Jan 25 2012
Dec 14 2011
Europe must complete its low carbon transition
By Nick Mabey
Dec 11 2011
Durban climate deal opens door to 2°C future
By Admin
Nov 30 2011
Driving down energy bills and security of supply: The case for demand side electricity market reform
By Taylor Dimsdale
Nov 18 2011
E3G Briefing: The Durban Package
By Shane Tomlinson, Liz Gallagher, Amal-Lee Amin
Nov 14 2011
ENDS: Euro travails and climate inaction – twin crises of political will
By Tom Burke
Nov 14 2011
Policy Brief: Securing Grids for a Sustainable Future
By Admin
Oct 20 2011
ENDS: From the greenest government ever… to our very own Tea Party
By Tom Burke
Sep 27 2011
Risk management, credible options and the future of European renewables policy
By Jonathan Gaventa and Nick Mabey
Aug 09 2011
More Fight, Less Fuel: Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy in the Department of Defense, USA.
By Claire Langley and Gouri Shukla
Jun 14 2011
Europe has to follow its Climate Realpolitik
By Nick Mabey
May 24 2011
Climate change: New frontiers in transparency and accountability
By Shane Tomlinson, Liz Gallagher, Claire Langley, Pelin Zorlu and Shin Wei Ng
Apr 13 2011
The case for EU moving to 30%: Global low carbon technology race and international cooperation
By Pelin Zorlu, Shane Tomlinson and Sanjeev Kumar
Apr 06 2011
Tom Burke participates on The Economist’s online live debate on Nuclear power.
By Tom Burke
CONCLUSION
The moderator in his last intervention challenged my view that nuclear power is too costly to afford. He correctly points out that France has afforded a very large nuclear programme, as indeed has Japan. He then suggested that values differ and thus what looks like a waste of money to one nation may look worthwhile to another.
There is some force in this argument. Nations have different endowments of natural resources, including energy resources. Supplies of energy are more vulnerable to interruption for some countries than for others. This will understandably lead to different views on what price it is worth paying for energy security.
It would have been more accurate to have said that nuclear power is too costly to compete. Political judgements of the national interest are rarely uncontested. Entrenched interests and economically powerful lobbies battle for influence and backroom negotiations often determine more policy outcomes than public analysis.
Nuclear electricity is only available when governments stack the deck by transferring large chunks of its costs from customers to taxpayers. In other words, nuclear power does not deliver electricity at a lower cost to consumers and businesses anywhere in the world, including France, than would some combination of the options Mr Lovins sets out in his intervention if the competition were fair. This is a situation that will only get worse for the nuclear industry as its costs continue to rise while those for other options fall sharply.
Three big issues have concerned those who oppose this motion. Some are anxious the events in Fukushima will precipitate an unjustified abandonment of nuclear power. They feel that the alternative ways of maintaining energy security will do more harm to human life. Others fear that the other options are less reliable. For some, the overwhelming urgency of climate change means that we must do anything and everything we can to reduce carbon emissions.
Public anxiety on both sides of the safety debate is understandable: there are real, if poorly understood, dangers to health and the media treatment of these issues sometimes borders on the hysterical.
However, the nuclear debate is about a far more complex set of issues than can be reduced to a simple calculus of casualties.
We do not decide our transport policy by a body count. Were we to, we would drive cars a lot less and take buses more often. Important though the nuclear safety debate is, it is only one of the many factors to consider in weighing up the motion.
There is widespread concern about the intermittency of the renewables. As we move to avoid dangerous climate change our energy use will become ever more dominated by electricity. This makes security of supply an imperative not an option.
It is true that the sun does not always shine or the wind blow. What is less obvious is that nuclear electricity is also intermittent though for different reasons. Sometimes this is planned, over 10% of the time, on other occasions it is not. In both cases it means a lot of power is lost all at once.
Unplanned loss of nuclear capacity can last for months – as in the six months loss of Sizewell last year - and sometimes for years. What is more, a common fault can take down several reactors at once. Even so, to worry about the availability of a particular technology is to misunderstand the nature of modern electricity grids.
It is the robustness of the network that matters most for security of supply. Mr Lovins sets out some of the management techniques that network operators now have at their disposal. These came into good use last month in Germany when the government shutdown seven nuclear power stations at once without the lights going out.
For some, the urgency of climate change is such that, in their eyes, it would be folly, bordering on immorality, to foreclose a low carbon option like nuclear. Even if, as I showed in my proposition, it can only make a marginal contribution we must do everything we possibly can.
This argument is as alluring as it is illusory. If there were no limits to the availability of financial and technical resources I might agree. But there are such limits. The danger in trying to do a little of everything is that you end up not doing enough of anything. This means we must make choices.
The loudly trumpeted, but now somewhat stalled, nuclear renaissance was designed to promote the idea that more nuclear was inevitable. Its intent was to conceal the availability of other choices that would make us better off.
The reality is that we have a very wide range of energy options with which the world would be better off. A climate and energy safe world of greater energy efficiency, smart grids, gas with carbon capture and storage and renewable technologies is available. All we have to do it choose it.
I urge you to support the motion.
