http://www.e3g.org/index.php/concept/3rdGenerationEnviron/ en Chris Littlecott Copyright 2008 2008-03-02T16:38:07+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/index.php/programmes/climate-articles/john-ashton-in-korea-youtube-interview/ http://www.e3g.org/index.php/programmes/climate-articles/john-ashton-in-korea-youtube-interview/#When:12:12:00Z E3G Founding Director John Ashton was recently visiting Korea in his role as Special Representative for Climate Change of the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office. A short interview with John has been posted on YouTube by the Foreign Office’s online team, and it is embedded here below. John highlights how decisions around the transition to a low-carbon economy will always be taken on the basis of an understanding of national interests, and don’t automatically flow from an international agreement. Climate and Energy Security - News & Comment 2008-07-15T12:12:00+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/index.php/programmes/climate-articles/carbon-capture-and-storage-letter-to-eu-energy-and-environment-ministers/ http://www.e3g.org/index.php/programmes/climate-articles/carbon-capture-and-storage-letter-to-eu-energy-and-environment-ministers/#When:15:09:00Z The EU’s package of climate and energy measures will be top of the agenda when EU Energy and Environment Ministers meet in Paris from 3-5 July 2008. Ahead of their meeting, we’ve joined together with seven other organisations to write an open letter in support of EU action to secure the effective demonstration of carbon capture and storage. The text of the letter follows below, and a pdf version is attached for download. Joint Open Letter from Alstom, Bellona, E3G, Climate Change Capital, Fortum, Shell, Sintef and Vattenfall to EU Energy and Environment Ministers Informal Energy and Environment Council in Paris, 3-5 July 2008 Brussels, 30 June 2008 Dear Minister, European leadership on climate change, and in particular the targets for reducing greenhouse gas emissions are laudable. We believe, however, that the needed reductions in CO2 emissions will not be achieved by 2030 without widespread deployment of CO2 capture and storage (CCS). Deployment of CCS on that time-scale requires CCS technology to be ready on commercial scale by 2015-2020. A well-constructed programme of demonstration projects starting early next decade is necessary to achieve this objective. The generally ambitious EU climate and energy package of legislative proposals urgently needs strengthening to enable this to happen. We are writing to you, as representatives of industry and environmental organisations, to propose a way of achieving this. CCS is an essential and pragmatic solution in a world that by 2050 will need to have cut greenhouse gas emissions by at least 50% from current levels and yet will remain dependent on fossil fuels due to rising energy demands. The critical contribution of CCS has been identified by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) for its potential to reduce global greenhouse gas emissions substantially. Global energy forecasts which limit global warming to 2°C are based on large-scale deployment of CCS starting in 2015-2020. By 2050 fossil fuel power plants throughout the world will generally have to operate with CCS. Europe must play a leading role in this. At the European Councils in June 2008 and March 2007, EU leaders have called for a mechanism to stimulate the construction and operation of up to twelve large-scale demonstration plants by 2015. If it is widely deployed, CCS could deliver at least one quarter of the CO2 emissions reductions required as part of efforts to stabilise temperature rises below 2°C. The EU has yet to establish firm financing mechanisms in support of pledges made by Heads of State and Government to have CCS demonstration projects up and running by 2015. Early demonstrations are key to beginning first CCS commercial deployment in 2015-2020. A range of CCS technologies are available now for large-scale demonstration. Shell has calculated that a seven year delay in the world’s known CCS projects means 90-100 billion tonnes of avoidable CO2 emissions being released into the atmosphere, or a 10 ppm increase in long-term CO2 stabilisation levels. We are keen to play our part, provided that governments create the right economic conditions as they have done with other new technologies. The proposed Directives on Geological Storage of CO2 and on Emissions Trading provide a unique opportunity to devise a framework for funding that must not be missed, as has been pointed out in European Parliament discussions. We jointly call for urgent decisions by the EU institutions to support a transitional project demonstration mechanism whereby industrial actors operating CCS demonstration projects would obtain allowances for the full chain of capture, transport and verified storage of CO2 that would be traded in the EU ETS. Where appropriate, this mechanism could be complemented by direct investment aid in line with Community rules on State Aid. Such a mechanism should be time- and volume-limited, transparent, competitive, and market-based and be part of a roadmap to mass CCS deployment in Europe. A new project support mechanism for large-scale CCS demonstration must build on clear rules for liability and safety of storage, as defined by the proposed directive on geological storage of CO2. Our organisations would equally support any other EU-wide funding solutions that would allow early CCS demonstration. By becoming a global first-mover on CCS and in line with its ambitious climate change commitments, Europe could become a world leader in what is likely to be seen as nothing short of a revolution in energy conversion. For every day full-scale demonstration of CCS is delayed, we make the challenge of meeting our targets harder. The time to act is now. Sincerely yours, Joan MacNaughton, CB Senior Vice President, Power & Environmental Policies Alstom Power Systems Frederic Hauge President The Bellona Foundation Nick Mabey Chief Executive E3G, Third Generation Environmentalism Mark Woodall Chief Executive Officer Climate Change Capital Maria Paatero-Kaarnakari Senior Vice President, Corporate Strategy Fortum Corporation Graeme Sweeney Executive Vice President Future Fuels & CO2 Shell International Petroleum Co Ltd Dr. Nils Røkke Vice President Climate Change Technologies SINTEF Dr. Helmar Rendez Senior Vice President Strategies Vattenfall AB CC: Commissioner Stavros Dimas Commissioner Andris Piebalgs Avril Doyle, MEP Chris Davies, MEP Climate and Energy Security - Activities 2008-06-30T15:09:00+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/index.php/programmes/climate-articles/the-humanitarian-challenge-of-climate-change/ http://www.e3g.org/index.php/programmes/climate-articles/the-humanitarian-challenge-of-climate-change/#When:15:53:01Z On the 5th June the University of Geneva Interdisciplinary Programme for Humanitarian Action hosted a one day conference entitled “Adapt or Surrender? The Challenges of Climate Change for Humanitarian Action”. The conference was intended to highlight the challenges and threats posed by climate change for humanitarian actors and highlight possible responses. Shane Tomlinson from E3G gave a keynote address highlighting the climate security challenge and the economic transformation which will be required to shift the world to a low-carbon development pathway. Unless nations understand the security implications of climate change it is unlikely to be prioritised in policy making. Debate on these issues needs to shift from narrowly focusing on apportioning the 0-2% of GDP global mitigation costs to managing the incidence of the 5-25% of global GDP damage costs which climate change could create. A pdf version of Shane’s presentation is attached for download, alongside the official conference flyer. Climate and Energy Security - Thinking 2008-06-05T15:53:01+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/index.php/programmes/climate-articles/eu-ccs-policy-financing-options/ http://www.e3g.org/index.php/programmes/climate-articles/eu-ccs-policy-financing-options/#When:15:50:01Z The International Emissions Trading Association (IETA) hosted a workshop on 3rd June 2008 to discuss the financing options that would support the development and deployment of Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS). E3G Associate Mark Johnston presented a technical working paper on the financing options. Mark’s presentation is attached here for download. It is also available on the IETA website, as are the presentations from Bellona, CEZ, and IETA. Climate and Energy Security - Thinking 2008-06-03T15:50:01+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/index.php/programmes/climate-articles/taming-king-coal-the-eus-energy-policy/ http://www.e3g.org/index.php/programmes/climate-articles/taming-king-coal-the-eus-energy-policy/#When:14:39:00Z Europe has willed the end but not the means to deliver the CCS demonstration programme. Unless a way is found to rebuild momentum at EU level it is likely that companies will look to invest in other projects and other areas. In short, Europe has put itself between a rock and a hard place.  That’s the argument E3G Chief Executive Nick Mabey makes in a leader article published in Issue 3 of Carbon Capture Journal. The text of his article follows below. It’s also available in the pdf version of the full issue of the journal. Taming King Coal - the EU’s energy policy In March 2007 EU Heads of Government called for the deployment of technologies for the capture and storage of CO2 (CCS) in new European power plants by 2020, and welcomed the European Commission’s intention to establish a mechanism to stimulate the construction and operation by 2015 of up to 12 CCS demonstration plants.  The EU is now in the process of adopting legislation providing for the geological storage of CO2. So far, so good; but the current EU demonstration strategy will not produce CCS as a deployable large scale low carbon power option before 2020.  Europe’s goals Preserving European climate security means limiting global temperature rises to 2°C. Europe cannot meet this multilateral goal, or achieve internal energy security without aggressive EU leadership on CCS.  Global energy scenarios which stabilise greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations around 450ppm CO2 equivalent – giving a 50% chance of remaining below 2°C – assume large scale deployment of CCS starting during the period 2015-20. Each year of delay, according to recent scenarios analysis by Shell, potentially raises the final stabilisation concentration by at least 1ppm.  Delay also risks lock-in to high emissions technologies. The next 25 years will see utilities in Europe build up to 850GW of new power stations, more than the US and nearly as many as China. Even if the EU meets its challenging renewable energy targets, over 75% of this investment will be in coal or gas fired power stations.  With gas prices high, and fears about dependence on Russian supplies rising, nearly 40GW of new coal power stations are planned by 2012 alone; mainly in Germany, Poland and Eastern Europe.  Unless these stations can be technically and economically retro-fitted with CCS, they risk having been inefficient investments – becoming costly stranded assets worth billions of Euros, or long term climate liabilities which reduce Europe’s ability to transform into a low carbon economy. Europe is the only major power seriously committed to delivering the 2°C target. The price of such leadership is that Europe needs to develop CCS technologies or the US, China and India will carry on investing in dirty coal and undermining European climate security. When we recognise that developing CCS is not an option but a necessity, the question becomes “if not us, then who?” Delivering CCS demonstration No single European country can alone take on developing an effective demonstration programme on CCS. While active industry and Member State support is critical for moving CCS forward, “bottom-up” activity is not currently delivering a comprehensive and accelerated demonstration programme.  A critical reason for this is that none of the countries or companies can on their own deliver a definitive assessment of CCS technologies and networks which would lead to market deployment. The resulting market failure leads to systematic underinvestment in CCS projects.  Producing high quality, comparable data to deliver an early resolution of many of the issues surrounding the technical and environmental feasibility of CCS, together with decisions on network investment inside a context of public acceptance, requires concerted EU action as a whole. And action must also be rapid.  Even starting immediately, it will take a decade to define and begin delivering this infrastructure at the scale needed to make a real difference to European carbon dioxide emissions.  The current Commission proposals foresee policy intervention: “a focused R&D and demonstration effort can bring down costs of CCS by 50% between now and 2020, facilitating commercial deployment.” But to deliver this outcome, the Commission looks primarily to the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS), where “under the carbon market, CCS will be deployed if and when it is cost-effective”.  This model will fail. From 2013 power plants face paying for 100% of their carbon permits, clearly creating stronger disincentives for building new coal plants. Even then, the carbon market cannot on its own deliver adequate investment in zero-carbon power to meet EU targets. CCS is likely to require prices of at least €75-85 a tonne of CO2 to be competitive with unabated gas power in the next two decades.  If power station construction costs continue to escalate, the threshold price needed for CCS deployment will continue to increase, with estimates as high as €100-120 tonne CO2; a figure comparable with the cost of large scale offshore wind power and concentrated solar thermal power stations. Forward prices in the ETS are not currently providing these incentives.  Further, from 2009, if a strong global climate deal is concluded at Copenhagen, European emission trading prices will effectively be capped by the price of externally purchased permits which could cover up to 50% of the EU’s effort beyond the 20% (or rather, Europe’s multilateral 30%) target by 2020.  The price of these permits will be set by the cost of decarbonisation in China and India, and is highly unlikely to reach levels necessary to deploy CCS. In short, there is a fundamental tension between using international trading in the ETS to lower the cost of meeting the EU’s targets, and expecting the ETS to send sufficient price signals to drive the low carbon power investment needed to reach the EU’s 2050 objectives.  Supplementary policies – both European public funding and clearer regulation – are needed to shift EU investment patterns.  Market pull instruments Already, some utilities argue that unless they continue to receive free ETS permits there will be a collapse in investment and Europe’s lights will go out. The answer to this dilemma is to give the utilities the regulatory certainty they say they need.  