E3G

Change Agents for Sustainable Development

Nov 24 2009

Sorting Blinks from Winks in the Copenhagen End Game

By Nick Mabey

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In the world of military intelligence much time is spent trying to distinguish “blinks” – unpremeditated random actions – from “winks” – deliberate moves designed to communicate intent and draw out a response.

The climate change negotiations have now entered a phase where a team of tame “spooks” is needed by anybody trying to make sense of the myriad messages emerging from the hectic schedule of pre-Copenhagen meetings.

The APEC Summit saw confident headlines that the US and China had agreed to a Danish proposal to make the Copenhagen outcome non-legally binding. On closer examination these reports came from a US press conference following an informal Heads breakfast. Meanwhile the real US-China Summit two days later agreed that both countries are “striving for final legal agreement” at Copenhagen, and the Chinese confirmed they are still “studying” the Danish proposal. A “Pre-COP” Ministerial meeting held in parallel in Copenhagen showed a range of conflicting messages from countries; with Saudi Arabia defending the Kyoto Protocol, some developing countries backing a new single negotiating process but a strong push from Brazil and others to maintain a legally binding Copenhagen outcome.

Conspiracy vs. Confusion

Even the US seems unclear what it wants: on the one hand, Obama is promoting an agreement at Copenhagen which has “immediate operational effect”, but his lead negotiator is discussing a mid-year deadline for completing a treaty. Of course, these outcomes need not be mutually exclusive, but in the fevered atmosphere of the end game, confusion is predictably interpreted as conspiracy.

“...in the fevered atmosphere of the end game, confusion is predictably interpreted as conspiracy”

This is damaging to the negotiations. The APEC story drowned out the positive announcements of new mitigation commitments by Brazil and South Korea. It also markedly increased the already high level of distrust between countries. Conversations in the negotiating corridors increasingly circle round what these events imply about the motivations of the main players. Is the US Administration acting in good faith but hamstrung by a hostile Congress? Or is there a subtle strategy to neuter the international regime and avoid pressure to increase US commitments? Will China align with its traditional allies in the G77? And if so, can it support the proposals from the industrialized countries? Will India stick with its oft-quoted red lines, or are these merely negotiating chips to be relinquished in return for new finance? The inability to sort blinks from winks – and conspiracy from confusion – makes countries fearful of making the bold diplomatic moves needed to make Copenhagen a success. It also fuels an increasingly pessimistic media cycle and undermines public faith in the effectiveness of the international negotiations.

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