawn considerably on the knowledge and experience of a great many colleagues in developing my thinking on the challenges facing business and the environment as we move deeper into the twenty first century. They do not, however, bear any responsibility for the results. My proposition this evening is that the 21st century will pose environmental challenges to the business community that are of a different order than those posed in the 20th century. This will create both new kinds of risk and new opportunities for business to respond to. If the challenges of the 20th Century required a tactical response from business, those of the 21st century will require a strategic response. Contributing to the global transition to sustainable development will be an imperative for business, not an option. So will forming active partnerships with government to maintain the environmental conditions which make security and prosperity possible. We live in extraordinary times. More people live longer, healthier lives, with more prosperity and greater security than ever before in history. We live in a world beyond our parents’ wildest dreams. There is no beach too remote, nor mountaintop too distant, for us to visit. We are connected to each other as never before: by trade, by internet, by satellite television and mobile phone. It is also a world of accelerating change. Globalisation has greatly expanded the realm of opportunity lifting many millions out of poverty. The creation of a single global information space has allowed us to create truly global markets for capital, goods and services. Falling prices of energy, commodities capital and information have underpinned prolonged growth of the global economy. But globalisation of opportunity has not often been accompanied by globalisation of responsibility. Too many millions can see, but cannot reach, the opportunities. Not all the change is good. When I was born there were just over 2 billion people on the planet. Today there are 6.5 billion. With luck, and the benefit of modern medicine, I might well live to see the 8 billionth person born. When I was born there were about six million elephants on earth. Today there are about six hundred thousand. I may well also live to see the last elephant in the wild die. The extraordinary economic growth we have witnessed in the past fifty years has not been bought without cost. Much of that cost has fallen on the environment. Not until the end of the sixties did the world begin to tackle this problem with any conviction. Since then we have been dealing with the easy politics of the environment. It has a familiar agenda. Air and water quality. Noise and nuisances. Toxic chemicals, radioactivity, wastes and recycling. Business everywhere is now increasingly engaged in solving these problems. They are the easy politics of the environment because the need to tackle these issues was clear. Rivers were catching fire or feet deep in foam. Children could be found playing on uncontrolled hazardous waste dumps. When politicians did take action there were many more winners than losers. The policy tools and institutions required were easily available. The issues were readily comprehensible to the media since there were clear villains and victims. You were on the side of the victims – who were often found among the least advantaged – and against the villains – who quite often turned out to be businesses. In much of the world we have done well on this environmental agenda. We have made significant progress in improving air and water quality; wastes are much more commonly recycled. Furthermore, the cost of dealing with them turned out to be much less than was often thought. Cutting pollution very often also cut costs. Dealing with this environmental agenda may not have seemed easy at the time but compared to the agenda that is now coming to dominate the environmental debate it really was. In the 21st century we must face the hard politics of the environment. The agenda is different: climate change, deforestation, water availability, biodiversity loss, fisheries collapse, soil loss. The need to tackle these issues is not so obvious. Fishermen are still arguing that there are plenty of fish in the sea. Former chancellors will still tell you there is no need to do anything about climate change. If you do act on this agenda, there are many more losers than winners. It is not immediately obvious what policy tools and institutions are needed. The media has great trouble getting a clear focus on the complex trade-offs involved and has no easy way of dealing with problems where the villains and the victims are the same people. Needless to say, we have made little progress in solving these problems and while that might, at first sight, look to have let business off the hook my argument this evening is that the business community will pay dearly for this failure as the century progresses. The agenda of the hard politics of the environment might also be called the sustainable development agenda. I know of no concept more prone to produce definitional constipation than sustainable development. I am quite content with the original Brundtland definition – development which meets the needs of today’s generation without undermining the capacity of future generations to meet their needs. Put operationally this means finding the ways to provide rising real incomes to some 8 billion people without collapsing the ecological foundations of the economy – croplands, rangelands, forestlands, freshwaters, the atmosphere and the ocean. Let me take a moment here to set sustainable development in its historical context. The phrase is rather more than a fashionable arrangement of words, though that is often overlooked, even by it most active promoters. From about the middle of the 18th Century there was a sustained debate, predominantly within Europe, about how to make the economy grow. As the industrial revolution gathered pace under the stimulus of the Napoleonic wars and the subsequent prolonged period of peace the answer became clear. If individuals are freed to pursue their own self-interest, the interests of all will be enhanced and the economy will grow. As a formula for increasing economic growth, there is no doubt that this argument was correct. As this liberal doctrine gained hold, economies did indeed grow rapidly. But as they grew they let loose an avalanche of change. It soon became apparent that economic growth disrupts social ligatures. The complex, multi-dimensional relationships of relatively stable communities are replaced in the creative destruction of capitalism by the simpler, transactional relationships of the cash economy. Cultural bonds with their complex patterns of mutual rights and obligations are replaced by economic bonds based simply on the ability to pay. This is undoubtedly more efficient. It is not necessarily more stable. Margaret Thatcher never quite understood that you cannot have both an accelerating expansion of economic opportunity and a return to Victorian values. The corrosive effect of rapid economic growth demolishes precisely those culturally rooted implicit rules which expressed Victorian values. In the 19th Century rapid economic growth led, then in Europe, as it does now globally, to very rapid social change. This social change, unmediated by any attempt to ameliorate its impacts on the welfare of large numbers of people, led to growing political instability which threatened to undermine the engine of the economic growth driving the change. It is worth recalling that by 1848 Marx had already written the communist manifesto. In time, the beneficiaries of industrialisation came to realise that to continue reaping the benefits they had to share them. A new debate began about how to maintain the social conditions necessary for growth. The answer that emerged over the next century was that some of the proceeds of economic growth must be invested in maintaining those social conditions. Institutions, policies and programmes were developed to do just that. Starting with Bismarck in the 1870s the nations of Europe slowly laid the foundations for the culture of solidarity, community and social investment that is modern Europe’s greatest strength. But we learned too