Apr 10 2012
Mar 30 2012
Tom Burke on Newsnight - 29th March 2012
By Tom Burke
Mar 16 2012
Nuclear power will fail to achieve what George Monbiot wants
By Tom Burke
Feb 14 2012
Financing the Decarbonisation of European Infrastructure
By Ingrid Holmes, Jonathan Gaventa, Nick Mabey and Shane Tomlinson
Feb 04 2012
Is There A Case Against Withholding Allowances From The EU ETS?
By Sanjeev Kumar
Jan 30 2012
Post-Durban Commentary: Why It Matters That Durban Did Not Fail
By Tom Burke
Jan 25 2012
Understanding Europe’s Unexpected Durban Success
By Nick Mabey
Dec 14 2011
Europe must complete its low carbon transition
By Nick Mabey
Dec 11 2011
Durban climate deal opens door to 2°C future
By Admin
Nov 30 2011
Driving down energy bills and security of supply: The case for demand side electricity market reform
By Taylor Dimsdale
Nov 18 2011
E3G Briefing: The Durban Package
By Shane Tomlinson, Liz Gallagher, Amal-Lee Amin
Nov 14 2011
ENDS: Euro travails and climate inaction – twin crises of political will
By Tom Burke
Nov 14 2011
Policy Brief: Securing Grids for a Sustainable Future
By Admin
Oct 20 2011
ENDS: From the greenest government ever… to our very own Tea Party
By Tom Burke
Sep 27 2011
Risk management, credible options and the future of European renewables policy
By Jonathan Gaventa and Nick Mabey
A strategic approach to infrastructure
The majority of existing power grids were built in an era in which electricity systems were predominately national, power generation was sited relatively close to the points of consumption, and power flows were uni-directional and more predictable. If the proportion of renewable electricity is to increase significantly, these conditions are unlikely to hold. Most of Europe’s large-scale renewable energy resources are located at its periphery (including wind and wave power in the northern seas and solar power around the Mediterranean), away from centres of consumption. Making best use of this potential will require greater volumes of electricity crossing national borders.
It is availability rather than demand that largely determines the use of renewables: turbines only turn when the wind is blowing. When such technologies represent a higher proportion of generation, supply and demand must be balanced either across larger geographical areas (the ‘super grid’ approach) or through using new grid technologies to shift generation and consumption profiles (the ‘smart grid’). Both options may offer associated benefits beyond renewables integration. Smart grids increase reliability and efficiency, and allow consumers to have greater control over their energy use. A super-grid could drive European market integration and increase security of supply.
However, such new grids will only be built if the EU adopts a more forward looking approach to planning and investment. Traditionally, investments in grids have followed the building of power plants and other generation, even though power lines take significantly longer to build than, say, wind turbines. This sequencing creates a vicious circle: delays in grid connection can undermine investment in new renewable generation; yet without the investment in new generation, the required grids will not be built. In Scotland for example, over 9 gigawatts (GW) of renewables is currently waiting for grid connection and much of this has a connection date later than 2018. (See note 4 below) This circle can only be broken if grid planning becomes anticipatory rather than solely reacting to where generation is already under construction, and regulators and transmission operators accept the risk that some lines will be under-utilised until new generation is built.
Some degree of predictability is provided by the new ‘ten year network development plan’ of the European Network of Transmission System Operators (ENTSO-E). The plan is an important starting point for providing more certainty for grid development. However, the current plan is insufficiently aligned with European decarbonisation goals and remains a collection of predominantly national plans. For future iterations, ENTSO-E must be empowered to address longer time horizons (say, 20 years rather than ten) and to push forward long-term transformational projects that could unlock significant volumes of low-carbon investments such as a North Sea grid for offshore wind or a Mediterranean grid for linking large-scale solar generation.
Keeping the high renewables option open… will require a widening of the debate from subsidising the use of wind and solar to adjusting the entire energy system to the widespread use of renewables.
Public investment must support the construction of these strategically important networks where existing funding mechanisms are insufficient. The majority of new lines are expected to be funded on a regulated tariff basis, whereby the investment costs are repaid through tariff revenue over time. But public financing mechanisms will need to be employed to lower the cost of capital, to fund projects that are innovative or difficult (for example, offshore hubs for connecting wind farms) or where a project has strategic importance for energy security or decarbonisation.
Under the ‘energy infrastructure package’, the European Commission is currently developing proposals for infrastructure finance, including insuring project bonds via the European Investment Bank. However the European Council conclusions from February 4th 2011 appeared to prioritise infrastructure designed to meet security of supply and solidarity concerns. The package must be expanded to include the key investments that ensure Europe is able to meet its climate change trajectories.
Reoriented power markets
Current power market arrangements are designed to drive competition mainly among conventional power plants running on gas and coal. Wholesale electricity prices tend to be based on short-run operational costs and are largely driven by changes in fossil fuel prices. Most renewable power generation, by contrast, has high upfront capital costs but low ongoing operational costs. As the proportion of renewable generation within the electricity market increases, wholesale power prices tend to fall, and it becomes increasingly difficult for any investments to earn back their fixed cost.
In several EU member-states, these challenges have led to calls for electricity market reform, including the introduction of ‘capacity payments’ (mechanisms to remunerate the provision of back up capacity rather than electricity sold) to cover fixed costs as well as operational costs. Unless a co-ordinated approach is taken, however, these proposals may sit uneasily alongside the goal of European power market integration, as Georg Zachmann explains elsewhere in this report.
The underlying issue behind these dilemmas is the deep uncertainty about how future power markets will operate, and the barriers this uncertainty places on investments in both renewable and conventional generation. To answer both the investment and the integration challenge, European governments will need to develop power market arrangements capable of limiting costs to consumers, managing risks during the low-carbon transition and enabling the emergence of a single European market. An extension of the status quo would fail on each of these counts.
A believable story about the future
The final criteria needed to ensure the high renewables pathway remains a credible option is a more believable narrative about the future of European energy policies. As currently framed, European renewables policy effectively ends in 2020, a mere nine years away. Post-2020, there are no further renewables targets and no binding decarbonisation targets other than a general ambition to achieve 80-95 per cent carbon reductions by 2050 if other countries take similar action. However, the significant levels of investments in long-lived renewables manufacturing and installation capacity needed to deliver the 2020 targets (for example, the testing facilities, factories and ships needed for offshore wind) is unlikely to materialise without greater certainty over what will happen to renewables policy after the 2020 target date.
The European Commission is set to produce a ‘2050 roadmap’ for energy later in 2011, following on from the roadmap for a low- carbon economy published in March. The roadmap is an opportunity to limit this uncertainty and ensure that the high renewables option remains viable. This implies establishing a clear date by which the power sector must be decarbonised; developing new renewables targets for the 2025 or 2030 time horizon; or pushing forward plant-based emissions performance standards to ensure that more polluting coal or gas-fired power plants cannot crowd out cleaner energy from renewable sources.
From subsidies to systemic change
Like all evolving technologies, those needed for the use of renewable energy sources entail risks and uncertainty. The financial support schemes that EU governments have put in place for renewables represent a strategic investment to expand available options by driving forward technological development and accumulating experience on risk and costs.
