E3G

Climate Change and Global Governance

By Nick Mabey

The Agreement must appear equitable to citizens in developing countries who will face higher future energy costs and structural changes because of the commitment their leaders take on at Copenhagen; even if some support and compensation is available from developed countries. If climate change action is seen to dash the aspirations of the next 1 billion “emergent energy consumers” then it will become politically poisonous in emerging economies. Though they are not major emitters the 100 most vulnerable countries – who have over 1 billion in population – could also derail the UNFCCC talks if they do not receive adequate support to assist in adaptation.

Even a relatively weak Copenhagen agreement will involve taxpayers and energy consumers in developed countries – and some developing countries - facing tens of billions of Euros in immediate extra costs. Though these will be more than balanced over time in reduced energy bills and savings in climate damages, the scale of any meaningful action will mean these costs cannot be hidden from citizens; as they often have been during the first Kyoto commitment period.

Therefore, for Copenhagen to be sustainable (and ratifiable) citizens in all countries who bear the costs must think it is giving good value for money, and is putting the world on a pathway towards true climate security. A weak agreement which seems a step forward and is “politically achievable” but does not credibly achieve this outcome will be highly vulnerable to attack, and risks spreading cynicism and apathy among citizens over the seriousness of intent of global political elites.

The UNFCCC is perhaps more analogous to global arms control than to the global trade regime it is often compared with. It requires far-sighted leadership to overcome immediate differences to avoid mutually assured destruction, but its sustainability will rest on citizen and domestic political perceptions of the minutiae of monitoring, verification and effective implementation.

Climate Policies outside the UNFCCC

A wide range of international meetings such as the UNGA, G8, MEF and G20 have been used as informal pre-negotiation and trust-building in front of the UNFCCC negotiations. However, there are also distinct elements of the international climate regime which are emerging in other fora to supplement the UNFCCC:

International Research and Development Cooperation: the countries in the Major Economies Forum are preparing technology roads maps on areas from carbon capture and storage to energy efficiency with the aim to begin implementation through plurilateral cooperation from November 2009. Given the difficulties in agreeing any meaningful technology agreement in the UNFCCC these may become a major regime element moving forward. Meanwhile World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) is assessing the issue of intellectual property rights over low carbon technologies.

Energy subsidies: the US has placed the highly contentious issue of energy subsidies on the G20 agenda – the first time this has been discussed in such a wide and senior forum. Though there is no expectation of quick progress, the role of the G20 as the world’s premier economic forum means that this issue now has a much better chance of seeing effective governance.

Trade liberalisation: liberalisation of low carbon goods and services has languished alongside all other multilateral trade issues in the The Doha Development Round negotiations. However, there may be attempts to move these issues forward in bilateral trade and investment agreements by both the US and EU, including as part of the overall Copenhagen deal.

Climate change will require OECD countries to revisit their international industrial policies by sharing advanced energy technologies and funding large-scale investment in economic competitors such as China and India. OECD countries must recognise that achieving climate security is a more vital national interest than the narrow maximisation of domestic company profits.

Energy Security

Energy security interests will be increasingly delivered through co-operation with energy consuming countries on technology development and diffusion, rather than through relationships with producing countries on fossil fuel discoveries and delivery. Declining use of imported fossil fuels may cause tensions with many producer countries; the EU’s gas demand could fall by 40% to 2030. Countries will not be able to achieve national energy security by undermining other countries’ climate security by using coal without capturing the carbon. There will be no agreement on climate security without guaranteeing all countries’ energy security.