late that we needed to invest some of the proceeds of economic growth to maintain the social conditions necessary for it to continue. Our failure to do so in good time let loose the massive tide of social tensions that swept through every country in Europe at the end of the 19th Century. As a consequence we spent the first half of the 20th Century deciding empirically whether communism or fascism was our preferred form of totalitarianism. By the middle of the last century there was no longer any argument over the need for nations to invest in health, education and social security in order to underpin their economies. The purpose of public policy expanded from simply facilitating economic growth to promoting economic development, that is, growth plus welfare. The arguments over how much welfare to provide and how best to provide it will continue for a very long time but very few today believe that governments can ensure prosperity without such investment. As population and prosperity accelerated in the aftermath of the Second World War the world entered an era of very rapid economic development. Within two decades a new debate began. As air and water quality deteriorated, wastes accumulated, the deserts spread, cities sprawled and natural habitats and the plants and animals that lived in them began to disappear, doubts emerged as to whether the planet could continue to provide the resources necessary to maintain the momentum of development. Reinforced by the graphic pictures from space of a blue and white planet alone in the darkness of the universe these growing doubts led to the first of the great global conferences that punctuated the last decades of the 20th Century. The Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment in 1972 defined for the first time an agenda for action to protect the planet’s environment. Over the following thirty years it became increasingly clear that we now needed to invest some of the proceeds of our burgeoning economic development in maintaining the environmental conditions for that development or it would not occur. In other words, economic development must become sustainable development if prosperity and security were to be ensured in the 21st Century. Let me recapitulate this argument. Lesson from history slide We can see very clearly where we have got to in the current debate by looking at Britain’s budget. In 2004, we spent some two hundred and forty five billion pounds on health, education and social security. We spent about fifty four billion pounds on internal and external security and about seven and a half billion pounds on the environment. In other words, we spent a great deal on maintaining the social conditions for prosperity and practically nothing on maintaining the environmental conditions. I wonder if these are really the right priorities to ensure security and prosperity for our children as the 21st century progresses. If we are to meet successfully the challenge of maintaining the environmental conditions for prosperity and security we must focus particular attention on the four resource pillars of prosperity. These are food security, water security, energy security and climate security. Together they provide a mutually reinforcing foundation on which the global economy rests. The rising affluence of a growing population in an increasingly interdependent world is stressing all four pillars. I will resist the temptation to drown you in gloomy data to illustrate my point. Let me simply leave you with one or two salient facts in each of the four areas: Cereal consumption has doubled since 1970 and stockpiles relative to consumption are at their lowest levels ever; 30% of the world’s major fisheries now have yields that are at less than 10% of their original level. On current projection there will be a 100% collapse by 2050; One third of the world’s population currently experience water stress. Two thirds of china’s cities, that is 400, already suffer water shortages; More than 250 rivers worldwide are depleted. In many years the Nile, Yellow, Indus, Rio Grande, Colorado, Oxus and Murray rivers do not reach the sea. This year, as last, drought has struck the Amazon; By 2030 world primary energy demand will be 80% greater than it was at the beginning of the century. Oil demand will be 116 million barrels per day compared to today’s 84 million barrels a day; Global average temperatures are rising by 0.2 degrees centigrade a decade. On current projections we will double the amount of carbon we add to the atmosphere each year by 2030.Each of these pressures would be significant in its own right, but it is the nexus of interactions between them that pose the more serious problem. These are poorly understood, pay no respect to geographical or bureaucratic boundaries and will be very difficult to manage. Our food security is hugely dependent on cheap energy to make the chemicals and pump the water necessary to maintain agricultural productivity, the transport to get the food to ever more urbanised consumers and to run the machinery to produce and process food. Without water for irrigation, far less land would be useful for food production, especially in the drylands where a great many of the world’s poorest people live. Nearly a third of the world’s population live in areas suffering already from water stress. This creates an ever greater demand for energy to pump water from ever deeper aquifers. Maintaining energy security today means being able use fossil fuels for transport and electricity generation. But demand for those fossil fuels is driving the price upwards and the use of them is destabilising the climate. An unstable climate will exacerbate water and food stress because a warmer world makes dry areas drier and also lower crop yields. These interactions mean that future political stability of China may depend on how well the U.S. manages its increasingly stressed water resources west of the Mississippi. Poor American water management leading to lower yields from the harvest in the U.S. can readily turn into large price rises for food in China. In 2006, the global grain harvest was lower than demand, largely as a result of higher temperatures. Falling farm yields in China resulting from temperature rises and water shortages due to climate change will add more price pressure. As will the growing demand for grain to convert to ethanol in order to meet growing energy security anxieties. Any sustained conjunction of such factors could very quickly lead to political instability in China. But in our interdependent economy that is also our problem. We share a dilemma with China and with the other rapidly emerging economies. We must all keep our economies growing in order to maintain social cohesion in Europe and basic political stability in China. But it is now increasingly clear that if our economies continue to grow as at present then we will degrade the pillars of prosperity, in some cases to the point of collapse. Were that to happen it will be impossible to keep our economies growing anyway. In either case, social cohesion and political stability is threatened unless we can find better ways to use resources and put much more effort into maintaining the integrity of the pillars. No issue more clearly illustrates that shared dilemma than climate change. It is certainly timely to take a closer look at this pillar of prosperity in the wake of the recent publication of the stern report. But is also an issue that vividly illustrates the changing nature of the landscape of risk and opportunity in which business leaders will need to operate successfully in the 21st century. There is now a high degree of confidence in the basic science of climate change. We know by observation that global average temperatures have risen by about 0.70c in the last century. We also know by observation that the concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere is now about 425 parts per million carbon dioxide equivalent up from the pre-industrial 280 parts per million. (Carbon dioxide equivalent is the concentration of carbon dioxide itself (380PPM) plus the carbon dioxide equivalent of the concentration of the other anthropogenic greenhouse gases e.g. methane, nitrous oxide etc). We know that