Without the prospect of significant CCS deployment by 2020, even if the technology is proven, companies will have weak incentives to invest their own financial and technical resources in accelerating the improvement of risky CCS technology through demonstration programmes.  As with large scale renewable energy technologies, a regulatory approach could give effective market incentives for private investors. This should take the form of either CCS as a mandatory requirement on new fossil fuelled plants from 2020 at the latest, or of an immediate carbon emission standard (tonnes CO2 per MWh generated) precluding the construction of unabated coal power.  Both rules should be technology neutral between CCS options, and between CCS and other low carbon power options. Unlike renewable energy there should be no obligation to build CCS power stations, but a requirement to fit CCS if a fossil fuel power station is being built.  Any regulation should be reviewed in 2014 based on the demonstration programme results, and revised if serious problems with CCS have arisen. The current legislation on storage needs to include these provisions. Market push The current legislation also fails to provide guaranteed EU funding to deliver the demonstration plants. The industry-led Zero Emissions Platform (ZEP) estimates the total incremental cost of the full CCS demonstration programme over its life time would be at least €6-10 billion. Others have estimated €10-16 bn. Industry has reiterated to the Commission the need for significant public support if they are to make complementary investments in major CCS demonstration projects. The result is that there is currently little progress on moving forward many of the major planned demonstration projects. Innovative proposals from ZEP to use part of the emission permit allocation in Phase III of the ETS have not yet found sufficient support among Member States to be implemented. The Commission will review the potential for EU funding at the end of 2008. This exercise primarily will look toward the next 7-year EU budget period for 2014-2020, but the clock is ticking, and with political will an earlier funding stream could be unlocked from the current budget underspend. In December 2007 the Member States rescued the Galileo satellite project using that year’s Common Agricultural Policy underspend. With the 20% (probably 30%) emissions reduction target looming, another existing EU project is now at risk of failure. It too could be funded. Agriculture underspend from 2008 alone was projected to be €7-8 bn – before rising food prices. This year’s underspend could now top €10 bn. Balancing risk and reward While lack of market pull cannot be made up just by additional public funding to push development and demonstration activities, and while extensive experience shows that over-reliance on public funds will lead to cost-overruns and “white elephant” experimental projects, companies will not drive aggressively toward CCS commercialisation without a near-term market signal. The European CCS demonstration strategy therefore must provide an acceptable balance of risk and reward for the private sector, and send very clear signals to investors over the future regulatory environment for fossil fuel power plants in Europe. The current high levels of uncertainty are tending to disincentivise investment in new low carbon technology in favour of simple hedging strategies like moving to gas–fired generation. There is a need for immediate European funding to support the initial capital costs for a priority programme of CCS demonstration projects which would give high European public value.  This programme should provide “first-mover rewards” by funding one example of each of the following: all major capture technologies; large scale CO2 storage and transport; demonstration in Central and Eastern Europe; CCS in the steel and cement industry; and CCS demonstration in major developing countries. Member States should develop and part-fund these projects with industry. EU funding of around €250-500 million per annum for 2009-13 would kick start this process. In return, all projects would operate under conditions of full transparency and comparability and potentially agree to conditions on technology cooperation. Depending on market conditions and/or technological development the CCS demonstrations may cost less than anticipated. In this case it is important that there are no windfall profits to CCS developers. This safeguard could be achieved by including a clause on sharing profits above a reasonable rate of return, with a 100% profit claw back above a certain level. Of course, the stronger the market pull signal, the more companies will be prepared to invest their own resources in demonstrating technologies, and the less public funding will be needed for the demonstration programme.  CCS ready assessment Utilities and investors across Europe have yet to fully price future climate change policy into their investment models, and discussions show that there is scepticism that the EU has the political will to achieve its emissions targets.  A weak requirement in the storage legislation for technical “CCS ready assessment” of new plants confuses rather than helps to resolve this dilemma, and Europe is in danger in the next decade of building a stock of new nominally “CCS ready” coal power stations which cannot be economically retrofitted with the technology.  The worst case is that new plants are making minor changes in site layout allowing for a future CO2 capture facility, when they have no economically viable access to transport and credible storage facilities. With high uncertainties regarding both transport and storage costs, as yet there is no clear business model for either. Will CO2 transport be allowed through common carrier pipelines, constructed with public funds and shared by many users?  Or will dedicated investment in transportation need to be included directly in project finances? Will CO2 storage compete with bulk gas storage, and be priced at variable rates? Or will storage be managed as a government concession with zero economic rent? It is critical for the industry, for consumers and policy makers that investors and operators are aware of the full costs and uncertainties around fossil fuel investments. Given the immaturity of this market it makes sense to require full technological, economic and financial readiness analysis, based on a set of agreed guidelines across Europe. The legislation could do this. Here is a proposal. All new plants should be required to undertake a full economic, financial and technical review of CCS retrofitting as part of their permitting process. Private investors in utilities should require similar analysis as due diligence for power plant financing. Guidelines for the analysis should be produced by the European Commission in consultation with member states and stakeholders. This would also avoid any legal challenges against future regulation requiring CCS retrofitting.  Between a rock and a hard place Europe has willed the end but not the means to deliver the CCS demonstration programme. Unless a way is found to rebuild momentum at EU level it is likely that companies will look to invest in other projects and other areas. In short, Europe has put itself between a rock and a hard place.  Climate and Energy Security - Thinking 2008-05-28T14:39:00+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/index.php/programmes/climate-articles/eu-must-accelerate-ccs-demo-plant-development/ http://www.e3g.org/index.php/programmes/climate-articles/eu-must-accelerate-ccs-demo-plant-development/#When:15:41:00Z EU Competition Commissioner Neelie Kroes hosted a full-day seminar on Environmental Protection and Climate Change - Cost, Opportunities and the Role of Public Support on the 27th May 2008. E3G Chief Executive Nick Mabey was one of the discussants, and his remarks were subsequently reported by ENDS Europe Daily (subscription required): Nick Mabey of sustainability campaign group E3G told the conference that governments had “agreed on the end of developing CCS but not the means”. It would be the “biggest failure of EU policy” if they fail to agree a funding mechanism for the demonstration plants by the end of the year, he said. Funding could come from the proceeds of carbon permit auctions in the EU emission trading scheme, from EU agricultural subsidy “underspend”, or by creating a new EU low-carbon technology transition fund, he said. Policymakers must take more risks to develop potential emission-cutting technologies such as CCS and all stakeholders must be prepared to see some of these fail, he said. “Doing this in the real economy is the best way of cooperating with China and India,” Mr Mabey added. “If we can’t show that decarbonisation and high wealth is possible by 2020, then we won’t get them to sign up [to a long-term global emission-cutting deal],” he said.” The ENDS article also reported the launch of the CCS leadership coalition of which E3G is a member: Separately on Tuesday, E3G along with British-Dutch oil firm Shell, French engineering firm Alstom and Norwegian environment group Bellona announced the creation of a “CCS coalition” that will lobby for accelerated action on carbon capture.” Climate and Energy Security - Activities 2008-05-27T15:41:00+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/index.php/programmes/climate-articles/clinton-mccain-obama-europes-opportunity-to-shape-a-presidency/ http://www.e3g.org/index.php/programmes/climate-articles/clinton-mccain-obama-europes-opportunity-to-shape-a-presidency/#When:13:00:01Z Who will lead the USA back into a meaningful international engagement on climate change in 2009? And who can Europe work with best? Those are the questions raised by Stephen Boucher of the thinktank Notre Europe in his recent paper Clinton, Obama, McCain - Europe’s Best Hope for Fighting Climate Change. Now, as one of a number of responses to Stephen Boucher’s paper, E3G’s Jennifer Morgan gives her perspective on this crucial matter. A pdf version of Jennifer’s paper is available her for download. Clinton, McCain, Obama – Europe’s opportunity to shape a Presidency Stephen Boucher’s paper “Clinton, Obama, McCain – Europe’s Best Hope for Fighting Climate Change” provides a thorough assessment of the candidates’ positions in the field and a thoughtful set of actions that Europe should pursue to reengage the United States. I would like to make 2 key points in response – firstly the nature of the challenge we face, then secondly the question of Europe’s next steps. 1. The nature of the challenge We must address our analysis and responses within the context of the broader foreign policy goals of the candidates. Each candidate recognizes the poor standing of the United States in current foreign affairs and the need to rebuild US standing and credibility in the world. To reclaim our proper place in the world, the United States must be stronger, and our policies must be smarter. The next president will have a moment of opportunity to restore America’s global standing and convince the world that America can lead once again. As president, I will seize that opportunity by reintroducing ourselves to the world. I will rebuild our power and ensure that the United States is committed to building a world we want, rather than simply defending against a world we fear.” Although this is a statement by Hillary Clinton in her Foreign Affairs piece on Security and Opportunity for the Twenty-first century, this statement could have come from any of the candidates. John McCain made similar points in his recent speech to The Los Angeles World Affairs Council and Barack Obama in his talk to the Chicago Council on Global Affairs last year titled “The American Moment”. Each candidate, in his or her own way, has gone on to outline how the US can rebuild trust and standing in the world once s/he enters office. Each raises climate change as one of the new threats that must be solved, and notes the importance of US leadership at home and the vital interest of being part of the solution. Climate change offers the new US President an opportunity to engage in a multi-lateral negotiation on an issue of immense importance to its major allies. Europe should insist that climate change and the post-2012 negotiations are top priorities for the new President’s “first hundred days” and for the first transatlantic Summit in early 2009. 2. Europe’s next steps In order to assess “What Europe should do now”, we must have the ongoing international climate negotiations on a post-2012 agreement in mind. As Boucher notes, at the Bali meeting of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (and its Kyoto Protocol), ministers launched a new round of negotiations scheduled to be completed in Copenhagen in December 2009. The core elements of these negotiations include what actions developed and developing countries will take to curb their emissions, advance technology innovation and cooperation, strengthen carbon markets, scale up adaptation and address the cross-cutting issue of finance. The role of the United States in these negotiations will be of central importance, and there are four key issues on which the next US president can re-establish a positive presence on the global stage: The level of ambition for developed countries. Parties to the Kyoto Protocol are currently negotiating their next set of targets and timetables for the period after 2012. They have agreed to be guided by the Itergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) data which notes that a reduction of 25 to 40% below 1990 levels by 2020 is required by industrialized ountries to keep open the chance of stabilizing global average temperature between 2.0 and 2.5 degrees C in comparison with pre-industrial levels. This range is controversial as it could be far too high for the survival of some small island nations and a range of ecosystems (e.g. coral reefs, the Arctic). The Bali Action Plan has, in a sense, left open a space for the US’ level of mbition to be negotiated under the UNFCCC to which it is a party, and noted that the commitment of the United States should be “comparable” with other industrialised countries. This question of comparability is nicely treated in Boucher’s analysis as it is quite clear that current US legislative proposals, while quite ambitious in the longer-term, are far away from the 25 to 40% range currently under negotiation. Europe must therefore engage the US Senate and the three candidates sooner rather than later to begin defining what a comparable effort might be. As Boucher notes, Europe will be in a far stronger position for this negotiation if it is able to complete its own legislative process on its target of 20% below 1990 by 2020 by the end of 2008 under the French Presidency. The level of effort for developing countries. At the negotiation of the Kyoto Protocol it was always foreseen that developing countries would, in the next commitment