Keeping the high renewables option open, however, will require a widening of the debate from subsidising the use of wind and solar to adjusting the entire energy system to the widespread use of renewables. Investors in technologies and supply chains will require greater clarity on how big future demand for renewables will be. They need confidence that Europe’s energy infrastructure will be up to the task, that market arrangements will work efficiently and that policy frameworks will deliver the required decarbonisation trajectory. This requires the EU and its member-states to institute a more strategic approach to infrastructure planning, to reform electricity markets and to adopt longer-term carbon and renewables targets. Unless these decisions are taken quickly, the option of a high renewables pathway to a low-carbon energy system will be effectively foreclosed.
Notes
1. Fraunhofer ISI, EEG and ECOFYS, ‘Economic analysis of reaching a 20 per cent share of renewable energy sources in 2020’, August 2006.
2. European Climate Foundation, ‘Roadmap 2050: A practical guide to a prosperous, low-carbon Europe’, 2010.
3. European Commission, ‘Renewable energy: Progressing towards the 2020 target’, January 2011.
4. House of Commons energy and climate change committee, ‘The future of Britain’s electricity networks’, second report of session 2009-10.
5. The UK’s committee on climate change has proposed that power sector emissions should be no greater than 50g CO2/kWh by 2030.
This article was written for the latest Centre for European Reform report entitled: GREEN, SAFE, CHEAP: Where next for EU energy policy?
Aug 09 2011
More Fight, Less Fuel: Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy in the Department of Defense, USA.
By Claire Langley and Gouri Shukla
Jun 14 2011
Europe has to follow its Climate Realpolitik
By Nick Mabey
Copenhagen showed us the limits of bottom-up action. Even an optimistic reading of the Copenhagen pledges gives an even chance of exceeding 3.5-4°C by the middle of the century. This is better than the 6-8°C which would have happened without Copenhagen, but is still catastrophic. At 4°C Berlin has the current climate of Tunis. Southern Europe sees temperatures rise by up to 7°C and rainfall drop by 40%. And a North African economy heavily based on agriculture and tourism implodes, potentially driving a level of political instability which would dwarf that of the Arab Spring. With its extended borders facing a range of unstable and climatically vulnerable regions, Europe is the most insecure of all developed countries. We do not have the Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans to shield us from poor people whose livelihoods have been destroyed. Europe needs a solution to climate change that really delivers in limiting such unmanageable impacts. That requires Europe to have a credible strategy for delivering a top-down climate regime.
The majority of countries agree with the EU’s approach. The most vulnerable countries in Africa, Asia, Latin America and the small island states all back a top-down architecture covering all countries. Many of these self-styled “progressive countries” are already cooperating through the Cartagena Dialogue process. Emerging economies such as Korea, Brazil and South Africa also back a binding agreement. In fact only the US, China, India, Venezuela and the OPEC countries are really holding out. And even China and India have said they would (eventually) join a binding regime if the US took stronger action.
Some argue that the EU continuing with Kyoto lowers the pressure on countries like China to act because it excludes them from having binding emissions caps. However, this is not an accidental oversight but the core of the political bargain made at Kyoto in 1997. The developed world agreed to go first and show decarbonisation was possible, and developing countries would take binding caps afterwards. A process implicitly assumed to happen from around 2020 onwards. Kyoto was never designed as a closed regime splitting developed and developing countries in perpetuity, and there is nothing in the architecture which prevents developing countries making commitments.
Given this history – and its links to longstanding North-South politics – the one guaranteed way to reduce pressure on emerging economies is for developed countries to renege on the Kyoto bargain. This is illustrated by a simple thought experiment. Imagine that by 2013 China, Brazil and India were all completely convinced that limiting climate change to below 2°C was in their fundamental core interests, but developed countries had all abandoned the Kyoto Protocol. How could the leaders of emerging economies explain to their domestic publics that they will take binding targets in a new regime after such an overt betrayal by developed countries? Even if their leaders wanted to act they would be unlikely to risk the resulting backlash from public opinion.
Bargaining chip
However, there is still a deal to be made and unilateralism has its limits. Europe must make its recommitment to Kyoto conditional on participation by key developed countries such as Australia. Major developing countries must signal that they are committed to an evolving regime that eventually binds everyone. If Europe cannot get all of this at Durban it should make its participation in a second commitment period conditional, for example, on a parallel comprehensive agreement being in place by 2015. This will put the pressure back on other high emitting countries – including the US and China – to complete their negotiations by then. In this way Europe can make the Kyoto Protocol the nucleus around which it builds a winning coalition of countries who are committed to limiting climate change to below 2°C. The real way to put pressure on the largest emitters is to build an inclusive movement of the majority of the world’s countries; Europe cannot do this if it abandons Kyoto.
Recommitting to Kyoto supports Europe’s medium term strategy on climate change, and also makes tactical sense in the short term. In the most optimistic scenario countries will agree to higher ambition inside a comprehensive global agreement in the next 3-4 years. In this scenario Europe gains negotiating strengthen by maintaining the Kyoto Protocol as the benchmark for the climate regime architecture. In the pessimistic case where countries do not agree to negotiate a more effective global regime it gives Europe a basis for changing its strategy. For example, if Europe then decides to levy border taxes on free-riding countries like the US and Canada it will have a much stronger basis in trade law from inside the Kyoto.
The EU’s leadership on climate change has often been the subject of derision since Copenhagen, especially from inside the EU. But the fact remains that Europe’s actions have driven a global revolution in renewable energy investment which now outstrips annual new fossil fuel powered investments. It is Europe’s energy regulations and standards which emerging economies are copying, and which underpin a global market worth $3 trillion. Without Europe’s lead China would not have decided to implement a Five Year Economic Plan based on the core assumption of rapidly expanding global markets in clean energy.
Europe’s climate diplomacy has shaped global economic reality. In comparison the US has better speeches but no comparable achievements. European climate diplomacy should not be characterised as a failure just because it hasn’t achieved all its objectives.
There is no rule that says delivering your fundamental interests is easy or inevitable. But the historical custodians of European realpolitik would surely turn in their graves to see Europe shrink from pursuing its fundamental interests because it feared being considered silly. Perhaps it is time we started revisiting some of those old-time European values and be prepared stand up for our interests again?
May 24 2011
Climate change: New frontiers in transparency and accountability
By Shane Tomlinson, Liz Gallagher, Claire Langley, Pelin Zorlu and Shin Wei Ng
Apr 13 2011
The case for EU moving to 30%: Global low carbon technology race and international cooperation
By Pelin Zorlu, Shane Tomlinson and Sanjeev Kumar
Apr 06 2011
Tom Burke participates on The Economist’s online live debate on Nuclear power.
By Tom Burke
REBUTTAL
Mr Hore-Lacy argues that nuclear power is safe and cheap and that it is a pity the accident was caught on television. When we all settle down and look at the reviews now being conducted by governments we will, he believes, discover that there are not many lessons to be learnt. This comes dangerously close to demonstrating exactly the complacency that many people fear most about the nuclear industry.
He does assert that nuclear is ‘greatly needed’ but provides no analysis to support this claim. This is a rather important omission as the question under debate is whether nuclear power is worth the effort and risk it entails.
Nuclear reactors are amongst the most complex and sophisticated examples of human ingenuity. They demonstrate an extraordinary level of engineering brilliance. Running them safely requires a level of management focus that other industries would do well to emulate. In routine operation, the nuclear industry has an excellent track record of meeting the required standard.
When running normally, nuclear reactors do little damage to public health. This contrasts vividly with the direct damage done to public health by burning coal. Furthermore, coal burning does considerable damage to the environment both directly and through its contribution to climate change.
I dealt in my previous contribution with the reasons why nuclear power can play, at best, only a minor role displacing coal use. As it happens, the technologies to make coal climate safe will also greatly reduce the health and other environmental impacts of its use.