this warming is already having an impact on ice sheets, glaciers, sea levels, and extreme weather events. We know enough about the mechanisms by which the long run translation of the carbon burden into temperature rises works to be able to predict with confidence that, even if we stopped any additional carbon entering the atmosphere today, we would still experience another 0.7°c rise in global average temperature. So whatever we do, or do not do, we are committed to a rise in temperature of 1.40c. This is very close to the 2.0°c threshold that European environment ministers have said marks the boundary of dangerous climate change. Of course, we are not going to stop carbon emissions overnight so we would be prudent to plan for a world in which temperatures go above 2.0°c. The Stern report is the most thorough and authoritative analysis of the economics of climate change yet to be conducted. Its core conclusions are very clear. Taking effective action on climate change would reduce global GDP by about 1% per year. Failing to take action would reduce it by between 5 – 20% - it would, in Stern’s own words risk ‘derailing the economy’. To avoid this risk, Stern concludes we must keep the eventual concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere to between 500 and 550 parts per million carbon dioxide equivalent. This is no small task. As environment minister, Ian Pearson, recently pointed out, it means we have to get all of the carbon out of our energy system by about 2050 and then we must keep it out, effectively for ever. Let me illustrate this prospect with a graph I call Stern on a page. ‘Stern on a page’ graph All four pillars of prosperity are coming under increasing stress as the rate of change in the global economy accelerates. Climate change stresses all the other stressors. We will not ever be short of energy, but unless we invest – at least twenty trillion dollars by 2030 according to the international energy agency’s latest forecast – in the technologies to make that energy available, energy insecurity will increase. On current plans most of that investment will make the climate problem much worse. Changing its technology trajectory so that it becomes carbon neutral is, however, a massive opportunity for those with the foresight to seize it. But, a world in which climate change and growing food and water insecurity is intensifying social, economic and political instability is not one that will be compellingly attractive to investors making the kind of long run investments that energy security requires. As the stresses on the pillars of prosperity increase so the landscape of risk and opportunity through which business must progress alters. Some of these risks and opportunities will be familiar, others less so. Most companies in the FTSE top 100, or indeed, the top 250, are planning to still be in business by 2030, when some of these stresses will have moved from being chronic to being acute. Few are yet equipped to understand, interpret and manage their impacts. There are two dimensions of risk that must be considered. The more familiar risks are the direct impacts of these stresses on markets and operations. They will largely appear as increased cost or lost revenues. Droughts and extreme weather events will interrupt operations causing lost production. Water stress will lead to higher charges for supply and more stringent wastewater treatment requirements. Competition for grain will increase prices. Rising water, food and energy prices will drive up wage demands. These risks are, for the most part, forecastable and manageable, or at the very least insurable. Businesses have a wide array of tools for dealing with them and personnel with the skills and experience to use them. As always, for the better managed companies, there will also be opportunities for new technologies or products. The second dimension of risk is policy risk. This is much less familiar ground for the business community. Maintaining the integrity of the four pillars of prosperity is, classically, a task for governments. Ensuring all forms of security is a first responsibility of governments. It is this that we pay our taxes for. Business traditionally relies on government to provide the stability necessary for investment. The scale and urgency of these challenges is such that this may no longer be wise. It is not so much that we cannot identify solutions to the problems. Nor that we cannot afford them. At the moment anyway, all four pillars are capable of being renewed. It is the politics that is the issue. These are all problems that fall under the banner of the hard politics of the environment. Effective action on anyone of them will generate many more losers than winners. There is a strong Mickawberish voice, which when it is not protecting its own economic or ideological issue is simply in denial. Solutions require both vigorous international and inter-departmental coordination. These are all deterrents to timely political leadership. The pillars of prosperity are public goods. They will not be reliably provided simply by the operation of markets. The most likely response to these challenges by governments will be first to paddle in the shallows of response - cosmetic actions that generate headlines but not much else. When the problem gets much more pressing, governments will move into prevaricate mode. This can last for a very long time. It is essentially where we are now on climate change and water security. There will be much wringing of hands and talk of painful choices. New national or international legislation with ambitious aims will be announced, even introduced, but the process of passing it will be long and with each passing day the politically sharp edges will be blunted by the persistent winds of compromise. Finally, when the damage to the pillars is so apparent it begins to cause public outrage, governments will panic. At that point they are most likely to implement the most costly measures to address a problem that by then may be beyond solution. This is not a scenario that will be good for business. At this point, the risk of highly disruptive regulatory or fiscal policy tools, with very short lead times for their implementation, is high. Businesses are not well prepared to deal with these risks. On the whole they are much better at reacting to policy proposals from government than at thinking through the policy framework that would best allow government and business to work together to offer society solutions to the kind of systemic problems we have been discussing. For the most part, today’s business leaders possess neither the knowledge nor the skills to think strategically about the hard politics of the environment. They certainly do not have the time. Few, if any companies, have developed the internal processes to connect their conversations about these issues to their core business conversations. The result is an inadvertent conspiracy of inaction. Governments understand the need to act decisively on these issues but are inhibited from doing so for fear of damaging the businesses on which the success of their economy depends. Businesses, which often recognise the importance of these issues without fully understanding how they affect the future of their business, wait patiently for government to give a clear and consistent signal of what they expect from business. Governments have the problems. Businesses nearly always have the solutions. This ought to be a marriage made in heaven. Instead it is a structurally dysfunctional relationship whose failures are bad for both parties and worse for the world as a whole. Finding the ways to create a much better founded relationship between government and business, particularly with respect to maintaining the pillars of prosperity, is a key part of meeting the challenges of the 21st century. Stability is a system condition for investment and therefore for business success. Business traditionally relies on government to maintain stability. In the 21st century, as the pillars of prosperity come under increasing stress, governments may find it increasingly difficult to play their assigned part. I do not believe that we are fundamentally short of the resources, capital and technology to provide a higher standard of living for eight billion people. But we are woefully ill-prepared to put those resources, capital and technology together in ways that are sustainable. The only resource we are truly short of is time. If we do not quickly build the more effective relationship between business and government that is central to maintaining the integrity of the resource pillars of prosperity then as the 21st century progresses we will find that governments are as increasingly unable to discharge their responsibility to their citizens as managements are to their shareholders. 