Mar 14 2011
China’s 12th Five-Year-Plan: Engaging the world on the low carbon race
By Shin Wei Ng
Mar 07 2011
Re-monopolising Power? Reform Of The Electricity Market To Meet Climate Change Goals
By Simon Skillings
Feb 10 2011
Degrees of Risk: Defining a Risk Management Framework for Climate Security
By Nick Mabey and Katherine Silverthorne
Article Documents
Degrees of Risk: Defining a Risk Management Framework for Climate Security_Executive Summary.pdfDegrees of Risk: Defining a Risk Management Framework for Climate Security_Full Report.pdfE3G_Degrees of Risk Presentation_Nick Mabey.pdfE3G_Degrees of Risk Presentation_Jay Gulledge.pdf
Article Published in
Email this Article
Share Article
Article hits (6013)
Feb 02 2011
Chinese challenge or low carbon opportunity
By Dr. Shin Wei Ng and Nick Mabey
Jan 21 2011
Energy Market Reform: E3G’s evidence at the House of Commons
By Simon Skillings
Dec 11 2010
CANCUN: Negotiators throw climate a lifeline
By Admin
Dec 09 2010
Assessment of priority countries for climate action in 2010
By E3G
Nov 29 2010
All eyes on the strategic climate colonels at Cancun
By Nick Mabey and Shane Tomlinson
Nov 26 2010
‘Whole-of-Government’ Response to Global Climate Change
By Nick Mabey
Nov 23 2010
Speech for the Business of Sustainability conference at the Minerals Council of Australia 13/10/2010
By Tom Burke
Nov 23 2010
Politically Robust Package of Power Market Reform
By Simon Skillings
Nov 19 2010
Building a sustainable and low carbon European recovery: the case for a 30 percent emissions target
By Sanjeev Kumar
Nov 08 2010
EU-China alliance - the power to take the lead on climate change
By Nick Mabey
Oct 26 2010
Renewables Policy: Renewables Obligation vs. Feed In Tariffs
By Simon Skillings
Oct 17 2010
Emissions Performance Standards: E3G gives evidence
By Jonathan Gaventa
Oct 15 2010
GB power market reform – high level policy choices
By Simon Skillings
Oct 05 2010
Toward Low Carbon Resilient Economies-Implications for the Fast-Start Finance Package
By Monica Araya
Article Documents
E3G_Toward Low Carbon Resilient Economiese_Executive Summary.pdfE3G_Toward Low Carbon Resilient Economies_Implications for fast-start finance.pdfUNFCCC, Tianjin_Toward a Transformative Fast-Start Finance Package.pdfPress Release_Transforming the future with “Fast-Start” finance.pdf
Article Published in
Email this Article
Share Article
Article hits (2511)
Sep 15 2010
Emissions Performance Standards may lower costs of decarbonisation
By Jonathan Gaventa
Sep 03 2010
A climate for European action
By Tom Burke
Aug 16 2010
Nuclear companies open new front in fight for government subsidies
By Tom Burke
Aug 16 2010
Choices at stake for power market reform
By Simon Skillings
Jul 27 2010
Investing for an uncertain future: Priorities for UK energy and climate security
By Nick Mabey
Jul 02 2010
An E3G response to The European Commission’s Energy Strategy 2011-2020 Consultation
By Jesse Scott
May 20 2010
What the UK elections mean for climate security
By Editor
Apr 20 2010
European Climate Diplomacy after Copenhagen
By Nick Mabey and Matthew Findlay
Apr 14 2010
Pathways mapped out to zero carbon power sector
By Jonathan Gaventa
Apr 06 2010
The Value Proposition for a European Supergrid
By Jonathan Gaventa
Mar 19 2010
Low Carbon Technology: A Framework for EU-China Dialogue
By Aleyn Smith-Gillespie
Article Documents
E3G_Low Carbon Technology Cooperation_A Framework for EU-China Dialogue_Executive Summary.pdfE3G_Low Carbon Technology Cooperation_A Framework for EU-China Dialogue.pdf
Article Published in
Email this Article
Share Article
Article hits (1693)
Mar 03 2010
The Road From Copenhagen: Prospects and Priorities for Action on Climate Change
By Matthew Findlay and Nick Mabey
Article Documents
E3G Post-Copenhagen Climate Stocktake.pdfE3G_Down But Not Out Reviving the EU’s Political Strategy after Copenhagen.pdfE3G_Down But Not Out_German.pdf
Article Published in
Email this Article
Share Article
Article hits (1759)
Feb 16 2010
UK Power Sector Market Reform: The Case for Action
By Simon Skillings
Feb 10 2010
EU Must Learn Lessons from Copenhagen and Lead by Example
By Taylor Dimsdale and Matthew Findlay
Article Documents
E3G – 30 Percent and Beyond (Updated Jan 2010)E3G – 30 Percent and Beyond_FR.pdfE3G – 30 Percent and Beyond_DE.pdfE3G_30 Percent and Beyond_ES.pdfE3G – 30 Percent and Beyond_PL.pdf
Article Published in
Email this Article
Share Article
Article hits (1480)
Feb 03 2010
Conservative Party announces Green Investment Bank plans
By Nick Mabey
Jan 26 2010
A Road Map to Deliver Smart Grid in the UK
By Simon Skillings
Jan 18 2010
What does the Security Community need from a Global Climate Regime?
By Nick Mabey
Jan 12 2010
Delivering Climate Security: COP15 side event report
By Katherine Silverthorne
Article Documents
Maj Gen Muniruzzaman_The Security Dimensions of Climate Change_COP15.pdfW Chris King_Afghanistan-An Environmental Security Case Study in Climate Change and Security_COP15.pdfAlexandros Papaioannou_Delivering Climate Security_COP15.pdfNick Mabey_Developing a Risk Management Approach to Delivering Climate Security_COP15.pdfCleo Paskal_From Constants to Variables_COP15.pdf
Article Published in
Email this Article
Share Article
Article hits (1794)
Dec 18 2009
Global Leaders Leave Job Unfinished
By Nick Mabey
Dec 16 2009
Targets, Foundations and Transformation: Benchmarks for a Successful Copenhagen Agreement
By Nick Mabey
Dec 14 2009
Copenhagen Week 2 - Closing the Deal
By Editor
Dec 14 2009
Technology Action Plans and Funding Complement Legally Binding Climate Agreement
By Shane Tomlinson
Dec 09 2009
The Real Message of the Leaked Danish Text
By Nick Mabey
Dec 07 2009
Delivering Climate Security: Official COP15 side event *New Venue*
By Nick Mabey and Katherine Silverthorne
Dec 02 2009
Be careful what you wish for
By Nick Mabey and Shane Tomlinson
Nov 25 2009
Delivering a Zero Emissions Power Sector: Policy Challenges
By Simon Skillings
Nov 25 2009
The European Low Carbon Transformation: If not now when?