But the issue raised by Fukushima is what happens when things go wrong. Here the contrasts are equally vivid. Most members of the public have intimate experience of Murphy’s Law operating in their lives both at home and at work. They are, properly, more interested in the consequences of a catastrophe than its likelihood.
Debate is already raging over effect of the catastrophic releases of radioactivity from Fukushima. Opinions range from the blandly reassuring – ‘trivial’ as Mr Hore-Lacy assures us - to the seriously anxious – the US government warning its citizens not to travel within 80 kilometres of the plant.
We will learn more about the damage from radiation in the months and years ahead. But in the meantime it is already clear that the impact of the accident on human well being is very large.
As many as 200,000 people face the prospect of never being able to return to their homes. TEPCO has lost 83% of its value, destroying the savings of a great many people. Millions more in Japan are understandably anxious about the potential impacts of radiation at any level on their children. Studies after Three Mile Island found that the mental health consequences were much more serious than the physical effects.
As Mr Hore-Lacy correctly points out, there have been very few nuclear catastrophes, though quite why he thinks that the ‘safety of nuclear power …… could hardly be better’ is not immediately obvious.
What happened at Fukushima was a loss of coolant accident. Caused, in this case, by the impact of the earthquake and tsunami which between them destroyed power supplies to the reactor’s cooling system.
This is among the worst things that could happen to a reactor and engineers have studied the likelihood of this happening extensively. These studies suggest such a catastrophic event might occur once in a hundred thousand years of reactor operations. Actual experience has been rather different. There have been three catastrophic loss of coolant events in the 14,500 reactor years to which Mr Hore-Lacy refers.
That is an actual frequency of once in every five thousand years of reactor operation. Put another way, with just over 400 reactors operating around the world, that is about once a decade. Given the cost of such events to taxpayers, it may not be long before even the most nuclear friendly governments begin to wonder if this is worth the risk.
Many government have been seduced by the idea that, whatever the risk, nuclear power is a cheap way to produce electricity. They believe Mr Hore-Lacy’s unsupported assertion that ‘only coal and natural gas can compete on cost’. In this they, like him, are mistaken.
No nuclear reactor anywhere has been built without government subsidy. The fact that private investors have never been willing to take the economic risk of nuclear power is a clear warning to treat all assertions about its costs with some suspicion.
The most extensive study yet done of nuclear subsidies concluded ‘ buying power on the open market and giving it away for free would have been less costly than subsidising the construction and operation of nuclear power plants.’ We have moved from the early claim of nuclear electricity being too cheap to meter, to it now being too costly to afford.
Mar 14 2011
China’s 12th Five-Year-Plan: Engaging the world on the low carbon race
By Shin Wei Ng
Mar 07 2011
Re-monopolising Power? Reform Of The Electricity Market To Meet Climate Change Goals
By Simon Skillings
Feb 10 2011
Degrees of Risk: Defining a Risk Management Framework for Climate Security
By Nick Mabey and Katherine Silverthorne
Article Documents
Degrees of Risk: Defining a Risk Management Framework for Climate Security_Executive Summary.pdfDegrees of Risk: Defining a Risk Management Framework for Climate Security_Full Report.pdfE3G_Degrees of Risk Presentation_Nick Mabey.pdfE3G_Degrees of Risk Presentation_Jay Gulledge.pdf
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Feb 02 2011
Chinese challenge or low carbon opportunity
By Dr. Shin Wei Ng and Nick Mabey
Jan 21 2011
Energy Market Reform: E3G’s evidence at the House of Commons
By Simon Skillings
Dec 11 2010
CANCUN: Negotiators throw climate a lifeline
By Admin
Dec 09 2010
Assessment of priority countries for climate action in 2010
By E3G
Nov 29 2010
All eyes on the strategic climate colonels at Cancun
By Nick Mabey and Shane Tomlinson
Nov 26 2010
‘Whole-of-Government’ Response to Global Climate Change
By Nick Mabey
Nov 23 2010
Speech for the Business of Sustainability conference at the Minerals Council of Australia 13/10/2010
By Tom Burke
Nov 23 2010
Politically Robust Package of Power Market Reform
By Simon Skillings
Nov 19 2010
Building a sustainable and low carbon European recovery: the case for a 30 percent emissions target
By Sanjeev Kumar
Nov 08 2010
EU-China alliance - the power to take the lead on climate change
By Nick Mabey
Oct 26 2010
Renewables Policy: Renewables Obligation vs. Feed In Tariffs
By Simon Skillings
Oct 17 2010
Emissions Performance Standards: E3G gives evidence
By Jonathan Gaventa
Oct 15 2010
GB power market reform – high level policy choices
By Simon Skillings
Oct 05 2010
Toward Low Carbon Resilient Economies-Implications for the Fast-Start Finance Package
By Monica Araya
Article Documents
E3G_Toward Low Carbon Resilient Economiese_Executive Summary.pdfE3G_Toward Low Carbon Resilient Economies_Implications for fast-start finance.pdfUNFCCC, Tianjin_Toward a Transformative Fast-Start Finance Package.pdfPress Release_Transforming the future with “Fast-Start” finance.pdf
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Sep 15 2010
Emissions Performance Standards may lower costs of decarbonisation
By Jonathan Gaventa
Sep 03 2010
A climate for European action
By Tom Burke
Aug 16 2010
Nuclear companies open new front in fight for government subsidies
By Tom Burke
The Concise Oxford English Dictionary defines a subsidy as “money contributed by the state to expenses of commercial undertaking”. The nuclear industry itself is on record that no nuclear power station has ever been built without subsidy. The challenge the industry now faces is either to do something that has never been done before, or to so transform the idea of a subsidy as to conjure away the money that must actually flow from the public purse to build any new nuclear capacity.
Without the political weight now attached to the issue of subsidies this would have been easy. A blizzard of words would have been generated to conceal it from view. The media would have quickly become bored with the technicalities and let the issue drop below the political horizon. Now everybody will be watching.
There will be plenty to see. The government already subsidises nuclear power by effectively insuring the industry against the bulk of its third-party liabilities in the event of a nuclear accident. As we have seen in the Gulf of Mexico, the low probability of an accident does nothing to reduce the scale of the consequences should it occur.
The government has also promised to cap the cost of managing the industry’s waste. The industry will be charged a fixed amount by the government to take waste off its hands. Since we have yet to build any of the facilities needed to handle this waste, this promise amounts to a blank cheque. Any difference between the charge set and what it actually costs will be a delayed subsidy ambushing a successor to Mr Huhne.
All those radioactive waste costs, so casually discounted away in the economic analyses underpinning Britain’s first nuclear scheme, have now turned up as a several billion-pound hole
But this is nowhere near enough subsidy to make new nuclear attractive to investors. There will also need to be a floor price for carbon. Strange how little faith there now is in markets. Imagine the outcry about economic distortion if you argued that there should be a floor price for any other traded commodity.
A floor price for carbon is essentially a unilateral tax on British consumers and businesses to artificially raise the price of electricity to boost the revenues of the predominantly foreign-owned nuclear suppliers. It is very difficult to see how this would not be “money contributed by the state”.
But even this will not be enough to make nuclear economically attractive. Hence the call for a level playing field. This is the starting gun on the battle over reforming the electricity market. This ‘level playing field’ really means that the mature nuclear industry should compete for the same subsidy as the emerging renewables industry. Thus the renewables obligation would be turned into a low-carbon obligation that would be a fourth subsidy to new nuclear build.