period, take further actions to reduce emissions. China and India were not forgotten in Kyoto – instead the UNFCCC principle of “taking the lead” was enacted. But now it is quite clear in the current negotiations that developing countries will have to take on “enhanced actions” that are “measurable, reportable and verifiable” to curb their emissions in the next phase. Currently under discussion are sectoral commitments and policies and measures. The post-2012 agreement will need to provide incentives for the major economies to be ambitious, including expanded access to carbon finance and clean technology. Europe has prioritised climate and energy security in its bilateral relationships with key developing countries – for example during the visit to China in April 2008 by President Barroso and his Commissioners. It should encourage the United States to follow suit. Ensuring that the next US President approaches China from a perspective of interdependence rather than competition should be a top priority for Europe. Technology Innovation and Cooperation The Copenhagen Agreement in 2009 should include new mechanisms to develop, deploy and transfer technologies. This is an essential element of the Global Deal in order to bring large developing countries on board – and is linked to the issue of carbon markets and finance. Low carbon technologies are a global public good, and finding ways of deploying them rapidly in emerging economies will be crucial to solving the climate crisis. While the current Lieberman/Warner bill does currently allow use of auction revenue to fund adaptation and deforestation reduction, it does not include any financing for technology cooperation with developing countries. Europe is also weak on this point, with only Germany using current auction revenue for international climate action and no countries championing this approach under the next phase of the European Emissions Trading System. It will not be possible to get a deal in Copenhagen if these issues are not sorted out early on. Trade Protectionism Recently, voices on both sides of the Atlantic have increasingly started to call for the use of trade sanctions as a tool to protect energy-intensive industries and/or workers. There is still however a distinct difference in approach. While Europe is waiting to see the outcome of the Copenhagen negotiations before implementing any protective measures for energy-intensive industries, the Lieberman/Warner bill poses a more explicit threat to emerging economies (i.e. China). The bill sets out that these countries should take on a national cap by a certain date or accept an emissions permit levy on energy-intensive exports to the US. This provision ignores the responsibility of the US and other developed countries to cut their emissions further and faster than developing countries. It would antagonise developing countries, make it harder to get a deal at Copenhagen and help only a handful of industries (energy intensive goods account for just 3% of US imports from China). Far more effective would be for Europe to continue its more positive engagement with China to bring together the world’s largest single market with the world’s most dynamic economy in the pursuit of a combined transition to a low carbon economy. For example, next year the European Commission should decide to remove high tariffs on Chinese compact fluorescent lightbulbs so that European consumers can purchase cheap low carbon goods, and Chinese producers can see the benefit of producing them. Really making such low carbon markets function would create massive first-mover benefits for both economies, and would signal the way forward for a more positive and proactive engagement from US business interests. The recent Chatham House / E3G paper, Changing Climates – Interdependencies on Energy and Climate Security for China and Europe develops the case for constructive engagement with China. Conclusion Stephen Boucher is right to note that whoever becomes President offers Europe, and the world, a new opportunity to tackle climate change in a serious manner. To capitalise on this, Europe has until the end of 2008 to gets its own house in order, and must also already be engaging now with the candidates to underline the importance of climate change as a core foreign policy issues. The opportunity exists to bring the US national legislative process together with the UNFCCC negotiations in a way that did not exist during the Kyoto negotiations. With a bit of strategic thinking, good analysis and strong diplomacy, Europe could make the most of this opportunity. About the Author Jennifer L Morgan is Director, Climate and Energy Security for E3G, Third Generation Environmentalism. An American citizen, Jennifer is based in Berlin for E3G, from where she previously led the climate change programme of WWF International. In 2007 Jennifer advised the German government on climate change issues during its G8 and EU Presidencies, and she is a prominent NGO spokesperson in the UN negotiations. Climate and Energy Security - News & Comment, Climate and Energy Security - Thinking 2008-05-20T13:00:01+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/index.php/programmes/climate-articles/invitation-climate-change-and-security-the-geopolitics-of-tomorrow/ http://www.e3g.org/index.php/programmes/climate-articles/invitation-climate-change-and-security-the-geopolitics-of-tomorrow/#When:10:37:00Z The reality of climate change will require fundamental changes to the practice of international relations. Impacting on strategic interests, alliances, borders, threats, economic relationships, comparative advantages and the nature of international cooperation, climate change geopolitics will extend far outside the environment sphere, and will link old problems in new ways. Managing the complexity of collective security will become an ever more important part of foreign policy. Climate Change and Security: The geopolitics of tomorrow The Centre and E3G invite you to a discussion on the security implications of climate change. Tuesday 20 May from 13:00 to 14:30 with a sandwich lunch served from 12:30 to 13:00 With: Nick Mabey (Chief Executive, E3G) and Steven Everts (Special Counsellor in the Cabinet of High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana), Chaired by Martin Porter Security sector actors must communicate the security implications and costs of uncontrolled and extreme climate change to political leaders and the public. The security sector has the vital - and expensively acquired - experience of how government can drive technological development and infrastructure deployment at scale. Climate change is also a security opportunity. A low-carbon global economy will be a far more energy-secure economy, as clean local energy sources lower rising geopolitical tensions over fossil fuel reserves. Nick Mabey is the author of Delivering Climate Security: International Security Responses to a Climate Changed World, published in April 2008 by the Royal United Services Institute. This will be the first of a series of events at The Centre on the Climate Security theme. Details of following events will be publicised soon. To register, please send an email with ‘Climate Change and Security’ in the subject field and stating clearly your name and organisation to . The Centre Avenue Marnix 22 B-1000 Brussels Climate and Energy Security - Activities 2008-05-08T10:37:00+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/index.php/programmes/climate-articles/new-frameworks-for-delivering-global-climate-and-energy-security/ http://www.e3g.org/index.php/programmes/climate-articles/new-frameworks-for-delivering-global-climate-and-energy-security/#When:20:00:00Z Until very recently Climate Protection and Energy Security have been viewed as largely contradictory or separate objectives. This week saw the Athens Summit on Climate Change and Energy Security strive to overthrow this zero-sum mentality. E3G Chief Executive Nick Mabey has been a member of the advisory board planning the summit, and also contributed a major presentation for the session “The Environment and Energy Communities Meet: Finding Common Ground for Energy and Climate Security”. Nick’s presentation “Beyond Zero Sum Politics: New Frameworks for delivering Global Climate and Energy Security” is attached here in pdf format for download. It outlines the need for closer cooperation between major energy consumers to secure energy and climate security; giving an agenda for collaboration to underpin and strengthen the UN climate change negotiations. Commenting on the unprecedented nature of the summit, Nick Mabey said: We need to create more coherence between energy and climate change policies. The fact that the Athens Summit has brought together the energy security and climate change communities for the first time at a major event shows how far we have to go in developing a common vision of a clean and secure energy future”. Mainstream energy analysts are still predicting rapid growth in the use of oil and gas in the coming decades, and predicting increasing tensions over dwindling resources concentrated in a few unstable regions of the world. But the logic of climate change requires concerted efforts to dramatically limit demand and expand low carbon, domestic energy sources which will provide a more secure energy future. The cooperation needed between major energy consumers to accelerate the innovation and use of new clean technologies could also be the cornerstone of cooperation on traditional energy security issues such as managing stability in producing countries and ensuring transparency of fossil fuel reserves and revenues. This would radically alter how we perceive and pursue ‘national interests’ in respect to energy security, with a movement away from the narrow focus of today’s state-led approaches, added Nick Mabey: In the battle against climate change our most important relationships around energy will be with major consumers, and relationships with fossil fuel producing countries will become relatively less important.” Climate and Energy Security - Thinking 2008-05-07T20:00:00+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/index.php/programmes/climate-articles/delivering-climate-security-nick-mabey-interview/ http://www.e3g.org/index.php/programmes/climate-articles/delivering-climate-security-nick-mabey-interview/#When:16:02:01Z Following on from the publication of Nick Mabey’s report ‘Delivering Climate Security’, BusinessGreen.com have interviewed Nick on the topic, including discussion of the implications for business. The full interview follows below: “Climate Change represents an existential threat” Former senior advisor to the UK Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit, Nick Mabey, warns that governments and businesses must begin to frame climate change as a global security issue James Murray, BusinessGreen, 07 May 2008 BusinessGreen.com: You recently wrote a report for the Royal United Services Institute warning that unless climate change is brought under control we could see a century long conflict on a scale of the two World Wars. What basis do you have for such a shocking prediction? Nick Mabey: The prediction is based directly on the Stern Report, although it is worth noting that Stern has said recently that he underestimated scale of the problem in that report. If you take Stern and the IPCC’s projections – that if we don’t control emissions then an increase in temperature of between five and six degrees by the end of the century and the triggering of irreversible carbon feedbacks are both possible – then that means areas that are home to hundreds of millions, if not billions, of people will become uninhabitable. In a perfect world, we’d realise the Earth is big enough to successfully relocate those people and we’d cope, but conflict analysis tells you that managing that level of disruption will result in major conflicts. But aren’t predictions of five to six degree increases in temperature based on worst case scenarios? Well, if you take the science seriously you have to accept the worst case scenarios as possible, and the role of security analysts is to always plan for those worst case scenarios. If those predictions come to pass than then World War scale conflicts are entirely realistic. The 9/11 committee in the US famously said that the security flaws in the lead up to the attacks were down to a “failure of imagination”; we are now seeing a same failure of imagination across the security sector with regards to climate change. So what can be done? The question for the UK defence sector is how do we secure the safety and interests of 60 million British citizens and 450 million Europeans in the light of climate change threats, and the answer is that you just can’t do it, or at least not in the style to which we’ve all become accustomed. The simple fact is we have to curb climate change and the security sector needs to accept that this is a security issue. Climate change is not just an issue for economists and environmentalists, it threatens the underlying social and economic conditions of every part of our society and that makes it a security issue. Climate change represents what security analysts refer to as an existential threat. It will disrupt everything. Trade, for example, will collapse, and to an extent we are already seeing that happen with recent food shortages. You only need a very small breakdown between supply and demand, and you are already seeing riots in places such as Haiti. Why do you think the issue of climate change has not been more widely regarded as a security threat? The environmentalists and economists are very bad at discussing these issues. Environmentalists don’t want to be portrayed as scaremongers and economists always assume that contracts are honoured, which makes them hard to model worst case scenarios. In contrast, security analysts start with the assumption contracts and treaties will be broken – that is why a lot of the climate change modelling work that is now so high profile started in the security sector. How do you see these conflict risks manifesting themselves? There are a lot of different avenues that can be explored when you start to look for direct impacts. Africa obviously faces huge climate change threats, as does Central Asia. We are already seeing low level insurgencies in northern China and northern India that are directly linked to climate-related land and resource issues. The most likely hot spots are places where the political situation amplifies the climate situation. There is an assumption that adaptation to social systems will be able to counter the worst climate change effects – that in effect we will all behave like Sweden and learn to get along. But what people struggle to accept is that in a lot of places climate change will instead drive old enmities. That is what has happened in Darfur where people are realising that the core issue behind the conflict is drought, land and resources, all of which have been used to spark old political grievances. What other areas do you see being at risk? Small island states in the