By Nick Mabey
Nov 24 2009
Sorting Blinks from Winks in the Copenhagen End Game
By Nick Mabey
All of this leads to a simple conclusion: if political leaders are unable to reach a binding international agreement in Copenhagen in December they must come up with a credible plan for concluding that agreement no later than June 2010, before US Congressional mid-term elections. Allowing the process to drag on beyond June 2010 risks a repeat of the Doha WTO negotiations, which have limped along without resolution for over a decade. Reaching agreement by June 2010 is challenging but achievable if Copenhagen provides the necessary political impetus.
Seal the Deal
Specifically, Copenhagen needs to do three things:
Give a clear political mandate to negotiators to reach agreement on all key issues by at the latest June 2010 and to enshrine this agreement in a legal instrument or instruments.
Set out in as much detail as possible the content of the eventual legal instrument(s), including emissions reduction targets for developed countries, nationally appropriate mitigation actions for developing countries, the long-term financing architecture, and the international framework for measurement, reporting and verification of commitments.
Maintain momentum through commitments to immediate action before 2012, including quick-start funding for adaptation, tackling deforestation and low carbon growth plans.
There are no fundamental obstacles of interest to such an agreement, but it will require great diplomatic skill and significant trust between countries to deliver; neither of which is yet apparent in the current negotiations. There are still some countries trying to block any substantive deal, but they are now a vanishing minority. In contrast, the impetus to agreement is supported by an unprecedented range of global business, finance, labour, faith and civil society coalitions who are aligned around the common elements of a Copenhagen deal.
In the final weeks towards Copenhagen it will be easy to be caught up in the day-to-day turmoil of events, but while fascinating as a spectator sport, this chatter is not what will determine the final outcome. The world is close to an ambitious deal; what is missing is the trust needed to cement the process through to a legal conclusion. Trust will be built through plain speaking, not hints, spin and clever tactics. That is why Obama must go to Copenhagen along with other leaders. Only a personal face-to-face commitment will generate the trust needed to seal the deal.
Nov 23 2009
Towards a Global Deal on Climate Finance at Copenhagen
By Monica Araya, Matthew Findlay and Claire Langley
Nov 20 2009
30 Percent and Beyond: Strengthening EU Leadership on Climate Change
By Taylor DImsdale and Matthew Findlay
Nov 18 2009
Investment momentum for decarbonising the EU power sector
By Jonathan Gaventa
Article Documents
E3G_Investment momentum for decarbonising the EU power sector.pdfE3G_Delivering a zero emissions EU power sector_Investment Scenarios.pdf
Article Published in
Email this Article
Share Article
Article hits (848)
Nov 16 2009
Making choices over China: EU-China co-operation on energy and climate
By Nick Mabey
Nov 16 2009
Tom Burke on Voice of America: Environment Ministers Meet in Effort to Invigorate Climate Talks
By Editor
Nov 12 2009
Fog of War
By Tom Burke
The intent of such slippery use of language is to manage the headlines not to change the outcome. There will be a lot more of it as we get closer to Copenhagen without resolving the real problems with getting a legally binding treaty in December. The central problem boils down to finding a way for the United States to re-enter the global regime without wrecking it in the process.
Neither the rest of the industrialised world, nor the developing world, is willing to make further emissions reductions commitments until they know what the US will put on the table. Since these commitments are what drive the whole regime, there is an understandable unwillingness to agree all the other issues until they are known.
“It is one thing to agree to play extra time, quite another to ask for a replay. To accept a political declaration in Copenhagen ... would be to give up establishing a climate regime with any prospect of staying below 2 degrees. It would be asking for a replay that might never happen.”
It is the fading prospect of the passage of US domestic legislation to underpin US reduction commitments before December which has undermined confidence that a treaty can be agreed in Copenhagen. In effect, no US commitments, no deal. The world, and the US negotiators, are sensibly wary of repeating the Kyoto experience where the US signed up to international obligations it later had to repudiate in the face of Congressional opposition.
In itself, this is not an insurmountable problem. The US is serious in its desire to rejoin the global climate regime. The rest of the world is equally anxious that it should do so. There is a well established device in international negotiations of ‘stopping the clock’ to avoid an otherwise available agreement being lost by running out of time.
If the US cannot pass its legislation by June 2010, it is very unlikely to be able to pass it in 2010, if at all. This defines for how long the clock must be stopped. Anything longer and we will be on the road to never-never land. In formal terms, that means that the negotiations in December would be adjourned not concluded.
This is the key point. It is one thing to agree to play extra time, quite another to ask for a replay. To accept a political declaration in Copenhagen that does not contain an unambiguous commitment to agreeing a ratifiable treaty by a specific date before June 2010 would be to give up establishing a climate regime with any prospect of staying below 2 degrees. It would be asking for a replay that might never happen.
If a political declaration is all that can be agreed in December it must be a postponement, not a cancellation. If it is to be a postponement that does not morph insidiously into a cancellation it must agree to a specific date by which a ratifiable treaty will be finalised. If you cannot find that date, it is not there. If it is not there, you have more fog, not a deal that will avoid dangerous climate change.