This is not a prospectus for a smart transition by Britain to a low-carbon future. It is simply a return to the inefficiencies and deferred bills of the last Conservative government’s Non-Fossil Fuel Obligation, which saw more than 90% of the subsidy – for that’s what it was – go to the nuclear industry.
Tom Burke is a founding director of E3G and a visiting professor at Imperial and University Colleges, London. He also advises Rio Tinto
Aug 16 2010
Choices at stake for power market reform
By Simon Skillings
Jul 27 2010
Investing for an uncertain future: Priorities for UK energy and climate security
By Nick Mabey
Jul 02 2010
An E3G response to The European Commission’s Energy Strategy 2011-2020 Consultation
By Jesse Scott
May 20 2010
What the UK elections mean for climate security
By Editor
Apr 20 2010
European Climate Diplomacy after Copenhagen
By Nick Mabey and Matthew Findlay
Apr 14 2010
Pathways mapped out to zero carbon power sector
By Jonathan Gaventa
Apr 06 2010
The Value Proposition for a European Supergrid
By Jonathan Gaventa
Mar 19 2010
Low Carbon Technology: A Framework for EU-China Dialogue
By Aleyn Smith-Gillespie
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Mar 03 2010
The Road From Copenhagen: Prospects and Priorities for Action on Climate Change
By Matthew Findlay and Nick Mabey
Article Documents
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Feb 16 2010
UK Power Sector Market Reform: The Case for Action
By Simon Skillings
Feb 10 2010
EU Must Learn Lessons from Copenhagen and Lead by Example
By Taylor Dimsdale and Matthew Findlay
Article Documents
E3G – 30 Percent and Beyond (Updated Jan 2010)E3G – 30 Percent and Beyond_FR.pdfE3G – 30 Percent and Beyond_DE.pdfE3G_30 Percent and Beyond_ES.pdfE3G – 30 Percent and Beyond_PL.pdf
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Feb 03 2010
Conservative Party announces Green Investment Bank plans
By Nick Mabey
Jan 26 2010
A Road Map to Deliver Smart Grid in the UK
By Simon Skillings
Jan 18 2010
What does the Security Community need from a Global Climate Regime?
By Nick Mabey
Jan 12 2010
Delivering Climate Security: COP15 side event report
By Katherine Silverthorne
Article Documents
Maj Gen Muniruzzaman_The Security Dimensions of Climate Change_COP15.pdfW Chris King_Afghanistan-An Environmental Security Case Study in Climate Change and Security_COP15.pdfAlexandros Papaioannou_Delivering Climate Security_COP15.pdfNick Mabey_Developing a Risk Management Approach to Delivering Climate Security_COP15.pdfCleo Paskal_From Constants to Variables_COP15.pdf
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Dec 18 2009
Global Leaders Leave Job Unfinished
By Nick Mabey
Dec 16 2009
Targets, Foundations and Transformation: Benchmarks for a Successful Copenhagen Agreement
By Nick Mabey
Dec 14 2009
Copenhagen Week 2 - Closing the Deal
By Editor
Dec 14 2009
Technology Action Plans and Funding Complement Legally Binding Climate Agreement
By Shane Tomlinson
Dec 09 2009
The Real Message of the Leaked Danish Text
By Nick Mabey
Dec 07 2009
Delivering Climate Security: Official COP15 side event *New Venue*
By Nick Mabey and Katherine Silverthorne
Dec 02 2009
Be careful what you wish for
By Nick Mabey and Shane Tomlinson
Nov 25 2009
Delivering a Zero Emissions Power Sector: Policy Challenges
By Simon Skillings
Nov 25 2009
The European Low Carbon Transformation: If not now when?
By Nick Mabey
Nov 24 2009
Sorting Blinks from Winks in the Copenhagen End Game
By Nick Mabey
This is the wrong way to approach the climate change process. We are not back in the Cold War trying to determine the aggressive intent of a declared and secretive enemy. Copenhagen is a multi-polar negotiation between highly interdependent countries who are aiming to preserve their mutual climate security. It is not a game any one nation can win, but it is one we can all lose.
Stripping away the confusion, the underlying dynamics of the Copenhagen end-game are rather more straightforward:
There is no credible alternative to a legally binding international agreement to limit global climate change below 2°C; any “bottom-up” system of country pledges will always fail to drive the necessary scale and pace of reductions as it does not help countries take on domestic interest lobbies.
The US will not accept a binding target unless China and India also agree to be bound to commitments that are internationally verifiable.
But China will not commit to decarbonise its economy unless the US accepts a binding and ambitious emissions reduction target.
The majority of developing countries will not agree to any new framework unless it binds developed nations and contains significant new medium term public finance for adaptation, forestry and clean energy.
Europe and Japan – who have met their reduction commitments under the binding Kyoto Protocol – can only accept the weak US commitments which are on the table if a new agreement is at least as binding as Kyoto, and the US commits to comparable emission reductions by 2030 at the latest.
Leadership
This is the inexorable logic of the multilateral negotiations and leaves a clear set of decisions for the US. The Obama administration will struggle to convince the US Senate to pass a domestic Climate Bill if it cannot show that this is part of a wider international effort that delivers climate security for America. A binding international agreement that commits China and India to real emission reductions would show the value of US leadership. To achieve this, the US will have to agree to be bound itself and to put its 2030 mitigation target and some commitment to medium term finance on the table.
“...an agreement…will require great diplomatic skill and significant trust between countries to deliver; neither of which is yet apparent in the current negotiations
None of this need breach the wise position of the US negotiators that they are not prepared to sign up to an international agreement unless they are confident they can pass the domestic legislation needed to implement it. The administration has a good story to tell of how committing to US legislation has catalysed serious emission reduction commitments from all major economies.
The US has more room for manoeuvre than it currently thinks. If President Obama wants to make real the leadership he has proclaimed so eloquently in his speeches, now is the time to send a clear, unified and unambiguous message to the other Parties. We want a 2°C agreement; we will put forward what is needed to secure this; we expect others to agree to be bound by their promises – as we agree to be bound by ours; this will require a legally binding treaty. We may need more time to agree final details, but we are ready to make substantial and lasting commitments in Copenhagen.
Nov 23 2009
Towards a Global Deal on Climate Finance at Copenhagen
By Monica Araya, Matthew Findlay and Claire Langley
Nov 20 2009
30 Percent and Beyond: Strengthening EU Leadership on Climate Change
By Taylor DImsdale and Matthew Findlay
Nov 18 2009
Investment momentum for decarbonising the EU power sector
By Jonathan Gaventa
Article Documents
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Nov 16 2009
Making choices over China: EU-China co-operation on energy and climate
By Nick Mabey
Nov 16 2009
Tom Burke on Voice of America: Environment Ministers Meet in Effort to Invigorate Climate Talks
By Editor
Nov 12 2009
Fog of War
By Tom Burke
Thus we now have a clear destination for the climate regime to be agreed in Copenhagen. In effect, 2 degrees has been established as the threshold of dangerous climate change. If Copenhagen sets the world on course to stay below this level it will have succeeded. If not, it will have failed.
If we could lift the thickening fog of war the key elements of a successful agreement would be clear to everyone. To have a reasonable chance of staying within the 2 degrees limit the concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere needs to be kept below 450 parts per million CO2-equivalent. To get there, global carbon emissions must peak by 2020 and be reduced by at least 50% from 1990 levels by 2050.
