E3G

Climate Change and Global Governance

By Nick Mabey

The success of Copenhagen will, in large part, be determined by whether it cements a credible expectation for the move to a global low carbon economy in the next decades in all major industrialised and emerging economies. This expectation will in itself change patterns of private sector investment and risk analysis.

Benchmarks for a successful Copenhagen Agreement

1. Added-value:  The Copenhagen regime can only be considered successful if it delivers more mitigation action than would occur through a bottom-up process of individual country legislation.  Current estimates are that existing developed country unilateral mitigation commitments are around 15% below 1990 levels by 2020; developing country pledges of action would reduce their total industrial emissions 4% below business-as-usual (BAU) by 2020.  This falls well short of what is required according to IPCC scenarios for GHG stabilisation at 450ppm CO2e, i.e. 25-40% reductions by 2020 for developed countries and 15-30% deviation below BAU by 2020 for developing countries.  If Copenhagen fails to take us closer to the global mitigation effort required to say below 2°C then the international negotiations have been a distraction, draining effort from other more productive activity at regional, national and sub-national level – including bilateral cooperation.

2. High Trust Regime:  As the foundation for a long term international climate regime, it is critical that the Copenhagen agreement establishes a robust, trusted and independent process for coordinating country efforts to tackle climate change.  The basic deal structure at Copenhagen will be one of reciprocity of action towards a shared global goal – or “I will if you will”. However, since all countries will experience policy failures and difficulties in complying with their obligations, it is critical to establish whether such problems stem from “events beyond their control” or deliberate inaction.  Without trust, the regime will collapse in mutual recrimination.  Key to this will be accurate, transparent, verified and publicly assessed data covering national GHG emissions, mitigation and finance actions.

3. Flexibility to move to stronger targets in future:  There is increasing scientific evidence that targets such as 350ppm CO2e and/or limiting global temperature rise to 1.5°C will be necessary to avoid critical tipping points in the earth’s climate system.  Realistically, these targets are not going to be agreed at Copenhagen, and so a critical benchmark for success is that it does not preclude moving to tighter targets in the future due to inflexibility of the target regime, a long commitment period or an ineffective scientific review mechanism.  Specifically, the agreement must include a strong and automatic review procedure for strengthening targets linked to the IPCC scientific process.

4. Driving Transformational Change:  Most OECD countries could reach the toughest 2020 targets currently under consideration through a combination of relatively marginal domestic policy changes and large scale international off-setting. This would not provide the necessary impetus for a rapid global transition to a low carbon economy.  A critical benchmark for success therefore is that OECD commitments motivate transformational change in technology development, infrastructure investment and regulation to catalyse the global transition to a low carbon economy.  Practical benchmarks include:  strong signals to the global business community about the inevitability of a carbon constrained world; halting of new OECD investment in unabated coal power plants; and rapid, large-scale demonstration of low carbon technologies in both developed and developing countries. 

5. Supporting Future Industrialising Country Caps: Copenhagen will at best put the world on an emissions path that keeps open the possibility of staying below 2°C.  It cannot guarantee a “safe” trajectory because major developing countries will most likely not be in a position to agree a binding peak-and-decline trajectory as part of any agreement.  A realistic but ambitious outcome is that Copenhagen helps drive comprehensive moves towards a low carbon economy in key industrialising countries so they will be in a position to agree binding emission peaking dates in the medium term (2020-2030).  This will depend on the scale and form of developing country commitments, and whether financial support is directed at low-cost offsets or higher cost decarbonisation programmes in developing countries.

6. Ensuring a fair deal for the most vulnerable:  The Copenhagen agreement must be seen as broadly legitimate if it is to command broad political support in all countries and set up the right incentives for future action.  It should demand more of countries with greater responsibility for climate change and with higher living standards.  It should also mobilise support for adaptation to climate change by the most vulnerable countries which are least responsible for the problem.  It is in the interests of both developed and developing countries to ensure that financial transfers drive efficient and effective action. Without a clear “return” on these investments it will be difficult to maintain public and political support for international cooperation. 

The Geo-politics of Climate Change

These benchmarks have political as well as policy relevance. The power politics of climate change are perhaps unique among all global problems. Though 50-70% of current climate change can be attributed to OECD countries, the largest global emitter is now China and developing countries will dominate future emissions growth even if their per capita emissions are still relatively low. Developed countries need action by emerging economies to preserve their domestic climate security but cannot force them to deliver it; instead they can encourage action by providing a strong case for financial and technology transfers. On the other hand, developing countries are more vulnerable to climate change than most developed nations, and so have a strong national interest in seeing global action. The danger in the UNFCCC negotiations is that horse-trading arguments over the 0.5% of OECD GDP in financial compensation and transfers needed to cement a deal, will derail the common need to agree an effective regime to avoid the 5-20% of GDP in climate change costs estimated by the Stern Review.