21st Century Sustainable Development 2006-11-09T11:20:00+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/concept/concept-articles/sustainable-development-in-context/ http://www.e3g.org/concept/concept-articles/sustainable-development-in-context/#When:07:35:00Z The challenge of Sustainable Development needs to be looked at in its historical context. Attached is a slide that attempts to do just that. The following text serves as an initial introduction - we’ll be returning to this idea in later posts. The Brundtland definition of sustainable development as “development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” remains as good today as when it was first drafted. What it means is that we have to deliver better economic opportunities to eight billion or more people without collapsing the ecological foundations of the economy. That is precisely those systems - the oceans, forests, freshwaters and climate - that it will take success at the hard politics of the environment to protect. We forget too easily that these systems provide everything in our economy that is not provided by fossil fuels and non-fossil minerals. Sustainable development is not about balancing anything. It does not mean striking some lowest common denominator equilibrium between environmental, social and economic factors. It is about maintaining the basic environmental conditions without which economic development cannot take place at all. Indeed, in the case of the climate, it is about maintaining the fundamental environmental conditions for civilisation itself. In the nineteenth Century we learned the hard way that you must maintain the social conditions for economic growth or your economy will not grow. It took until the middle of the twentieth Century for everyone to accept the need to invest some of the proceeds of economic growth in maintaining those social conditions – health, education, welfare. But by then we had spent five decades deciding whether communism or fascism was our preferred form of totalitarianism. It took another four decades before both options in that grim choice were finally gone. If we fail to maintain the environmental conditions for development, if we do not invest much more of the proceeds of that development in their maintenance, if, in other words, we do not make the transition to sustainable development, we will repeat that sad lesson in this century. And the consequences of that failure will be even more catastrophic for humanity. 21st Century Sustainable Development 2006-08-29T07:35:00+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/concept/concept-articles/the-hard-politics-of-the-environment/ http://www.e3g.org/concept/concept-articles/the-hard-politics-of-the-environment/#When:07:33:01Z We are at a transition from the easy politics of the environment to the hard politics. The easy politics of the environment have a familiar agenda – air and water pollution, hazardous wastes; toxic chemicals, radioactive substances. These were issues with easily identified victims and villains. There was a clear case for action. And, when action was taken, there were more winners than losers - a particularly important factor for politicians. Many win-win solutions were available and the policy tools were at hand to deal with the problems. That agenda has not gone away. And addressing it may not have seemed easy at the time. But compared to the agenda now coming to dominate the environmental debate, it really was easy. The emergent agenda – deforestation, ocean degradation, water scarcity, food insecurity, biodiversity loss and, perhaps above all, climate change – introduce a very different, and more difficult, political challenge. The case for action is not always clearly perceived. And if action is taken, there are more immediate losers than winners – a real switch off for politicians. It is far more difficult to find win-win solutions, the policy tools are far less obvious and, just to confuse matters more, the victims and villains are often simply ourselves oscillating haphazardly between our needs as citizens and our desires as consumers. That is the challenge we face now: the hard politics of the environment. I do not believe that the world is fundamentally short of the resources, capital or technology to offer a decent life to all of the eight billion inhabitants it will soon have. I do believe we are short of the capacity to put those resources capital and technology together in ways that are sustainable. And we are increasingly short of time. Building that capacity, aligning our choices so that they add up to something we can all live with, is politics. By politics I do not mean the degraded, and increasingly, degrading, battle for the headlines that currently passes for politics in our age of celebrity. I mean the art of making collective choices, of harnessing what Abraham Lincoln called ‘ the better angels of our nature’, to a profoundly important purpose. 21st Century Sustainable Development 2006-08-22T07:33:01+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/concept/concept-articles/green-and-blue-the-conservative-party-and-the-environment/ http://www.e3g.org/concept/concept-articles/green-and-blue-the-conservative-party-and-the-environment/#When:12:36:00Z Since his election as Conservative Party leader, David Cameron has been trying to reposition his party in the centre ground of British politics. One of his strategies has included placing a much greater emphasis on the environment and climate change. He has also cycled (occasionally) to the House of Commons, and replaced the Party’s Torch logo with an image of an Oak tree. BBC Radio 4 recently aired a programme entitled ‘How did I get to be so green and blue’ which looks at the Conservative Party’s changing relationship to the environment. The programme includes a number of contributions from E3G Founding Director Tom Burke, who was an advisor to three successive Environment Ministers under the last Conservative government. Tom discusses the different ideological streams within the Conservative Party and Margaret Thatcher’s ‘conversion’ to environmental awareness in the 1980’s. Tom also analyses the major structural change in British politics – the loss for all parties of a mass membership. He points out that this has implications for all political parties as they go about taking leadership decisions on environmental issues, stating: The idea that somehow the people of Britain can’t be informed about the real challenges that they face – aren’t themselves already informed and aren’t willing to follow a strong and clear lead about what needs to be done on these terms – just shows a huge lack of faith in the British people. I think it’s more because the political parties have got so divorced, structurally, from the base of society that they’re unwilling to lead. And remember what political leadership does is expand the realm of the possible. Politics is the art of the possible it’s true. Political leadership is the art of expanding the realm of the possible. This is an area that cries out for political leadership and it’s not getting it.” The full transcript can be read online on the BBC website. Renewing Environmentalism 2006-04-10T12:36:00+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/concept/concept-articles/open-democracy-debate-three-identity-battles/ http://www.e3g.org/concept/concept-articles/open-democracy-debate-three-identity-battles/#When:11:45:00Z Following the publication of Jonathon Porritt’s book ‘Capitalism as if the world matters’ and his associated Open Democracy article“As if the world matters”: reconciling sustainable development and capitalism, E3G