Politically Binding
The EU and the US have already set this as the long run goal of their climate policy. But because the build up of carbon in the atmosphere is cumulative, you cannot leave getting there to the last minute. This means setting mid-term targets.
These mid-term targets for the industrialised nations are the key to the whole Copenhagen agreement. To put the world onto the right path to stay below 2 degrees, the industrialised nations must agree to a binding commitment to reduce their emissions 25-40% below 1990 levels by 2020.
The developing countries would not yet need to make binding commitments to reduce their emissions below current levels. But they would have to make binding commitments to programmes of action to reduce their emissions below where they might otherwise have been. In the jargon of the negotiations these actions would have to be ‘measurable, reportable and verifiable.’
In return for these commitments the industrialised nations would provide finance to the tune of about $100 billion annually by 2020. This finance would be available in part to support the action programmes to reduce emissions and in part to pay for adaptation in climate vulnerable countries. Some 30% of these capital flows would be from public sources but the majority would be in the form of private capital flows – largely financed by the purchase of carbon off-sets needed to meet the industrialised nations’ emissions reduction commitments.
There is a well established device in international negotiations of ‘stopping the clock’ to avoid an…agreement being lost by running out of time.
This is the essential heart of the deal to be done at Copenhagen. If this deal, or something close to it, cannot be struck then the whole global climate regime is in doubt. There are, of course, many other issues and a lot more details any one of which could block agreement. But the closer we are to getting the core deal the less likely this is.
The reason the verbal fog of war is thickening so rapidly stems from a growing lack of confidence that this deal can be struck in December. This has led to the proposal to settle for a political declaration in Copenhagen which might or might not lead to a ratifiable treaty.
It has stimulated the Danish Prime Minster to talk beguilingly of a ‘politically binding’ agreement for ‘immediate implementation’. This is simply hand waving. All anyone can do immediately is what they have already committed themselves to do. In which case, what is being negotiated? The term ‘politically binding’ has no meaning at all in diplomacy. It is simply a promise by a politician worth as much as any other such promise.
Nov 05 2009
Scorecards on Best and Worst Policies for a Green New Deal
By Taylor Dimsdale
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E3G-WWF_Briefing_Scorecards on Best and Worst Policies for a Green New Deal.pdfE3G-WWF_Scorecards on Best and Worst Policies for a Green New Deal.pdf
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Nov 04 2009
UNFCCC Technology Institutional Structure: Identifying Convergence in Country Submissions
By Shane Tomlinson and Pelin Zorlu
Nov 03 2009
Financial assessment of the technology proposals under the UNFCCC: an E3G-ECN report
By Shane Tomlinson and Pelin Zorlu
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E3G_ECN Executive Summary_Financial Assessment of the Technology Proposals under UNFCCC_October 2009.pdf
E3G_ECN Financial Assessment of Technology Proposals under UNFCCC_October 2009.pdf
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Oct 28 2009
What the Security Community needs from Copenhagen: Washington Roundtable
By Nick Mabey and Katherine Silverthorne
Oct 28 2009
How can Copenhagen Support NAMAs in Pioneering Developing Countries?
By Monica Araya, Matthew Findlay and Claire Langley
Oct 26 2009
Climate Change and Global Governance
By Nick Mabey
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- Climate and Energy Security - Delivering Climate Security
- Climate and Energy Security - Delivering a Global Deal
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The success of Copenhagen will, in large part, be determined by whether it cements a credible expectation for the move to a global low carbon economy in the next decades in all major industrialised and emerging economies. This expectation will in itself change patterns of private sector investment and risk analysis.
Benchmarks for a successful Copenhagen Agreement
1. Added-value: The Copenhagen regime can only be considered successful if it delivers more mitigation action than would occur through a bottom-up process of individual country legislation. Current estimates are that existing developed country unilateral mitigation commitments are around 15% below 1990 levels by 2020; developing country pledges of action would reduce their total industrial emissions 4% below business-as-usual (BAU) by 2020. This falls well short of what is required according to IPCC scenarios for GHG stabilisation at 450ppm CO2e, i.e. 25-40% reductions by 2020 for developed countries and 15-30% deviation below BAU by 2020 for developing countries. If Copenhagen fails to take us closer to the global mitigation effort required to say below 2°C then the international negotiations have been a distraction, draining effort from other more productive activity at regional, national and sub-national level – including bilateral cooperation.
2. High Trust Regime: As the foundation for a long term international climate regime, it is critical that the Copenhagen agreement establishes a robust, trusted and independent process for coordinating country efforts to tackle climate change. The basic deal structure at Copenhagen will be one of reciprocity of action towards a shared global goal – or “I will if you will”. However, since all countries will experience policy failures and difficulties in complying with their obligations, it is critical to establish whether such problems stem from “events beyond their control” or deliberate inaction. Without trust, the regime will collapse in mutual recrimination. Key to this will be accurate, transparent, verified and publicly assessed data covering national GHG emissions, mitigation and finance actions.
3. Flexibility to move to stronger targets in future: There is increasing scientific evidence that targets such as 350ppm CO2e and/or limiting global temperature rise to 1.5°C will be necessary to avoid critical tipping points in the earth’s climate system. Realistically, these targets are not going to be agreed at Copenhagen, and so a critical benchmark for success is that it does not preclude moving to tighter targets in the future due to inflexibility of the target regime, a long commitment period or an ineffective scientific review mechanism. Specifically, the agreement must include a strong and automatic review procedure for strengthening targets linked to the IPCC scientific process.
4. Driving Transformational Change: Most OECD countries could reach the toughest 2020 targets currently under consideration through a combination of relatively marginal domestic policy changes and large scale international off-setting. This would not provide the necessary impetus for a rapid global transition to a low carbon economy. A critical benchmark for success therefore is that OECD commitments motivate transformational change in technology development, infrastructure investment and regulation to catalyse the global transition to a low carbon economy. Practical benchmarks include: strong signals to the global business community about the inevitability of a carbon constrained world; halting of new OECD investment in unabated coal power plants; and rapid, large-scale demonstration of low carbon technologies in both developed and developing countries.
5. Supporting Future Industrialising Country Caps: Copenhagen will at best put the world on an emissions path that keeps open the possibility of staying below 2°C. It cannot guarantee a “safe” trajectory because major developing countries will most likely not be in a position to agree a binding peak-and-decline trajectory as part of any agreement. A realistic but ambitious outcome is that Copenhagen helps drive comprehensive moves towards a low carbon economy in key industrialising countries so they will be in a position to agree binding emission peaking dates in the medium term (2020-2030). This will depend on the scale and form of developing country commitments, and whether financial support is directed at low-cost offsets or higher cost decarbonisation programmes in developing countries.
6. Ensuring a fair deal for the most vulnerable: The Copenhagen agreement must be seen as broadly legitimate if it is to command broad political support in all countries and set up the right incentives for future action. It should demand more of countries with greater responsibility for climate change and with higher living standards. It should also mobilise support for adaptation to climate change by the most vulnerable countries which are least responsible for the problem. It is in the interests of both developed and developing countries to ensure that financial transfers drive efficient and effective action. Without a clear “return” on these investments it will be difficult to maintain public and political support for international cooperation.