Caribbean and Pacific also face serious risks. If we see an increase in the incidence of tropical storms that leaves those economies having to rebuild once every few years instead of once a decade then that becomes a huge drain on GDP. The second biggest indicator of future conflict after the existence of past conflict is falling GDP and that is what many of these countries are likely to face. Again, we are already seeing this happen where large populations of urban poor and rising food and fuel prices result in falling real GDP and serious unrest. What can businesses do to help mitigate these risks? The most urgent thing that they can do is assess what contribution they can make to tackle climate change. Although, internally they also need to look carefully at what these risks mean for their own operations. In particular, they need to look much more seriously at the long term climate and security risks present in the countries they decide to invest in. They should be asking how the country will be affected by climate change and resource scarcity and they have to be aware that expropriation of businesses by governments will only become more likely as resources become constrained. The politics of insecurity invariably sees governments attempt to exert greater control over the market, and nationalisation of businesses and resources will become increasingly likely under these scenarios. Are firms doing this level of risk assessment? Big multinationals undertake this type of scenario planning, but there is certainly a greater focus on it now than there has been in the past – in no small part because investors are demanding that it is done. The bottom line is that unless firms do this analysis properly they will end up making very bad investment decisions. Firms can reduce their exposure to some of the risks you have outlined, but more generally what can they do to help ensure these worst case scenarios are not realised? Businesses are going to have to take a more positive – or perhaps that should be less risk averse – approach to IP [intellectual property] sharing and government environmental policies. A lot of businesses still take a narrow short term view about environmental legislation and that will prove hugely damaging unless it is challenged and business leaders begin to understand a more co-operative approach is required. There will also have to be an acceptance that tackling climate change will be hugely disruptive and will require change in a lot of industries. Some industries will lose out, but others will benefit hugely. As a rule of thumb business models that are built on intelligence and design will be well positioned, while those relying on intense use of resources will face problems.  Climate and Energy Security - News & Comment 2008-05-07T16:02:01+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/index.php/programmes/climate-articles/invitation-eu-india-a-new-partnership-on-climate-change/ http://www.e3g.org/index.php/programmes/climate-articles/invitation-eu-india-a-new-partnership-on-climate-change/#When:16:34:00Z The climate debate between Europe and India is stuck, with official positions limited by how far governments are willing to go in light of UNFCCC negotiations. Both the EU and India are falling far short of their potential. If we are to respond to the climate challenge effectively, fresh thinking is urgently needed. We are pleased to announce the first in a series of seminars in India and Europe, designed to ask hard questions of why the partnership is not working and what needs to be done to reinvigorate it. Across the EU and India new voices are emerging in response to the perceived failure of governments to deliver on climate change. This seminar series will bring many of them together to build new coalitions for action and work with governments to move official positions on. The series will culminate with a set of recommendations feeding into the EU-India Summit in Marseille on 29 Sept 2008. ‘EU-India: Towards a new partnership on climate change’ Tuesday 6 May 2008 from 11:00 am to 1:00 pm Speakers: Ms Malini Mehra, Founder & Chief Executive, Centre for Social Markets (India) Mr Matthew Findlay, Global Deal Programme Leader, E3G Mr M. K. Lokesh, Deputy Head of Mission, Indian Embassy Mr Robert Donkers, Environment Counsellor, European Commission Delegation to India Chaired by Martin Porter, Managing Director of The Centre Venue: The Centre, Avenue Marnix 22, B-1000 Brussels To register, please send an email with “EU-India climate partnership” in the subject field and stating clearly your name and organisation to .  Climate and Energy Security - Activities 2008-04-30T16:34:00+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/index.php/programmes/climate-articles/creating-a-secure-climate-the-g8-leadership-challenge/ http://www.e3g.org/index.php/programmes/climate-articles/creating-a-secure-climate-the-g8-leadership-challenge/#When:12:50:00Z Climate change will be at the top of the agenda when leaders of the world’s major economies gather in Japan for the G8 Summit in July. The science is clear on the need for an ambitious and rapid response. Almost all heads of government now have a basic understanding that without climate security they will be unable to meet their economic or development goals. This makes reducing global greenhouse emissions a vital national interest and a core issue for international diplomacy. So writes E3G’s Jennifer Morgan, in a comment article published in the May 2008 edition of The World Today - the monthly magazine of Chatham House. A pdf version of the article is attached for download. Creating a secure climate BY 2050, THE WORLD WILL NEED to cut its emissions dramatically, to at least half of 1990 levels. The challenge is to agree how this will be shared between countries and create the political conditions for national leaders to sign up to a global climate deal. The starting point for the negotiations is the 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and its subsequent Kyoto Protocol, agreed five years later. Kyoto set emission reduction targets for developed countries up to 2012 and created the carbon market which includes the Clean Development Mechanism to finance complementary action in developing nations. Although the Protocol was rejected by President George Bush’s administration, it was ratified by enough countries to enter into force in 2005. With the exception of Canada, all Kyoto ratifiers are likely to meet their targets through domestic action or by purchasing carbon credits. Kyoto should be the basis for the post-2012 agreement as it contains many of the key elements required for a comprehensive deal. DANGEROUS LEVELS The aim is to reach an ambitious global climate deal at the UN climate change conference in Copenhagen in December next year. It should set the world on a path to keep the global average temperature rise below two degrees in relation to pre-industrial levels. This is a tight but important deadline, intended to maintain confidence in the growing carbon market and drive the rapid changes required in government policy and investment decisions. Climate change is already approaching dangerous levels. To avoid passing potentially catastrophic tipping points, global emissions must peak and decline within the next ten to fifteen years. That means making the right technology and infrastructure investments today that will lock in global emissions levels for decades to come. The global deal must include a new technology cooperation and innovation mechanism that makes the transition to a low carbon economy possible throughout the world. To put this into perspective, global greenhouse gas emissions are on a path to reach sixty gigatons a year by 2030. The challenge is to switch to low-carbon development that saves at least thirty gigatons per year by 2030 and does so in an equitable fashion across major economies that have fundamentally different starting points. Analysis by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and others suggests that around eighty percent of the necessary savings – twenty-five gigatons – can be achieved with existing technologies. Many of these could be introduced at minimal cost, including measures to improve energy efficiency in key sectors – power, industry, buildings and transport. Others will require some form of public support to accelerate their adoption, including renewable energy sources such wind and solar. It is also vital to reduce emissions from coal through large-scale carbon capture and storage technology. LEADERSHIP STARTS AT HOME At the heart of the post-2012 deal must be ambitious, absolute mandatory caps on emissions by developed countries so they are twenty-five to forty percent below 1990 levels by 2020. The G8 summit should endorse this range; in Bali it was accepted by all G8 countries except the US. Without this it will be immensely difficult to get developing countries such as China and India to commit to something that has never been done before – rapid economic development combined with radical decarbonisation. For developed-country commitments to be taken seriously, they must be backed up by concrete laws and domestic measures that demonstrate the transition to a low carbon economy has begun. Nowhere is this more important than in Europe, which will be debating its own low carbon plan at a key stage in the international negotiations. The European climate package must be finalised by the end of the year. Through this climate package, it must be clear to the world that Europe will not build any more coal-fired power plants, unless they are designed for carbon capture and storage; that big improvements in energy efficiency are reducing demand; that renewable supplies are becoming mainstream; and that the emissions trading system will have permit auctioning at its core, with the auction revenue earmarked to support developing countries’ adoption of clean technologies and adaptation to climate change. In parallel, Europe should be encouraging the production and trade of low carbon goods. Next year the European Commission should remove high tariffs on Chinese compact fluorescent light-bulbs so that European consumers can purchase them cheaply and Chinese firms can see the benefit of producing such goods. ENGAGING THE UNITED STATES All eyes will of course be on the new President of the United States as he or she takes office in January. How the US re-engages with the world on climate change will have a defining impact on the outcome of Copenhagen. On the one hand, the signs are good. The leading candidates have set out fundamentally different positions from the Bush administration, including support for mandatory caps on US emissions and national regulations for efficiency and renewables. On the other, the US economy is in bad shape and politicians are deeply troubled about the loss of jobs and competitiveness to China and other emerging economies. The next president needs to understand that a strong multilateral position on climate change is vital to support the country’s re-emergence as a popular and positive international force. Without this level of priority the issue will not get the attention it needs in the first hundred days of the new administration. Europe should engage now with the presidential candidates to underline this message and stress the need for a special envoy for climate change at the next major meeting in Poznan in November. FAIR DEAL FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIESBig developing countries such as China and India need to commit to ambitious action in return for increased technological and financial assistance. This is perhaps the most difficult challenge for Copenhagen and will rest heavily on the level of confidence built between the key players in the coming eighteen months. China is especially important: by some estimates it is now the world’s largest emitter and there is no realistic chance of the US ratifying a global climate deal without meaningful Chinese participation. Beijing is taking important steps in the right direction, including its ambitious drive to raise energy efficiency by twenty percent between 2005 and 2010. However it will only sign-up to additional commitments as part of a global deal if it is confident they are consistent with its wider economic growth goals. Developing countries emphasise that, on a per capita basis, their emissions remain well below those of the developed world. The average American emits six times more carbon than the average Chinese and thirteen times more than the average Indian. Since the US and Europe have been industrial economies for longer, the historical inequity is even greater. At the same time, the costs of climate change fall disproportionately on poor people in the developing world. This perceived lack of fairness is at the heart of the global deal negotiations and could easily derail them. With time against us, we need to rise above these arguments and recognise the problem for what it is – a threat to our collective security. Technical solutions are available and the economic case for investing in them is understood. The issue is how we distribute the short-term costs of the transition to a low-carbon economy and overcome the political obstacles; including powerful vested interests. The G8 summit will be an important test. Climate and Energy Security - News & Comment, Climate and Energy Security - Thinking 2008-04-29T12:50:00+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/index.php/programmes/climate-articles/invitation-towards-a-global-deal-on-climate-latest-views-from-the-eu-china-/ http://www.e3g.org/index.php/programmes/climate-articles/invitation-towards-a-global-deal-on-climate-latest-views-from-the-eu-china-/#When:10:07:00Z The last few months have seen mounting activity on the climate talks culminating in interesting positions emerging at Bangkok. The US, EU and emerging powers continue to be in the centre of the frame with bilateral and multilateral diplomacy stepping up several gears. Where are the talks going and what are the prospects for elements of a deal emerging in the coming months? Come and join us for some expert views from observers close to the issues - and bring your own insights and opinions. Towards a Global Deal on Climate? Latest views from the EU, China & India Monday 28 April 2008, 12:00pm - 2:00pm, Chatham House, St James’ Square, London As part of their series ’From Bali to Copenhagen – The Climate Briefings’, Chatham House, CSM, E3G and Chinadialogue invite you to a discussion on ’Global deal on climate? Latest views from EU, China & India’ with: Nick Mabey, Co-Founder & Chief Executive, E3G (UK) Ma Jun, Director, Institute of Public & Environmental Affairs (China) Malini Mehra, Founder & Chief Executive, Centre for Social Markets (India) Chaired by Isabel Hilton, Editor, Chinadialogue To register, please send an email with “Global Deal – Chatham House” in the subject field and stating clearly your name and organisation to . Climate and Energy Security - Activities 2008-04-23T10:07:00+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/index.php/programmes/climate-articles/climate-change-and-the-future-john-ashton-tv-interview/ http://www.e3g.org/index.php/programmes/climate-articles/climate-change-and-the-future-john-ashton-tv-interview/#When:10:43:00Z E3G Founding Director John Ashton has been interviewed by British Satellite News in his role as Special Representative for Climate Change at the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office. The interview focussed on the security implications of climate change and the continuing need to change from high carbon to low carbon economies. The video is hosted on the blip.tv site, and is also embedded here below. Climate and Energy Security - News & Comment 2008-04-16T10:43:00+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/index.php/programmes/climate-articles/climate-elements-of-an-ambitious-agreement-in-copenhagen/ http://www.e3g.org/index.php/programmes/climate-articles/climate-elements-of-an-ambitious-agreement-in-copenhagen/#When:20:26:01Z The Danish newspaper Politiken has published an international comment article written by E3G’s Jennifer Morgan on the necessary elements of an ambitious Copenhagen agreement. The text in Danish is available here from the E3G website. Here below follows an English version of the text, which is also attached for download in pdf format. Climate: Elements of an ambitious agreement in Copenhagen Jennifer L Morgan In Bali the world decided to embark on an unprecedented road – negotiate an immensely complex and vital issue to the economy and the planet – in just two years, during which the United States, Russia, Germany, India and many other key countries will have national elections.  