Founding Directors John Ashton and Tom Burke contributed articles to the Open Democracy debate in response. John Ashton’s article follows here below. Tom Burke’s article is published here. Three identity battles John Ashton The belated acknowledgement by the environmental movement of the role of markets and private capital in the transition to sustainable development is the least of our worries. The battle over ownership of the means of production ended with the cold war. There is no coherent challenge to the mixed economy, based on freedom of choice regulated by the rule of law, as a means of aligning private interests and the public good. The transition to sustainable development will turn on the outcome not of yesterday’s struggles but today’s. The frontline has moved, from the economy to a bigger question: the question of who we are and how we can construct a meaningful sense of identity in relation to each other and the environment, and in a globalising world where our ability to achieve the outcomes we want will depend on whether we can come to terms with the consequences of interdependence on an unprecedented scale. Three battles of identity are now in progress. Environmentalists should pay them close attention. The first is the battle between exceptionalism and universalism (see Fred Halliday on “The crisis of universalism: America and radical Islam after 9/11”, September 2004). Jonathon Porritt is right to enlist Thomas Jefferson to the cause of sustainable development. Nobody will live the lives to which they aspire in a world of 9 billion people unless the ecological foundations for security and prosperity remain intact. In the face of this challenge, we truly are all equal. We must learn to define ourselves by what we have in common with each other, not by what divides us. Secondly, there is the battle between faith and reason for control of the temporal realm. Fundamentalism is on the march, subjugating reality to myth, science to dogma. Sustainable development requires an empirical understanding of the link between the choices we make and the real-world outcomes to which they lead. Only science can tell us how natural systems work, how the economy depends on them, the effect upon them of our actions, and what we must do to maintain their integrity. Thirdly, there is the battle for the globalisation of responsibility. Sustainable development makes us accountable for the social and environmental consequences of our actions. Globalisation means that those consequences are as likely to be felt on the other side of the world as across the road. As Tom Burke says, if we want to continue enjoying the fruits of globalised opportunity, we must invest in the environmental and social conditions on which it depends. We must globalise responsibility. To achieve sustainable development is the biggest challenge humanity has ever faced. No political party anywhere is offering a way across this threshold. The real failure of the environmental movement has been its inability to convert the path to sustainable development into a set of political choices compelling enough to mobilise people and resources on the scale and with the urgency necessary for the task. Smarter capitalism will certainly be part of the journey. But as a political banner, its power to inspire is questionable. The manifesto we need is yet to be written, but when it is, it will tell us who we can be – who we need to become – not merely as homo economicus but as homo sapiens. 21st Century Sustainable Development 2005-12-06T11:45:00+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/concept/concept-articles/open-democracy-debate-conserving-capitalists/ http://www.e3g.org/concept/concept-articles/open-democracy-debate-conserving-capitalists/#When:10:27:00Z Following the publication of Jonathon Porritt’s book ‘Capitalism as if the world matters’ and his associated Open Democracy article“As if the world matters”: reconciling sustainable development and capitalism, E3G Founding Directors John Ashton and Tom Burke contributed articles to the Open Democracy debate in response. Tom Burke’s article follows here below. John Ashton’s article is published here. Conserving capitalists Tom Burke Capitalism is the process of liberating capital to pursue opportunity. From about the middle of the 18th century there was a debate about how to make the economy grow. As the industrial revolution gathered pace under the stimulus of the Napoleonic wars and the subsequent prolonged period of peace the answer became clear. If individuals are freed to pursue their own self-interest, the interests of all would be enhanced as the economy grew. As this liberal doctrine gained hold, economies did indeed grow rapidly. But economic growth corrodes social ligatures. The complex, multi-dimensional relationships of relatively stable communities are replaced in the creative destruction of capitalism by the simpler, transactional relationships of the cash economy. Cultural bonds, with their complex patterns of mutual rights and obligations, are replaced by economic bonds based simply on the ability to pay. Margaret Thatcher never understood that you cannot have both increasing economic opportunity and a return to Victorian values because of the corrosive effect of rapid economic growth on culturally rooted rules systems. In the 19th century, rapid economic growth led then in Europe, as it does now globally, to very rapid social change. This social change, unmediated by any amelioration of its impacts on the welfare of large numbers of people, led to growing political instability. This threatened to undermine the economic growth driving the social changes. By 1848 Marx had already written the Communist Manifesto. By the middle of the 19th century, as the dynamics of what we would now call a negative feedback loop became apparent, a new argument began. This was about how to maintain the social conditions for the economy to continue growing. The answer that emerged over the next century was that some of the proceeds of that economic growth must be invested in maintaining the social conditions for it to continue. In the 1880s, the German chancellor Otto von Bismarck had already laid the foundations of what we would now call the welfare state in Germany. By the middle of the 20th century, the argument was over. All of the largest and fastest growing economies invested a significant amount of the proceeds of that growth in health, education and social security in order to maintain the social conditions for its continuation. Economic development became the primary focus of public policy. This occurred just as the population of the planet was about to explode, tripling from about 2 billion to more than 6 billion in a single lifetime. By the beginning of the last quarter of the 20th century, a new debate had begun. Rapid economic development was precipitating environmental changes that threatened to undermine the ecological foundations of the economy – the oceans, atmosphere, freshwaters, forestlands, croplands and rangelands that supply everything in our economy not supplied by fossil fuels and non-fossil minerals. If the productivity of those foundations is undermined, the eventual result is a malign and self-defeating cycle: the economy is weakened, creating political instability that further blocks the ability of the economy to grow – and economies which do not grow cannot support capitalism. Making the transition to sustainable development means learning to invest some of the proceeds of our accelerating economic development in maintaining the environmental conditions for its continuation. We have barely begun. This year Britain will spend some £250 billion on maintaining the social conditions for economic growth, about five times what we will spend on internal and external security. Alongside, we will spend about £7.5 billion on the environment – 3% of what we are spending on maintaining the social conditions for growth. Unless we can rapidly redress this imbalance, the landscape of opportunity for capital to pursue will diminish rapidly as the 21st century progresses. Delivering sustainable development – that is, economic growth that maintains both the social and environmental conditions for its continuation – is a necessary condition for the survival of capitalism. It is time that both environmentalists and capitalists discovered their mutual interest in accelerating the transition. 