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Decoding nuclear nonsense: 7 myths and their antidote, Tom Burke
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The following article has been recommended to you. You can find the original article together with any associated downloads at http://www.e3g.org/programmes/climate-articles/decoding-nuclear-nonsense-7-myths-and-their-antidote/ ********************************************************************************* Following the publication of the 2007 Energy White Paper by the UK government last week E3G Founding Director Tom Burke has contributed an article to Open Democracy which draws out some of the themes of his recent speech and readers guide. Decoding nuclear nonsense The British government is proposing nuclear power as an answer to the country’s energy needs. Wrong, says Tom Burke. The argument over nuclear power in relation to Britain’s future energy needs is set to intensify with the government’s announcement of a five-month “consultation” on the issue on 23 May 2007 to accompany the publication of its white paper on energy policy. To avoid this consultation becoming the sort where the conclusions and the practical outcomes are decided by the host in advance, it is essential to begin by clearing away some of the myths that encrust the issue. Here then is a provisional list of seven elements of the pro-nuclear case, which can be expected to have a full airing in the weeks ahead, along with their antidote: evidence and argument based on economic, political and environmental reality. The first element in the nuclear myth-complex is the observation that the generators must be allowed to build new nuclear-power stations. This is an intentionally misleading statement. There is nothing to prevent anyone who wishes to build a nuclear-power station from doing so today. Except, that is, the economics. The reason no one is applying to build new nuclear-power stations is that there is no pressing need to do so at the moment. Much is made of the uncertainty caused by the regulatory and the planning system. These arguments are largely hand-waving. The real barrier to investment in new nuclear build is the uncertainty about future electricity prices and the cost of actually constructing nuclear reactors. Uncertain electricity prices are a consequence of a liberalised electricity market and a government policy explicitly intended to drive down electricity prices. This leaves a government intent on having new nuclear build with the choice of abandoning the liberalised electricity markets it wants the rest of the European Union to adopt or finding someway to cheat on its pledge to provide no subsidies. The second element follows: the way the government will cheat to ensure its favoured outcome. The most likely way to cheat would be by offering to provide a framework for the pricing of carbon that offers enough stability to encourage long-term investment. Put in plain language, it will propose a floor price for carbon. Given that the current price for carbon is less than €1 ($0.75) a tonne and the floor price needed to make new nuclear attractive would be much more than €20 ($27) a tonne this would commit the Treasury to very large future expenditures. It will also cheat by making the taxpayer bear an unspecified share of the cost of radioactive- waste disposal (see Rob Edwards, “Nuclear-waste politics”, 18 May 2006). The minister responsible, Alistair Darling, has consistently refused to specify what he means by “full share” of these costs. If the cost is to be shared at all then the generators are not being asked to bear the full cost. That means they will be getting another subsidy. The third element of myth-making is the language used in the debate. Watch and listen, and beware of words like “allow” in relation to the construction of nuclear facilities.This can be interpreted to mean “should not be prevented from”; although, as there is no prevention anyway it is more likely that what the government means by “allow” is “should be actively assisted to”. The three obstacles the government is intending to help the generators with are: the time it would take to subject the reactor design to a proper examination of its safety case; the time it would take for the need for the reactors to be examined properly by the public; and the uncertainty about the future price of electricity. The fourth element is the question of whether nuclear-power stations are really necessary. The proposition that they are is a return to the supposed “generation gap” much favoured by the Central Electricity Generating Board (CEGB) before Margaret Thatcher sold it.It is simply an artefact of forecasting. No “generation gap” will appear.It is true that Britain’s existing generation capacity will decline in the future, including its nuclear-generation capacity. As it does so it will be replaced in the future, as it has been in the past, with new capacity decided on by the generators. That is how markets work. There is currently a margin of more than 20% of capacity over peak demand. Why would anyone expect the generators to build new power stations before they are needed? The fifth element is the question of increasing dependence on Russian gas. This is simply a scare tactic, with three aspects. First, gas is used mainly to provide heat. Only a quarter of the gas Britain burns is used to produce electricity. Much of that quarter is used to generate electricity at peak times because gas turbines can be switched on and off easily. Nuclear-power stations must be run constantly to be economic so they can only replace a small proportion of the gas we use for electricity generation. Second, most of Britain’s gas now and in the future comes from that deeply unstable country, Norway. Third, Russia is (as has been pointed out by one of the UK’s former ambassadors in Moscow, Rodric Braithwaite) more dependent on Western Europe’s revenues than the other way round. The sixth element is the question of climate change. New nuclear build can do nothing worthwhile to help with climate change and would divert capital, and more importantly, scarce skills away from investments in the carbon-neutral coal technologies, renewables and energy efficiency that will reduce Britain’s carbon footprint faster and more cheaply than new nuclear build. Even under the most favourable circumstances there is no possibility of any new nuclear electricity being available in Britain before 2020. As the government points out, Britain will have had to replace most of its nuclear and some of its coal-generating capacity before then. It will have to do that in a carbon-neutral way to meet emissions-reductions targets. If the country has the carbon-neutral technologies to generate electricity before it can possibly have any new nuclear electricity, what does it need the nuclear for? The seventh element is economics. Look very carefully at any numbers about capital costs or construction times. The nuclear industry has always got these wrong. Frequently cited estimates for the capital cost of a nuclear-power station range from $1,000/kilowatt to just over $2,000/kilowatt hour. The estimated cost of eight reactors currently being constructed in Asia is just over $4,500/kilowatt. The construction time for the much vaunted new reactor in Finland has increased from forty-eight months to sixty-six months since November 2005. If the myths are dispelled, the proposed consultation might become a serious debate. Stay tuned, and stay alert.
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