The Geo-politics of Climate Change
These benchmarks have political as well as policy relevance. The power politics of climate change are perhaps unique among all global problems. Though 50-70% of current climate change can be attributed to OECD countries, the largest global emitter is now China and developing countries will dominate future emissions growth even if their per capita emissions are still relatively low. Developed countries need action by emerging economies to preserve their domestic climate security but cannot force them to deliver it; instead they can encourage action by providing a strong case for financial and technology transfers. On the other hand, developing countries are more vulnerable to climate change than most developed nations, and so have a strong national interest in seeing global action. The danger in the UNFCCC negotiations is that horse-trading arguments over the 0.5% of OECD GDP in financial compensation and transfers needed to cement a deal, will derail the common need to agree an effective regime to avoid the 5-20% of GDP in climate change costs estimated by the Stern Review.
Sep 24 2009
Feasibility Study on EU-CHINA Low Carbon Technology and Investment Demonstration Zones
By Nannan Lundin and Shin Wei Ng
Sep 22 2009
Systematic Risk Management Approaches to Climate Change: London Workshop
By Katherine Silverthorne
Sep 13 2009
New Winners Emerging in Global Race for Low Carbon Competitiveness
By Nick Mabey, Matthew Findlay and Monica Araya
Article Documents
G20 Low Carbon Competitiveness Report.pdfE3G Policy Brief_G20 Low Carbon Competitiveness.pdfMEDIA RELEASE_New Winners Emerging in Global Race for Low Carbon Competitiveness.pdfMEDIA RELEASE_Neue Gewinnerländer im globalen Rennen um co2-arme Wettbewerbsfähigkeit.pdf
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Jul 13 2009
Living on Earth Radio: Mired in the Mud on the Road to Copenhagen
By Jennifer Morgan
Jul 06 2009
Office of Tony Blair: Technology for a Low Carbon Future
By Shane Tomlinson
Jul 02 2009
Road to Copenhagen: UK Prime Minister’s Initiative
By Nick Mabey
Jul 01 2009
Financing the UK’s Low Carbon Transformation
By Nick Mabey
Article Documents
Delivering Centralised Renewables.pdfDelivering Energy Efficiency to the Residential Sector.pdfAccelerating Green Infrastructure Financing.pdf
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Jun 22 2009
The Future of Climate Policy
By Tom Burke
The nature of the climate is such that the future cannot redeem today’s mistakes. Once a given concentration of carbon is in the atmosphere, the climate it drives is inexorable even if it takes decades or more to fully express itself. In the most literal sense, the sins of the fathers will indeed be visited on the sons and well beyond the third and fourth generation.
We humans do not learn easily. We try and fail and try again. Our progress is incremental and we are prone to repeating our mistakes. We are too often content to let the future redeem the mistakes of the present. Climate change does not suit us. We have little experience with the irrevocable, and dislike exacting time limits.
Compared to the diplomatic effort needed to achieve success in Copenhagen that required for a final settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian problem or to deter Iran from seeking nuclear weapons is relatively small. But there is little sign that an effort of the required level of ambition is yet being made. Compare the amount of media coverage, and intensity of political effort, given to the Middle East to that accorded to climate change.
History does not have an agenda on which items can be prioritised. Either you deal with the events it throws at you or they deal with you.
This is not to diminish in any way the magnitude of those problems nor to argue that less should be done to address them. It is rather to point out the classic human error of allowing the more immediate to obscure the more urgent. History does not have an agenda on which items can be prioritised. Either you deal with the events it throws at you or they deal with you. As Carlyle once remarked “if something be not done, something will do itself and in a way that pleases no-one”*.
No leader will want to come away from Copenhagen saying they failed to solve the most serious problem facing humanity. But the appearance of success will be easier to achieve than the substance. It will consist of words and the less the success the more interpretable the words.
The Copenhagen negotiations are among the most complex ever undertaken. The goal is to achieve a so-called ‘global deal’ in which the industrialised world agrees to a second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol and agrees to provide finance for adaptation and the transfer of low carbon technologies in return for rest of the world undertaking ‘monitorable, reportable and verifiable’ commitments to reduce their emissions.
In reality there are two main, and a number of related negotiations, including those on forestry, going on separately under the same umbrella without, as yet, a clear mechanism for bringing them all together. The issue of the legal form of whatever will be agreed in Copenhagen is one of the least discussed but potentially most difficult of the matters to be resolved.
National leaders are currently distracted by the need to engineer an economic recovery. They are increasingly unwilling to impose constraints on economic growth. Furthermore, public finances are already over-stretched by the loss of tax revenues and urgent need to finance economic stimulus packages.
This considerably narrows the scope for agreement on the necessary funding for adaptation and technology transfer. Proposals for financing such capital flows rely heavily on a carbon price or permit auction revenues which are themselves dependent on the agreement by the industrialised countries to a second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol.
Jun 12 2009
Blame games on climate change
By Nick Mabey and Malini Mehra
May 22 2009
Carbon Capture and Storage in China
By Matthew Findlay
May 11 2009
Building the ambition coalition towards Copenhagen: Australia’s role
By Jennifer Morgan
May 04 2009
Copenhagen Climate Deal Business Briefing: Innovation and Technology Cooperation
By Nick Mabey, Shane Tomlinson, Jennifer Morgan
Fundamentally climate related innovation will reach new markets when companies are presented with the right balance of risk and reward. Action is therefore required to increase the size and certainty of markets and overcome other market failures to drive private investment. The private sector should work to ensure Copenhagen provides a strong signal on the future evolution of the carbon market, targeted support for the development and demonstration of technologies, market regulation and access issues and structures to maintain incentives for future innovation investment.
This urgent need points to several key questions for business engagement:
1. How can we achieve a global goal to increase public RD&D and diffusion support on the scale required to stabilise temperature rises below 2oC?
In the past discussions have focused on either taking emissions reductions targets or technology targets, but it is now clear that we need both. The European Commission has proposed quadrupling energy related RD&D from current levels by 2020. Will this be sufficient? What about other sectors?
2. What institutional structure is required inside and outside of the UNFCCC?
How can the UNFCCC link to existing structures? What frameworks are required to ensure outcome based technology cooperation? How can we generate international technology action programmes with private sector involvement for key strategic technologies?
3. What is the best way to facilitate international joint-ventures and public-private partnerships?
The Copenhagen Deal is likely to drive more collaborative R&D with emerging economies such as China and India. How can we produce more effective models for co-development and joint-ventures? How can we ensure effective private sector participation in this process?
4. How can we protect incentives for climate-related innovation while enabling the benefits to be shared at the necessary speed?
A “protect and share” agreement involving government-to-government commitments for IPR and licensing of climate technology could resolve this dilemma. On the one hand, multilateral funding could help developing countries to strengthen their IPR protection measures consistent with existing commitments under WIPO and the WTO. On the other hand, enhanced IPR protection would be balanced by a framework agreement for the use of existing provisions to accelerate the diffusion of technology. This should include actions such as the use of parallel markets, advance purchase commitments, compulsory licensing, pay to licence systems and the use of Global Commons. How can business and countries come together to have a productive conversation on IPR issues? What will it require to build trust in this area? How can we ensure that taxpayers receive a fair return for supporting private sector activities?
For more information or to discuss these issues further please contact Shane Tomlinson.