*This briefing is published with the permission of ENDS magazine. It will appear in a forthcoming special supplement on climate change to be published towards the end of November 2009
Tom Burke is a Founding Director of E3G and a Visiting Professor at Imperial and University Colleges, London.
Nov 05 2009
Scorecards on Best and Worst Policies for a Green New Deal
By Taylor Dimsdale
Article Documents
E3G-WWF_Briefing_Scorecards on Best and Worst Policies for a Green New Deal.pdfE3G-WWF_Scorecards on Best and Worst Policies for a Green New Deal.pdf
Article Published in
Email this Article
Share Article
Article hits (3272)
Nov 04 2009
UNFCCC Technology Institutional Structure: Identifying Convergence in Country Submissions
By Shane Tomlinson and Pelin Zorlu
Nov 03 2009
Financial assessment of the technology proposals under the UNFCCC: an E3G-ECN report
By Shane Tomlinson and Pelin Zorlu
Article Documents
E3G_ECN Executive Summary_Financial Assessment of the Technology Proposals under UNFCCC_October 2009.pdf
E3G_ECN Financial Assessment of Technology Proposals under UNFCCC_October 2009.pdf
Article Published in
Email this Article
Share Article
Article hits (2015)
Oct 28 2009
What the Security Community needs from Copenhagen: Washington Roundtable
By Nick Mabey and Katherine Silverthorne
Oct 28 2009
How can Copenhagen Support NAMAs in Pioneering Developing Countries?
By Monica Araya, Matthew Findlay and Claire Langley
Oct 26 2009
Climate Change and Global Governance
By Nick Mabey
Article Documents
Article Published in
- Climate and Energy Security - Delivering Climate Security
- Climate and Energy Security - Delivering a Global Deal
Email this Article
Share Article
Article hits (1979)
The Agreement must appear equitable to citizens in developing countries who will face higher future energy costs and structural changes because of the commitment their leaders take on at Copenhagen; even if some support and compensation is available from developed countries. If climate change action is seen to dash the aspirations of the next 1 billion “emergent energy consumers” then it will become politically poisonous in emerging economies. Though they are not major emitters the 100 most vulnerable countries – who have over 1 billion in population – could also derail the UNFCCC talks if they do not receive adequate support to assist in adaptation.
Even a relatively weak Copenhagen agreement will involve taxpayers and energy consumers in developed countries – and some developing countries - facing tens of billions of Euros in immediate extra costs. Though these will be more than balanced over time in reduced energy bills and savings in climate damages, the scale of any meaningful action will mean these costs cannot be hidden from citizens; as they often have been during the first Kyoto commitment period.
Therefore, for Copenhagen to be sustainable (and ratifiable) citizens in all countries who bear the costs must think it is giving good value for money, and is putting the world on a pathway towards true climate security. A weak agreement which seems a step forward and is “politically achievable” but does not credibly achieve this outcome will be highly vulnerable to attack, and risks spreading cynicism and apathy among citizens over the seriousness of intent of global political elites.
The UNFCCC is perhaps more analogous to global arms control than to the global trade regime it is often compared with. It requires far-sighted leadership to overcome immediate differences to avoid mutually assured destruction, but its sustainability will rest on citizen and domestic political perceptions of the minutiae of monitoring, verification and effective implementation.
Climate Policies outside the UNFCCC
A wide range of international meetings such as the UNGA, G8, MEF and G20 have been used as informal pre-negotiation and trust-building in front of the UNFCCC negotiations. However, there are also distinct elements of the international climate regime which are emerging in other fora to supplement the UNFCCC:
International Research and Development Cooperation: the countries in the Major Economies Forum are preparing technology roads maps on areas from carbon capture and storage to energy efficiency with the aim to begin implementation through plurilateral cooperation from November 2009. Given the difficulties in agreeing any meaningful technology agreement in the UNFCCC these may become a major regime element moving forward. Meanwhile World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) is assessing the issue of intellectual property rights over low carbon technologies.
Energy subsidies: the US has placed the highly contentious issue of energy subsidies on the G20 agenda – the first time this has been discussed in such a wide and senior forum. Though there is no expectation of quick progress, the role of the G20 as the world’s premier economic forum means that this issue now has a much better chance of seeing effective governance.
Trade liberalisation: liberalisation of low carbon goods and services has languished alongside all other multilateral trade issues in the The Doha Development Round negotiations. However, there may be attempts to move these issues forward in bilateral trade and investment agreements by both the US and EU, including as part of the overall Copenhagen deal.
Climate change will require OECD countries to revisit their international industrial policies by sharing advanced energy technologies and funding large-scale investment in economic competitors such as China and India. OECD countries must recognise that achieving climate security is a more vital national interest than the narrow maximisation of domestic company profits.
Energy Security
Energy security interests will be increasingly delivered through co-operation with energy consuming countries on technology development and diffusion, rather than through relationships with producing countries on fossil fuel discoveries and delivery. Declining use of imported fossil fuels may cause tensions with many producer countries; the EU’s gas demand could fall by 40% to 2030. Countries will not be able to achieve national energy security by undermining other countries’ climate security by using coal without capturing the carbon. There will be no agreement on climate security without guaranteeing all countries’ energy security.