21st Century Sustainable Development 2005-12-06T10:27:00+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/concept/concept-articles/address-to-green-alliance-25th-anniversary/ http://www.e3g.org/concept/concept-articles/address-to-green-alliance-25th-anniversary/#When:09:50:02Z Tom Burke, formerly Director of Green Alliance from 1982 to 1991, gave an address to the 25th Anniversary celebration of the Green Alliance on 24th February 2005. His address doesn’t just focus on the history of Green Alliance - it also encompasses the wider history of environmentalism and the political challenges ahead. Address to Green Alliance 25th Anniversary Thank you for that very kind introduction. It is a great pleasure to be among so many good friends tonight. Over the past twenty-five years we have all shared hopes and fears, laughter and tears, victories and defeats in the great cause that is our environment. And through it all, the Green Alliance has been a growing force. We are here tonight to celebrate that growth, to renew and reinforce it and to look ahead to future challenges. I am honoured to have been asked to introduce this evening. And, I must admit, a little intimidated. Guy Thompson does not do easy. ‘Just sum up the past twenty-five years and say what’s next – oh, and don’t take more than twenty minutes’. I will do my best. But first I want to pay tribute to all of those whose hard work has brought us to this point. Many of them are here this evening. They are far too numerous to mention individually. Without them there would be nothing to celebrate and no future to plan. But I could not let this moment pass without a thought for Maurice Ash whose gentle guidance and deep pockets in those always difficult early days got us off to such a good start - securing the independence of thought and action that has been such a hallmark of the Green Alliance. The Green Alliance’s is a story whose end is yet to be written. But, it began, as good stories always do, with a very simple idea. The environment needs to be at the heart of politics. The informing vision of the Green Alliance was that environmentalists needed as good a grip on the politics as we had on the arguments. And that is what we set out to do with, it must be admitted, rather more enthusiasm than experience. It was a good thing that we did. Just as the Green Alliance bridges the twentieth and twenty-first Centuries, so it bridges the transition from the easy politics of the environment to the hard politics. The easy politics of the environment have a familiar agenda – air and water pollution, hazardous wastes; toxic chemicals, radioactive substances. These were issues with easily identified victims and villains. There was a clear case for action. And, when action was taken, there were more winners than losers -  a particularly important factor for politicians. Many win-win solutions were available and the policy tools were at hand to deal with the problems. That agenda has not gone away. And addressing it may not have seemed easy at the time. But compared to the agenda now coming to dominate the environmental debate, it really was easy. The emergent agenda – deforestation, ocean degradation, water scarcity, food insecurity, biodiversity loss and, perhaps above all, climate change – introduce a very different, and more difficult, political challenge. The case for action is not always clearly perceived. And if action is taken, there are more immediate losers than winners – a real switch off for politicians. It is far more difficult to find win-win solutions, the policy tools are far less obvious and, just to confuse matters more, the victims and villains are often simply ourselves oscillating haphazardly between our needs as citizens and our desires as consumers. Meeting this agenda is the core challenge of sustainable development. This is now a much misused term – not the least by DEFRA – as so many people have bent its meaning to catch whatever fashionable wind was blowing. The Brundtland definition remains as good today as when it was first drafted. What it means is that we have to deliver better economic opportunities to eight billion or more people without collapsing the ecological foundations of the economy. That is precisely those systems - the oceans, forests, freshwaters and climate - that it will take success at the hard politics of the environment to protect. We forget too easily that these systems provide everything in our economy that is not provided by fossil fuels and non-fossil minerals. Sustainable development is not about balancing anything. It does not mean striking some lowest common denominator equilibrium between environmental, social and economic factors. It is about maintaining the basic environmental conditions without which economic development cannot take place at all. Indeed, in the case of the climate, it is about maintaining the fundamental environmental conditions for civilisation itself. In the nineteenth Century we learned the hard way that you must maintain the social conditions for economic growth or your economy will not grow. It took until the middle of the twentieth Century for everyone to accept the need to invest some of the proceeds of economic growth in maintaining those social conditions – health, education, welfare. But by then we had spent five decades deciding whether communism or fascism was our preferred form of totalitarianism. It took another four decades before both options in that grim choice were finally gone. If we fail to maintain the environmental conditions for development, if we do not invest much more of the proceeds of that development in their maintenance, if, in other words, we do not make the transition to sustainable development, we will repeat that sad lesson in this century. And the consequences of that failure will be even more catastrophic for humanity. These are daunting prospects. Each of us has our own way of making them personally meaningful. For me it is this thought.  I was born into a world of two and a half billion people. I live today in a world of six and a half billion. With luck I may well be alive on the day the eight billionth person is born. When I was born there were six million elephants on the planet. Today there are about six hundred thousand. I may also live to see the last truly wild elephant die. Now, I do not expect the Green Alliance to prevent this all on its own. But it will play a part. And, because of its expertise and focus on politics, an increasingly important part. Influence is the art of using the power of others. The Green Alliance has earned its reputation as one of the more influential pressure groups in Britain. The trick to leveraging the work of larger organisations is the ability to build coalitions – to build bridges across issue or institutional boundaries. This has been the Green Alliance’s core competence. It means success by stealth and letting others take the credit wherever possible. It means thinking well ahead of the issue curve. It means understanding and aligning the interests of others. It means matching patience to passion. And, it means never, ever, mistaking the headlines for the outcomes. We can be proud of those outcomes over the past twenty-five years. We began the dialogue between business and the environment in Britain. We launched the first discussions of green finance. We set agendas. Julie Hill opened the debate on GM foods here in 1987 with a lecture by Jeremy Rifkin. It’s hard to believe now, but we had great difficulty in getting someone from Greenpeace to attend. More recently, we launched a ground breaking initiative to explore what children really think about their environment and opened the debate on environmental justice. In today’s terminology, we have been an incubator for new organisations. Sustain, Wastewatch and the Pesticides Trust all arose from Green Alliance initiatives. We helped the government discover the need for Britain’s first ever White Paper on the environment – a need the present government should urgently re-discover. Knowing that