Apr 23 2009
An effective, fair and robust global climate agreement: Considerations for US policymakers
By Taylor Dimsdale
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Comparable-Efforts-230409.pdfE3G-EU-Climate-Package-Briefing-Note-MEF.pdfPlus-Five-(US)-Updated-260109-TD.pdf
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Apr 02 2009
E3G-WWF report: Economic-Climate Recovery Scorecards
By Taylor Dimsdale
Mar 16 2009
Case Studies on Low Carbon Zones in China
By Nannan Lundin, Matthew Findlay and Shin Wei Ng
Mar 11 2009
Delivering a Sustainable Low Carbon Recovery
By Nick Mabey
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E3G_Delivering_a_Sustainable_Low_Carbon_Recovery.pdfE3G_Delivering_a_Sustainable_Low_Carbon_German.pdf
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Failing to kick-start low carbon investment will lock in dangerous climate change
The urgency of the economic crisis is matched by the imperative to tackle climate change. The global energy economy is at a crossroads. In order to prevent catastrophic climate change, global carbon emissions need to peak by 2015 and then reduce by 5% per year. This is a radical change from business-as-usual which foresees emissions rising at 2-3% per year. Put simply, the world needs to move to a virtually zero carbon energy system by 2050, and in developed countries well before this.
Stimulus packages could provide the necessary jump start to low carbon industries to quickly achieve this structural transformation. Investing in business-as-usual projects will merely delay necessary expenditures to a time when public spending will be very tight, risking locking economies into high carbon infrastructure. This transformation is also affordable. Estimates put the cost at only 1-2% of global GDP, and reduced dependence on oil and gas use means that this cost falls to zero if oil prices remain above $120/bbl.
Low carbon stimulus plans are too small and dwarfed by high carbon spending
Delivering growth in low carbon sectors requires policy packages which combine immediate fiscal measures with sustainable medium term policies. Countries are already implementing packages covering energy efficiency, renewable energy, carbon capture and storage, grid infrastructure, public transport, efficient vehicles, water systems and RD&D. However, current spending is too small to achieve the level of change required.
Current stimulus packages will amount to 3.25% of global GDP over 2008-2010, with two thirds in direct government spending. The IMF expects this total to increase as more countries finalise their policies for 2010-2011. On a generous assessment around $436bn, or 23% of the total stimulus, has been allocated to low carbon investment. However, if investment with uncertain carbon reduction gains (e.g. infrastructure) is excluded, direct spending on improved efficiency, low carbon energy, transport and R&D is only $140bn or 8% of the total. This is almost half of the $272bn allocated to road-building in the same stimulus packages.
These averages also mask strong differences between countries. South Korea has dedicated 80% of its stimulus spending on low carbon investments. China also ranks highly (37%), dedicating around $200bn to low carbon investments – although a substantial amount of this is committed to rail and grid infrastructure with uncertain climate benefits. Amongst developed countries only the US, France and Germany have allocated over 10% of their stimulus to low carbon investment. All countries have scope to increase the range and size of low carbon stimulus spending, especially on energy efficiency and low carbon energy. Europe and Japan are lagging behind the average, despite their strong climate change policies and leadership in low carbon industries.
A large scale expansion of investment is possible in these dynamic sectors. For example, global renewable energy investment grew by 60% annually from 2004-2007. Given current financing problems, sustaining scale-up of production in these sectors in the coming years may require short term industrial support (e.g. loans, tax holidays) perhaps clustered in Low Carbon Innovation Zones. Additional finance can be generated using innovative mechanisms such as green bonds backed by public or private funds, and can be distributed through low carbon infrastructure facilities which leverage private finance.
Feb 23 2009
Low Carbon Zones: EU-China cooperation
By Matthew Findlay and Felix Preston
Feb 09 2009
Copenhagen 2009: Political Risks Briefing
By Tom Burke
Feb 02 2009
Technology Cooperation – More Than Just a North-South Deal
By Nick Mabey and Shane Tomlinson
Jan 26 2009
What the EU Climate Package means for the Global Climate Deal
By Taylor Dimsdale
Jan 09 2009
UN Climate Conference: The countdown to Copenhagen
By Tom Burke
But if all the major governments now accept it, getting them to agree on how to tackle it still seems a very long way off indeed. The essential problem, to use the jargon, is burden-sharing. We know the world has to cut its CO2 emissions drastically, and soon. But which countries are to cut them, by how much?
The Chinese, for example, with their scarcely believable economy growing at 10 per cent a year, have now overtaken the Americans as the biggest carbon emitters; but historically, America has emitted far more; and on a per capita basis, US emissions still dwarf those of China. So the Chinese have felt (so far) that they have a moral right for their economy to grow unchecked, and their carbon emissions to grow with it; but many Americans have felt (so far) that they see no reason to act unilaterally to cut their own CO2 if the Chinese are not willing to do the same.
Differences like those stubbornly percolate the whole negotiating process and make achieving a universal agreement mind-bogglingly hard.
This is the most complicated deal the world has ever tried to put together,” says Tom Burke, visiting professor at Imperial College and an adviser on climate change to the Foreign Office. “In effect, you’re asking nearly 200 countries to align their energy policies – to create a common world energy policy. If you look at how hard it has been for the member states of the European Union to align their energy policies, you get an idea of the difficulty of attempting it with the whole world.”
Yet it has to be done, and the penalty for failure could not be higher. It is just 20 years since the world woke up to the danger of rising carbon emissions destabilising the atmosphere. Two decades ago it seemed a fairly distant threat, prefigured principally in supercomputer climate prediction programmes; something that was likely to happen a comfortably long distance away, such as at the end of the 21st century.
Three things have altered since then. First, the changing climate is now visible, not just in computer predictions, but all around us: spring in southern Britain, for example, is arriving about three weeks earlier than it did 40 years ago. At this time last year a red admiral butterfly, an archetypal creature of the summer, was photographed perching on a snowdrop, a flower of the winter – a previously unheard-of occurrence.
Second, it has become clear in the past five years that the earth is responding to the increasing CO2 loading of the atmosphere much more rapidly than scientists initially thought. There are numerous examples but to instance just one, the summer sea ice of the Arctic Ocean is melting far more quickly than anyone imagined.
Third, it has become apparent, even more recently, that global emissions of CO2 are shooting up at a rate that far exceeds anything the UN’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) thought possible when it sketched out future emissions scenarios in a special report in 2000. Even though we have had 20 years to think about emissions cuts, and 11 years of the Kyoto protocol, the treaty which actually prescribed the first cuts for the industrialised countries, emissions are soaring as never before.
Dec 15 2008
A New European Climate Diplomacy: Engaging the US in solving the climate crisis
By Jennifer Morgan and Simon Koschut
Abseits von Washington ist es zu zahlreichen Initiativen und Gesetzen zum Klimaschutz auf lokaler und regionaler Ebene gekommen. Dabei unternehmen die Bundesstaaten in den USA, mit Kalifornien als Vorreiter, wesentlich stärkere und effektivere Bemühungen, entsprechende Richtlinien einzuführen und umzusetzen. In mehr als 20 Bundesstaaten wird versucht, den Anteil erneuerbarer Energien am Energiemix zu erhöhen. Zwölf Bundesstaaten haben Gesetze zur Reduzierung von Treibhausgasemissionen erlassen. Darüber hinaus entstehen im amerikanischen Westen, im Mittleren Westen und im Nordosten Klimaschutzinitiativen, die einen landesweiten Markt für Emissionsrechte und eine Zusammenarbeit mit Europa anstreben. So existieren bereits Kooperations- und Partnerschaftsabkommen zwischen EU-Staaten und amerikanischen Bundesstaaten bzw. Regionen. Auf europäischer Ebene existiert seit Oktober 2007 eine Internationale Partnerschaft zum Emissionshandel (International Carbon Action Partnership, ICAP) zwischen der EU, den amerikanischen Staaten der »Western Climate Initiative (WCI)« und der »Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI)« der Nordoststaaten.