Sep 24 2009
Feasibility Study on EU-CHINA Low Carbon Technology and Investment Demonstration Zones
By Nannan Lundin and Shin Wei Ng
Sep 22 2009
Systematic Risk Management Approaches to Climate Change: London Workshop
By Katherine Silverthorne
Sep 13 2009
New Winners Emerging in Global Race for Low Carbon Competitiveness
By Nick Mabey, Matthew Findlay and Monica Araya
Article Documents
G20 Low Carbon Competitiveness Report.pdfE3G Policy Brief_G20 Low Carbon Competitiveness.pdfMEDIA RELEASE_New Winners Emerging in Global Race for Low Carbon Competitiveness.pdfMEDIA RELEASE_Neue Gewinnerländer im globalen Rennen um co2-arme Wettbewerbsfähigkeit.pdf
Article Published in
Email this Article
Share Article
Article hits (7997)
Jul 13 2009
Living on Earth Radio: Mired in the Mud on the Road to Copenhagen
By Jennifer Morgan
Jul 06 2009
Office of Tony Blair: Technology for a Low Carbon Future
By Shane Tomlinson
Jul 02 2009
Road to Copenhagen: UK Prime Minister’s Initiative
By Nick Mabey
Jul 01 2009
Financing the UK’s Low Carbon Transformation
By Nick Mabey
Article Documents
Delivering Centralised Renewables.pdfDelivering Energy Efficiency to the Residential Sector.pdfAccelerating Green Infrastructure Financing.pdf
Article Published in
Email this Article
Share Article
Article hits (4880)
Jun 22 2009
The Future of Climate Policy
By Tom Burke
There is thus a considerable risk of a chicken and egg impasse. The first commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol expires at the end of 2012. Two years is the time typically needed to go from reaching such an agreement to its binding commitments coming into force. Delay beyond the end of this year therefore risks undermining the revenues flows needed to get agreement in the first place.
While previous experience suggests that there is some margin to continue negotiating beyond the end of 2009 this margin is small. In any case, uncertainty as to whether or not the world remains on course to develop a global price for carbon lead to future carbon prices being discounted well before the negotiations conclude. This would in turn lead to pressure for a more direct, but less politically deliverable, sourcing of the capital flows to the developing world needed for agreement on the ‘global deal’ to be reached.
Balanced against this gloomy prognosis is the re-entry of the United States into the constructive development of the global climate regime. There is no doubt, both from president Obama’s campaign pledges, from the frequent inclusion of references to climate change in his speeches, and from the nature of his appointments to key posts that his administration will now play a full and leading part in addressing this issue globally.
However, this will not be an unmixed blessing and the re-engagement will need to be skilfully handled to avoid creating new problems as it solves those which are familiar. Politically, President Obama has pledged to reduce U.S. domestic emissions to 1990 levels by 2020 and to aim for a reduction of 80% from present levels by 2050. This is an ambitious goal which converges on that of the EU albeit on a different trajectory.
The gap between rhetoric and action on climate change in even the most serious of nations is so wide as to justify much scepticism. Without clear signs of that gap closing, the political conditions for an ambitious enough policy agreement in Copenhagen and later will remain elusive.
To deliver it will require very tough federal legislation which a majority of commentators in the U.S. think is unlikely to pass this year. There is also a widespread view that the U.S. will not enter into binding international commitments until it has settled its domestic legislation. This would avoid the risk of repeating the Kyoto experience of negotiating an agreement in good faith only to be unable to achieve ratification by the Senate.
Should this prove to be the case, the US would not be in a position to join the other Annex 1 countries in agreeing to a second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol in Copenhagen. This is another reason for anticipating that reaching a final agreement might spill over into 2010.
It is widely expected that a core condition for achieving agreement to a ‘global deal’ in Copenhagen by the major developing countries such as China, India and Brazil, will be a US agreement to binding targets. Thus a successful ‘deal’ might require a difficult to accomplish alignment of timetables of the UN treaty process and us domestic legislative process.
There are four broad outcomes to the negotiations in December. The first is the satisfactory achievement of the so-called ‘global deal’ along the lines I outlined a moment ago. I cannot say from my recent conversations that this is yet in sight. To achieve it will require rather heavier lifting than we have yet seen from Prime Ministers and Presidents.
At the other end of the spectrum there remains a possibility of complete breakdown. Issues such as the amount of credible new money available for adaptation or the failure to agree the exact legal form of the ‘deal’ are readily available breakdown points. The highly stressed atmosphere of the concluding stages of climate negotiations is such that breakdown by accident is quite possible.
Between these poles, two other outcomes are possible. A partial success could then lead, as it did at Kyoto, to later recovery. Or, a partial success could lead, in ways that are all too familiar from trade negotiations, to a prolonged loss of momentum.
Of all the outcomes, this latter is the one that is most dangerous. Political leaders will have got the headline and crossed the problem off the to-do list. But nothing will actually have happened and re-starting the momentum will take time we do not have and will quite likely require some kind of catastrophic event.
Jun 12 2009
Blame games on climate change
By Nick Mabey and Malini Mehra
May 22 2009
Carbon Capture and Storage in China
By Matthew Findlay
May 11 2009
Building the ambition coalition towards Copenhagen: Australia’s role
By Jennifer Morgan
May 04 2009
Copenhagen Climate Deal Business Briefing: Innovation and Technology Cooperation
By Nick Mabey, Shane Tomlinson, Jennifer Morgan
Apr 23 2009
An effective, fair and robust global climate agreement: Considerations for US policymakers
By Taylor Dimsdale
Article Documents
Comparable-Efforts-230409.pdfE3G-EU-Climate-Package-Briefing-Note-MEF.pdfPlus-Five-(US)-Updated-260109-TD.pdf
Article Published in
Email this Article
Share Article
Article hits (2588)
Apr 02 2009
E3G-WWF report: Economic-Climate Recovery Scorecards
By Taylor Dimsdale
Mar 16 2009
Case Studies on Low Carbon Zones in China
By Nannan Lundin, Matthew Findlay and Shin Wei Ng
Mar 11 2009
Delivering a Sustainable Low Carbon Recovery
By Nick Mabey
Article Documents
E3G_Delivering_a_Sustainable_Low_Carbon_Recovery.pdfE3G_Delivering_a_Sustainable_Low_Carbon_German.pdf
Article Published in
Email this Article
Share Article
Article hits (4422)
At least 50% of stimulus packages should be focused on low carbon investment
Moving to a low carbon economy requires higher levels of investment, as fossil fuel use is replaced with new clean technologies. The IEA estimates that $1.7 trillion of investment each year to 2030 is needed to put the world on a path to avoid the worst impacts of climate change. Much of this investment will come from the private sector, but given current private sector weakness it is critical that public sector spending puts the world onto the right investment trajectory over the next two years.