politicians really only listen to other politicians we wrote speeches and held seminars for all the political parties. Indeed, just last week, I had the pleasure of attending a seminar that Guy Thompson chaired where the Secretary of State spent two hours discussing the environment community’s expectations of a Labour government post-election. I have no doubt that I will soon be receiving my invitations to similar events with the other parties. There are far too many other successes to mention tonight – from arranging the dinner at which the Prince of Wales first met the environmentalists from his own generation to providing a constant stream of special advisors to Ministers. But no-one could doubt that the Green Alliance is fulfilling its mission of projecting the environment into the heart of politics. Environmentalism is an opera not a song. There are many parts to be played and a lot of songs to be written and sung. The music must never become monotonous – a fault I fear found to frequently in our community. And there must be a strong story. The Green Alliance’s story is part of an older and wider tale. It begins with the nineteenth Century naturalists who laid the foundations of the modern conservation organisations. The first generation of environmentalists. William Morris was an early leader, founding the Commons and Open Spaces Society. Its narrative runs through many tributaries – the RSPB, The World Wildlife Fund, the Wildlife Trusts, the Royal Society for Nature Conservation, Plantlife and a host of other bodies – to form that broad river we see today. They were joined in the nineteen seventies by a second generation of younger, more impatient, environmentalists. If the first generation had as their impelling force the preservation of nature for its intrinsic or aesthetic value, this second generation had a more utilitarian, and more urgent, focus. These are the campaigners, Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace, Transport 2000 and an army of other local and national bodies. They are driven by the goals of securing a healthy environment for people and preserving the natural resource base of the economy. Like any good story, this one has its proud record of battles fought and won. But I do not think that any one of us here this evening really thinks that we are winning the war. The first two generations of environmentalists have been a guerrilla army. Outsiders, striking hard at the exposed weaknesses in the stubborn walls of economic orthodoxy that so dominate public policy debate. Their most enduring success has been to build a broad consciousness of the harm human beings are doing to their planet and thus to themselves. This success manifests itself increasingly as a third, emerging generation of environmentalists. They are not outsiders. They are to be found in their hundreds of thousands within the walls of bureaucracies, financial institutions, universities, trades unions, professional associations and elsewhere. They have all been infected with the environmental virus and they carry it with them wherever they work. The Green Alliance bridges the centuries, it has learnt to bridge issue and institutional boundaries. It must now become an even stronger bridge between the first two generations of environmentalists and this emerging third generation. The Green Alliance has always been a catalyst, accelerating the delivery of environmental solutions, opening up new avenues for environmental action, re-defining the boundaries of the possible. We began in the year Ronald Reagan was elected President of the United States and John Lennon was assassinated. CNN began broadcasting the same year. I do not think any of us really thought then about where we would be in twenty-five years time. Somewhere, in the most secret recesses of our hearts,  we might have wished that our job would be done and the environment would be at the centre of politics. I do not think that any of us had really grasped the scale of the task we had set ourselves. Well, times have changed. The need for the Green Alliance has grown rather than diminished. We still have that catalytic role to play in the environmental community. But the tasks facing that community have changed too. There are three strategic challenges that we must address as we go forward into our second quarter century. Each is important in its own right but together they comprise the breakout by environmentalists from the green ghetto. The first is to communicate better. I do not mean more. We understand the environment better than we do people. We often seem to think that if we tell people more about the issues, give them more facts, better pictures, a deeper analysis that is all we have to do to protect the environment. This means we too often sound as if we are only concerned with our own preoccupations and have no interest in theirs. We need to frame our arguments in terms that resonate more immediately with others. Without a stable climate national security and economic prosperity are impossible, the world will not be fairer, communities will not be stable, families will be hurt, personal opportunities will be limited, our children’s future will be stolen . But we rarely sound as if we are talking about those everyday concerns. The second is to get real about political discourse. The dominant language of debate among politicians is over how much gets spent by whom on what. Too often we appear to be more interested in winning the argument than changing the outcome. Changing environmental outcomes in the twenty first Century will require some serious money. Today, we spend just under three hundred billion pounds a year on social protection, health and education. We spend about fifty five million pounds on internal and external security. We spend a fraction over seven billion pounds on the environment. Do you really believe those are the right proportions to ensure the continued well being of the British people as our environmental problems accumulate faster than we are finding solutions for them? Thirdly, we must build stronger institutions to defend the environment. We build institutions to consolidate and express our values – to make them manifest in the world. It is a strange thought that as environmental problems have become more pressing our national and international environmental institutions have become weaker. What does it tells us about our government’s real values that on a whim, without a by your leave, it could re-arranged its environmental institutions in a way no-one in the whole environmental community would ever have proposed? The same government is now moving around its institutional assets for nature conservation on the basis of an anecdotal analysis by a businessman with little understanding of either government or the environment. I make these points not so much to criticise the government - though I did quite enjoy that - as to point out how weak our community’s grasp is on political power is in reality. Imagine a government proposing to abolish the Ministry of Defence on the grounds that we had won the Cold War. The Navy could now become part of the Department of Transport to protect our shipping and the Army could go to the Department for International Development to help with the occasional adventure in a small state somewhere. The Air Force could be privatised and sold off to British Airways. If we do not have strong institutions to promote the environment we have no hope of making a transition to sustainable development. If we cannot protect the ones we have, how can we hope to build the ones we need? There are, of course, many other challenges that must be met if the environment is to be at the heart of twenty first Century politics. I have picked three that seem to me to be particularly urgent. You will each have your own set. But whatever is on our lists, the Green Alliance will be central to translating idea into action, dream into reality, fear into hope. I do not believe that the world is fundamentally short of the resources, capital or technology to offer a decent life to all of the eight billion inhabitants it will soon have. I do believe we are short of the capacity to put those resources capital and technology together in