While at first sight this might seem naïve or a bit crazy, it is clear that there is no choice. The science of climate change is telling us that the urgency of the problem requires an unprecedented, ambitious and rapid response. Gone are the days when a new IPCC report would be released without any attention. Almost all Heads of State now have a basic understanding that without climate security they will be unable to meet economic or development goals. This makes climate change an issue of national security interest, one that moves up the list from a “nice to do environmental agreement” to an “essential to our national interests agreement.” In the end the agreements struck in Copenhagen must reflect a fundamental shift in the politics of climate change, both domestically and internationally. This shift should be represented in an agreement which says to investors that pouring funds into conventional coal in developed countries must end very soon and in developing countries not too long thereafter. It should be an agreement that says to politicians that they must now get their domestic houses in order to be able to implement such an agreement and manage carbon across the economy. It is an agreement that will say to the public that it is different this time – that they can rest assured for their kids and grandkids, that the politicians and CEOs really get it now, but also that they must remain diligent and ensure the changes occur in practice. This is a high bar for success, but it is one that climate scientists would back up. If global emissions have to peak and decline in the next ten to fifteen years to avoid some quite catastrophic impacts, Copenhagen must not only include the mechanisms to do so such as technology cooperation. It must also be a vehicle that moves countries into a cooperative space on climate change, one that truly responds to our shared dilemma. It is clear that at the core of the agreement is a continuation of many of the elements and commitments of the Kyoto Protocol. The linchpin is ambitious absolute mandatory caps on emissions for developed countries that ensure that these emissions are 25 to 40% below 1990 by 2020. Without this agreement, it will be immensely difficult to get developing countries to sign up to ambitious commitments. If Europe and others do not show it can be done, why should China agree to something that no one has ever done before – rapid economic development while decarbonising the economy? In order for developed country commitments to such a range to be taken seriously they must be backed up by concrete laws and measures at home that demonstrate that the transition to a low carbon economy has begun. Nowhere is this more important than in Europe, which has to live up to its promise to do just this. During the time of the international negotiations, the EU will be debating its own “low carbon plan”. By the end of 2009 it must be clear to the world that Europe will not build any more conventional coal fired power plants, that any emissions trading system will have auctioning at its core, with some of that revenue going towards adaptation and technology transfer, and that renewables are mainstream, backed up by tremendous efficiency to reduce demand.  In parallel, Europe should be encouraging the production and trade of low carbon goods. Next year the Commission should decide to remove the high tariffs on Chinese compact fluourescent lightbulbs so that European consumers can purchase cheap low carbon goods, and Chinese producers can see the benefit of producing such goods. This again moves to shifting the domestic politics in Europe from one of competition to one of collaboration. All eyes of the world will of course be on the new President of the United States as s/he takes office in January 2009. How the United States reengages with the world on climate change will have a defining impact on the level of success of the Copenhagen Summit. On the one hand the signs are good. All three candidates have fundamentally different positions than the Bush Administration. They support mandatory caps on US emissions, national regulations for renewables and efficiency, and recognize that the approach taken by this Administration has been “fundamentally flawed”. On the other hand, the U.S. is going into a recession (if it is not there already), has to decide the future of its engagement in Iraq, and is terribly troubled about loss of jobs and competitiveness – especially in regards to countries like China. Hence, work must be done now to engage the Presidential campaigns to make the point that time is not on our side, that we need a new shadow US delegation at the next major climate meeting in Poznan in November this year, and that climate change must be handled quickly.  More fundamentally, however, the new President of the United States needs to understand that a strong multilateral position and engagement on climate change will begin to re-establish the U.S. as a credible multilateral actor on the global stage on an issue of great importance to most major economies around the world. Without this level of attention, we risk climate change being one of many other issues that will likely not get addressed in the first 100 days of the new Administration. Europe needs to understand this and engage now. Finally, with the support of an innovative and robust technology cooperation and finance package for adaptation and mitigation, large developing countries must also commit to ambitious actions on climate change. Ensuring that these commitments are ambitious will perhaps be the most difficult challenge in Copenhagen. Much will rest on the level of confidence built in the coming year and a half. We have to demonstrate that a transition to a low carbon economy will bring more benefits than costs. and is in the national interest of the rapidly growing economies of the world. An edited version of this article appeared in Danish in the newspaper Politiken, 9th April 2008. Climate and Energy Security - News & Comment 2008-04-09T20:26:01+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/index.php/programmes/climate-articles/klima-elementer-til-ambitis-aftale-i-kbenhavn/ http://www.e3g.org/index.php/programmes/climate-articles/klima-elementer-til-ambitis-aftale-i-kbenhavn/#When:16:14:01Z The Danish newspaper Politiken carries an international comment article written by E3G’s Jennifer Morgan on the necessary elements of an ambitious Copenhagen agreement. The text in Danish follows below and is attached for download in pdf format. Klima. Elementer til ambitiøs aftale i København Jennifer L Morgan Ved klimakonferencen på Bali besluttede verden at slå ind på en helt ny vej – at indgå aftale om et yderst komplekst problem af afgørende betydning for økonomien og kloden. Det skal ske inden valg I USA, Rusland, Tyskland, Indien og en række andre centrale lande. Umiddelbart kan det forekomme som en naiv og nærmest vanvittig målsætning, men ved nærmere eftertanke står det klart, at vi ikke har noget andet valg, og forskning i klimaforandringer fortæller os, at der er tale om et uopsætteligt problem, som kræver en hurtig, ambitiøs og hidtil uset indsats. Næsten alle stats- og regeringschefer har i dag forstået, at uden klimasikkerhed vil de ikke kunne leve op til egne mål for økonomi og udvikling. Dette gør klimaforandringerne til et spørgsmål om national sikkerhed, og fra at være et punkt på dagsordenen, som ‘det ville vært godt at få på plads’, er en miljøaftale nu blevet ‘af afgørende betydning for vores nationale interesser.’ I sidste ende skal den aftale, der forhåbentlig indgås på næste års topmøde i København, afspejle en grundlæggende kursændring i klimapolitikken, bade i de enkelte lande og internationalt. Denne kursændring skal siden udmønte sig i en aftale, som fortæller investorer, at det meget snart er slut med at skyde penge i konventionel kulkraft i de industrialiserede lande og inden længe også er et overstået kapitel i udviklingslandene. Aftalen skal fortælle offentligheden, at denne gang er det anderledes. Folk kan på deres børns og børnebørns vegne være forvisset om, at nu har politikerne og erhvervslederne forstået budskabet, men de skal sikre sig, at der rent faktisk bliver gjort noget ved problemerne. Det er en ambitiøs målestok for succes, men der er nødvendigt, hvis vi skal sikre, at den globale udledning falder i løbet af de næste 10-15 år, og så vi undgår katastrofale konsekvenser. Aftalen i København skal således ikke blot opstille rammer for det teknologiske samarbejde, men også være en motor, der driver de enkelte lande til at forene kræfterne i kampen mod klimaforandringerne – en aftale, der for alvor griber fat om roden på problemet. Det står klart, at kernen i aftalen er en videreførelse af mange af elementerne og forpligtelserne i Kyotoprotokollen. Hjørnestenen er bindene lofter over industrilandenes udledninger, som sikrer, at udslippene i 2020 er reduceret med 25-40 procent i forhold til 1990. Uden denne aftale vil det vaere meget svaert at få udviklingslandene til at skrive under på ambitiøse forpligtelser. Hvis ikke EU og andre vestlige lande går forrest og viser, at det kan lade sig gøre, hvorfor skulle Kina så indlade sig på noget, som ingen nogensinde har gjort før – at skabe hurtig økonomisk udvikling og samtidig begraense udledningen af drivhusgasser? EU skal vedtage love og tage konkrete skridt, der viser, at overgangen til en økonomi med begraenset udledning af drivhusgasser er begyndt. Intet andet sted er dette vigtigere end i Europa, fordi man har lovet at gøre det. Ved udgangen af 2009 skal EU vedtage sin ’energispareplan’, der garanterer, at medlemslandene ikke vil bygge flere konventionelle kulkraftværker, at handel med CO2-kvoter skal foregå via auktion, at en del af indtægterne herfra skal øremærkes tilpasning og overførsel af teknologi, og at der skal satses på vedvarende energikilder og høj energieffektivisering for at begrænse efterspørgslen. Verdens øjne vil naturligvis være rettet mod USA’s nye præsident, når han eller hun overtager posten i januar 2009. På den ene side ser det lovende ud. Alle tre kandidater støtter forpligtende lofter over USA’s udledning, national lovgivning om vedvarende energikilder og effektiv energiudnyttelse og anerkender, at Bushregeringens politik på området ’grundlæggende har slået fejl’. På den anden side er USA hastigt på vej mod en økonomisk afmatning. Regeringen skal tage stilling til den fremtidige indsats i Irak og er plaget af bekymringer om mangel på arbejdspladser og tab af konkurrenceevne, især i forhold til lande som Kina. Udviklingslande som Kina, Sydafrika og Brasilien har vist deres vilje til at indgå aftale om større forpligtelser. Disse forpligtelser vil formentlig ikke være bindene nationale målsætninger, fordi landene befinder sig på et andet udviklingstrin, men de skal være tilstrækkelig ambitiøse til at vende udviklingen i den globale udledning i de næste 10-15 år. Mere vidtrækkende målsætninger for udviklingslandene, kombineret med et større marked for CO2-kvoter og et styrket teknologisk samarbejde, kan danne grundlag for en aftale. Det er dog afgørende, at Europa i løbet af det næste halvandet år styrker tilliden til, at en energibesparende økonomi vil skabe flere fordele end omkostninger og således kun vil være af interesse for verdens hastigt voksende økonomier. Published 9th April 2008 as an International Commentary article by Politiken. Climate and Energy Security - News & Comment 2008-04-09T16:14:01+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/index.php/programmes/climate-articles/eu-china-cooperation-support-for-low-carbon-economic-zones/ http://www.e3g.org/index.php/programmes/climate-articles/eu-china-cooperation-support-for-low-carbon-economic-zones/#When:15:42:01Z Back in November, we launched the ‘Changing Climates’ report [4Mb pdf] we authored alongside Chatham House as part of our joint project on Interdependencies on Energy and Climate Security for China and Europe. Since then, a Chinese version has been launched in Beijing, and interest continues to grow around its innovative proposals. Senior Chinese economist Angang Hu has added his voice to the discussion, supporting key ideas from the report in an article published on the Changing Climates forum of ChinaDialogue. Starting with the view that “The extent to which China and Europe cooperate will be an important factor in determining the success or failure of global attempts to tackle climate change”, he states that There is strong political will in China—from the party and government—to achieve scientific green development and establish a harmonious society. Tackling climate change and achieving energy and climate security are in themselves key aspects of China’s “scientific outlook on development”. As Changing Climates, a report from UK think-tank Chatham House, states: “China’s strategic aspiration towards an innovation-based economy with science-based development – as enunciated at the 17th Party Congress in October 2007 – is in line with the vision for a low-carbon transition. A focus on developing and deploying advanced climate technologies is also consistent with China’s aspiration to move up the global value chain.” ” He then goes on to underline the importance of EU-China cooperation in a number of areas, including the innovative idea of Low Carbon Economic Zones: “Establishing a Low Carbon Special Economic Zone in China. China is in the process of defining specialised functional zones in