Using IEA estimates of the investment needed to avoid the worst impacts of climate change, there is a need for $1,680bn of low carbon investment over the next two years. This could be delivered through direct government spending, but it will often be possible to leverage a substantial quantity of private sector investment through the provision of partial government loans and/or risk guarantees.
If countries devoted 50% of their stimulus packages to low carbon areas this would deliver $911 - $1,215bn of low carbon investment under different stimulus scenarios. Given other commitments, this is probably the highest realistic level of commitment and is consistent with the investment levels needed to shift to a low carbon trajectory. Most countries still have flexibility to shape the structure of their stimulus packages, and even on current projections it is likely that further stimulus measures will be announced for spending in 2010-2011. Therefore there is still an opportunity to increase the focus of this spending on low carbon recovery, and through coordination improve its impact on delivering a sustainable economic recovery.
The G20 Summit can play a vital role in delivering a low carbon recovery
Prioritising Low Carbon Spending: agreeing to prioritise low carbon action in their stimulus packages, with an aim of increasing the global proportion of low carbon actions to 50%.
Committing to Grow Global Low Carbon Markets: increasing business confidence in the strong future growth of low carbon markets by recommitting to deliver existing national policies in key sectors such as renewables, energy grids, low carbon vehicles and public transport. The IEA could be tasked with assembling these commitments, and estimating the impact of early policy delivery on oil price levels.
Avoiding Wasteful Subsidy Competition: maximising the impact of stimulus spending and avoiding wasteful competition by making support to high carbon industries conditional on improving energy efficiency and low carbon innovation. To ensure “low carbon recovery” is not used as a mask for distorting subsidies, G20 countries should report on the delivery of environmental conditions for fiscal restructuring support to key trading industries (e.g. car manufacturers, steel). The OECD and UNEP could act as the analytical clearing house for this data.
Develop Proposals for International Low Carbon Financing Mechanisms: a robust Copenhagen climate change agreement in 2009 will help guarantee the sustainable growth of global low carbon markets. The Copenhagen agreement will need to design effective international financing mechanisms for driving low carbon investment in developing countries, giving efficient and effective incentives to countries and companies to scale up investment. The G20 should establish a Task Force involving finance and other relevant ministries to develop practical proposals on the required quantity, sources, mechanisms and governance for such low carbon finance. The Task Force should develop its recommendations to feed into the UNFCCC negotiations by October 2009.
Feb 23 2009
Low Carbon Zones: EU-China cooperation
By Matthew Findlay and Felix Preston
Feb 09 2009
Copenhagen 2009: Political Risks Briefing
By Tom Burke
Feb 02 2009
Technology Cooperation – More Than Just a North-South Deal
By Nick Mabey and Shane Tomlinson
Jan 26 2009
What the EU Climate Package means for the Global Climate Deal
By Taylor Dimsdale
Jan 09 2009
UN Climate Conference: The countdown to Copenhagen
By Tom Burke
Some leading climate scientists are now openly voicing concerns that this makes it increasingly unlikely we can meet the aim of keeping global temperature rise to about 2C above the pre-industrial level, which is generally regarded as the most that may be endured by human society without mortal danger. (We are now at about 0.75 degrees C above pre-industrial, and another 0.6 of a degree is thought to be inevitable because of the CO2 which has already been emitted).
Certainly, if we are to have any chance at all at holding the increase to two degrees, there is wide agreement that global emissions have to peak very soon – probably by 2015 or 2016 – and then rapidly decrease, to 80 per cent below present levels by 2050. The later the peak, the greater (and therefore more difficult) the subsequent decrease would have to be.
That’s the pathway the world has to follow. Copenhagen offers the chance to set out along it. But even if the deal in December is not as ambitious as scientists and environmentalists insist is necessary – and at the moment, that seems pretty likely – it is vital that there is actually an accord. Disagreement would be a catastrophe.
Three conditions, according to Britain’s Energy and Climate Change Secretary, Ed Miliband, have to be fulfilled for Copenhagen to be regarded as a success. First, the wealthy industrialised countries have to agree tough new targets for cutting their C02. Second, the developing countries led by China, even if they do not take on the same sort of numerical targets, have to move away from “business as usual”. And third, the rich nations have to agree a way of financing the developing countries, especially the poorer ones, in the measures they take to adapt to the climate change that is coming anyway. Otherwise they won’t sign up to anything.
Securing such a deal will be a matter of political will: a global political consensus will have to be hammered out. It is becoming clear that, over the next 11 months, the world could well do with a high-level political fixer, jetting unceasingly from capital to capital, to pull such a consensus together, in the manner in which the Argentine diplomat, Raul Estrada, managed to pull the original Kyoto agreement together in the Japanese city in December 1997. It could be Britain’s Ed Miliband, according to Tom Burke.
“There has to be someone who can put the time in, and go round various capitals and talk to the key people at a very high level, and not just environment ministers,” he says. “Ed Miliband could play that role. He’s known to be close to Gordon Brown, and Britain is reasonably respected for its record on climate change. It doesn’t have to be him. But there probably needs to be someone.”