ways that are sustainable. And we are increasingly short of time. Building that capacity, aligning our choices so that they add up to something we can all live with, is politics. By politics I do not mean the degraded, and increasingly, degrading, battle for the headlines that currently passes for politics in our age of celebrity. I mean the art of making collective choices, of harnessing what Abraham Lincoln called ‘ the better angels of our nature’, to a profoundly important purpose. I do not doubt that the ‘better angels’ are there, nor that they can be reached and mobilised to pursue the purpose we all share. Nor do I doubt that in this room are the people with the energy, foresight and commitment to drive that mobilisation. It is the Green Alliance’s task to help us make those efforts add up to more than their parts. I wish it well for the next twenty-five years. Renewing Environmentalism 2005-02-24T09:50:02+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/concept/concept-articles/the-environmentalists-case-for-europe/ http://www.e3g.org/concept/concept-articles/the-environmentalists-case-for-europe/#When:09:20:00Z The May / June 2004 edition of Green Futures magazine featured an opinion piece by John Ashton on the connection between environmentalism and the Future of Europe. The environmentalist’s case for Europe Pundits are predicting record low turnouts in the European elections this June – though only heroic levels of apathy would outdo the 4 percent registered by the citizens of Sunderland in 1999. The new constitution for Europe will when it is finally agreed shape the lives of 450 million people in the enlarged European Union. Yet the Convention on the Future of Europe that crafted it has been more an exercise in “We the elites” than “We the Peoples”. Should environmentalists worry? Here are five good reasons why they cannot achieve their goals without a strong and dynamic EU in touch with the people of Europe. First, all but the most local environmental problems transcend political boundaries. They cannot be addressed without pooling sovereignty – whether in managing a regional watershed or the global atmosphere. Sharing sovereignty is difficult. The EU is the world’s only sustained experiment at doing it. What the EU has achieved to date is an example of what is possible in building shared solutions to shared problems while maintaining the diversity of cultures and nations. It is a model available on an open source basis for application in other settings. Second, weight counts in global politics. The EU, because of its pooled sovereignty, has a more powerful voice in the global diplomacy of the environment than would its member countries individually. The Kyoto Protocol would be long dead without the EU and no-one should imagine that Tony Blair, for all his commitment to climate change, could have saved it on his own. Third, an environmentalist foreign policy must be multilateralist. Only through the application of multilaterally agreed rules can the cross-border costs of self-interested national behaviour be mitigated. But multilateralism in its current form is a relatively recent experiment. It is under threat: from lack of political and financial investment in its instruments, from those in the US who see it as inimical to US interests, and from the short attention span of modern politics in the face of long haul problems. It is falling to this generation to choose between a global open society based on rules equitably agreed, and a fortress world in which gated communities of power and wealth look after their own. On the front line in that choice is the EU. Europeans know that multilateralism can work because they have made it work in Europe. Environmentalists need the EU to prevail as champion of multilateral approaches elsewhere. Fourth, environmental goals can only be achieved as part of a wider social, economic and political vision. The climate negotiations are as much about how we organise our economies and prevent global instability as they are about environmental regulation in any narrow sense. Nobody would argue that the EU’s sense of its role in the world has yet achieved this level of coherence. But its new Security Strategy acknowledges that Europe’s security depends on managing the interconnectedness of the global infrastructure in energy, transport, and information; that environmental stress and competition for natural resources outside Europe undermines security within it; and that Europe’s “diplomatic efforts, trade and environmental policies should follow the same agenda”. Environmentalists have an overwhelming interest in the emergence of this new diplomacy based on interconnectedness. A strong EU will take us there more quickly. Fifth, innovation is essential for the environment. But that innovation needs to be multi-dimensional – not just technological innovation, but legal, social, financial, institutional and cultural as well. This demands markets, capital, knowledge and choice to be organised on a continental scale.  Nowhere is innovation being harnessed with greater effort to the requirements of sustainable development than in the EU. The EU Emissions Trading Scheme is as significant for sustainable development as any recent policy adopted anywhere. Not even the most ardent Europhile would claim that the EU has achieved perfection on any of these fronts. It is hypocrisy for those who defend the EU’s agricultural protectionism to assert credentials in the effort against global poverty. But sustainable development is a journey. Direction and rate of progress matter more than the precise point that has been reached at any time. By that measure, environmentalists and champions of the European project are on the same side. So environmentalists should worry that the European project has lost touch with European people. They should overcome the ambivalence towards Europe that has long characterised their movement. They should make it their business to build a new vocation for an enlarged EU as an exemplar and driver of sustainable development globally. They should start by voting in the European elections.   Renewing Environmentalism 2004-05-01T09:20:00+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/concept/community-articles/online-community-your-ideas/ http://www.e3g.org/concept/community-articles/online-community-your-ideas/#When:20:02:00Z Update, December 2006. As the eagle-eyed among you may have noticed, we are still as yet to launch an E3G online community. We’ve been continuing to think about how we can best implement an online community for third generation environmentalists, but for the moment the launch of the proposed E3G community is on hold: the calls on our time are so great at the moment that we need to find additional resources to take this forward. If you’d like to connect with our work as we continue to ponder our next steps, then do sign up for our electronic newsletter. If you have particular interest or expertise in online communities, do get in contact. In October 2006 we will be launching the first stage of our online community. Our aim is to provide (over time) a space where third generation environmentalists from around the world can come together to share information and collaborate on projects of mutual interest. Over the next month or so, we’ll be working with our friends at Trampoline Systems to finalise the configuration of our planned online member directory. We’ll also be drawing up our plans for the next stage of the site development, where greater interactive functionality will become available. If you are interested in becoming involved with the fledgling online community or have experience from other online networks we’d love to hear your views. In particular, we are interested in learning more about what you would find most useful - what would help you to connect and then collaborate with fellow third generation environmentalists? If you have individual experiences you’d like to share, feel free to send us an . Alternatively, make a suggestion via the comments section to this post - that would be a good early test of whether there is a market for online collaboration within the wider environmental community. Community News 2006-09-02T20:02:00+00:00