order to optimise production structures. I believe optimisation of energy consumption is the most crucial factor. The Low Carbon Special Economic Zone should not be limited to attracting investment on research and high-end production. It should also have an optimal energy consumption structure and conserve energy. The Low Carbon Special Economic Zone could be implemented in one of the current functional zones. It would be required to meet strict environmental standards. The zone could become a powerful model for the promotion of energy conservation and emissions reductions across China.” Angang Hu is professor of Public Policy & Management at Tsinghua University and director of the influential policy think tank, the Center for China Studies, Chinese Academy of Sciences/Tsinghua University. He did his post-doctoral research at Yale University and was a visiting professor at Harvard University and Keio University, Japan. Climate and Energy Security - News & Comment 2008-03-26T15:42:01+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/index.php/programmes/climate-articles/eu-china-interdependencies-praise-for-low-carbon-proposals/ http://www.e3g.org/index.php/programmes/climate-articles/eu-china-interdependencies-praise-for-low-carbon-proposals/#When:16:04:00Z The 28th February saw the Beijing launch of the ‘Changing Climates’ report from the EU-China Interdependencies project of which E3G is a member. Since then, interest has continued to grow in the specific proposals put forward. The journal Chemistry World has reported on the proposals, and includes quotes from our Chinese partner institutions: Pan Jiahua of CASS, a senior advisor to the Chinese government on climate policy, welcomes the report, saying that low-carbon economic zones and joint research and development (R&D) can help solve the high-cost problems faced by developing nations in the transfer of climate-friendly technologies. Jiang Kejun of the Energy Research Institute in Beijing, an author of part of the Chatham House report, points out that intellectual property right (IPR) issue poses a barrier to technology transfer from EU to China. ‘It is unrealistic to expect EU automobile companies to endow their technologies without reasonable charges,’ Jiang told Chemistry World. ‘But joint R&D between China and EU, both on public and commercial levels, towards the next generation of electric or hydrogen-powered vehicles can help the two sides overcome the IPR challenge from the beginning.’ Pan adds that for the chemical industry, cooperation between EU and China can create significant business opportunities. The industry could benefit both from its own energy efficiency improvements, he says, and by supplying the products used to improve other sectors’ energy efficiency - such as the catalysts and membranes used in clean coal technology. Climate and Energy Security - News & Comment 2008-03-11T16:04:00+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/index.php/programmes/climate-articles/with-optimism-jennifer-morgans-proactive-approach-to-international-climate/ http://www.e3g.org/index.php/programmes/climate-articles/with-optimism-jennifer-morgans-proactive-approach-to-international-climate/#When:16:13:00Z Jennifer Morgan’s contribution to the international climate negotiations is featured in the March 2008 edition of Eco@work Magazine, published by the Berlin-based Öko-Institute. The short portrait (in German) outlines the proactive work by Jennifer Morgan at the international climate negotiations. It explores her approach to building strategic coalitions between advisers of heads of state, who usually do not tend to cooperate much. This enables her to prepare adequate political climate solutions and feed them into the policy discussions. Jennifer Morgan Eco@work portrait Jennifer is also quoted, saying: We need to make countries see all the benefits that arise from global climate cooperation rather than remain focussed on international competition. It is scary how little time is left to make a difference to the global climate – we will need our optimism.” Climate and Energy Security - Activities 2008-03-03T16:13:00+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/index.php/programmes/climate-articles/eu-china-interdependencies-beijing-report-launch/ http://www.e3g.org/index.php/programmes/climate-articles/eu-china-interdependencies-beijing-report-launch/#When:16:39:05Z The Chinese version [2Mb pdf] of the E3G-Chatham House report, Changing Climates: Interdependencies on Energy and Climate Security for China and Europe, is launched today in Beijing. The report shows how China and the European Union (EU) must work together strategically to drive a global low carbon economy, and how collaboration between them has the potential to deliver economic, as well as environmental, benefits to both regions. The report is being presented to an audience of Chinese officials, business leaders and NGOs in Beijing, China, on Thursday 28 February 2008. Bernice Lee, Head of Chatham House’s Energy, Environment and Development Programme and co-author of the report said: Changing Climates is about the opportunities presented by the twin challenges of securing energy supply and addressing climate change. Our research identified pathways for strategic collaboration between China and the EU that will not only help both achieve their own targets but also unlock the potential of a low carbon economy.” The pathways for change cover three broad areas: energy efficiency, energy generation, and markets and investment. Overwhelmingly the report concluded that by playing a proactive role in the transition to a low carbon economy China could achieve its strategic aspiration to become an innovation-based economy, secure market access and opportunity and deliver its own energy needs. Three examples demonstrate the powerful transformative role China and the EU could play if they worked together. Markets for low-carbon energy products are likely to be worth at least $500bn per year by 2050. China’s clear advantage in manufacturing has an opportunity to develop that advantage in low-carbon products such as energy efficiency lightbulbs. The EU - China’s largest trading partner - presents a ready and needy market for such low carbon products to meet its own energy efficiency targets. Experience shows that by defining shared standards for key products China and the EU could use their bilateral trade relationship to effectively set the global standards for such products. Similarly the creation of a low-carbon free-trade agreement could establish a global precedent for the treatment of climate-friendly technologies which could be extended to other markets. China produces four-fifths of the world’s energy saving light bulbs, with exports worth US$1.5bn in 2006. It is estimated that lifting duties into the EU could help save 23 million tonnes of co2 each year. Chinese coal use is well documented and unique, making up 40% of the world’s coal consumption. China’s plans for increased electricity generating capacity are also well known: 1200GW of new capacity is planned. What is less reported is that the EU also plans new generating capacity of a similar nature: 800-900 GW. Carbon lock in that would be catastrophic in climate change terms could be avoided by ensuring new power stations in China are fitted with the same emissions reduction technology and the same efficiency of generation as their EU counterparts. Reducing energy consumption within Chinese buildings would also bring significant benefits especially as, by 2020, China will probably have built new building stock equal to the entire existing building stock of the EU-15 in 2002. Buildings currently account for nearly 20% of final energy consumption in China. More ambitious standards for new buildings and refurbishing old ones could reduce energy consumption in buildings annually. The report suggests a reduction of 600-700 million metric tonnes in CO2 emissions could be achieved by 2030. About the Project The Interdependencies on Energy and Climate Security for China and Europe Project is an independent initiative of European and Chinese research institutions. The project aims to identify the mutual interests, challenges and opportunities for China and the EU in energy security and climate security over the next 25 years; and to produce high-quality independent analysis on the priorities for future collaboration to meet both regions’ climate and energy security goals. The Steering Committee includes representatives from Chatham House (Royal Institute of International Affairs), E3G (Third Generation Environmentalism), the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), the Chinese Energy Research Institute (ERI), the Institute for Sustainable Development and International Relations (IDDRI) and the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impacts Research (PIK). Climate and Energy Security - Activities, Climate and Energy Security - Thinking 2008-02-26T16:39:05+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/index.php/programmes/climate-articles/eu-commitments-on-climate-strengths-and-weaknesses/ http://www.e3g.org/index.php/programmes/climate-articles/eu-commitments-on-climate-strengths-and-weaknesses/#When:10:51:01Z Europe has been hailed as a leader in the fight against global warming, but are its policies really enough to prevent catastrophe? Jennifer Morgan assesses the EU’s recent policy proposals, in a new article published by ChinaDialogue. To comment on this article, head over to the ChinaDialogue bilingual forum. EU commitments on climate: strengths and weaknesses Jennifer Morgan February 20, 2008 “Responding to the challenge of climate change,” European Commission president, José Manuel Barroso, said last month, “is the ultimate political test for our generation.” He spoke as the European Commission released the specifics of an ambitious set of proposals that were first agreed last year, when European Union heads of state proposed a package of new policies on climate change and energy. The EU decided in March 2007 to unilaterally implement a target of cutting greenhouse gases to 20% below 1990 levels by 2020, and reduce emissions further—to 30% below 1990 levels—if other major economies would also take on ambitious commitments. To back this up, a legally binding target was agreed upon for 20% of Europe’s energy supply to be renewable by 2020, as well as a 20% efficiency target for 2020. Ten to 12 carbon capture and storage demonstration plants were slated to be up and running by 2015. Last month, specifics were also released on the future of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS), which concludes its current phase in 2012. The ETS is a policy approach that sets binding caps on key sectors in the European economy, such as the power industry, allowing companies to sell permits if they can go below their target, for others to buy if they need additional permits. So, how ambitious was the package? Looking at it point-by-point, one finds strengths and weaknesses. The proposal for a revised ETS is one such strong point. If the Commission’s proposal is adopted, the scheme will be greatly improved by expanding the covered sectors to include, for instance, aluminium and ammonia. Another development is that in the first phase, companies were given pollution permits straight away, an approach dubbed “grandfathering.” The new proposal, however, moves away from giving out permits, requiring companies to buy them, a system known as auctioning. This approach will ensure that the polluter actually pays the cost of the environmental damage from the carbon dioxide emitted. It will also generate revenues, some of which will be allocated for climate protection on a member-state level. These revenues could also be allocated for elements of the post-2012 international agreement: adaptation, avoided deforestation or technology transfer, for instance. In these respects, the European market can serve as a model for other countries as they move forward in their own emissions trading debates. The package’s draft Renewable Energy Directive also provides a good basis for future development. By proposing national binding targets, the Commission places renewables at the centre of the low-carbon economy, emphasising their development and reducing costs for the international community. Carbon capture The main weakness of the Commission package, however, is its proposal on carbon capture and storage (CCS).  The capture and storage in geological formations of carbon dioxide from power plants and other installations is often cited as a part of the solution to climate change. The challenge, however, is that this technology has yet to be demonstrated on a large scale. In 2007, the Commission put forward an ambitious plan to tackle global coal use, not only by building 12 large scale demonstration plants using CCS, but also by aiming to make CCS mandatory for all new plants by 2020 and retrofitting all plants built after 2010. This was also aimed at creating the new technology needed to tackle rapidly growing coal emissions in China, India and the US. However, the 2008 proposal signals a retreat by the European Commission from its ambition to make the EU the first advanced economy to decarbonise the power sector. Though much has been made of the EU’s renewable energy package in the media and political circles, over 75% of new power capacity in Europe will come from fossil fuels, even with the 20% renewables target in place. High gas prices and fears over energy dependence on Russia are making coal the new fuel of choice, with 40 major new coal power plants planned to be built in the next five years. This will undermine the EU’s own 2050 emission targets to reduce emissions 60% below 1990 levels. This aspect of the new climate package is a step backward. It fails to provide guaranteed EU funding for the demonstration plants, and may only look at mandatory deployment of CCS as a possible last resort if private sector investment is slow. This has implications for other nations, as some of the demonstrations should occur in countries such as China and India. It is critical to develop a more centrally funded mechanism for these demonstrations if they are to be built in a time-frame relevant to keeping the global average temperature rise below two degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels.  