E3G

Climate Change and Global Governance

By Nick Mabey

Consumer dominated forums such as the G20 are likely to play a far more important role in energy security moving forward than producer-consumer dialogues.

Nuclear proliferation

Counter-proliferation mechanisms will need to be greatly strengthened if nuclear power is to be deployed at a scale which would make a real difference to climate change. Climate change will be used as a political mask for some states to acquire nuclear technology for military purposes, and development and sharing of more benign energy alternatives is the best protection against this. A major climate change disaster in the next decade would also drive pressure for a “crash programme” of rapid deployment of nuclear power worldwide; at rates which would compromise the ability of the current nuclear industry supply chain to preserve safety or security. Research and development into the next generation of proliferation resistant and modular safe reactors currently seems unlikely to produce a commercial alternative to current reactor designs before 2025-30.

The UK has already placed this issue on the agenda for the NPT (Non-Proliferation Treaty) Review conference in 2010, and its importance will doubtless rise over the coming decade.

Borders and resources

Rising sea levels and melting ice caps in the Arctic are already leading to territorial disputes between major powers. The disappearance of small islands could release valuable marine resources into the already contested waters of the Indian Ocean, Pacific and South China Sea. The rights of environmental refugees and migrants will become a source of national and international tensions, especially in delta regions such as Bangladesh, Nigeria and Egypt. Fisheries stocks will collapse or move, destroying millions of people’s livelihoods and undermining delicately negotiated international management regimes. The EU Common Fisheries Policy will not survive in its present form.

Countries will respond to the forecasts of more erratic water flows in all major river basins by building new upstream dams and water storage. Such “climate change adaptation” will drive cross-border tensions in the next decade, including the potential for armed inter-state conflict. Any international adaptation funding under the UNFCCC which affects transboundary water flows should be made conditional on adoption of a “climate change resilient” water sharing agreement.

Strengthened international rules and more activist preventative diplomacy from the international community will be needed to peacefully manage changes in shared water and fisheries resources, and to preserve the rights of displaced people and states. Many of these issues are likely to emerge in the UN Security Council if not dealt with adequately in specialised parts of the international systems.

Preventing Conflict and Instability

Climate change is already increasing conflict risks in unstable regions – especially Africa – as fragile governance systems are overwhelmed by the social stresses released by drought, famine, flood, migration, extreme weather events and rising sea levels.

Over the next decades, the determinant of whether climate change drives serious conflict lies in how political systems respond to the tensions it creates. Too often, analysis of climate change impact assumes that all governments will act to maximise the common good in response to change. But resource management regimes in much of the world are already built upon communal divisions and conflict, and are highly unlikely to respond in a predictable, rational and inclusive manner to climate stresses. Experience of current instability in the Sahel – especially Darfur – shows how quickly disputes over access to resources in times of environmental stress can become politicised and exacerbate existing communal conflicts based on ethnic, religious or other lines. These conflicts develop their own internal dynamics, but will see no sustainable solutions unless the root causes of resource grievances are addressed.

Achieving security in a climate-stressed world will require a more proactive and intensive approach to tackling instability in strategically important regions with high climate vulnerability and weak governance. This will require changes across international, regional and national security regimes, with a stronger incorporation of long-term and structural risk factors into planning and a willingness to engage effectively with tough governance challenges; bringing diplomatic, development, intelligence and law enforcement capabilities to bear. This does not just require implementation of some general ‘conflict prevention’ agenda, but rather a direct focus on the strategic necessity of managing increased resource use tensions.

Conclusion

Climate change could drive a more collaborative approach in inter-state relations or it could exacerbate tensions between and within countries, leading to a ‘politics of insecurity’ as countries focus on protecting themselves against its impacts. Currently most countries are hedging their bets and adopting both collaborative and competitive strategies in terms of access to resources.
The pattern of cooperation which arises will depend on how effectively climate change is incorporated into mainstream foreign policy and international governance, and actually changes the balance of national interests of major countries across a wide range of security and geopolitical issues.