However, Mr Miliband, and the British Government, may face a problem of reduced credibility in climate change terms as a result of two policy decisions likely to be taken in the next few weeks. One, which Mr Miliband will take personally, is whether or not to agree to a new coal-fired power station at Kingsnorth in Kent. If he gives it the go-ahead, without strict controls over its emissions, environmentalists will accuse him of sanctioning a new generation of power plants run on the most carbon-intensive fuel. The other is whether or not to allow Heathrow airport to build a third runway, and thus expand British aviation, whose CO2 emissions are growing faster than those of any other sector.
If both these projects go ahead – as seems perfectly possible – there is no doubt that the UK’s position as a potential Copenhagen broker will be weakened. “If countries like Britain, who, for better or worse, are the global leaders, go to Copenhagen with new coal-fired power stations and expanding airports at home, it’s very difficult to see how we will be taken seriously by other countries which have even more serious energy security problems and concerns about economic growth,” said Robin Oakley, the head of climate change at Greenpeace UK. “That leadership can’t just be shown by grandstanding at the meeting. It has to be shown by what we do in our domestic policy.”
In the absence of Mr Miliband or any other leading politician emerging as the Copenhagen fixer, the key player in the process is likely to be Barack Obama. The President-elect has already opened a chasm, in terms of climate change policy, between himself and the outgoing George Bush, who, in 2001, withdrew the US from Kyoto and began years of climate policy obstructionism.
Mr Bush wanted no truck with emissions cuts of any sort; Mr Obama has pledged he will get US emissions down to 80 per cent of 1990 levels by 2050 (a target identical with Britain’s) and “engage vigorously” with the international negotiating process over the next few months. Hints have been dropped that he may convene meetings of key world leaders to speed the negotiations along. It seems highly likely that he will go to Copenhagen himself – which means every other world leader will want to be present.
Whether or not they can do the deal the world needs is another matter. Yet there is no doubt the world needs it. It may seem reasonable to think, in the coldest winter for years, that global warming has gone away, yet nothing could be further from the truth.
Dec 15 2008
A New European Climate Diplomacy: Engaging the US in solving the climate crisis
By Jennifer Morgan and Simon Koschut
Auf der internationalen Agenda stehen noch andere große Herausforderungen weit oben, wie die Stabilisierung des Irak und Afghanistans sowie der Umgang mit dem Iran. Der designierte Präsident Obama wird deshalb nach einer außenpolitischen Agenda Ausschau halten, die rasche Erfolge ermöglicht. Der Klimawandel bietet eine solche Agenda, insbesondere aufgrund der Bedeutung, die Europa dieser Problematik beimisst, aber auch wegen des dringenden globalen Handlungsbedarfs. So bekannte Obama noch in der Wahlnacht: »Unser Planet steht auf dem Spiel.« Die Zeit drängt. In nur sieben Jahren wird der Höchststand globaler Emissionen erreicht sein. Im Dezember 2009 sollen die internationalen Klimaverhandlungen für ein Nachfolgeabkommen abgeschlossen werden. Vor wenigen Tagen bekräftigte Obama in einer Videobotschaft seine Bereitschaft, trotz der Wirtschaftskrise im Kampf gegen den Klimawandel eine führende Rolle zu übernehmen: »Meine Präsidentschaft markiert ein neues Kapitel der amerikanischen Führungsrolle.« Allerdings wird es eine Herausforderung werden, den Kongress von diesem Vorhaben zu überzeugen. Dort wird von einigen Vertretern auf mögliche negative Auswirkungen auf die amerikanische Wirtschaft verwiesen. Ein Gesetzesentwurf, der ähnliche klimapolitische Ziele wie Obama verfolgte, scheiterte in diesem Jahr im Senat. Aber mit einem neuen Kongress und einem neuen Weißen Haus wird es 2009 vielleicht anders.
Die USA müssen in der internationalen Klimapolitik eine Führungsrolle übernehmen
Ohne die USA wird es kein Nachfolgeabkommen zum Kyoto-Protokoll geben. Die Einigung auf ein nationales Klimaschutzpaket in den USA ist deshalb von entscheidender Bedeutung. Nur wenn sich die USA innenpolitisch für weitreichende Klimaschutzgesetze aussprechen, kann sich der neue Präsident glaubwürdig und mit der Unterstützung des Kongress für ein internationales Folgeabkommen des Kyoto-Protokolls einsetzen. Diesen Schritt werden die USA jedoch nur gehen, sofern auch Schwellenländer wie China mit im Boot sind.
Deutschland sollte deshalb im Verbund mit den Mitgliedstaaten der Europäischen Union die Rolle des »coalition builder« übernehmen und zwischen den Schwellenländern einerseits und den USA andererseits vermitteln und beide Seiten zusammenbringen. Europas bisherige Führungsrolle in den klimapolitischen Verhandlungen und seine Erfahrungen in der bilateralen Zusammenarbeit mit China und Indien ermöglichen es der EU, sich als gleichwertiger Partner der USA zu positionieren. Allerdings sollte sich insbesondere Berlin gegenüber Washington nicht als »grüner Besserwisser « aufspielen, sondern den Vereinigten Staaten eine Führungsrolle (leadership) in der Klimaschutzpolitik zugestehen. Gleichzeitig sollte die Bundesregierung die bestehenden Kontakte und Netzwerke in den USA auf lokaler und regionaler Ebene nutzen, um auf allen Ebenen der US-Politik für ein internationales Klimaschutzabkommen zu werben.