To avoid the devastating impacts associated with that temperature rise, global emissions must peak and decline in the next 10 to 15 years. This is a tremendous challenge, particularly due to the new coal power plants being built around the world. Taking account of the development pathways of countries like China and India, it is crucial that a zero-emissions coal plant is developed and deployed as rapidly as possible. Global negotiations and beyond A number of key elements in the package are linked with the outcome of the international climate negotiations, which were launched at recent UN-led talks in Bali and will conclude in Copenhagen in 2009. These negotiations, the so-called “Bali Action Plan” or “Bali road map”, will cover all core elements of a post-2012 agreement, after the current phase of the Kyoto Protocol expires, including mitigation, adaptation, technology and finance. On the issue of mitigation, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) outlines that developed countries must reduce emissions in the range of 25% to 40% below 1990 by 2020. While the EU strongly supported that range in Bali, its own package only plans for a 20% reduction. Instead of creating a 30% reduction plan upfront, the Commission has created a ratcheting mechanism to change the target according to what is agreed upon internationally. This is one of the weaknesses of the package; it would have been preferable to plan for success in Copenhagen and create implementation legislation of 30% across Europe. The treatment of internationally competitive industries in the ETS is also linked to the international picture; their treatment will be revisited after the conclusion of negotiations in an assessment in 2011, which will take into account any binding sectoral agreements that may be concluded. This links directly to the section of the Bali Action Plan that addresses internationally competitive sectors as well as into the negotiations over “reportable, measurable and verifiable” new actions by developing countries. Many informal proposals now focus on how developing countries could take on sectoral commitments to reduce emissions. This is now formally linked with the evolution of the ETS. The Commission’s ETS proposal allows for some continued use of Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) credits, but limits this until global negotiations are completed. It also excludes land-use, land-use change and forestry crediting, citing its preference to use auction revenue to fund deforestation reductions, rather than linking it directly with emissions trading. These are wise proposals, and indicate the central focus the Commission has placed on both achieving the transition to a low-carbon economy in Europe and post-2012 negotiations.  How the emissions trading and CDM provisions of the Kyoto Protocol and UNFCCC evolve is a core element of the negotiations. Countries will also be expected to contribute new ideas for innovative financing on deforestation, adaptation and mitigation, where the role of auctioning revenue internationally and nationally will play a large role. The ETS provides an excellent forum to test out the international applicability of some of these ideas in the financing realm. The EU has a unique opportunity to show the world how to move to a low-carbon economy while producing new jobs and modernising infrastructure and sectors. Many of these lessons will be essential for emerging economies, such as China, which are willing to act but have few models to follow. The success of the EU will also be key to bringing the United States back into the game in an ambitious fashion. As the next US president becomes known, let’s hope he or she can look to Europe for concrete examples on how to move to tackle climate and energy security together, while growing the economy. Climate and Energy Security - News & Comment 2008-02-20T10:51:01+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/index.php/programmes/climate-articles/climate-change-and-health/ http://www.e3g.org/index.php/programmes/climate-articles/climate-change-and-health/#When:08:50:01Z The Royal College of Physicians hosted a major conference on the theme of ’Climate change and its impact on health’ on the 29th January 2008. E3G Founding Director Tom Burke gave the opening speech, which is follows below. It is also attached here for download as a pdf, as is the event agenda. Climate Change and Health Address to the Royal College of Physicians by Tom Burke CBE London, January 29th 2008 Thank you very much for inviting me to speak to you today. It is often said that climate change is the most serious problem facing humanity in the 21st Century. This is not an exaggeration as I and the other speakers will be making clear during the course of today. My task this morning is simply to set the scene, to layout the landscape of how climate change and health interact and to say something about the role the medical professions might play in helping the world tackle this problem. Climate change conferences are occurring with increasing frequency at the moment but I think this one is particularly important for a number of reasons. Perhaps most significantly because its focus is on what a rapidly changing climate means for human beings. You could be forgiven watching recent media coverage of this issue for thinking that climate change was really bad for polar bears but was not yet something that should concern most of us very much. All too often the language we use and the effects we highlight make this issue sound remote from the everyday concerns of most people. The public is largely unaware that climate change is already having some damaging effects on human health and that we are seeing today only the very earliest signs of what is to come. Furthermore, investing the authority of this distinguished institution in articulating the link between climate change and the daily lives of ordinary people sends a powerful signal to politicians and public alike. The medical professions have, in some ways, an unenviable task in human affairs. All too often, it is to you that we turn first to deal with the human consequences of policy failure. It is to you that we look to repair the damages of our ignorance and lack of foresight or self-discipline both as individuals and as a society. The consequences of policy failure on climate change will fall very immediately on the medical professions and they will be on a scale unlike anything humanity has seen before. What is at stake is not just the health of very large numbers of human beings, but, potentially in many parts of the world, the integrity and capability of the whole infrastructure that supports health. The medical professions also have something few other actors in this debate possess in such measure – public trust. Success in tackling this problem is going to require a mobilisation of human effort and resources of an unparalleled magnitude. The addition of your trusted voice to that mobilisation effort adds to our chances of success. So, I was particularly pleased to see you have a session this afternoon devoted specifically to addressing that question. The scale of the challenge Climate change is a bad problem that is getting worse. For the moment, it remains a manageable problem. But it is now clear that within the next few decades it will become an unmanageable problem unless we act decisively. There is a very broad and deep consensus within both the scientific and policy making communities about the science of climate change. It is now accepted everywhere that human activities are changing the climate and at an unprecedented speed. You will be hearing later in much more detail about the science of climate change, so all I will do at the moment is pick out some of the key numbers that illustrate the nature of the challenge we face. Europe’s political leaders have been clear that a 20C rise above pre-industrial levels in global average temperature is the threshold of dangerous climate change. Jim Hansen, the climate scientist who has done most to alert the world to the dangers of climate change, and who you will be hearing from later, thinks that even this may be too high. We have already observed a 0.70C rise since the beginning of the 20th Century. Such is the nature of the climate system that even if we were to halt all further emissions of greenhouse gases today, we would see another 0.70C before temperatures stabilised. You do not need to be a better mathematician than I am to agree that 1.40C is awfully close to 20C. To be very confident of staying below this threshold – as Nick Stern pointed out in his landmark report – we need to keep the concentration of greenhouse gases to between 450 and 550 parts per million (ppm) carbon dioxide equivalent. That is the measured carbon dioxide plus the effect of all the other gases we are adding to the atmosphere expressed as their carbon dioxide equivalent. At the lower end of that range our best estimate currently is that we would have only an evens chance of staying below 20C. At the upper end, the odds would be about 5 to 1 against staying below 20C. The concentration is now 425 ppm and rising at more than 2ppm every year. Why climate change is different There are three ways in which climate change is different from any other problem that humanity has ever faced. The first is the sheer scale of the problem. Climate change threatens to undermine the prosperity, security and well being of literally every single one of the six and a half billion people on the planet. No other problem does this. Millions of us are threatened daily by crime and conflict, but millions more lead lives of peaceful security. Many more of us lead poorly educated lives of unhealthy poverty but millions of others lead lives of well educated, healthy affluence. No-one will escape the consequences of a rapidly changing climate. Second is the urgency. To have any chance of avoiding dangerous climate change total global carbon emissions have to peak within a decade and then decline rapidly. And they have to do this while meeting the rapidly expanding need for energy to fuel economic development. No-one will trade-off energy security for climate security so we must achieve both together. Because agriculture, deforestation and land-use changes produce large carbon emissions which are very difficult to control this means, in effect, that we must develop a carbon neutral global energy system by around the middle of the century. This will require transformational changes in energy technologies on a scale that makes the Apollo or Manhattan Projects look unambitious. Third, the nature of the climate system means we cannot afford policy failure. Humanity learns predominantly by trial and error. We make mistakes and then try again and again until we get it right. This often takes a long time. But for most problems the goal remains the same and we can keep moving towards it however erratically. The long life of carbon in the atmosphere and the very large lag between stimulus and response in parts of the earth system mean that climate change is irreversible on human timescales. There is no rewind button. Once a given concentration of greenhouse gases is in the atmosphere we are committed to living with whatever climate it produces. In other words, the goal we can reach changes with time. If our policy efforts fail, we cannot go back and try again for the same goal as it is no longer available. All that remains is the next worst option. The politics of climate change This also changes the politics. Urgency is not the same as immediacy. We successfully fought the Cold War because the Soviets had their tanks on our lawns and their ideas in our factories. So we spent billions of pounds on weapons we hoped never to use and when they became obsolete, we threw them away and bought newer and more expensive weapons we hoped never to use. The threat of climate change to the security, prosperity and well being of Britain’s citizens is a lot more certain than was the danger of the Cold War turning hot. Responding successfully will take an even bigger effort than winning the Cold War but such is the nature of the problem that by the time the tanks are visible it will be too late to respond. Which is why it is so important that people quickly come to understand the impacts of climate change on their health. Health is personal, intimate, immediate. All the things that climate change is not. You will be hearing a lot more of the detail about the interaction between climate change and health later this morning. As research continues and our understanding of the many impacts of climate change on our lives grows, it is becoming clear that the impacts on our health will be among those that are earliest and most widespread. Stressing the stressors There is often a rather sterile debate about whether climate change causes a particular harm to human beings – conflict in sub-Saharan Africa for example. Climate change does not work in such a simple way.  It works by stressing all the other stressors on human well being. Conflict in Darfur has many causes of which climate change, by altering precipitation patterns, is one. The excess deaths in Europe observed during the 2003 heatwave were not caused by climate change alone, but climate change was responsible for making the outcome worse than it might otherwise have been. We are beginning to get a good understanding of some of the direct effects of climate change on infectious disease vectors, on allergies and air quality as well as heat stress. But the indirect effects are less well understood if potentially more significant. Hurricane Katrina gave us all an unforgettable insight into what an increase in the frequency and intensity of extreme weather events might mean in even the most organised of societies. Less noticed in the immediate horror of that event was the long term damage to hospitals and the essential public health infrastructure on which so much of human well being depends. The systemic impacts on health will over time be even more significant. One third of the world’s population currently experiences water stress. Two thirds of China’s cities, that is 400, already suffer water shortages. The glaciers that supply Lima in Peru with water will, at current rates of melting, be gone before the middle of the century. The rapid rise in global food prices last year were partly a consequence of a prolonged drought in some parts of the world and floods elsewhere. Those prices rose 37% globally and that was on top of a 14% rise the year before. In China, both floods and drought played their part in driving food price inflation to 18%. These pressures were exacerbated by the growing demand for grain to convert to ethanol in order to meet energy security anxieties. A warmer world makes dry areas drier and, in much of the world, lowers crop yields. Poor nutrition and a lack of access to water for hygiene and sanitation increases vulnerability to other health stresses. What is clear is that a changing climate will add considerably to the pressures on health services already over-burdened. Katrina is a warning that in the most extreme events they could be completely overwhelmed.  Financial implications and the generational gap A subtler stress will come as pressure grows to find the public funds necessary to finance the response to climate change. We cannot avoid some climate change and will have to pay to adapt to its consequences. This will not be cheap and we will have to pay for it at the same time as we are paying to cut emissions dramatically. The medical professions could well find themselves caught between a rock and a hard place. Climate policy failure could well lead to a squeeze from both ends as demand for health services grows in the face of the impacts of climate change at the same time as governments need to divert funds from healthcare in order to stop climate change becoming even more dangerous. A little while ago I was interviewed for a Channel 4 film on climate change. At the end of the session, the interviewer asked if the situation was really as bad as I was portraying. Without really thinking I said, ‘Don’t be under forty. That’s my advice if we fail to solve this problem.’ Needless to say, that made it into the film. On reflection, I meant exactly what I said. Anyone in Britain under forty today has, thanks to the medical professions, a very good chance of living beyond the middle of the century. By that time, if we have failed to get a grip on this problem, the visible prospect for humanity will be looking very bleak. Getting the politics right Kofi Annan, speaking at a climate meeting in Nairobi shortly before he left office, pointed out that there was a large and growing gap between what the science of climate change was telling us we needed to do and what the politics of climate change seemed capable of delivering. Despite the intense level of climate activity throughout last year, that gap has grown rather than shrunk. Climate change is a problem well within the envelope of our technical and economic competence to solve. The technologies we need are already available or within reach. The policies to deploy them in time to avoid high risk climate change are not yet in place. Not all the available technologies are important – nuclear power, for example, has at best only a limited role to play despite the government’s obsession. Not all of the available policies will make a significant enough difference – we are relying more than we should on the arcane magic of a carbon price. What is needed is very rapid transformational change in the deployment of low carbon energy technologies. This is unlikely to be accomplished by policy measures designed to achieve incremental change. The missing element is simply the political will to do what we know can be done. To paraphrase a saying from the Clinton years, it’s the politics stupid. This is all too easy to say. It is somewhat harder to say how that is to be assembled. This is already, and will become more so, a highly contested area of policy. If you believe in smaller government, less regulation, lower taxes, more personal freedoms and that markets are wiser than governments, you are going to find it hard to come up with a political programme for dealing successfully with climate change. There will be winners and losers in the changes that must be made to take us very rapidly to a low carbon economy. The climate debate is already so loud with the complaints of the few who might lose, that we hear little from the many who would win. In this highly contested cacophony, the trusted voice of the medical professions reminding everyone of the true cost of policy failure on climate change will be central to building that political will. Climate and Energy Security - News & Comment, Climate and Energy Security - Thinking 2008-01-29T08:50:01+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/index.php/programmes/climate-articles/too-chic-to-meter-nuclear-power-in-france/ http://www.e3g.org/index.php/programmes/climate-articles/too-chic-to-meter-nuclear-power-in-france/#When:14:45:02Z Tom Burke explores France’s relationship with nuclear power, in this comment article published in The House Magazine. Too chic to meter? ‘Why can’t we be more like the French?’ is not a cry often heard from British politicians. But such is the capacity of nuclear power to confuse otherwise rational people, that this plea has been heard a lot of late as the energy debate in Britain took off. Ministers have looked across the Channel with bemused envy and wondered, perish the thought, if the French public might not be more sensible than our own. This sentiment reflects a number of misapprehensions. The first is an upshot of the short memory of most politicians. When the French nuclear programme began in the mid-Seventies, it was accompanied by large-scale protests of a rather French kind. Not for France the quiet calm – soon to be abolished here – of a public inquiry. The early days of the French nuclear programme were accompanied by widespread and occasionally violent demonstrations – leading to the death of a protester on at least one occasion. The tide of those demonstrations ebbed as the ten-year burst of nuclear construction ended in the mid-Eighties. Since then the relatively slow build rate of additional reactors has diminished the focus for public concern, but opposition to nuclear power in France remains strong. This became clear during the extraordinary formal dialogue involving politicians, business, NGOs, trades unions and academics that took place during 2007. In his speech last October welcoming the outcome of this process, President Sarkozy promised that France was not going to replace its existing nuclear fleet in its entirety. In future no more than 60 per cent of France’s electricity will be produced from nuclear, well down on the current 85 per cent. Incidentally, the French Grenelle process, named after the town where the first meeting took place, seems a far better model for achieving real political consensus on technically difficult strategic issues than the proposed Independent Planning Commission in this country. Only the politically naïve would believe that this is likely to be independent enough to become anything other than a rubber stamp for pre-ordained government policies. “The government has made much of the apparent shift in British opinion to a view more favourable to nuclear power.” A second misapprehension is that resolving this issue has anything to do with public opinion. The government has made much of the apparent shift in British opinion to a view more favourable to nuclear power. Considering that there has been no serious debate on the issue here for more than 20 years, this is hardly surprising. Whether this apparent shift will hold if a concrete proposal emerges to focus opposition remains to be seen. Again, differences between France and Britain on nuclear issues can be exaggerated. In both countries the decisive conversations take place within tiny, hermetic elites neither open to, nor influenced by, wider engagement. In both, public opinion is something to be quietened by fear, carefully selected facts, authoritative assertion or, if the opportunity occurs, straightforward bribery – a page we have stolen from the French playbook with the recent offer to bribe local authorities that welcomed radioactive waste dumps. Public opinion played no role in the demise of nuclear power in Britain. Nor did the ruling elite abandon their faith. It was brought about entirely by Margaret Thatcher’s decision to privatise the electricity industry. Investors took one look at CEGB books and unanimously said ‘Nuclear power? No thanks’. The economics of nuclear were so bad that it had to remain in public ownership for the privatisation to go ahead. They have not improved since. Nuclear power in France is still in the hands of a state-run industry with inevitably opaque economics. Britain, quite rightly, is a champion of the greater liberalisation of electricity markets within Europe. It would be a delicious irony if success in that endeavour helped to undermine its mistaken faith in a nuclear industry well past its sell-by date.  Climate and Energy Security - News & Comment 2008-01-28T14:45:02+00:00 http://www.e3g.org/index.php/programmes/climate-articles/decoding-nuclear-nonsense-ii-the-real-evidence/ http://www.e3g.org/index.php/programmes/climate-articles/decoding-nuclear-nonsense-ii-the-real-evidence/#When:17:55:00Z This week the UK Government will announce its plans for the future of the Nuclear power industry. In this new reader’s guide, Tom Burke highlights the 5 key claims being made in support of the Government’s position, and sets out the real economic, political and environmental evidence against each one. A pdf version is attached for download. Decoding Nuclear Nonsense II A reader’s guide to the Government’s announcement on the future of nuclear power in Britain. Summary The Government’s case for new nuclear build in Britain rests on two key propositions: that it is essential to maintain Britain’s energy security and that without it Britain cannot meet its climate change emissions. Neither proposition is valid. Nuclear power can do nothing to improve Britain’s energy security or help it meet the urgent challenge of climate change. even if an order were placed today there would be no new nuclear electricity before 2020; the capital cost of nuclear power has tripled in the past three years to $6,000/Kw; the world’s nuclear capacity increased by 2GW in 2007 compared to some 15GW for wind power alone; in the next three years, Britain will spend £2.8 billion/year on cleaning up the nuclear legacy of the past and nothing on deploying carbon capture and storage “The Government is making a ‘difficult long term decision’ to go ahead with nuclear power.” It is doing no such thing. Nothing has prevented, or now prevents, anyone who wished to build a nuclear power station in Britain from doing so. They have not been built because Britain’s privately owned utilities have assessed them as uneconomic. The Government is simply announcing, to no-one’s surprise, that it is in favour of new nuclear power stations in Britain. It is also announcing again that it will help potential investors in new nuclear power stations by reducing planning and regulatory constraints. In due course, Britain’s French- and German-owned utilities will have to make a tough decision about whether to order a capital intensive nuclear power station in the face of highly uncertain electricity and carbon prices. The Government has consistently announced that it will provide no public subsidies to nuclear developers. Many people expect that it will try to find some way to work around this commitment in order to guarantee revenues to the nuclear builders. “Nuclear power is essential for Britain’s energy security” There are three significant threats to Britain’s energy security. The most important is the threat of interruptions to our oil supply. However, essentially all of Britain’s oil is used for transport and cannot be replaced by nuclear electricity. Preventing political instability in the Middle East and reducing our dependence on imported oil by more efficient transport systems are the only ways to improve the security of our oil supplies. Much has been made of the threat of becoming over-dependent on imported gas, particularly from Russia. Unfortunately, half of our gas is used directly for domestic space and water heating and cannot be replaced by electricity. More is used for industrial processes, leaving under a third that is used for electricity generation. Much of that third is used to generate electricity at peak times because gas turbines can be easily switched on and off to meet short term spikes in demand. Nuclear power stations must be run continuously. This considerably limits the role nuclear electricity can play in reducing our dependence on gas, from wherever it is imported. Finally, Ministers have frequently expressed anxiety about the ‘generation gap’ that will emerge as some 20GW of obsolete coal and nuclear capacity is closed between now and 2020. They argue that this would threaten security of electricity supply. If this capacity is not replaced by new nuclear, carbon-intensive gas or coal will have to be used thus damaging the climate. Unfortunately, the Government’s own nuclear consultation admitted that even if an order were placed immediately under its accelerated regulatory procedures, it would be 8 years before construction could start. It also assumed a 5 year construction period – making an optimistic assumption for a wholly new design. The Government has not explained how a nuclear power station that will not be operating before 2021 can help it meet a ‘generation gap’ it expects to appear well before 2020. “Nuclear power is necessary to maintain climate security” New nuclear build in Britain will not help with climate change and will divert capital, and more importantly, scarce skills away from investments in the carbon neutral coal technologies, renewables and energy efficiency that will reduce our carbon footprint faster and more cheaply than nuclear. The Government’s commitment to keeping the eventual rise in global average temperature to below 20C cannot be met unless the world very quickly makes its coal use carbon neutral by deploying carbon capture and storage technologies. The International Energy Agency forecasts 1400GW of new coal fired power stations by 2030. China is building new coal fired plant at the rate of 2GW a week. China also has the world’s most ambitious nuclear power programme. It plans 40 nuclear power stations by 2030. If they are all built they will still only provide 4% of China’s electricity. If we want others to make their coal burning carbon neutral we must do so ourselves. Action speaks louder than words. In the next three years Britain will spend £2.8billion/year on cleaning up the nuclear legacy of the past. We will spend nothing on deploying carbon capture and storage which is the world’s most important technology for ensuring climate security in the future. Given our real, as opposed to our rhetorical, priorities, why would anyone believe that we were serious about carbon capture and storage? “A nuclear renaissance is underway around the globe” But only in the headlines. The build rate for new nuclear power stations around the world has been 1GW/year since 2000. Simply to replace the existing reactors as they become obsolete means building 14GW/year for the next 23 years. There are major constraints to increasing this rate of build. There is a 6 year waiting list for reactor coolant pumps and only 2 places in the world now produce the specialist forgings required for reactor pressure vessels. Engineers, welders and other workers with the specialised skills for nuclear construction are in short supply and experiencing very high demand for more immediately valuable projects. These supply chain pressures have seen a rise from $2,000/Kw to $6,000/Kw in the capital cost of new nuclear power stations in just two years. The much vaunted Finnish reactor, the first of the new generation of reactor designs, is already 2 years late after just 2 years of construction. Construction costs are at least 25% greater than forecast and the whole project is more than £1 billion over budget. “There are problems but they can be overcome by political will.” This is certainly what Gordon Brown thinks. It is also what Margaret Thatcher thought. Shortly after taking office she announced a programme of 10 new reactors. They were to be built to avoid the danger that Britons would find themselves freezing in the dark. 15 years later 1 reactor had been built at 2 times its original cost. She had been defeated by the economics of nuclear power. No-one froze in the dark. Climate and Energy Security - News & Comment, Climate and Energy Security - Thinking 2008-01-07T17:55:00+00:00