Auch in der amerikanischen Wirtschaft wird zunehmend das gewinnbringende Potential alternativer Energiequellen und Energieeinsparung gesehen. Dabei setzen Firmen auf freiwillige Obergrenzen zur Reduzierung von Treibhausgasen, Investitionen in energieeffiziente Technologien und bessere Abfallentsorgung, Handel mit Emissionsrechten sowie die Entwicklung energiesparender Produkte. Zehn Unternehmen gründeten 2007 gemeinsam mit vier Umweltorganisationen die »U. S. Climate Action Partnership« und sprachen sich für eine sechzig- bis achtzigprozentige Reduzierung amerikanischer Emissionen bis 2050 aus.
Neue Chance, große Herausforderungen
Mithilfe der zahlreichen Aktivitäten seitens des Kongress, der Bundesstaaten und der Wirtschaft ist der Boden für eine umfassende Klimapolitik auf nationaler Ebene bereitet worden.
Das Wahlprogramm des designierten Präsidenten Barack Obama unterscheidet sich in der Energie- und Umweltpolitik grundlegend von der Bush-Regierung. Obama betont die Chancen einer neuen Energieökonomie in den Vereinigten Staaten. Darin soll die Abhängigkeit von ausländischem Öl reduziert, sollen neue Arbeitsplätze im umweltfreundlichen Technologiebereich geschaffen und Investitionen in umweltfreundliche Energiewirtschaft getätigt werden. Dabei formuliert Obama anspruchsvolle Ziele. Der Anteil erneuerbarer Energien am Energiemix soll bis 2050 auf 25 Prozent anwachsen. Die Energieeffizienz soll bis 2030 um 50 Prozent steigen. Dies beinhaltet eine Erhöhung von 15 Prozent bei der Energieversorgung sowie höhere Effizienzstandards in der Automobilindustrie. Obama hat staatliche Investitionen in umweltfreundliche Forschung und Entwicklung angekündigt. In den nächsten zehn Jahren sollen zudem insgesamt 150 Milliarden Dollar für neue Infrastrukturprojekte, für die Förderung erneuerbarer Energien und zur Steigerung von Energieeffizienz ausgegeben werden. Eine bindende Empfehlung für einen Emissionsrechtehandel mit einer hundertprozentigen Versteigerung der Rechte war ebenfalls Teil des demokratischen Wahlprogramms. Gesteuert wird dies durch das Vorhaben, den Ausstoß an Treibhausgasen bis zum Jahr 2050 um 80 Prozent gegenüber dem Stand von 1990 zu reduzieren. Ein Zwischenschritt soll bereits im Jahr 2020 mit der Rückkehr zum Niveau von 1990 erzielt werden. Letzteres bleibt jedoch hinter den Empfehlungen des »Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)« für die Industrieländer zurück. Dies wird sicherlich eine Debatte zwischen den USA und dem Rest der Welt auslösen.
Die drängendste Aufgabe für den neuen Präsidenten wird deshalb sein, bestehende Vorhaben seitens der Bundesstaaten, der Wirtschaft und des Kongress auf nationaler Ebene zusammenzuführen. Auf diesem Wege sollen eine neue bindende Gesetzgebung in den USA und eine Beteiligung an einem bindenden internationalen Klimaschutzabkommen ermöglicht werden. Offenkundig beschäftigen die amerikanische Öffentlichkeit derzeit noch andere Probleme. Dabei stehen massive wirtschaftliche Sorgen an erster Stelle, gefolgt vom Ziel einer umfassenden Gesundheitsversorgung und den Folgen der Finanzkrise. Vor diesem Hintergrund besteht die einzige Möglichkeit für Bewegung in der Klimaschutzpolitik in einer transformativen Agenda, die die Schaffung von Arbeitsplätzen, eine neue Energiewirtschaft und Wirtschaftswachstum in den Mittelpunkt stellt. Tatsächlich ist es sehr wahrscheinlich, dass in den USA ein Paket aus wirtschaftlichen Anreizen, gefolgt von einem neuen Energiepaket, noch vor einem neuen Klimapaket in den politischen Prozess eingebracht wird. Die europäischen Partner müssen diese Logik nachvollziehen und verstehen, dass auch diese Reihenfolge letzten Endes förderlich für den Klimaschutz ist. Europa sollte diesen Prozess unterstützend begleiten und zeigen, dass – wie in Deutschland – eine Wirtschaft wachsen kann, indem neue »grüne« Arbeitsplätze geschaffen werden.
Nov 29 2008
Jennifer Morgan on Living on Earth Radio
By Jennifer Morgan
GELLERMAN: But you know it’s interesting because the world hasn’t even met the commitments to cut emissions under Kyoto.
MORGAN: I think in the end we’re now just in what’s called the commitment period when countries are implementing their plans, and it is true that countries are not doing enough to reduce emissions, but I am feeling pretty confident that the European Union will meet its commitments, that Japan will meet its commitments and that pretty much all of the industrialized countries, perhaps except for Canada, will in the end meet the targets that they agreed upon in Kyoto. We’re just in the middle or kind of getting started on that. We’ll know in 2012.
GELLERMAN: But Italy’s emissions are actually up 13 percent. The United States, which is not a signature to Kyoto, had and increase of 14 percent over 1990 levels.
MORGAN: Yes. I think Italy and part of the European Union they – the way that the Kyoto Protocol works, is that countries should reduce as much as possible or meet the substantial part of their reduction targets domestically, through domestic reductions, but they are also kind of a made in the USA proposal that was brought into Kyoto allowed to invest in projects in developing countries that reduce emissions and then use those credits that they generate from those projects towards meeting their own targets. So it’s a bit of investment in developing countries. And I believe that Italy has a pretty ambitious program on that in order to make up a gap of what it hasn’t done domestically, so. And as far as the United States goes, well, that is the big question is how the new Obama administration will hopefully come in and turn around the tide of rising emissions in the United States.
GELLERMAN: Of course, Mr. Obama is not going to Poznan, nor is he sending a delegation there.
MORGAN: That’s correct. I think he has stated quite clearly that we have one president at a time, and in his video message recently that he gave to Governor Schwarzenegger’s meeting, I think he made it clear that he knows that the Poznan meeting is taking place, he’s noted that the work of the negotiators there is important for the planet, but we can expect him to engage once he’s taken office, and I think that seems like the right thing to do to me.
GELLERMAN: You spoke of hope and momentum – how much is pie in the sky? Yvo de Boer who is the head of the climate change secretariat for the United Nations has said that lower oil prices will mean less of an incentive to invest in renewables. The economies of the world are tanking. Will companies and countries want to invest in costly emission cuts?
“They cannot operate in a business as usual world any more where we just continue to pump money into old technologies, whether they be cars or infrastructure…”
MORGAN: Well I think that’s - number one, I think when you look at the state of the economy today and the types of short term, initial actions that can be taken to curb the climate crisis, you actually see quite a lot of opportunity. Because the things that we need to do to slow down global warming are things that save energy. For example, if you’re looking at the government pumping billions of dollars into the economy, then it would make a lot of sense for that money to be going into new train systems in the United States to get cars off the road and reduce dependency on oil and curb emission. Energy efficiency programs for low income housing to save money, create new jobs. Leaders really have to have all of these goals in mind. They cannot operate in a business as usual world any more where we just continue to pump money into old technologies, whether they be cars or infrastructure or anything else.