Deutschland sollte ehrgeizige Ziele setzen, aber klug damit umgehen. Die USA müssen die Bekämpfung des Klimawandels als ureigenes Interesse (ownership) betrachten und nicht in erster Linie als ein Zugeständnis an die Europäer. Nur auf dieser Grundlage werden sich die USA überhaupt an einem internationalen Klimaschutzabkommen beteiligen. Das Zustandekommen eines solchen Abkommens liegt wiederum im Interesse Deutschlands und Europas. Die Kombination aus amerikanischem »ownership« und »leadership« birgt für Deutschland und Europa nicht nur die Erfolgsaussicht, dass sich die USA dem Klimaschutz zuwenden werden, sondern sich darüber hinaus zu einem multilateralen Vorgehen verpflichten und international einbinden lassen. Europa muss sich für eine neue Art der Diplomatie stark machen, die auf einer Lösung der Energie- und Klimakrise basiert und zu einem transformativen Bruch mit der Vergangenheit führt, der es den USA erlaubt, die Führung zu übernehmen.
Nov 29 2008
Jennifer Morgan on Living on Earth Radio
By Jennifer Morgan
GELLERMAN: Do you expect the United States will become a signature to a new climate treaty next year?
MORGAN: I do expect that. I certainly hope it. I think that the way these negotiations were launched last year, even with a Bush administration, they were done so in a way that there is a space for the United States to engage, both in looking at what it’s own emission reduction targets could be, but also how it could cooperate globally with other countries to move forward on tackling climate change and building the base for a low carbon economy.
GELLERMAN: Ms. Morgan, you’re an optimist.
MORGAN: Well, I’m a tremendously worried optimist. [LAUGHS] I think I am optimistic seeing what a new U.S. president could do to transform this debate internationally. But I think that the moment is hopefully there where the economic realities come together with the scientific realities to move forward. That doesn’t mean that this isn’t a massive challenge that won’t require all of us to come together and try to tackle it, but I think that the issue is so fundamental to the future of the planet, that my hope is that leaders will get it.
GELLERMAN: Well, Ms. Morgan, thanks a lot. I really appreciate it.
MORGAN: You’re very welcome.
GELLERMAN: Jennifer Morgan is director of global climate change for the think tank, E3G.
Nov 24 2008
E3G report launch: Innovation and Technology Transfer: Framework for a Global Climate Deal
By Shane Tomlinson, Pelin Zorlu and Claire Langley
Article Documents
Executive Summary: Innovation & Technology TransferFull Report: Innovation & Technology TransferChinese Executive Summary: Innovation & Technology TransferChinese Full Report: Innovation & Technology TransferIPR Press Release
Article Published in
- Climate and Energy Security - News & Comment
- Climate and Energy Security - Activities
- Climate and Energy Security - Thinking
Email this Article
Share Article
Article hits (15510)
Nov 11 2008
“Plus Five”: Climate Action in Major Emerging Economies
By Matthew Findlay and Taylor Dimsdale
Nov 10 2008
Market distorting impacts of free EUA allocation to energy intensive industries
By Nick Mabey and Jesse Scott
Oct 15 2008
Europe’s World: An EU-China pact is key to a global climate deal
By Nick Mabey
The new housing that will be built in China between now and 2020 is equal to all the existing housing stock in the EU-15; European housing will help drive emissions growth in the next 15 years. Acting together now to improve efficiency standards would help avoid locking in inefficient housing with high CO2 emissions for the next half-century.
China and Europe will dramatically improve their chances of achieving energy and climate security by finding concrete ways to work more closely together. Their cooperation must be concerted and transformational if it is to affect global economic and political conditions, going beyond the confused plethora of small, nationally driven projects that currently dominate EU–China energy cooperation.
Building “low-carbon economic zones” (LCEZs) in China was one of the initiatives proposed in the Changing Climates report of November last year by Chatham House and E3G. These LCEZs would be formed at prefecture level (30-40m people) and would provide testing grounds for new technologies. LCEZs would be magnets for attracting investment in research and high-end manufacturing, which is consistent with the Chinese leadership’s desire to move into higher added-value industries. The LCEZs could be to China’s next industrial revolution what Shenzhen was to the current one – and they would be a powerful demonstration of the viability of a low-carbon economy. The EU could focus its energy and climate cooperation around these zones so as to demonstrate to other countries the reality of large-scale transformations.
China uses coal to generate around 80% of its energy needs – a uniquely high percentage, coal use is likely to increase in China and also in the EU as both seek to reduce fuel imports. Europe and China should therefore radically upgrade their existing cooperative programme on carbon-neutral coal power though the development of carbon capture and storage technology, and should have a full-scale demonstration plant in operation by 2012 with a further programme of technology development beyond that.
Because China now manufactures such a vast array of goods for Europe and elsewhere, adopting world-class standards for energy-efficient goods would bring clear benefits to all. Under its Eco-Design Directive, the EU will be setting increasingly tight energy efficiency standards, and China and the EU could drive progress in both their markets by setting up a consultative committee to define challenging standards for energy-efficient, low-carbon goods. This could be coupled with the introduction of an EU–China ultra-efficiency building research platform to drive new technical and development opportunities in this fast-growing sector. Other opportunities for EU–China cooperation include developing a low-carbon free trade and investment agreement.
Fulfilling this vision of a truly transformational approach to EU–China collaboration clearly implies moving away from today’s endless jostling over trade issues, and an end to the kind of political rhetoric that feeds exaggerated fear in Europe of Chinese competition. To win political support for removing barriers to trade and investment in climate-friendly goods, services and technologies, we need to focus much more on the potential benefits rather than on the costs of low-carbon transition.
Sep 08 2008
Nick Mabey on Morning Ireland: urgently fund Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) plants
By Nick Mabey
Sep 05 2008

